Delhi High Court
Puran Chand (Deceased) Through Lrs And … vs Prabhat (Deceased) Through Lrs on 2 May, 2026
Author: Neena Bansal Krishna
Bench: Neena Bansal Krishna
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on: 10th February, 2026
Pronounced on: 2nd May, 2026
+ RSA 101/2023, CM APPL. 26508/2023 & CM APPL. 26568/2023
1. SH. PURAN CHAND (DECEASED)
S/o Sh. Balu Ram
Through Legal Heirs
(i) Sh. Kundan Lal (Son)
S/o. Sh. Late Puran Chand
(ii) Sh. Devi Dayal (Son)
S/o. Sh. Late Puran Chand
(iii) Smt. Mamta Devi (Daughter)
W/o. Sh. Nathu Ram
(iv) Smt. Shanti Devi (Daughter)
W/o. Sh. Rajesh Kumar
(V) Smt. Soni Devi (Wife)
W/o. Late Sh. Puran Chand
2. SH. KUNDAN LAL
S/o Late Puran Chand
3. SH. DEVI DAYAL
S/o. Sh. Late Puran Chand
All R/o. C-57, Ground Floor,
Shiv Gali Nanak Basti,
Kotla Mubarakpur, New Delhi- 110003
.....Appellants
Through: None
versus
SH. PRABHAT (DECEASED)
Through Legal Heirs
All r/o. C-57, Ground Floor,
Shiv Gali Nanak Basti,
Kotla Mubarakpur, New Delhi- 110003.
RSA 101/2023 Page 1 of 19
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Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
Signing Date:02.05.2026
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1. Chet Ram (Son)
2. Sh. Ghanshyam (Son)
3. Ishwar Singh (Son)
4. Ms. Puni (Daughter)
W/o. Late Sh. Leela Ram,
R/o. 432/5, Khichripur, De1hi- 110091.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Navjot Kumar, Mr. Karan
Khanna and Ms. Rashmi Sharma
Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA
J U D G M E N T
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.
1. The present Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) has been filed against the judgment and decree
dated 31.03.2023 whereby the learned ADJ in RCA DJ No. 99/2019, has
upheld the judgment and decree dated 07.06.2019 of the learned Civil
Judge, whereby the suit for Mandatory and Permanent Injunction was
decreed against the Defendants, who were directed to deliver the possession
of the Suit property, to the plaintiff.
2. The Plaintiff, Prabhat, filed the Suit bearing No. 96065/16 for
Mandatory and Permanent Injunction against the Defendants, namely Puran
Chand, Kundan Lal, Devi Dayal and Dhanna Ram, for directing Defendant
No. 1 to deliver possession of the suit property, and for restraining the
Defendants from creating any third-party interest in the suit property.
3. The Plaintiff claimed that he was the absolute owner of the Property
bearing No. C-57, comprising of ground floor and first floor with entire
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build up portion, located in Shiv Gali, Nanak Chand Basti, Kotla
MubarakPur, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the “Suit Property”), by
virtue of registered Sale Deed dated 16.01.1966.
4. The Defendant No. 1, Puran Chand being the brother of the Plaintiff
and Defendants No. 2 Sh. Kundan Lal and 3 being his sons, were permitted
by the Plaintiff to stay in the Suit Property, as they were not well off.
Subsequently, Defendant No. 2, had been staying in the Suit Property.
5. Defendant No. 4-Dhanna Ram also being the brother of the Plaintiff,
was staying in a portion of the Suit Property, but Defendant No. 4 is a
proforma party and no relief was claimed against him.
6. The Plaintiff despite making every endeavour to persuade the
Defendants No. 1 to 3 to vacate the premises, was not successful in doing so
as they were adamant and had dishonest intention to retain the property of
the Plaintiff.
7. It was further asserted that Defendant No. 1 owns a property bearing
No. C-157, Shyam Gali, Kotla Mubarak Pur, New Delhi and is earning more
than Rs.15,000/- per month, while he is occupying the property of the
Plaintiff as a permissive user.
8. Left with no option, Plaintiff sent a Legal Notice dated 13.02.2007, to
which an absolutely false and frivolous Reply dated 22.02.2007, had been
sent by Defendants.
9. Thus, Plaintiff filed the Suit for Mandatory Injunction for directing
the Defendants No. 1 to 3 to vacate the Suit Premises and for Permanent
Injunction to restrain them from creating any third party rights in the Suit
Property.
