Jharkhand High Court
Prakash Munjal Aged About 72 Years vs The State Of Jharkhand on 1 May, 2026
Author: Deepak Roshan
Bench: Deepak Roshan
2026:JHHC:13049
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(C) No. 1510 of 2021
.........
1.Prakash Munjal aged about 72 years
2. Harish Munjal aged about 68 years,
both sons of Late Jiwan Lal Munjal.
3.Ritul Munjal aged about 40 years S/o Harish Munjal
All Residents of Firayalal Compound, Kadru Diversion
Road, Near Railway Over Bridge, Ranchi P.O. and P.S.
Chutia District Ranchi ….. Petitioner(s)
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2.Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand,
Jharkhand Mantralaya, Project Building, P.O. and P.S.
Dhurwa District Ranchi.
3. Home Secretary, Department of Home, Government of
Jharkhand, Jharkhand Mantrayala, Project Building,
P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa District Ranchi.
4. Director General of Police, Government of Jharkhand,
P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa District Ranchi.
5. Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, P.O. G.P.O. P.S.
Kotwali, District Ranchi Jharkhand.
6. Senior Superintendent of Police, Ranchi, Jharkhand
P.O. G.P.O. P.S. Kotwali, District Ranchi Jharkhand.
7. Officer In-Charge Sadar Police Station, P.O G.P.O. and
P.S. Sadar District Ranchi.
9(a) Salo Devi, W/o Late Sanjay Pahan, aged about not
known to the petitioner, R/o Booty, P.O.-G.P.O, P.S.
Sadar, Dist.-Ranchi.
9(b) Asha Kumari, D/o Late Sanjay Pahan, aged about
20 years, R/o Booty, P.O.-G.P.O, P.S. Sadar, Dist.-
Ranchi.
9(c) Misha Kumar, D/o Late Sanjay Pahan, aged about
18 years, R/o Booty, P.O.-G.P.O, P.S. Sadar, Dist.-
Ranchi.
9(d) Usha Kumari, D/o Late Sanjay Pahan, aged about
15 years, R/o Booty, P.O.-G.P.O, P.S. Sadar, Dist.-
Ranchi.
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9(e) Anisha Kumari, D/o Late Sanjay Pahan, aged about
10 years, R/o Booty, P.O.-G.P.O, P.S. Sadar, Dist.-
Ranchi.
9(f) Ansh Pahan, S/o Late Sanjay Pahan, aged about 20
years, R/o Booty, P.O.-G.P.O, P.S. Sadar, Dist.-Ranchi.
….. Respondent(s)
with
W.P.(C) No. 1791 of 2021
………
1. Prakash Munjal, aged about 72 years, S/o Late Jiwan
Lal Jiwan Lal, R/o Firayalal Compound, Kadru Diversion
Road, near Railway Overbridge, Ranchi, P.O and P.S.
Chutia, District -Ranchi (Jharkhand)
2. Harish Munjal, aged about 68 years, S/o Late Jiwan
Lal Jiwan Lal, R/o Firayalal Compound, Kadru Diversion
Road, near Railway Overbridge, Ranchi, P.O and P.S.
Chutia, District-Ranchi (Jharkhand).
3. Ritual Munjal, aged about 40 years, Firayalal
Compound, Kadru Diversion Road, near Railway
Overbridge, Ranchi, P.O and P.S. Chutia, District Ranchi
(Jharkhand) ….. Petitioner(s)
Versus
1.State of Jharkhand through its Secretary, Revenue,
Land Reforms and Registration, officiating from his office
at Project Bhawan, Dhurva, P.O- Dhurva, P.S-
Jagannathpur, Dist-Ranchi.
2. The Presiding Officer-cum-Hon’ble Minister, Revenue,
Registration and Land Reforms Department,
Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, officiating from his
office at Project Bhawan, Dhurva, P.O- Dhurva, P.S-
Jagannathpur, Dist-Ranchi.
3. Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi having his office at O/o
Collectorate Building, near Civil Court, P.O- G.P.O and
P.S- Kotwali, Dist. Ranchi.
4(a). Salo Devi, W/o Late Sanjay Pahan aged about not
known to the petitioner, R/o Booty, P.O. Booty, P.S.
Sadar, District-Ranchi.
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4(b). Asha Kumari, D/o Late Sanjay Pahan aged about
20 years, R/o Booty, P.O. Booty, P.S. Sadar, District-
Ranchi.
4(c). Misha Kumar, D/o Late Sanjay Pahan aged about
18 years, R/o Booty, P.O. Booty, P.S. Sadar, District-
Ranchi. ..... Respondent(s)
.....
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
…….
For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Amar Kumar Sinha, Adv
Mr. Kundan Kr. Ambastha, Adv
Mr. Parth Jalan, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, A.G.
Mr. Piyush Chitresh, AC to A.G.
For the Private Resp. : Mr. Amritansh Vats, Adv
Mr. Shivak A. Pathak, Adv
Mr. Amartya Choudbey, Adv
Mr. Arpan M. Ekka, Advocate
Mr. Ashish Choudhary, Adv
………
C.A.V. ON 13/03/2026 PRONOUNCED ON:01/05/2026
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Both these Writ Petitions involve common issue;
accordingly, with consent of the parties, both were heard
together and are being disposed of by this common order.
3. The relief sought in WP(S) No. 1510 of 2021 is as
follows:-
1. That in the instant writ petition the petitioners pray
for issuance of an appropriate
writ/rule/order/direction commanding upon the
respondents and refraining them from making
illegal and unauthorized construction over the
lands measuring an area of 2.90 acres
appertaining to R.S Plot Nos. 1947,1948 and 1949
of Khata No. 79 situated at Village Booty, P.S.
