Riyaz Ahmad Wani Age 52 Years vs Abdul Hamid Dar on 28 April, 2026

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    Jammu & Kashmir High Court – Srinagar Bench

    Riyaz Ahmad Wani Age 52 Years vs Abdul Hamid Dar on 28 April, 2026

          HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
                         AT SRINAGAR
    
                             CM(M) No. 118/2026
    
                                                             Reserved on : 20.04.2026
                                                           Pronounced on: 28.04.2026
                                                             Uploaded on: 28 .04.2026
                                                          Whether the operative part or full
                                                            Judgment is pronounced: Full
    
    
    Riyaz Ahmad Wani age 52 years
    s/o Gh. Rasool Wani                                         ...Petitioner(s)
    R/o Tragpora Rafiabad, Baramulla
    
          Through:        Mr. Parvaiz Nazir, Advocate
    
    
    
    Vs.
    Abdul Hamid Dar                                              ...Respondent(s)
    S/o Sajad Ahmad Dar
    R/o Haigam Sopore Baramulla
               Through: None
    
    CORAM:
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, JUDGE.
                                   JUDGEMENT
    

    BRIEF FACTS:

    01. The petitioner has invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court

    under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, calling in question the

    Lok Adalat Award dated 08.03.2025 passed in File No. 192 titled

    Abdul Hamid Dar vs Riyaz Ahmad Wani and the proceedings

    emanating therefrom.

    02. It emerges from the record that the respondent/complainant instituted a

    criminal complaint under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the

    Negotiable Instruments Act before the Court of Chief Judicial

    Magistrate, Sopore. The complaint was founded on two cheques

    Page 1 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
    bearing Nos. 426904 dated 01.06.2024 and 426905 dated 02.08.2024,

    each for an amount of ₹50,000/-, drawn in favour of the complainant

    and maintained at J&K Bank Branch, Baramulla. The said cheques,

    upon presentation, came to be dishonoured with the remarks “Funds

    Insufficient and Alterations require drawer’s attention,” as reflected in

    the return memos dated 11.07.2024 and 02.08.2024.

    03. The material on record further reveals that the complainant had

    business dealings with the brother of the petitioner, who had allegedly

    taken an advance amount of ₹4,50,000/- from the complainant in

    connection with supply of apple boxes, which transaction did not

    fructify. It is stated that the petitioner thereafter undertook to discharge

    the liability of his brother and, in furtherance thereof, issued the

    aforesaid cheques in favour of the complainant. Upon dishonour of the

    cheques and alleged failure to make payment within the statutory

    period despite issuance of demand notice, the complaint under Section

    138 NI Act came to be filed.

    04. Upon issuance of process, the petitioner appeared before the learned

    Magistrate, and his statement under Section 251 Code of Criminal

    Procedure was recorded on 11.02.2025. In the said statement, the

    petitioner acknowledged the cheque amount, while asserting that the

    liability pertained to his brother, who was residing outside the country.

    05. The record further indicates that on 19.02.2025, after recording the

    statement of the petitioner, the learned Magistrate obtained an

    undertaking from the petitioner with regard to payment of the amount

    Page 2 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
    involved and, instead of proceeding further with the trial, referred the

    matter to the Lok Adalat for amicable settlement.

    06. Pursuant thereto, the matter came up before the Lok Adalat on

    08.03.2025, where an award came to be passed recording that the

    parties had amicably settled the dispute. In terms of the said award, the

    petitioner/accused undertook to pay an amount of ₹3,80,000/- (Rupees

    Three Lakhs Eighty Thousand only) to the complainant in full and

    final settlement of the dispute, within the stipulated period, i.e., by the

    end of March, 2025. The award further provided that in case of failure

    to adhere to the terms of settlement, the petitioner herein shall be liable

    to one year imprisonment and payment of double of the settled amount.

    07. On the basis of the aforesaid Lok Adalat Award, the respondent

    initiated execution proceedings before the competent court. It is stated

    that in the course of such proceedings, the executing court proceeded

    to issue coercive process, including warrants of arrest against the

    petitioner, and listed the matter at short intervals for ensuring

    compliance of the award.