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10. The Defendants Nos. 1 to 3, in their Written Statement, stated that
the Plaintiff and Defendants Nos. 1 and 4 are real brothers, the Plaintiff
being the eldest. Upon the demise of their father, the parties, then young,
continued as members of a joint family and started earning at a young age.
11. All the three brothers were earning and as the family grew and some
income was generated, the family needed shelter and all the brothers from
the common pool/funds, purchased the land admeasuring 45 sq. yards
bearing C-57, Shiv Gali, Nanak Chand Basti, Kotla Mubarak Pur, New
Delhi and later, raised the construction through their common funds.
12. As the family expanded, the need of another house arose and plot No.
C-93, admeasuring 50 sq. yards, Shiv Gali, Nanak Chand Basti, Kotla
Mubarak Pur, New Delhi was purchased, from the common funds of all the
brothers. Since Plaintiff was the eldest and other brothers had great regard
for him, both the plots were purchased in the name of the Plaintiff and
thereafter, they never felt any need or necessity to mutate the properties or
transfer or partition the said properties.
13. Since the very beginning, all the brothers remained and lived in a joint
family; as the family expanded, Plaintiff shifted to nearby property, i.e. Plot
No. C-93, admeasuring 50 sq. yards, Shiv Gali, Nanak Chand Basti, Kotla
Mubarak Pur, New Delhi. There was no question of Suit Property ever
belonging exclusively to the Plaintiff.
14. Even before the purchase of the Suit Property, all the three brothers
were living in the Suit Property as tenants and had been paying the rent to
the erstwhile owner. The Property was subsequently purchased from the
common funds, and all the three brothers were living in the Suit Property.
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15. It was further asserted that though the area of Property No. C-93,
Kotla Mubarak Pur, New Delhi, was more than the area in possession and
occupation of the Plaintiff, but considering the close relationship and the
mutual agreement/Family Settlement, which had taken place long back in
mid 1980s, no objection has ever been raised by the Defendant. The present
Suit is the outcome of the situation wherein, the sons of the Plaintiffs have
forced and coerced their father i.e. the Plaintiff, to file the present Suit.
16. The Defendants claimed that they were never a licensee, but were in
possession and occupation of Suit premises, as it had been jointly purchased
from the equal contribution made by Defendant No. 1.
17. It was asserted that the Plaintiff is not the exclusive owner of the Suit
Property and thus, the Suit does not disclose any cause of action. The Suit
for Mandatory Injunction and Permanent Injunction is, also not maintainable
for want of seeking declaratory right and the possession of the Suit Property.
18. On merits, all the averments made in the Plaint, were denied and the
defence was taken as narrated above.
19. No Replication was filed by the Plaintiffs, to the Written Statement
of the Defendant Nos. 1 to 3.
20. The Issues were framed on 03.02.2010, as under:-
(i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of
permanent injunction, as prayed for? OPP
(ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of
mandatory injunction, as prayed for? OPP
(iii) Whether there is no cause of action to file the
present suit? OPD
(iv) Relief.
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21. An Additional Issue was framed on 11.01.2013, as under:-
3(a) Whether the defendant No. 1 has provided the fund
for the purchase of the suit property to the plaintiff? OPD
22. The Plaintiff in support of his case, examined as PW-1.
23. PW-2 is Mr. Bhuwneshwar Singh, from Delhi Jal Board, South-II,
Giri Nagar, who produced the documents pertaining to water connection
installed in the name of Plaintiff and the requisite document is exhibited as
Ex.PW-2/1. DW-1,
24. DW-1, Sh. Devi Dayal, Defendant No. 3 and son of Defendant 1,
corroborated the defence taken in the Written Statement.
25. DW-2, Smt. Soni Devi wife of the Defendant No. 1, corroborated the
testimony of DW-1.
26. The learned Civil Judge-cum-Additional Rent Controller, Delhi,
considered the evidence led by both the parties and concluded that it was not
proved that the Suit Property was purchased from the joint funds. It was
further held that the Defendants were not the owners or co-owners of the
Suit Property in question.
27. The Suit was decreed and the Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 were directed to
hand over the possession of the Suit Property to the Plaintiff and they were
also restrained from creating third party rights in the Suit Property.
28. Aggrieved by the said Judgment, the Regular First Appeal bearing
No. RCA DJ No. 99/2019 was filed on behalf of the Defendants/Appellants.