Sadar, District Ranchi exclusively belonging to the
petitioners having acquired the same in a legal and3
2026:JHHC:13049valid manner by registered deed of sale dated
2.12.1959 after obtaining permission of the
competent authority under section 49 of the
Chotanagpur Tenancy Act in view of the fact that
the petitioners have been forcibly evicted from the
lands under proceeding without taking recourse of
law and the respondent authorities have not taken
any action despite the several representations and
complaint made by the petitioners stating therein
that the respondent Nos. 8 and 9 along with 400
persons have unlawfully assembled over the lands
in the night of 20th February 2021 and surrounded
the lands by PVC Sheets forcibly and stealthily and
are making illegal constructions over the lands
under proceeding without having any right, title
and interest over the same
AND
Further the petitioners pray that the respondent
authorities be directed to restore the possession of the
aforementioned lands to the petitioners forthwith as
the respondents have forcibly and illegally
dispossessed the petitioners from the lands without
initiating any proceeding and without any order of the
competent authority and the respondent authorities be
directed to demolish the unauthorized and illegal
construction over the lands and direction may be given
to the respondents to maintain ante status quo with
respect to the lands in question AND/OR Pass such
other relief or reliefs to which the petitioners are legally
entitled to.
4. The relief sought in WP(S) No. 1791 of 2021 is as
follows:-
a. For the issuance of an appropriate writ(s), order(s)
or direction(s) for quashing of the order dated 17th of
February 2021 passed by the Presiding Officer-cum-
Hon’ble Minister, Revenue, Registration and Land
Reforms Department, Government of Jharkhand
(Respondent No. 2) in Misc Case No. 267 of 2020
(Annexure-16) by which Respondent No. 2 has passed
an order to restore possession of the lands measuring
2.90 acres appertaining to R.S. Plot nos. 1947, 1948
and 1949 of Khata no. 79 situated at village Booty,
P.S. Sadar, District Ranchi in favour of the respondent4
2026:JHHC:13049no. 4 under Section 49(5) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy
Act while further directing to annul the permission
granted by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi on 11th
of November 1959 under Section 49 of the CNT Act for
sale of the aforementioned lands vide permission case
no. 34R8II/1959-60 as well as to annul the transfer
of land by sale deed dated 2nd of December 1959,
executed and registered in favour of the ancestor of
the petitioners namely Jiwan Lal after obtaining
permission of the competent authority, while issuing
direction to the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi to lodge
criminal case against the petitioners and direction has
also been given to the Anti-Corruption Bureau to lodge
F.I.R. against the petitioners; the impugned order has
been passed solely on the basis of an affidavit filed by
the Respondent No. 4 and has been passed without
giving any opportunity to the Petitioner and without
considering the several judicial order with respect to
the same property. Respondent No. 2, has further
ignored that the application is hopelessly barred by
limitation.
AND
b. For the issuance of such other writ(s), order(s), or
direction(s) to stay the operation of the order passed
in Misc 267 of 2020 till the adjudication of the instant
writ petition. Case No.
AND/OR
c. For the issuance of such other writ(s), order(s), or
direction(s) as this Hon’ble Court may think just and
proper in the facts and circumstances of the case
doing conscionable justice to the petitioner.
5. Briefly stated as per the writ petitions, in a
nutshell, are that as per the Survey Record of Rights (1935),
lands situated at Village Booty, P.S. Sadar, Thana No. 182,
under Khata No. 79, comprising Plot Nos. 1947 (0.67 acres),
1948 (0.70 acres) and 1949 (1.53 acres), were recorded in
the name of Bipta Pahan. Upon his demise, the said lands
devolved upon his sons, Ram Pahan and Somra Pahan. In
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2026:JHHC:13049
the year 1959-60, the said raiyats applied before the Deputy
Commissioner, Ranchi in Misc. Case No. 34R 8 (II) of 1959-
60 seeking permission to transfer the land. Upon
recommendation of the Rent Suit Deputy Collector and
approval of the Sub-Divisional Officer, permission was
granted by the Deputy Commissioner on 13.11.1959 under
Section 49 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, pursuant
to which a sale deed was executed by Somra Pahan (for
himself and on behalf of his brother Ram Pahan, who was
deaf and dumb) in favour of Jiwan Lal, the predecessor of
the petitioners. A mortgage (jarpeshgi) was also created in
favour of Dayanand Modi, which was subsequently
redeemed by the petitioners’ predecessor.
Thereafter, a series of proceedings ensued wherein
possession and rights of Jiwan Lal were repeatedly affirmed.
Proceedings under Sections 144 and 145 of CrPC initiated by
one Azmat Ali in 1961 and 1964 respectively were decided in
favour of Jiwan Lal, and even a criminal revision (No. 8 of
1964) preferred against such orders was dismissed,
culminating in execution of a release deed by Azmat Ali in
favour of Jiwan Lal. Mutation in favour of the petitioners’
predecessor pursuant to Case No. 51(R)27 of 1960-61 also
attained finality.
6. Subsequently, in 1991, Sukra Pahan initiated
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proceedings under Section 71A of the CNT Act (SAR Case
No. 185 of 1990-91), which were challenged by Jiwan Lal
before this Court in CWJC No. 2321 of 1991 (R), wherein the
proceedings were stayed and ultimately set aside. Parallel
SAR cases (Nos. 34, 35 and 36 of 1991), though initially
allowed ex parte, were also rendered ineffective in view of the
orders passed by this Court. A subsequent SAR Case No.
276 of 2002-03 also failed. Thereafter, the petitioners
approached this Court in W.P.(C) No. 5100 of 2004, which
was allowed directing issuance of rent receipts in their
favour.
7. In the year 2018, Somra Pahan instituted Original
Suit No. 657 of 2018, before Civil Judge, Senior Divion,
Ranchi. Subsequently, in 2020, upon an application made
by Sanjay Pahan, proceedings under Section 49(5) of the
CNT Act were initiated, and despite submission of a detailed
reply by the petitioners, the Presiding Officer-cum-Minister,
Government of Jharkhand Ranchi, vide order dated
17.02.2021, purportedly cancelled the permission granted
under Section 49. Hence this writ petition.
Submission on behalf of Petitioner
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that
it is the admitted case of both the parties that the permission
under Section 49 of the Act, 1908 was accorded by the then
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Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi on 13th of November 1959.
