― Advertisement ―

HomeRiyaz Ahmad Wani Age 52 Years vs Abdul Hamid Dar on 28...

Riyaz Ahmad Wani Age 52 Years vs Abdul Hamid Dar on 28 April, 2026

ADVERTISEMENT

Jammu & Kashmir High Court – Srinagar Bench

Riyaz Ahmad Wani Age 52 Years vs Abdul Hamid Dar on 28 April, 2026

      HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
                     AT SRINAGAR

                         CM(M) No. 118/2026

                                                         Reserved on : 20.04.2026
                                                       Pronounced on: 28.04.2026
                                                         Uploaded on: 28 .04.2026
                                                      Whether the operative part or full
                                                        Judgment is pronounced: Full


Riyaz Ahmad Wani age 52 years
s/o Gh. Rasool Wani                                         ...Petitioner(s)
R/o Tragpora Rafiabad, Baramulla

      Through:        Mr. Parvaiz Nazir, Advocate



Vs.
Abdul Hamid Dar                                              ...Respondent(s)
S/o Sajad Ahmad Dar
R/o Haigam Sopore Baramulla
           Through: None

CORAM:
      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, JUDGE.
                               JUDGEMENT

BRIEF FACTS:

01. The petitioner has invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court

under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, calling in question the

Lok Adalat Award dated 08.03.2025 passed in File No. 192 titled

Abdul Hamid Dar vs Riyaz Ahmad Wani and the proceedings

emanating therefrom.

02. It emerges from the record that the respondent/complainant instituted a

criminal complaint under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act before the Court of Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Sopore. The complaint was founded on two cheques

Page 1 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
bearing Nos. 426904 dated 01.06.2024 and 426905 dated 02.08.2024,

each for an amount of ₹50,000/-, drawn in favour of the complainant

and maintained at J&K Bank Branch, Baramulla. The said cheques,

upon presentation, came to be dishonoured with the remarks “Funds

Insufficient and Alterations require drawer’s attention,” as reflected in

the return memos dated 11.07.2024 and 02.08.2024.

03. The material on record further reveals that the complainant had

business dealings with the brother of the petitioner, who had allegedly

taken an advance amount of ₹4,50,000/- from the complainant in

connection with supply of apple boxes, which transaction did not

fructify. It is stated that the petitioner thereafter undertook to discharge

the liability of his brother and, in furtherance thereof, issued the

aforesaid cheques in favour of the complainant. Upon dishonour of the

cheques and alleged failure to make payment within the statutory

period despite issuance of demand notice, the complaint under Section

138 NI Act came to be filed.

04. Upon issuance of process, the petitioner appeared before the learned

Magistrate, and his statement under Section 251 Code of Criminal

Procedure was recorded on 11.02.2025. In the said statement, the

petitioner acknowledged the cheque amount, while asserting that the

liability pertained to his brother, who was residing outside the country.

05. The record further indicates that on 19.02.2025, after recording the

statement of the petitioner, the learned Magistrate obtained an

undertaking from the petitioner with regard to payment of the amount

Page 2 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
involved and, instead of proceeding further with the trial, referred the

matter to the Lok Adalat for amicable settlement.

06. Pursuant thereto, the matter came up before the Lok Adalat on

08.03.2025, where an award came to be passed recording that the

parties had amicably settled the dispute. In terms of the said award, the

petitioner/accused undertook to pay an amount of ₹3,80,000/- (Rupees

Three Lakhs Eighty Thousand only) to the complainant in full and

final settlement of the dispute, within the stipulated period, i.e., by the

end of March, 2025. The award further provided that in case of failure

to adhere to the terms of settlement, the petitioner herein shall be liable

to one year imprisonment and payment of double of the settled amount.

07. On the basis of the aforesaid Lok Adalat Award, the respondent

initiated execution proceedings before the competent court. It is stated

that in the course of such proceedings, the executing court proceeded

to issue coercive process, including warrants of arrest against the

petitioner, and listed the matter at short intervals for ensuring

compliance of the award.

08. Aggrieved by the Lok Adalat Award dated 08.03.2025, and the

consequential execution proceedings initiated pursuant thereto, the

petitioner has filed the present petition invoking the supervisory

jurisdiction of this Court.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

09. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned Lok

Adalat Award dated 08.03.2025 is ex facie illegal and unsustainable in

the eyes of law, inasmuch as the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987

does not empower the Lok Adalat to impose penal consequences or

Page 3 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
pass an order amounting to conviction. It is contended that the

direction providing for imprisonment and payment of double the

settled amount, in case of default, travels beyond the statutory mandate

and is liable to be quashed.