29. The learned District Judge after appreciating the evidence, found
that there is no merit in the Appeal and dismissed it, vide Order and
Judgement dated 31.03.2023.
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30. Aggrieved, the Defendants/Appellants have preferred the Second
Regular Appeal.
31. The grounds of challenge are that the two Courts failed to consider
that the relief of possession, could not have been given to the Respondents,
in a simpliciter Suit for Mandatory Injunction, when there was a serious
dispute about the Respondent’s title over the Suit Property.
32. It was asserted that the Appellant had been in possession of the Suit
Property for last over four decades and at no prior time, did the Respondents
ever dispute the title of Appellant No. 1, over the Suit Property. It is only in
2007 for the first time, that the Respondents came out with the frivolous plea
that the title of the Suit Property belonged to him and the Appellants were
mere licensees and that they were asked to vacate the Suit Property. Despite
there being genuine dispute over the title of the Property, simpliciter Suit for
Injunction, has been allowed.
33. Reliance was placed on Anathula Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy
(Dead) by LRS and Others, (2008) 4 SCC 594 wherein it was observed that
where a cloud is raised on the plaintiff’s title and he does not have
possession, the Suit for declaration and possession, with or without a
consequential injunction, is the remedy. Similar observations have been
made by the Apex Court in Jharkhand State Housing Board vs. Didar Singh
and Another, (2019) 17 SCC 692.
34. It is further asserted that the title of the Property belonged to the
Appellant No. 1, pursuant to a mutual understanding/Family Settlement.
Reliance is placed on Kale and Others vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation
and Others, (1976) 3 SCC 119 wherein it was held that family settlement,
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even if oral, should be given weight as an object of the family settlement is
to protect the family from a long-drawn litigation.
35. The substantial questions of law, which arise for consideration, are
proposed as under:-
(i) Whether the Courts below have erred in entertaining
the Respondent’s suit for injunction simpliciter, as the
case involved disputed and complicated questions
regarding the title of the suit property?
(ii) Whether the Courts below have erred in granting the
relief of possession to the Respondent in a suit for an
injunction simpliciter, in light of the present factual
scenario where there is a cloud over the title of the
Respondent and the possession of the suit property
was with the Appellants?
(iii) Whether the Courts have erred in entertaining
averments in relation to the title of the property in a
suit for a simple injunction simpliciter, instead of
relegating the parties to a remedy by way of a fresh
comprehensive suit for the declaration of title of the
suit property?
(iv) Whether the Courts have erred in entertaining the
Respondent’s suit, despite the Respondent not paying
the adequate Court fees in accordance with the value
of the suit property?
(v) Whether the Courts have erred in failing to give
adequate weightage to the family settlement arrived
between the Appellants and the Respondent?
36. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned Judgment dated
31.03.2023 of learned ADJ-04, Saket Courts, New Delhi, be set-aside.
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37. Written submissions have been filed on behalf of the Appellants, to
corroborate the grounds of Appeal.
38. Further reliance is placed on Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements
Act, 1882 which expressly provides that a licence becomes irrevocable
where the licensee, acting upon the licence, has executed a work of a
permanent character and expressed incurred expenses in the execution
thereof.
39. It is further contended that the Respondents/Plaintiffs had admitted
that the construction was raised by the Defendants, which clearly attracts the
protection of Section 60(b) of the Indian Easement Act, 1882 and renders
the alleged license, irrevocable in law. Reliance is placed on Ram Sarup
Gupta vs. Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors., (1987) 2 SCC 555.
40. There was acquiescence and waiver by the Respondents for over 40
years, which clearly establishes the implied consent of the Respondents.
41. Furthermore, the possession of the Property handed over pursuant to
execution of a decree, does not automatically render an Appeal infructuous
in all cases, especially where the Appeal raises substantial questions of law
and fact.
42. Reliance is placed on Bablu alias Shivraj Singh vs. Rajinder Singh
Ratan (Dead) Thr. Lrs. Smt. Kuldeep Kaur Ratan and Others, (1987) 2 SCC
555. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned Judgment and decrees of
the two Courts, are liable to be set-aside.
43. Written Submissions were filed on behalf of the Respondents
wherein it was submitted that the Appellants are trying to make various
substantial questions of law when in fact, these are questions on fact. There
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is no substantial question of law raised, either in the Appeal or during the
course of arguments.