Section 49(5) of the Act, 1908 was inserted vide the
Amending Act of 1975, i.e., much after the transaction [also
much after the lapse of a period of 12 (twelve years) dated of
13th of November 1959. Learned counsel submitted that
Section 49(5) of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 cannot
be applied retrospectively to invalidate transfers effected
prior to its enactment, and the impugned proceedings are, in
any case, barred by limitation.
He further submitted that even if Section 49(5) is
assumed to apply, it prescribes a strict limitation of twelve
years, which is mandatory and not extendable. This position
stands settled in Kusum Devi & Ors. v. State of Bihar &
Ors1. and reaffirmed in Krishna Kumar Dodrajka & Ors.
v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.2
He had also submitted that Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 is inapplicable to such original
proceedings. Further, the reliance on Section 17 of the
Limitation Act on the ground of fraud is misconceived. In view
of Section 230 of the Tenancy Act, the Limitation Act applies
only to the extent it is not inconsistent. Since Section 49(5)
expressly provides that limitation runs from the date of
1 MANU/JH/0372/2004
2 MANU/JH/0187/2017
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2026:JHHC:13049
consent, invocation of Section 17 is excluded. Consequently,
the impugned proceedings are without jurisdiction and liable
to be quashed.
9. Learned counsel submitted that even assuming,
without admitting, any element of fraud, the Respondents
had clear knowledge of the petitioners’ ancestor’s title since
1991-92, when proceedings under Section 49 of the Chota
Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 were instituted by Sukra Pahan
and Somra Pahan. It was further submitted that a
subsequent application by Somra Pahan, being SAR Case
No. 276 of 2002-03, was dismissed on 23.07.2002 in light of
findings in CWJC No. 2321 of 1991 (R). Despite such
knowledge, no proceedings were initiated within the
prescribed period thereafter. In these circumstances,
Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked, as
the Respondents failed to act within three years from the
date of knowledge. The plea of fraud is thus untenable and
does not extend limitation.
He further submitted that the impugned
proceedings are barred by res judicata. Earlier proceedings
under Sections 71A and 49(5) of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy
Act, 1908, initiated by the petitioners’ ancestor, were decided
in his favour, and the same issue cannot be reopened. The
applicability of res judicata to such proceedings stands
9
2026:JHHC:13049
affirmed in Jagan Bediya & Ors. v. Kameshwar Narayan
Singh & Ors.3
He further submitted that the Respondents’ case
rests on the plea that the permission granted by the Deputy
Commissioner falls outside Section 49 of the Chota Nagpur
Tenancy Act, 1908. The Petitioner relies on the provision as
it stood at the relevant time, when permission could be
granted upon existence of “reasonable cause,” an inclusive
expression wide enough to cover purposes such as purchase
of cattle. It was further argued that such permission cannot
be reopened after expiry of twelve years. Moreover, the State
cannot simultaneously allege that the permission was
contrary to legislative intent and also obtained by fraud; such
inconsistent stands are barred by the doctrine of approbate
and reprobate.
He submitted that Section 49 of the Chota Nagpur
Tenancy Act, 1908 clearly mandates that annulment of
transfer can be made only within twelve years from the date
of transfer. The provision being unambiguous, no resort to
legislative intent is required. He further submitted that the
Respondents’ claim of possession is wholly false and
unsupported by any document, particularly for the period
3 MANU/JH/0703/2010
10
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1959-2019. Their own application under Section 71A for
recovery of possession, which was dismissed in favour of the
Petitioner, demolishes such claim. Further, rent receipts
issued in favour of the Petitioner and mutation entries
constitute strong prima facie proof of possession.
He further submitted that forcible dispossession
can be remedied in writ jurisdiction. In the case of Waqf
Alalaulad v. Sundardas Daulatram & Sons,4 as affirmed
in the case of Union Club, Dhanbad v. State of Jharkhand
& Ors.,5 it has been held that possession taken by force can
be restored. In the present case, the Petitioner was illegally
dispossessed, and is therefore entitled to restoration.
He finally submitted that the Respondents, knowing
that their remedy lay before the Civil Court, had instituted
Original Suit No. 657 of 2018, which has since abated.
During its pendency, they initiated the present proceedings
as a circuitous method to secure possession, amounting to
forum shopping. Such conduct is a clear abuse of process. In
the case of V. Anima Malar v. S. Aadhavan & Ors.6 and in
the case of Neelam Manmohan Attavar v. Manmohan
Attavar,7 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has deprecated
4 MANU/UP/1008/1996
5 Civil Appeal No. 6626 of 2012
6 MANU/SC/0111/2026
7 MANU/SC/0055/2021
11
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parallel and repeated proceedings on the same cause.
Accordingly, he prayed that the impugned proceedings,
having been initiated during pendency of the suit and after
dismissal of earlier claims, are vitiated by forum hunting and
liable to be set aside.
Submission on Behalf of State
10. Learned Counsel for the State submitted that the
District Administration, Ranchi, through the Circle Officer,
Bargain, along with the Circle Inspector, Bargain and the
Revenue Sub-Inspector, Booty Village, undertook a detailed
verification of the revenue records and conducted a local
enquiry with respect to the land and in question. Upon such
physical verification and record inspection, enquiry reports
were submitted vide Letter No. 1047(ii) dated 27.11.2021
and Letter No. 55(ii) dated 02.02.2026, which reveal the
following material facts:
(A) That the land in question is in actual physical possession of
the legal heirs and successors of the recorded raiyat, namely
Bipta Pahan, S/o Shital Pahan.
(B) That the name of Bipta Pahan stands duly recorded in
Volume-I, Page 79 of Register-II, wherein the change of
authority column records fixation of rent vide Case No. 27
R8/1959-60 dated 09.11.1959. The records further reflect
continuous realization of rent from the year 1955-56 up to
1995-96 pursuant to order dated 11.09.1995 of the Circle
Officer, and thereafter, rent realization is reflected in the offline
Register-II up to 2014-15 and in the online Register-II up to
2020-21.