    08. Aggrieved by the Lok Adalat Award dated 08.03.2025, and the

    consequential execution proceedings initiated pursuant thereto, the

    petitioner has filed the present petition invoking the supervisory

    jurisdiction of this Court.

    SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

    09. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned Lok

    Adalat Award dated 08.03.2025 is ex facie illegal and unsustainable in

    the eyes of law, inasmuch as the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987

    does not empower the Lok Adalat to impose penal consequences or

    Page 3 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
    pass an order amounting to conviction. It is contended that the

    direction providing for imprisonment and payment of double the

    settled amount, in case of default, travels beyond the statutory mandate

    and is liable to be quashed.

    10. It is further submitted that the alleged settlement was not voluntary, as

    the petitioner was neither afforded adequate opportunity to peruse the

    complaint nor to understand the terms thereof, and the consent was

    obtained under undue influence and pressure, thereby vitiating the

    entire proceedings.

    11. Learned counsel submits that the proceedings before the Lok Adalat

    were conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice, and the

    petitioner was denied a fair and reasonable opportunity of being heard,

    rendering the impugned award bad in law.

    12. It is also contended that the Lok Adalat has exceeded its jurisdiction by

    entertaining a matter involving criminal liability and by virtually

    converting the same into civil liability through execution proceedings,

    which is impermissible under law.

    13. Learned counsel further submits that the executing court has acted

    arbitrarily and in violation of the prescribed procedure, inasmuch as no

    proper notice or opportunity to show cause was granted to the

    petitioner and warrants were issued in a mechanical manner, thereby

    vitiating the entire execution proceedings.

    LEGAL ANALYSIS

    14. Heard and considered.

    Page 4 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026

    15. Before adverting to the factual matrix of the present case, this Court

    deems it appropriate to reiterate that an award passed by a Lok Adalat

    on the basis of a settlement arrived at between the parties attains

    finality, is binding upon the parties, and is executable as a decree of a

    civil court. No appeal lies against such an award. However, the same

    may be assailed before the High Court in exercise of its writ

    jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India on

    limited grounds, inter alia, absence of free consent, jurisdictional error,

    or fraud.

    16. In this regard, it may be appropriate to refer to Section 21 of the Legal

    Services Authorities Act, 1987, which is extracted as under:

    “21. Award of Lok Adalat.– (1) Every award of the Lok
    Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court or, as
    the case may be, an order of any other court and where a
    compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok
    Adalat in a case referred to it under sub-section (1) of section
    20
    , the court-fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the
    manner provided under the Court-fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870).

    (2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and
    binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall
    lie to any court against the award.”

    SPONSORED

    17. This legal position stands consistently reiterated in a catena of cases.
    Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punjab v. Jalour Singh reported as (2008)
    2 SCC 660 has held as under:

    “It is true that where an award is made by the Lok Adalat in
    terms of a settlement arrived at between the parties (which
    is duly signed by parties and annexed to the award of the
    Lok Adalat), it becomes final and binding on the parties to
    the settlement and becomes executable as if it is a decree of
    a civil court, and no appeal lies against it to any court. If
    any party wants to challenge such an award based on

    Page 5 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
    settlement, it can be done only by filing a petition under
    Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution, that too
    on very limited grounds. But where no compromise or
    settlement is signed by the parties and the order of the Lok
    Adalat does not refer to any settlement, but directs the
    respondent to either make payment if it agrees to the order,
    or approach the High Court for disposal of appeal on
    merits, if it does not agree, is not an award of the Lok
    Adalat. The question of challenging such an order in a
    petition under Article 227 does not arise. As already
    noticed, in such a situation, the High Court ought to have
    heard and disposed of the appeal on merits.”

    18. Applying the aforesaid settled position of law to the facts of the

    present case, it is evident that the impugned Lok Adalat Award dated

    08.03.2025 has been passed on the basis of a settlement arrived at

    between the parties and duly recorded by the Lok Adalat. The award

    clearly reflects that the petitioner/accused undertook to pay an amount

    of ₹3,80,000/- to the respondent/complainant in full and final

    settlement of the dispute within a stipulated time frame.