44. It is further stated that the Plaintiff, Mr. Prabhat was the absolute
owner of the Suit Property by virtue of a Sale Deed dated 16.01.1966, which
has not been disputed in the Written Statement or evidence or challenged by
way of a separate Suit. Since a registered property document is in favour of
the Plaintiff, it establishes the ownership of the Plaintiffs; a mere oral
averment to disprove the registered document, is not sufficient/admissible as
has been held in the case of Karan Madaan vs. Nageshwar Pandey, (2014
(3) CLJ 589 DEL and Bishundeo Narain Rai vs. Anmol Devi, AIR 1998
(SC) 3006.
45. It is further asserted that during the pendency of the Suit, the
Defendants/Appellants had raised unauthorised construction in the Suit
Property. Suit bearing CS No. 313/2014 was filed by the Plaintiff for
removal of unauthorised construction, which was dismissed on 20.12.2014
with a finding that the plaintiff was the owner but had failed to prove the
unauthorised construction.
46. Thereafter, the Plaintiff/Respondent had filed First Appeal bearing
RCA No. 18/2016, which was allowed vide Judgment dated 03.01.2018 and
the Appellants were directed to remove the unauthorised construction. The
Defendants/Appellants herein then filed RSA No. 47/2018 before this Court,
but that was also dismissed vide Judgment dated 20.03.2018.
47. This litigation firmly established that the Plaintiff was the owner of
the Suit Property, by virtue of a registered Sale Deed dated 16.01.1966. The
Defendants/Appellants did not challenge the Judgment of this Court before
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the Supreme Court of India and therefore, the ascertainment of ownership,
has attained finality.
48. It is further submitted that the Defendants admitted the case of the
Plaintiffs in cross-examination, that they had been permitted the use of the
Suit Property by the Plaintiffs. In view of this admission, they cannot deny
ownership in terms of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act. Reliance is
placed on Bimpla Chopra vs. Kuldeep, 2023 Lawpack Delhi 93391.
49. It is submitted that the Appellants have failed to prove any Family
Settlement between them and the Respondents , as has been claimed.
50. Furthermore, the Suit for Mandatory Injunction for Possession against
the permissive user after termination of license, is maintainable as held in
the case of Sant Lal Jain vs. Avtar Singh, AIR 1985 SC 857; Mulk Raj
Kullar vs. Anil Kapur & Ors., 2013 (139) DRJ 303; Ajab Singh vs. Shital
Puri, AIR 1993 All 138 and Joseph Severance and Ors. vs. Benny Mathew
& Ors, 2005 (7) SCC 667.
51. It is, therefore, submitted that there is no merit in the Appeal, which is
liable to be dismissed.
Submissions heard and Record perused.
52. The substantial Question of law is framed as under:
(i) Whether the licence in favour of the Appellants had become
irrevocable on account of construction of a permanent
nature, having been raised by them?
53. It is not disputed that the Plaintiff has a registered Ex. Sale Deed
dated 16.01.1966, Ex.PW-1/1, in his favour. The only plea taken by the
Appellants, was that in fact, they were living in joint family and that all the
three brothers had contributed for purchase of the Suit Property. However,
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aside from bald assertions in their testimony, there is no cogent evidence
produced to show that either there was a joint family existing in the year
1966 between the brothers or that there were joint funds, which had been
used for the purchase of the Property in the name of the Plaintiff, being the
elder son. The claim that Mr. Puran Chand and Late Dhanna Ram, had
contributed for purchase of the Suit Property, aside from being an assertion,
did not get substantiated by any evidence.
54. Moreover, it cannot be overlooked that in the year 1966, the Property
had been purchased vide Sale Deed in the name of the Plaintiffs/
Respondents and till date, no challenge was ever made to the Sale Deed nor
did the Appellants ever claim to be the joint owners of the Property
allegedly being purchased from the joint funds, not did they ever assert that
they have become the owners, pursuant to any Family Settlement.
55. The Appellants may have lived in the Property for 40 years, but it has
emerged in the evidence that it was purely because they were permitted to
occupy the Suit Property by the Respondents. The long permissive
user/occupation of the Suit Property by the Appellants, would not make them
the owners of the Property, especially when the Plaintiff has deposed that
they were only in permissive user. This fact was also admitted by DW1, in
his cross-examination, as observed by the Trial Court.
56. Both the Courts, on appreciation of evidence, have concluded that the
Suit property is in the exclusive ownership of the respondent.