(C) That although the names of the writ petitioners, namely
Harish Munjal and Prakash Munjal, find mention in Volume-V,12
2026:JHHC:13049Page 1 of Register-II pursuant to orders passed in W.P.(C) No.
5100 of 2004 and consequential administrative directions, and
rent entries exist in their favour, the enquiry categorically
records that they have never been in actual physical
possession of the land.
(D) That similarly, the name of one Jitendra Bahadur Johar has
been entered in Register-II (Volume-VI, Page 71) pursuant to
Mutation Case No. 5678 R 27/07-08, and though rent
realization entries exist in his favour for certain periods, the
enquiry report clearly records that he too is not in possession of
the land.
11. Learned Counsel for the State submitted that
Sanjay Pahan, S/o Somra Pahan (Respondent No. 9 in
W.P.(C) No. 1510 of 2021), filed an application before the
competent authority asserting that the land measuring about
2.90 acres is his Khatiani raiyati land is under threat from
land mafias, pursuant to which Misc. Case No. 267 of 2020
was initiated under Section 49(5) of the Chotanagpur
Tenancy Act, 1908.
It was submitted that the land is recorded as Kaimi
Raiyati in the name of Bipta Pahan, S/o Shital Pahan, a
member of the Munda (Scheduled Tribe) community, and
thus its transfer is strictly regulated by Sections 46 to 49 of
the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. The land, admeasuring
about 2.90 acres, stands recorded under Khata No. 79,
Village Booty, Thana No. 182 (Sadar), and was originally
recorded in the Survey Record of Rights (circa 1935) in the
name of Bipta Pahan as raiyat.
It was further submitted that post vesting under
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the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, Bipta Pahan was found
in peaceful possession and cultivation of the land, and his
name was duly entered in the revenue records with
continuous rent payment. His possession remained
undisturbed, and upon his death, the land devolved upon his
sons, Ram Pahan and Somra Pahan, and thereafter
exclusively upon Somra Pahan, who continued in
possession.
It was further contended that the alleged
permission granted by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi in
1959-60 under Section 49 of the CNT Act was obtained
without the knowledge of Somra Pahan, and despite such
alleged transfer, the raiyats and their successors remained
in uninterrupted possession. It was only in the year 2018
that the respondents came to know of such transaction,
whereupon Somra Pahan instituted Original Suit No. 657 of
2018 seeking declaration of the sale deed dated 02.12.1959
as null and void on grounds of fraud. The said suit, having
abated due to the demise of the plaintiffs, is now sought to
be restored by filing Civil Misc. Case No. 16 of 2026, which is
pending consideration before the competent civil court.
12. Learned Counsel vehemently submitted that the
alleged permission granted by the Deputy Commissioner,
Ranchi in 1959-60 under Section 49 of the Chotanagpur
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Tenancy Act, 1908 was obtained by fraud and is legally
unsustainable and the same is wholly without jurisdiction. It
was contended that Section 49 permits transfer of tribal land
only for specified purposes such as charitable, religious or
educational use, which is admittedly not the case herein, as
the recorded purpose for the purchase of bullocks does not
fall within the permissible categories.
It was further submitted that the revenue enquiry
reports vide Letter No. 1047(ii) dated 27.11.2021 and Letter
No. 55(ii) dated 02.02.2026 conclusively establish that the
raiyats and their legal heirs have remained in continuous
and undisputed possession of the land, and that the writ
petitioners were never in possession.
It was argued that the entire claim of the writ petitioners
is founded upon fraudulent and void transactions in violation
of the CNT Act, 1908, and that mutation entries or issuance
of rent receipts pursuant to W.P.(C) No. 5100 of 2004 do not
confer any title or possession. Reliance was placed on
Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy8 to submit that no relief
can be granted to perpetuate fraud.
It was lastly submitted that the present writ petition,
seeking restoration of possession, involves a private civil
8 (2010) 8 SCC 383
15
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dispute and is not maintainable under Article 226, as held in
Roshina T. v. Abdul Azeez K.T.9
He finally submitted that the present dispute
involves complex questions of fact, title and possession,
which cannot be adjudicated in exercise of jurisdiction under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, and must
be relegated to the competent civil court, the writ forum being
inappropriate for such determination.
Submission on behalf of Private Respondent
13. Learned Counsel for the Private Respondent
submitted that the petitioners’ claim is wholly misconceived
and founded upon a sale deed dated 02.12.1959 which is
void ab initio, as the alleged executant, Somra Pahan, had
no right, title or interest over the land at the relevant time,
his father being the recorded tenant, and further, he was a
minor, thereby rendering the transaction legally invalid.
He further submitted that the said transaction is
vitiated by gross illegality, as no lawful guardian was
appointed for Ram Pahan, who was admittedly a minor and
incapacitated, making the execution of the deed
unsustainable in law.
14. Learned Counsel submitted that the answering
9 (2019) 2 SCC 329
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respondents have already instituted Original Suit No. 657 of
2018 before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division)-IX,
Ranchi seeking declaration of title and cancellation of the
sale deed, and upon abatement due to unavoidable
circumstances, have filed Civil Miscellaneous Case No. 16 of
2026 for restoration, which is presently pending, thus
clearly establishing that the dispute is civil in nature and
sub judice. He further submitted that the respondents are
in long, continuous possession of the land, duly supported
by State records, Register-II entries and rent receipts in the
name of Bipta Pahan.
He further submitted that the documents relied
upon by the petitioners are seriously disputed and appear to
be forged and fabricated, as even the family members of
Somra Pahan have denied execution of any such documents,
and the alleged S.A.R. Case No. 185 of 1991 and CWJC No.
2321 of 1991 are not binding upon the answering
respondents.