    19. The record further reveals that the petitioner had appeared before the

    learned Magistrate, his statement under Section 251 Code of Criminal

    Procedure was recorded, and thereafter, upon an undertaking given by

    him with regard to payment, the matter was referred to the Lok Adalat.

    The petitioner, thus, was fully aware of the proceedings and

    consciously participated in the settlement process, which culminated in

    the passing of the impugned award.

    20. In such circumstances, the contention of the petitioner seeking to assail

    the Lok Adalat Award is wholly misconceived. Once a settlement has

    been voluntarily arrived at and an award has been passed in terms

    Page 6 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
    thereof, the same attains finality and becomes binding upon the parties,

    being executable as a decree of a civil court in terms of Section 21 of

    the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.

    21. The grounds on which such an award can be interfered with in exercise

    of jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India are

    extremely limited, namely absence of free consent, fraud, or

    jurisdictional error. In the present case, no material has been brought

    on record to demonstrate that the petitioner’s consent was vitiated by

    coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation, or that the Lok Adalat acted

    without jurisdiction.

    22. Mere subsequent failure on the part of the petitioner to adhere to the

    terms of settlement cannot be a ground to invalidate an otherwise

    lawful and binding Lok Adalat Award. Permitting such challenges

    would defeat the very object of the Legal Services Authorities Act,

    1987, which is to ensure expeditious resolution of disputes through

    consensual settlement.

    23. It is further to be noticed that the petitioner, at no point prior to the

    passing of the award, raised any objection with regard to the reference

    of the matter to the Lok Adalat or the terms of settlement recorded

    therein. Having participated in the proceedings and having consciously

    undertaken to discharge the liability, the petitioner is under law

    estopped from resiling from the same at a subsequent stage, merely, on

    account of inconvenience or inability to comply.

    24. The conduct of the petitioner also assumes significance inasmuch as,

    despite having acknowledged the cheque amount during the

    Page 7 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
    proceedings before the learned Magistrate, he chose to settle the matter

    before the Lok Adalat and derive the benefit of avoidance of criminal

    prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

    Having availed such benefit, the petitioner cannot now be permitted to

    approbate and reprobate by challenging the very settlement which was

    voluntarily entered into.

    25. The material placed on record further demonstrates that, although the

    petitioner has purported to lay a challenge to the award passed by the

    Lok Adalat, no challenge, whatsoever, has been thrown to the

    execution proceedings arising therefrom. A careful reading of the

    pleadings further reveals that even in the prayer clause, there is no

    specific challenge to the execution proceedings, and only a vague and

    general reference to the Lok Adalat and subsequent proceedings is

    made

    26. In the absence of any explicit challenge to the execution proceedings,

    the present petition, insofar as it seeks to assail the consequences

    flowing from such proceedings, is legally untenable.

    27. On this ground alone, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed as not

    maintainable, this defect going to the very root of the matter and

    striking at the maintainability of the petition itself. In the absence of a

    specific challenge to the execution proceedings, no relief can be

    granted, and the petition is liable to fail on this ground alone.

    28. Furthermore, the conduct of the petitioner unmistakably demonstrates

    a complete lack of bona fides in relation to compliance with the award.

    If the petitioner was genuinely dissatisfied with the terms and

    Page 8 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
    conditions embodied therein, there was no occasion for him to have

    consented to the award in the first place. He could very well have

    withdrawn from the proceedings, as is permissible in law, instead of

    consciously participating therein and appending his signature to the

    settlement. His active participation and express consent clearly

    indicate that he had accepted the award at the relevant point in time.

    The subsequent challenge, raised only after the commencement of

    execution proceedings, gives rise to a legitimate inference that the

    petitioner merely intended to buy time by participating in the

    proceedings and had no real intention either to honour the settlement

    or to question it at the appropriate stage. Such conduct is wholly

    inconsistent with fairness and reflects an absence of bona fides.

    29. Insofar as the petitioner’s submission that the impugned award dated

    08.03.2025, by incorporating stipulations of imprisonment and

    payment of double the settled amount upon default, travels beyond the

    scope of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, on the ground that a

    Lok Adalat lacks penal jurisdiction, thereby rendering the award ex

    facie illegal and liable to be quashed, is concerned, upon closer

    scrutiny does not withstand legal examination.