57. The next defence taken on behalf of the Appellants, was that because
of the expansion of families, it was mutually agreed by way of Oral
Settlement that the Suit Property would belong to the Defendant No. 1 and
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Late Mr. Dhanna Ram, in equal share, while the Plaintiff would be the
owner of the Property bearing No. C-93, Kotla Mubarakpur, New Delhi.
58. Though a mutual Settlement or Agreement, had been pleaded, but it
was only to the effect that the Appellants and Late Mr. Dhanna Ram, would
become the owners. There is no specific date or the exact details of the
mutual understanding and the Oral Settlement. This plea is absolutely vague
as there are no particulars of mutual Settlement, mentioned or proved by the
Appellants.
59. The Appellants have placed reliance on Kale and Others (supra), to
assert that the Family Settlement even if oral, should be given weight as the
object of a family settlement is to protect the family from a long-drawn
litigation.
60. However, there is no date of family settlement or arrangement given
by the Appellants. The only claim is that it was mutually agreed that the
Appellants would occupy the Suit Property. The onus was on the Appellants,
to bring cogent evidence in respect of the Family Settlement, which they
have miserably failed to do. The judgment of Kale and Others (supra),
therefore, does not come to their assistance.
61. An argument had been raised that the Suit simpliciter for Mandatory
Injunction for seeking Possession, was not maintainable, without seeking a
declaration in regard to the title, when there is a cloud raised in regard to the
title of the plaintiff.
62. However, as has been rightly contended on behalf of the Respondents,
there is no question of any cloud on the title of the Respondents, for the
simple reason that he became the owner of the Property by virtue of Sale
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Deed dated 16.01.1966, which has never ever been questioned by the
Appellants. There is no cloud whatsoever on the title of the Respondents.
63. Rather, the Appellants have miserably failed to prove their claim that
there were joint funds, which had been utilised for purchase of the Suit
Property. Moreover, no Declaration has ever been sought by the Appellants,
either to challenge the Sale Deed or to seek its cancellation.
64. The Appellant No. 3, Mr. Devi Dayal as DW-1, had next claimed that
the construction was raised by them in the Suit Property, to which no
objection was ever taken by the Plaintiff. A plea of Section 60(b) of the
Indian Easement Act, 1882, has been taken.
65. Before considering this argument, it is necessary to understand what
constitutes a licence in law and also the scope of S.60 Indian Easement Act,
1882. In classical jurisprudence, as explained by Salmond, a licence is
understood as a permission which renders lawful that which would
otherwise be unlawful. It does not create any proprietary right in the
property, but merely confers a personal privilege to do an act upon the
property of another.
66. The essential attribute of a licence, therefore, is its permissive
character. It does not confer any independent right in the property, nor does
it create any interest in favour of the licensee. The continuance of such right
is wholly dependent upon the will of the grantor, and the licensee derives his
authority only so long as such permission subsists.
67. This principle stands incorporated in Section 52 of the Indian
Easements Act, 1882, which defines a licence as a right to do, or continue
to do, something in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, which
would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, but which does not amount
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to an interest in the property. The statutory definition thus, emphasises
the absence of any proprietary element in a licence.
68. In view of its purely permissive nature, a licence is ordinarily
revocable at the instance of the grantor. The licensee cannot claim any
vested or enduring right to remain in possession, once such permission is
withdrawn, unless the case falls within the limited exceptions recognised by
law.
69. Section 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, embodies these
exceptions by providing that a licence, though generally revocable, may
become irrevocable, in certain defined circumstances. These exceptions are
in the nature of statutory limitations on the general rule of revocability and
are to be applied strictly, having regard to the nature of a licence as a
personal and non-proprietary right.
70. Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 reads as under:
“60. License when revocable – “A licence may be revoked
by the grantor, unless–
…
(b) the licensee, acting upon the licence, has executed a
work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the
execution.”
71. Section 60(b) stipulates that a licence is irrevocable, only if it is
coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is in force, or where the
licensee, acting upon the licence, has executed a work of a permanent
character and incurred expenses thereon. Being an exception to the general
rule of revocability, the provision must be strictly construed and the burden
squarely lies on the licensee to establish its applicability.