15. In regard to the alleged permission under Section
49 of the C.N.T. Act learned counsel submitted that the
permission is itself illegal, as the purpose disclosed does not
fall within permissible categories, thereby rendering the
entire transaction void. To buttress his argument he relied
upon Mandu Prakhand Sahakari Grih Nirman Sahyog
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Samiti Limited v. State of Bihar10 wherein this Court has
held that the reasonable and sufficient purpose under
section 49 includes the use of land for any charitable,
religious and educational purpose or any other purpose,
which the State Government may by general or special order
declared to be a public purpose and if the transfer was not
for the said purpose then, the said permission deemed to be
rejected.
He further submitted that the writ petition being
W.P (C) No. 1510 of 2021 seeking restoration of possession
and adjudication of title is not maintainable under Article
226, in view of settled law laid down in Roshina T. v. Abdul
Azeez K.T. (supra) and Shri Sohan Lal v. Union of India.11
Analysis
16. After hearing both the parties and perusal of the
materials on record, it transpires that the fulcrum of this
case is the order dated 13 November 1959, by which the
Deputy Commissioner accorded permission to sell the
subject land purportedly in terms of section 49 of the
Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, on an application made
by Ram Pahan and Somra Pahan in favour of late Jiwan Lal,
the ancestor of the present petitioners. Consequent thereto,
10 (2004) 1 JLJR 260
11 1957 SCC Online SC 39
18
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a sale deed was executed in December 1959. The petitioner’s
case is entirely founded on this order.
17. In the application filed by Ram Pahan and Somra
Pahan, permission was sought to sell the land on the ground
that they have among themselves, 32.08 acres of land and
some of their paddy lands have been mortgaged and hence
they want to dispose their Tanr lands in order to release their
paddy lands from mortgage and further that they also
propose to purchase bullocks. The Deputy Commissioner
accepted the application and held that the purposes for sale
appear to be reasonable and consequently, on the basis of
the recommendations made by his subordinate officials
sanctioned transfer of the subject lands by the applicants to
the ancestor of the present petitioners.
18. Section 49 of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act, prior
to its amendment and as it stood in the year 1959, permitted
an occupancy or any member of Bhuinhari family to transfer
his holding or tenure, or any part thereof for any reasonable
and sufficient purpose. Subsection (2) of section 49 set out
what the expression “reasonable and sufficient purposes”
would include, which are as follows:-
a) In the case of a member of Bhuinhari family, but not in the
case of an occupancy raiyat, building purposes, generally;
b) In any case, the use of land for any charitable, religious, or
educational purpose, or for any other purpose, which the state
government may, by general or special order, declare to be19
2026:JHHC:13049public purposes or for the purposes of manufacturer or irrigation
or as building ground for any such purpose, or for access to land
used or required for any such purpose, and
c) In any case, the use of the land for the purpose of mining or
for any other purposes, which the state government may, by
notification, declared to be subsidiary there two or four access
to land used or required for any such purpose.
19. Section 49 CNT carves out exceptions from the
restrictions imposed by the preceding sections. Provisions of
section 49 CNT grant exemptions. It is well settled that
exemption / exception provisions must be construed strictly
[see Sea Customs Act, s. 20(2), In re: AIR 1963 SC 1760].
20. In Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar,12 the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the preamble of CNT Act
suggests that it was a law to amend and consolidate certain
Acts relating to the law of landlord and tenant and the
settlement of rent in Chota Nagpur.
21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amrendra Pratap
Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati13 while dealing with a case
involving interpretation of the Orissa Scheduled Areas
Transfer of Immovable Property (by Scheduled Tribes)
Regulations, 1956, the purpose of which is akin to the CNT
Act, held as follows:
“15. Tribal areas have their own problems. Tribals are historically
weaker sections of the society. They need the protection of the
laws as they are gullible and fall prey to the tactics of
unscrupulous people, and are susceptible to exploitation on
account of their innocence, poverty and backwardness extending
over centuries. The Constitution of India and the laws made
thereunder treat tribals and tribal areas separately wherever12 (1996) 5 SCC 125
13 [(2004) 10 SCC 65]20
2026:JHHC:13049needed. The tribals need to be settled, need to be taken care of by
the protective arm of the law, and be saved from falling prey to
unscrupulous device so that they may prosper and by an
evolutionary process join the mainstream of the society. The
process would be slow, yet it has to be initiated and kept moving.
The object sought to be achieved by the 1950 Act and the 1956
Regulations is to see that a member of an aboriginal tribe
indefeatably continues to own the property which he acquires and
every process known to law by which title in immovable property
is extinguished in one person to vest in another person, should
remain so confined in its operation in relation to tribals that the
immovable property of one tribal may come to vest in another tribal
but the title in immovable property vesting in any tribal must not
come to vest in a non-tribal. This is to see and ensure that non-
tribals do not succeed in making inroads amongst the tribals by
acquiring property and developing roots in the habitat of tribals.
18. In Pandey Oraon v. Ram Chander Sahu the term “transfer” as
used in Section 71-A of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, came
up for the consideration of the Court. “Transfer” was not defined
in the Act. It was held that considering the situation in which the
exercise of jurisdiction is contemplated, it would not be proper to
confine the meaning of “transfer” to transfer under the Transfer of
Property Act or a situation where “transfer” has a statutory
definition. What exactly is contemplated by “transfer” in Section
71-A is where possession has passed from one to another and as
a physical fact the member of the Scheduled Tribe who is entitled
to hold possession has lost it and a non-member has come into
possession, would be covered by “transfer”. Their Lordships
observed: (SCC p. 80, para 7)
“7. The provision is beneficial and the legislative intention is
to extend protection to a class of citizens who are not in a
position to keep their property to themselves in the absence
of protection. Therefore when the legislature is extending
special protection to the named category, the court has to
give a liberal construction to the protective mechanism which
would work out the protection and enable the sphere of
protection to be effective than limit by (sic) the scope.”
Their Lordships referred to three earlier decisions of this Court,
namely, Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka3, Lingappa
Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra4, Gamini Krishnayya
v. Guraza Seshachalam5 and a decision of the House of Lords in
D (a minor) v. Berkshire County Council6 laying down the
proposition that a broad and liberal construction should be given
to give full effect to the legislative purpose.