    30. At the outset, the scheme of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987

    makes it clear that a Lok Adalat does not exercise adjudicatory powers

    in the strict sense, much less any criminal or penal jurisdiction. Its role

    is confined to facilitating a voluntary settlement between the parties,

    and the award so passed derives its binding force not from an

    adjudication on merits, but from the consensus ad idem of the parties.

    Page 9 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
    Section 21 of the Act gives such an award the status of a decree of a

    civil court, rendering it final and binding.

    31. However, this statutory limitation does not imply that parties are

    precluded from incorporating deterrent or default clauses within the

    terms of their settlement. A compromise may validly include

    stipulations providing for enhanced liability upon breach, so as to

    secure performance. Such clauses are neither uncommon nor

    impermissible; rather, they are recognised incidents of a binding

    settlement, unless they are shown to be opposed to law.

    32. In the present case, the stipulation providing for payment of a higher

    amount in the event of default is clearly compensatory and coercive in

    a civil sense, intended to ensure compliance with the settlement. It

    cannot, by any stretch, be equated with the imposition of a “penalty” in

    the criminal law sense. The petitioner, having voluntarily agreed to

    such a term, cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate by

    accepting the benefit of settlement while repudiating its burdens.

    33. As regards the clause referring to “imprisonment”, it must be

    construed in its proper legal context. A Lok Adalat, undoubtedly,

    cannot order conviction or impose a sentence of imprisonment. Any

    such consequence does not flow from the award per se, but, if at all,

    from the process of enforcement in accordance with law. Once an

    award attains the status of a civil decree, its enforcement is governed

    by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that process, the

    executing court may, subject to statutory safeguards, resort to

    permissible coercive measures for enforcement of a decree, including

    Page 10 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
    those contemplated under Order XXI. Therefore, the mere presence of

    a clause alluding to coercive consequences does not render the award

    without jurisdiction; at best, it is a reflection of the legal consequences

    that may follow upon non-compliance.

    34. Importantly, the petitioner has neither alleged nor established that the

    settlement was vitiated by fraud, coercion, misrepresentation, or lack

    of free consent.The absence of such foundational pleadings, the

    challenge essentially seeks to reopen a concluded settlement on

    technical grounds, which runs contrary to the very object of the Act,

    namely, to ensure finality and expeditious resolution of disputes.

    35. Viewed thus, the impugned award cannot be characterised as ex facie

    illegal or beyond jurisdiction. The grievance, if any, pertains not to the

    competence of the Lok Adalat to record the settlement, but to the

    consequences of its breach–an aspect that squarely falls within the

    domain of execution proceedings.

    36. It would be profitable, at this stage, to advert to Section 138 of the

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which statutorily engrafts

    consequences for the dishonour of a cheque on account of

    insufficiency of funds or where it exceeds the arrangement with the

    bank. The provision unequivocally declares such dishonour to

    constitute an offence and renders the drawer liable to punishment with

    imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine

    which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both.

    37. For facility of reference, Section 138 is reproduced hereunder:

    “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.–

    Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by

    Page 11 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
    him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another
    person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part,
    of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either
    because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account
    is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount
    arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with
    that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence
    and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be
    punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two
    years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the
    cheque, or with both.”

    38. Viewed in the aforesaid statutory backdrop, the challenge laid by the

    petitioner loses much of its force. The stipulations forming part of the

    impugned award do not introduce any alien or impermissible

    consequence; rather, they mirror the very contours of liability that the

    legislature itself has contemplated in cases of cheque dishonour.

    39. Thus, the petitioner’s attempt to characterise the stipulations in the

    award as being contrary to law is misconceived and unsustainable.

    40. In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned Lok Adalat Award

    dated 08.03.2025 is hereby upheld and shall continue to remain

    binding upon the parties, being enforceable in accordance with law.

    41. Consequently, the present petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed.

    POSTSCRIPT

    42. Before parting with the instant matter, this Court deems it necessary to

    emphasise the raison d’être behind the introduction of Lok Adalats

    and the necessity which impelled the legislature to conceive such a

    mechanism under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.