10. It is further submitted that the alleged settlement was not voluntary, as

the petitioner was neither afforded adequate opportunity to peruse the

complaint nor to understand the terms thereof, and the consent was

obtained under undue influence and pressure, thereby vitiating the

entire proceedings.

11. Learned counsel submits that the proceedings before the Lok Adalat

were conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice, and the

petitioner was denied a fair and reasonable opportunity of being heard,

rendering the impugned award bad in law.

12. It is also contended that the Lok Adalat has exceeded its jurisdiction by

entertaining a matter involving criminal liability and by virtually

converting the same into civil liability through execution proceedings,

which is impermissible under law.

13. Learned counsel further submits that the executing court has acted

arbitrarily and in violation of the prescribed procedure, inasmuch as no

proper notice or opportunity to show cause was granted to the

petitioner and warrants were issued in a mechanical manner, thereby

vitiating the entire execution proceedings.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

14. Heard and considered.

Page 4 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026

15. Before adverting to the factual matrix of the present case, this Court

deems it appropriate to reiterate that an award passed by a Lok Adalat

on the basis of a settlement arrived at between the parties attains

finality, is binding upon the parties, and is executable as a decree of a

civil court. No appeal lies against such an award. However, the same

may be assailed before the High Court in exercise of its writ

jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India on

limited grounds, inter alia, absence of free consent, jurisdictional error,

or fraud.

16. In this regard, it may be appropriate to refer to Section 21 of the Legal

Services Authorities Act, 1987, which is extracted as under:

“21. Award of Lok Adalat.– (1) Every award of the Lok
Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court or, as
the case may be, an order of any other court and where a
compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok
Adalat in a case referred to it under sub-section (1) of section
20
, the court-fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the
manner provided under the Court-fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870).

(2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and
binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall
lie to any court against the award.”

SPONSORED

17. This legal position stands consistently reiterated in a catena of cases.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punjab v. Jalour Singh reported as (2008)
2 SCC 660 has held as under:

“It is true that where an award is made by the Lok Adalat in
terms of a settlement arrived at between the parties (which
is duly signed by parties and annexed to the award of the
Lok Adalat), it becomes final and binding on the parties to
the settlement and becomes executable as if it is a decree of
a civil court, and no appeal lies against it to any court. If
any party wants to challenge such an award based on

Page 5 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
settlement, it can be done only by filing a petition under
Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution, that too
on very limited grounds. But where no compromise or
settlement is signed by the parties and the order of the Lok
Adalat does not refer to any settlement, but directs the
respondent to either make payment if it agrees to the order,
or approach the High Court for disposal of appeal on
merits, if it does not agree, is not an award of the Lok
Adalat. The question of challenging such an order in a
petition under Article 227 does not arise. As already
noticed, in such a situation, the High Court ought to have
heard and disposed of the appeal on merits.”

18. Applying the aforesaid settled position of law to the facts of the

present case, it is evident that the impugned Lok Adalat Award dated

08.03.2025 has been passed on the basis of a settlement arrived at

between the parties and duly recorded by the Lok Adalat. The award

clearly reflects that the petitioner/accused undertook to pay an amount

of ₹3,80,000/- to the respondent/complainant in full and final

settlement of the dispute within a stipulated time frame.

19. The record further reveals that the petitioner had appeared before the

learned Magistrate, his statement under Section 251 Code of Criminal

Procedure was recorded, and thereafter, upon an undertaking given by

him with regard to payment, the matter was referred to the Lok Adalat.

The petitioner, thus, was fully aware of the proceedings and

consciously participated in the settlement process, which culminated in

the passing of the impugned award.

20. In such circumstances, the contention of the petitioner seeking to assail

the Lok Adalat Award is wholly misconceived. Once a settlement has

been voluntarily arrived at and an award has been passed in terms

Page 6 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
thereof, the same attains finality and becomes binding upon the parties,

being executable as a decree of a civil court in terms of Section 21 of

the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.

21. The grounds on which such an award can be interfered with in exercise

of jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India are

extremely limited, namely absence of free consent, fraud, or

jurisdictional error. In the present case, no material has been brought

on record to demonstrate that the petitioner’s consent was vitiated by

coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation, or that the Lok Adalat acted

without jurisdiction.