19. State of M.P. v. Babu Lal is an interesting case showing how
this Court dealt with an artistic device employed by a non-tribal to
deprive a tribal of his land. The M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959
imposed restrictions on the transfer of land by members of a
Scheduled Tribe. Babu Lal, a non-tribal, filed a suit for declaration
against Baddiya, a Bheel, notified Scheduled Tribe, for declaration
that his name be recorded in the revenue record as bhumiswami
over the land of Baddiya. Baddiya did not contest the suit and the
parties filed a compromise conceding to the claim of Babu Lal. The
State Government intervened and filed a petition in the High Court
21
2026:JHHC:13049
seeking a writ of certiorari, submitting that the entire proceedings
in the suit were in contravention of sub-section (6) of Section 165
of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. The judgment of the civil
court based on compromise was sought to be quashed. The High
Court dismissed the petition holding that the State could pursue
the alternative remedy of filing a suit for declaration that the
decree was null and void. In appeal by special leave, this Court
set aside the judgment of the High Court and issued a writ of
certiorari to quash the judgment and decree passed in the civil suit.
It was held: (SCC p. 436, para 5)
“5. One of the principles on which certiorari is issued is
where the Court acts illegally and there is error on the face
of record. If the Court usurps the jurisdiction, the record is
corrected by certiorari. This case is a glaring instance of
such violation of law. The High Court was in error in not
issuing writ of certiorari.”
(underlining by us)
20.The law laid down by this Court is an authority for the
proposition that the court shall step in and annul any such
transaction as would have the effect of violating a provision of law,
more so when it is a beneficial piece of social legislation. A simple
declaratory decree passed by a civil court which had the effect of
extinguishing the title of a member of a Scheduled Tribe and
vesting the same in a non-member, was construed as “transfer”
within the meaning of Section 165(6) of the M.P. Land Revenue
Code, 1959. Thus, we are very clear in our minds that the
expression “transfer of immovable property” as defined in clause
(f) of para 2 of the 1956 Regulations has to be assigned a very
wide meaning. Any transaction or dealing with immovable
property which would have the effect of extinguishing title,
possession or right to possess such property in a tribal and vesting
the same in a non-tribal, would be included within the meaning of
“transfer of immovable property.”
22. Thus, it is clear that the court shall step in and
annul any such transaction as would have the effect of
violating a provision of law; more so, when it is a beneficial
piece of social legislation. Therefore, it is the duty of the
Court including the Constitutional Courts to ensure that the
tribals get the protection of the laws as they are gullible and
are susceptible to fall prey to the tactics of unscrupulous
people, and are vulnerable to exploitation on account of their
innocence, poverty and backwardness.
22
2026:JHHC:13049
23. The object sought to be achieved by the CNT Act is
to see that a member of an aboriginal tribe indefeasibly
continues to own the property and ensure that non-tribals
do not succeed in making inroads amongst the tribals by
acquiring property in a manner prohibited by the CNT Act.
24. Having noticed that one of the object and purpose
of the CNT Act is to protect the lands belonging to the
aboriginal raiyat it has to be ascertained as to what is the
purport of the term “includes” appearing in section 49 (as it
existed at the relevant time) and the same is an important
issue which falls for consideration for determination in the
present petition.
25. It is well settled that whenever a definition clause
uses the word “includes”, it is so done in order to enlarge the
meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of
the statute, and when it is so used, these words of phrases
must be construed as comprehending, not only such things
which they signify according to their natural import, but also
those things with the interpretation declare that they shall
include [see State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries
Ltd.,14 (paras 21 and 22)].
26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation v. Ashok
14 (2017) 10 SCC 713
23
2026:JHHC:13049
Iron Works (P) Limited,15 at paragraph 17 held that resort
to the word “includes” by the legislature after shows the
intention of the legislature that it wanted to give extensive
and enlarged meaning to the relevant expression. However,
sometimes the context may suggest that the word “includes”
may have been designed to mean “means” and thus, for
interpretation of the word “includes”, sufficient guidance
may be provided by setting, context, and object of the
relevant Act. Likewise, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers
Association v. State of Gujarat,16 held that generally
“includes” is used as a word of extension, but there could
not be any inflexible rule that the word ‘include’ should be
read always as a word of extension without reference to the
context.
27. The right way therefore to interpret the provisions
of section 49 CNT (as it stood earlier) is to read it in the
context of the CNT Act.
28. Section 49 has an overriding effect over the earlier
provisions of section 46, 47 and 48, which imposed
restrictions of transfer of raiyati rights. Therefore, if the
words “for any reasonable and sufficient purpose” occurring
15 (2009) 3 SCC 240
16 (1976) 4 SCC 601
24
2026:JHHC:13049
in section 49 construed liberally to include any purpose as
reasonable and sufficient, then the provisions as contained
in section 46, 47 and 48 would be rendered absolutely otiose
and completely nugatory.
29. In Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit,17 the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India discussed in details the rule
of purposive construction with respect to a beneficial
legislation in the following manner:
“8. To answer the issue at hand, it is imperative for this Court to
discuss the rules of interpretation to be applied when interpreting
a beneficial legislation akin to the Act at hand. While dealing with
certain provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, this Court in
Brahampal v. National Insurance Co, observed that a beneficial
legislation must receive a liberal construction in consonance with
the objectives that the Act concerned seeks to serve.
9. This Court in K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacoz reiterated the
above expositions and stated that : (SCC pp. 135-36, paras 11 &
13)
“11. Provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be
construed with a purpose-oriented approach. The Act should
receive a liberal construction to promote its objects. Also,
literal construction of the provisions of a beneficial
legislation has to be avoided. It is the Court’s duty to discern
the intention of the legislature in making the law. Once such
an intention is ascertained, the statute should receive a
purposeful or functional interpretation.