    43. The institution of Lok Adalats was envisaged as a pragmatic response

    to the ever-increasing burden before regular courts, with the object of

    Page 12 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
    providing a speedy, efficacious and cost-effective forum for resolution

    of disputes through the process of conciliation and mutual settlement.

    The underlying philosophy was to promote access to justice by

    encouraging amicable resolution, thereby reducing the burden on the

    formal judicial system and preserving valuable judicial time.

    44. It was in recognition of these objectives that Lok Adalats were

    designed not as adjudicatory bodies, but as conciliatory forums, where

    disputes are resolved through consensus rather than by determination

    on merits. The success of this mechanism, therefore, hinges upon

    adherence to its foundational principles of voluntariness, fairness and

    absence of coercion.

    45. It is in this backdrop, Rule 13 of the National Legal Services Authority

    (Lok Adalats) Regulations, 2009, which prescribes the procedure to be

    followed by Lok Adalats is very pertinent and the same is reproduced

    hereunder for facility of reference:

    “Procedure in Lok Adalats.–

    (1) Members of Lok Adalat have the role of statutory conciliators
    only and have no judicial role and they, mutatis mutandis, may
    follow the procedure laid down in sections 67 to 76 of the
    Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996).
    (2) Members of Lok Adalat shall not pressurise or coerce any of the
    parties to compromise or settle cases or matters, either directly or
    indirectly.

    (3) In a Lok Adalat, the members shall discuss the subject matter
    with the parties for arriving at a just settlement or compromise and
    such members of the Lok Adalat shall assist the parties in an
    independent and impartial manner in their attempt to reach an
    amicable settlement of their dispute:

    Provided that if it is found necessary, the assistance of an
    independent person or a trained mediator may also be availed of
    by the Lok Adalat.

    Page 13 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
    (4) Members of Lok Adalat shall be guided by principles of natural
    justice, equity, fair play, objectivity, giving consideration to, among
    other things, the rights and obligations of the parties, custom and
    usages, and the circumstances surrounding the dispute.
    (5) The Lok Adalat may conduct the proceedings in such manner as
    it considers appropriate, taking into account the circumstances of
    the case, wishes of the parties including any request by a party to
    the Lok Adalat to hear oral statements, and the need for a speedy
    settlement of the dispute.

    (6) The Lok Adalat shall not determine a reference at its own
    instance, but shall determine only on the basis of a compromise or
    settlement between the parties by making an award in terms of the
    compromise or settlement arrived at:

    Provided that no Lok Adalat has the power to hear the parties to
    adjudicate their dispute as a regular court:

    Provided further that the award of the Lok Adalat is neither a
    verdict nor an opinion arrived at by any decision-making process.”

    46. A conjoint and purposive reading of the aforesaid provision,

    particularly Rule 13(1) and the second proviso to Rule 13(6) of the

    National Legal Services Authority (Lok Adalats) Regulations, 2009,

    makes it clear that the Members of Lok Adalat function solely as

    statutory conciliators and are divested of any adjudicatory role. The

    award that emanates from such proceedings is not the result of a

    judicial determination but merely a voluntary settlement arrived at

    between the parties.

    47. This Court deems it appropriate to observe that the Legal Services

    Authorities Act, 1987 envisages Lok Adalats as an efficacious

    mechanism of alternate dispute resolution, intended to foster amicable

    settlements, reduce adversarial litigation, and consequently ease the

    mounting burden on regular courts, thereby conserving valuable

    judicial time.

    Page 14 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026

    48. However, the practical experience has, in certain cases, belied this

    salutary object. Instead of acting as an effective instrument for

    reducing pendency, Lok Adalats, on occasion, appear to have

    contributed to further litigation, thereby frustrating the very purpose

    for which they were conceived.

    49. This Court is constrained to observe that, day in and day out, it is

    coming across cases where parties seek to challenge awards passed by

    Lok Adalats. This growing tendency leads to the unnecessary

    invocation of the writ jurisdiction of this Court and results in a waste

    of valuable judicial time, which ought to be devoted to genuine and

    deserving matters. The very object behind the establishment of Lok

    Adalats, that is, to ensure expeditious, amicable and cost-effective

    resolution of disputes and to reduce the burden on regular courts, is

    defeated when such awards are routinely and indiscriminately brought

    under challenge.