22. Mere subsequent failure on the part of the petitioner to adhere to the

terms of settlement cannot be a ground to invalidate an otherwise

lawful and binding Lok Adalat Award. Permitting such challenges

would defeat the very object of the Legal Services Authorities Act,

1987, which is to ensure expeditious resolution of disputes through

consensual settlement.

23. It is further to be noticed that the petitioner, at no point prior to the

passing of the award, raised any objection with regard to the reference

of the matter to the Lok Adalat or the terms of settlement recorded

therein. Having participated in the proceedings and having consciously

undertaken to discharge the liability, the petitioner is under law

estopped from resiling from the same at a subsequent stage, merely, on

account of inconvenience or inability to comply.

24. The conduct of the petitioner also assumes significance inasmuch as,

despite having acknowledged the cheque amount during the

Page 7 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
proceedings before the learned Magistrate, he chose to settle the matter

before the Lok Adalat and derive the benefit of avoidance of criminal

prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Having availed such benefit, the petitioner cannot now be permitted to

approbate and reprobate by challenging the very settlement which was

voluntarily entered into.

25. The material placed on record further demonstrates that, although the

petitioner has purported to lay a challenge to the award passed by the

Lok Adalat, no challenge, whatsoever, has been thrown to the

execution proceedings arising therefrom. A careful reading of the

pleadings further reveals that even in the prayer clause, there is no

specific challenge to the execution proceedings, and only a vague and

general reference to the Lok Adalat and subsequent proceedings is

made

26. In the absence of any explicit challenge to the execution proceedings,

the present petition, insofar as it seeks to assail the consequences

flowing from such proceedings, is legally untenable.

27. On this ground alone, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed as not

maintainable, this defect going to the very root of the matter and

striking at the maintainability of the petition itself. In the absence of a

specific challenge to the execution proceedings, no relief can be

granted, and the petition is liable to fail on this ground alone.

28. Furthermore, the conduct of the petitioner unmistakably demonstrates

a complete lack of bona fides in relation to compliance with the award.

If the petitioner was genuinely dissatisfied with the terms and

Page 8 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
conditions embodied therein, there was no occasion for him to have

consented to the award in the first place. He could very well have

withdrawn from the proceedings, as is permissible in law, instead of

consciously participating therein and appending his signature to the

settlement. His active participation and express consent clearly

indicate that he had accepted the award at the relevant point in time.

The subsequent challenge, raised only after the commencement of

execution proceedings, gives rise to a legitimate inference that the

petitioner merely intended to buy time by participating in the

proceedings and had no real intention either to honour the settlement

or to question it at the appropriate stage. Such conduct is wholly

inconsistent with fairness and reflects an absence of bona fides.

29. Insofar as the petitioner’s submission that the impugned award dated

08.03.2025, by incorporating stipulations of imprisonment and

payment of double the settled amount upon default, travels beyond the

scope of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, on the ground that a

Lok Adalat lacks penal jurisdiction, thereby rendering the award ex

facie illegal and liable to be quashed, is concerned, upon closer

scrutiny does not withstand legal examination.

30. At the outset, the scheme of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987

makes it clear that a Lok Adalat does not exercise adjudicatory powers

in the strict sense, much less any criminal or penal jurisdiction. Its role

is confined to facilitating a voluntary settlement between the parties,

and the award so passed derives its binding force not from an

adjudication on merits, but from the consensus ad idem of the parties.

Page 9 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
Section 21 of the Act gives such an award the status of a decree of a

civil court, rendering it final and binding.

31. However, this statutory limitation does not imply that parties are

precluded from incorporating deterrent or default clauses within the

terms of their settlement. A compromise may validly include

stipulations providing for enhanced liability upon breach, so as to

secure performance. Such clauses are neither uncommon nor

impermissible; rather, they are recognised incidents of a binding

settlement, unless they are shown to be opposed to law.

32. In the present case, the stipulation providing for payment of a higher

amount in the event of default is clearly compensatory and coercive in

a civil sense, intended to ensure compliance with the settlement. It

cannot, by any stretch, be equated with the imposition of a “penalty” in

the criminal law sense. The petitioner, having voluntarily agreed to

such a term, cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate by

accepting the benefit of settlement while repudiating its burdens.