***
13. While interpreting a statute, the problem or mischief that
the statute was designed to remedy should first be
identified, and then a construction that suppresses the
problem and advances the remedy should be adopted. It is
settled law that exemption clauses in beneficial or social
welfare legislations should be given strict construction. It
was observed in Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram
Kowshik that the exclusionary provisions in a beneficial
legislation should be construed strictly so as to give a wide
amplitude to the principal object of the legislation and to
prevent its evasion on deceptive grounds. Similarly, in
Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v. NSW
Aboriginal Land Council, Kirby, J. held that the principle of
providing purposive construction to beneficial legislations
mandates that exceptions in such legislations should be
construed narrowly.”
17 (2025) 2 SCC 787,
25
2026:JHHC:13049
(emphasis supplied)
10. More recently, in Kozyflex Mattresses (P) Ltd. v. SBI General
Insurance Co. Ltd., this Court held the definition of a consumer
under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to include a company or
corporate person in view of the beneficial purpose of the Act.
11. While considering the provisions of the Medical Termination of
Pregnancy Act, this Court in X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi), reiterated
that interpretation of the provisions of a beneficial legislation must
be in line with a purposive construction, keeping in mind the
legislative purpose. Furthermore, it was stated that beneficial
legislation must be interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries when
it is possible to take two views.
12. It is in the above background that we must proceed to examine
the Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act indicates
the purpose behind the enactment, as relied upon by this Court in
S. Vanitha v. Commr, is:
“Traditional norms and values of the Indian society laid stress
on providing care for the elderly. However, due to withering
of the joint family system, a large number of elderly are not
being looked after by their family. Consequently, many older
persons, particularly widowed women are now forced to
spend their twilight years all alone and are exposed to
emotional neglect and to lack of physical and financial
support. This clearly reveals that ageing has become a major
social challenge and there is a need to give more attention to
the care and protection for the older persons. Though the
parents can claim maintenance under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, the procedure is both time-consuming as
well as expensive. Hence, there is a need to have simple,
inexpensive and speedy provisions to claim maintenance for
parents.”
13. The Preamble of the Act states that it is intended towards more
effective provisions for maintenance and welfare of parents and
senior citizens, guaranteed and recognised under the Constitution.
14. Therefore, it is apparent, that the Act is a beneficial piece of
legislation, aimed at securing the rights of senior citizens, in view
of the challenges faced by them. It is in this backdrop that the Act
must be interpreted and a construction that advances the
remedies of the Act must be adopted.”
30. Therefore, the term “reasonable and sufficient
purpose” must be interpreted in a manner which would be in
consonance with the context and object of the CNT Act, 1908.
31. The instances given in section 49 of the CNT Act
as to what would constitute a “reasonable and sufficient
purpose” is the reflection of the legislative policy and must
guide the court to lead to an inference that not every purpose
26
2026:JHHC:13049
cited by the tribal to obtain permission can be said to be a
“reasonable and sufficient purpose” and purpose must be
akin to what has been set out in the illustrations.
32. In the application purportedly filed by the claimed
predecessors of the private respondents to transfer the land,
it was stated that they need the permission to get their paddy
lands released and to purchase bullocks. Ex facie it appears
that the grounds set out in the said application cannot be
brought within the ambit of reasonableness and sufficiency
as contemplated by the provisions of section 49 of the CNT
Act. The existence of “reasonable and sufficient purpose” is
the jurisdictional fact for exercise of powers under section 49
CNT Act.
33. In Shrisht Dhawan (Smt) v. M/s. Shaw Bros.,18
an interesting discussion on “jurisdictional fact” is found in
the concurring opinion of Hon’ble R.M. Sahai, J. (as his
Lordship then was). It reads : (SCC pp. 551-52, para 19)
“19. … What, then, is an error in respect of jurisdictional fact? A
jurisdictional fact is one on existence or non-existence of which
depends assumption or refusal to assume jurisdiction by a court,
tribunal or an authority. In Black’s Legal Dictionary it is explained
as a fact which must exist before a court can properly assume
jurisdiction of a particular case. Mistake of fact in relation to
jurisdiction is an error of jurisdictional fact. No statutory authority
or tribunal can assume jurisdiction in respect of subject-matter
which the statute does not confer on it and if by deciding
erroneously the fact on which jurisdiction depends the court or
tribunal exercises the jurisdiction then the order is vitiated. Error
of jurisdictional fact renders the order ultra vires and bad. In Raza
Textiles it was held that a court or tribunal cannot confer
jurisdiction on itself by deciding a jurisdictional fact wrongly……..”
18 (1992) 1 SCC 534
27
2026:JHHC:13049
34. This Court is constrained to observe that the order
purporting to grant permission to transfer the land under
section 49 CNT Act is an order which suffers from grave error
of jurisdiction and without the existence of any jurisdictional
fact and the assumption of jurisdiction is nothing but an
egregious fraud on the beneficial legislation. In State of
Assam v. Banshidhar Shewbhagavan & Co.,19 the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held as under:
“8. …..There can be no doubt that if any authority exercised any
power conferred on him by law in bad faith or for collateral
purpose, it is an abuse of power and a fraud on the statute. In
such a case there can be no difficulty in striking down that act of
the authority by the issue of an appropriate writ under Article 226
of the Constitution…..”
35. The order granting permission is a glaringly,
conspicuously, and extraordinarily bad act of deception. It is
not merely a small mistake or a standard dispute, but a
flagrant violation that is so obvious and reprehensible that it
shakes the conscience of the Court. The order dated
13.11.1959 passed by the Deputy Commissioner in Misc.
Case No. 34/R/8/(II) of 1959-60 is a nullity and hence void
ab initio. The order is unenforceable and no Court and / or
authority can take cognizance of it. The validity of an order
without jurisdiction can be tested in a collateral proceeding
and especially when the same is sought to be enforced. The
Courts including constitutional courts enforce rights but
19
(1981) 4 SCC 283
28
2026:JHHC:13049
when no right is validly created by an order of an authority
or court or any legislative or executive act, the courts would
ignore such orders/ acts even in absence of a direct challenge
to it.