72. The essential ingredients of Section 60(b), are threefold:
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(i) firstly, the licensee must have executed a work of a permanent
character on the property;
(ii) secondly, such work must have been executed “acting upon the
licence”, that is, pursuant to and within the scope of the permission
granted, and with the knowledge and consent of the licensor; and
(iii) thirdly, the licensee must have incurred expenses in the execution
of such work. The absence of any one of these conditions is fatal to
the plea of irrevocability
73. In Shankar Gopinath Apte v. Gangabai Hariharrao Patwardhan,
(1976) 4 SCC 112, the Supreme Court explained the expression “acting
upon the licence” occurring in Section 60(b). It was held that even if a
person has executed work of a permanent character, the protection of
Section 60(b) would not be available unless such work was executed in his
capacity as a licensee. Where the work is carried out under some other
assertion of right, such as in the belief of being a tenant, prospective
purchaser or owner, it cannot be said that the work was done “acting upon
the licence”.
74. The import of “acting upon the licence” can be well understood in the
light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun
Narain Inter College 1987 SCC OnLine SC 189, wherein Section 60(b) was
applied in a case where land was granted for running an educational
institution and the licensee; acting in furtherance of that very purpose, had
constructed permanent buildings and incurred substantial expenditure. It was
observed that a licence may become irrevocable, where permanent
structures are raised in furtherance of the very purpose of the licence and
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substantial expenditure is incurred. It was emphasised that the construction
must be directly referable to the licence and must be in furtherance of the
permission granted. It is not the mere existence of construction, but its
nexus with the licence, that is determinative.
75. The Supreme Court in Mumbai International Airport Pvt Ltd v
Golden Chariot Airport (2010) 10 SCC 422, has clarified that the doctrine
of irrevocability of a licence is of limited application. The Apex Court
underscored that a licence does not create any interest in immovable
property and that irrevocability is not the norm and arises only in limited
circumstances. In this case, despite the licensee having incurred expenditure
in fitting out and commercially utilising the licensed premises, the Court
declined to treat the licence as irrevocable, holding that mere investment or
expenditure, even if substantial, does not satisfy the requirements of Section
60(b). It was clarified that unless the construction or expenditure is shown
to be authorised and undertaken in pursuance of the licence, the protection
of Section 60(b) cannot be invoked.
76. In Bhaurao S/o Jagoji Junankar v. Geetabai W/o Panjabrao
Deshmukh, 2013 (7) ALL MR 478, it was held that the burden lies on the
licensee to establish execution of permanent work, acting upon the licence,
and incurring of expenses, all of which must cumulatively exist for Section
60(b) to apply.
77. The facts of the present case, may now be considered, in the light of
the law, so discussed. There is no material to show that the alleged licence
was coupled with any transfer of property, nor is there evidence that the
Appellants, acting upon such licence, executed any work of a permanent
character so as to render the licence irrevocable.
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78. On the contrary, the record shows that the Plaintiff had objected to the
unauthorised construction and had initiated separate proceedings in that
regard, culminating in directions against the Appellants for removal of the
unauthorised construction. Once the construction itself has been found to be
unauthorised, it cannot be said that the Appellants had “acted upon the
licence” within the meaning of Section 60(b) or that any proprietary interest
was created in favour of the Appellants by the said act.
79. The evidence on record establishes that the construction, if any, was
carried out unauthorisedly by the Appellants and that too, only as
permissive users under a licence. The Plaintiffs/Respondents had explained
in the Written Submissions that a Civil Suit bearing CS No. 313/2014 was
filed in regard to this unauthorized construction, which was allowed in
RCA No.18/2016, vide Judgment dated 03.01.2018, and the Appellants
were directed to remove the unauthorised construction.
80. Therefore, it cannot be said that no objection was ever taken by the
Appellants in regard to the construction. Moreover, it has been established
that the construction was raised unauthorisedly. The requisite conditions of
S.60 have therefore, not been satisfied; rather it is established the appellants
had carried out unauthorized construction, against the wishes of the
Respondent.
81. As clarified by the Supreme Court in Mumbai International Airport
(supra), mere expenditure or commercial utilisation of premises cannot, in
the absence of the statutory conditions, render a licence irrevocable. The
Appellants have failed to demonstrate acquisition of any easementary right
or any independent interest or legal right in the Suit Property.
RSA 101/2023 Page 18 of 19
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
Signing Date:02.05.2026
16:23:44
82. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that the Appeal, is
devoid of merit, and is accordingly dismissed.
83. All pending applications are disposed of, accordingly.
(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)
JUDGE
MAY 02, 2026
N/RS
RSA 101/2023 Page 19 of 19
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
Signing Date:02.05.2026
16:23:44
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