    50. This leads to the moot question as to what has gone awry in the

    functioning of Lok Adalats so as to render their foundational objective,

    that is, amicable settlement and reduction of judicial burden, largely

    illusory.

    51. The answer, in the considered view of this Court, lies in the manner of

    discharge of duties both by the parties as well as by the Members

    constituting the Lok Adalat. The statutory scheme casts a

    corresponding obligation on both. The parties are expected to approach

    the Lok Adalat with bona fides and a genuine intent to resolve their

    disputes. They cannot be permitted to act in a mischievous or evasive

    Page 15 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
    manner by ostensibly consenting to a settlement during the

    proceedings and thereafter resiling from the same, thereby setting at

    naught the sanctity of the process and inviting further rounds of

    litigation.

    52. Equally, the Members constituting the Lok Adalat are under a solemn

    duty to ensure that the settlement arrived at is voluntary, informed, and

    lawful, and not the result of any coercion, undue influence or

    misapprehension. They must scrupulously adhere to the mandate of

    Rule 13 of the National Legal Services Authority (Lok Adalats)

    Regulations, 2009 and refrain from assuming any adjudicatory posture

    or from imposing terms upon the parties. The role of the Members is

    facilitative and not determinative, and any deviation therefrom would

    vitiate the very foundation of the award.

    53. At the same time, this Court deems it necessary to emphasise that Lok

    Adalats, while facilitating settlements and passing awards, must

    exercise due care to ensure that the terms and conditions incorporated

    therein are unambiguous, practicable, and capable of effective

    enforcement. Any stipulation that is inherently impracticable, or

    incapable of execution is bound to generate further disputes, thereby

    defeating the very object of settlement and giving rise to avoidable

    rounds of litigation.

    54. An award must be capable of implementation in its true letter and spirit.

    Terms which are vague, unduly onerous, or contingent upon uncertain

    events beyond the control of the parties render the settlement illusory

    and incapable of execution. The inclusion of such impracticable

    Page 16 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
    conditions not only diminishes the efficacy of the award but also sows

    the seeds for further disputes at the stage of enforcement.

    55. The members of the Lok Adalat must, therefore, ensure that the terms

    embodied in the award are precise, realistic, and capable of compliance

    within the framework of law. Directions which the parties cannot

    reasonably perform, or which are inherently incapable of enforcement,

    ought not to find place in the award. What is unenforceable in law

    should not be stipulated in the first instance.

    56. Ultimately, the efficacy and credibility of a Lok Adalat award lie in its

    workability and enforceability. The members would do well to confine

    the settlement to lawful, practicable, and executable terms, so that the

    award achieves its intended purpose of bringing finality to the dispute,

    rather than engendering further litigation.

    57. It is imperative that the rules engrafted under Rule 13 of National

    Legal Services Authority (Lok Adalats) Regulations, 2009 are strictly

    observed in its letter and spirit. Only such awards as are founded upon

    a genuine, lawful and consensual compromise between the parties can

    sustain the test of legality. Any award which travels beyond this

    limited jurisdiction, or which is impracticable, unconscionable or

    contrary to law, cannot be sustained and would be liable to be

    interfered with in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction.

    58. It is, therefore, incumbent upon both the parties participating in the

    Lok Adalat proccedings and the Members constituting the Lok Adalat

    to remain conscious of the nature and limits of the proceedings. While

    the parties must ensure that any settlement entered into is voluntary,

    Page 17 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
    lawful and capable of enforcement, the Members constituting the Lok

    Adalat are equally obliged to confine themselves strictly to recording

    such settlement as arrived at, without superimposing any extraneous,

    coercive or legally impermissible conditions. Any deviation on either

    count not only renders the award susceptible to judicial scrutiny but

    also erodes the credibility and efficacy of the Lok Adalat mechanism

    as an effective forum for alternative dispute resolution.

    (WASIM SADIQ NARGAL)
    JUDGE
    SRINAGAR:

    28.04.2026
    Shamim Ah. Dar/PS

    Whether the order is speaking: Yes
    Whether the order is reportable: Yes

    Page 18 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026



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