36. The case of the petitioners is completely founded
on the order dated 13.11.1959 passed by the Deputy
Commissioner in Misc. Case No. 34/R/8/(II) of 1959-60. It
is trite that if the foundation goes the superstructure is
bound to fall. In TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd.,20,
the Hon’ble Supreme court held that:
“54. ….Needless to say, once the infrastructure collapses, the
superstructure is bound to collapse. One cannot have a building
without the plinth…”
37. In State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh
Bhullar,21 the Hon’ble Supreme Court on similar lines, had
elaborated the principle and the same applies with equal
force in the present case.
“106. The order impugned has rightly been challenged to be a nullity at
least on three grounds, namely, judicial bias; want of jurisdiction by
virtue of application of the provisions of Section 362 CrPC coupled with
the principles of constructive res judicata; and the Bench had not been
assigned the roster to entertain the petitions under Section 482 CrPC.
The entire judicial process appears to have been drowned to achieve a
motivated result which we are unable to approve of.
107. It is a settled legal proposition that if initial action is not in
consonance with law, all subsequent and consequential proceedings
would fall through for the reason that illegality strikes at the root of the
order. In such a fact situation, the legal maxim sublato fundamento cadit
opus meaning thereby that foundation being removed, structure/work
falls, comes into play and applies on all scores in the present case.
108. In Badrinath v. Govt. of T.N. and State of Kerala v. Puthenkavu
N.S.S. Karayogam this Court observed that once the basis of a
proceeding is gone, all consequential acts, actions, orders would fall to
the ground automatically and this principle is applicable to judicial,20 [(2017) 8 SCC 377]
21 (2011) 14 SCC 77029
2026:JHHC:13049quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings equally.
109. Similarly in Mangal Prasad Tamoli v. Narvadeshwar Mishra this
Court held that if an order at the initial stage is bad in law, then all
further proceedings, consequent thereto, will be non est and have to be
necessarily set aside.
110. In C. Albert Morris v. K. Chandrasekaran this Court held that a
right in law exists only and only when it has a lawful origin. (See also
Upen Chandra Gogoi v. State of Assam, Satchidananda Misra v. State of
Orissa, SBI v. Rakesh Kumar Tewari and Ritesh Tewari v. State of U.P.)
111. Thus, in view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that
the orders impugned being a nullity, cannot be sustained. As a
consequence, subsequent proceedings/orders/FIR/investigation stand
automatically vitiated and are liable to be declared non est.”
38. In Employees’ State Insurance Corporation
and others v. Jardine Henderson Staff Association and
others,22 (para 61), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that relief in
a writ of certiorari can be denied inter alia when it would be
opposed to public policy or in a case where quashing of
an illegal order would revive another illegal order.
39. More recently the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Al-
Can Export (P) Ltd. v. Prestige H.M. Polycontainers Ltd.,23
has held as under:-
“98. Assuming for the moment that the Additional Commissioner
had no jurisdiction to adjudicate and decide the two appeals filed
by Respondent 1 and Respondent 6, respectively, yet the common
order passed by the Additional Commissioner allowing the
appeals and remanding the matter back to the authority concerned
could not have been disturbed and the High Court rightly did not
disturb the same. Had the High Court taken the view that the
Additional Commissioner had no jurisdiction and the order passed
by it was a nullity, the result would have been the revival of the
illegal order passed by the Additional Collector confirming the sale.
99. It is well-settled principle in law that issuance of a writ or
quashing/setting aside of an order if revives another pernicious or
wrong or illegal order then in that eventuality the writ court should
not interfere in the matter and should refuse to exercise its
discretionary power conferred upon it under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The writ court should not quash the order if it revives
a wrong or illegal order. (Vide : Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. State
of A.P.; Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo v. State of Bihar; M.C.
Mehta v. Union of India; Mallikarjuna Mudhagal Nagappa v. State22 (2006) 6 SCC 581
23 (2024) 9 SCC 9430
2026:JHHC:13049of Karnataka; Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Raj Kumar
Soni v. State of U.P.)”
40. In the backdrop of the above position in law, this
Court is of the considered view that all the contentions of
petitioner leading to its attack to the order dated 17.02.2021
passed by the Presiding Officer – cum- Minister, Revenue,
Registration and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand
in Misc Case No. 267 of 2020 (Annexure 16), directing
restoration of the subject land and annulling the permission
granted under section 49 CNT Act must fail; as setting the
same aside would revive and restore the order dated
13.11.1959 passed by the Deputy Commissioner in Misc.
Case No. 34/R/8/(II)) of 1959-60, which has been held in
earlier part of this judgment and order to be a nullity being
an order without jurisdiction.
41. Though the petitioners have raised various
arguments, both on substantive and procedural, but, there
is no doubt that all such argument emanate on the basis of
the right purportedly created by the order dated 13.11.1959
passed by the Deputy Commissioner in Misc. Case No.
34/R/8/(II)) of 1959-60 and thus once the said order fails
to satisfactorily withstand the legal challenge on the ground
of jurisdiction, no further discussion on the subsequent
proceedings is required.
31
2026:JHHC:13049
42. However, the observations and directions made in
the impugned order dated 17.02.2021 regarding initiating
criminal proceedings by the Deputy Commissioner and the
Anti-Corruption Bureau is misconceived and unwarranted
to that extent the order dated 17.02.2021 is bad and
requires interference. The Presiding Officer – cum- Minister,
Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, Government of
Jharkhand while deciding an application under section
49(5) is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction and such directions
are in excess of the jurisdiction vested in such authority.
Hence such directions are set aside.
43. This Court, for the reasons stated above, is not
inclined to exercise its discretion under Article 226 or 227 of
the Constitution in favour of the petitioners, especially
having regard to the object and purpose of the CNT Act.
44. The writ petition must fail except to the extent
indicated above. Ordered accordingly. Costs made easy.
Pending I.A.s, if any, also stands closed.
(Deepak Roshan, J.)
Dated:01/05/2026
Amardeep/fahim
A.F.R
Uploaded on
04.05.2026
32