33. As regards the clause referring to “imprisonment”, it must be

construed in its proper legal context. A Lok Adalat, undoubtedly,

cannot order conviction or impose a sentence of imprisonment. Any

such consequence does not flow from the award per se, but, if at all,

from the process of enforcement in accordance with law. Once an

award attains the status of a civil decree, its enforcement is governed

by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that process, the

executing court may, subject to statutory safeguards, resort to

permissible coercive measures for enforcement of a decree, including

Page 10 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
those contemplated under Order XXI. Therefore, the mere presence of

a clause alluding to coercive consequences does not render the award

without jurisdiction; at best, it is a reflection of the legal consequences

that may follow upon non-compliance.

34. Importantly, the petitioner has neither alleged nor established that the

settlement was vitiated by fraud, coercion, misrepresentation, or lack

of free consent.The absence of such foundational pleadings, the

challenge essentially seeks to reopen a concluded settlement on

technical grounds, which runs contrary to the very object of the Act,

namely, to ensure finality and expeditious resolution of disputes.

35. Viewed thus, the impugned award cannot be characterised as ex facie

illegal or beyond jurisdiction. The grievance, if any, pertains not to the

competence of the Lok Adalat to record the settlement, but to the

consequences of its breach–an aspect that squarely falls within the

domain of execution proceedings.

36. It would be profitable, at this stage, to advert to Section 138 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which statutorily engrafts

consequences for the dishonour of a cheque on account of

insufficiency of funds or where it exceeds the arrangement with the

bank. The provision unequivocally declares such dishonour to

constitute an offence and renders the drawer liable to punishment with

imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine

which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both.

37. For facility of reference, Section 138 is reproduced hereunder:

“138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.–

Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by

Page 11 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another
person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part,
of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either
because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account
is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount
arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with
that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence
and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two
years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the
cheque, or with both.”

38. Viewed in the aforesaid statutory backdrop, the challenge laid by the

petitioner loses much of its force. The stipulations forming part of the

impugned award do not introduce any alien or impermissible

consequence; rather, they mirror the very contours of liability that the

legislature itself has contemplated in cases of cheque dishonour.

39. Thus, the petitioner’s attempt to characterise the stipulations in the

award as being contrary to law is misconceived and unsustainable.

40. In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned Lok Adalat Award

dated 08.03.2025 is hereby upheld and shall continue to remain

binding upon the parties, being enforceable in accordance with law.

41. Consequently, the present petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed.

POSTSCRIPT

42. Before parting with the instant matter, this Court deems it necessary to

emphasise the raison d’être behind the introduction of Lok Adalats

and the necessity which impelled the legislature to conceive such a

mechanism under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.

43. The institution of Lok Adalats was envisaged as a pragmatic response

to the ever-increasing burden before regular courts, with the object of

Page 12 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
providing a speedy, efficacious and cost-effective forum for resolution

of disputes through the process of conciliation and mutual settlement.

The underlying philosophy was to promote access to justice by

encouraging amicable resolution, thereby reducing the burden on the

formal judicial system and preserving valuable judicial time.

44. It was in recognition of these objectives that Lok Adalats were

designed not as adjudicatory bodies, but as conciliatory forums, where

disputes are resolved through consensus rather than by determination

on merits. The success of this mechanism, therefore, hinges upon

adherence to its foundational principles of voluntariness, fairness and

absence of coercion.

45. It is in this backdrop, Rule 13 of the National Legal Services Authority

(Lok Adalats) Regulations, 2009, which prescribes the procedure to be

followed by Lok Adalats is very pertinent and the same is reproduced

hereunder for facility of reference:

“Procedure in Lok Adalats.–

(1) Members of Lok Adalat have the role of statutory conciliators
only and have no judicial role and they, mutatis mutandis, may
follow the procedure laid down in sections 67 to 76 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996).
(2) Members of Lok Adalat shall not pressurise or coerce any of the
parties to compromise or settle cases or matters, either directly or
indirectly.

(3) In a Lok Adalat, the members shall discuss the subject matter
with the parties for arriving at a just settlement or compromise and
such members of the Lok Adalat shall assist the parties in an
independent and impartial manner in their attempt to reach an
amicable settlement of their dispute:

Provided that if it is found necessary, the assistance of an
independent person or a trained mediator may also be availed of
by the Lok Adalat.

Page 13 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
(4) Members of Lok Adalat shall be guided by principles of natural
justice, equity, fair play, objectivity, giving consideration to, among
other things, the rights and obligations of the parties, custom and
usages, and the circumstances surrounding the dispute.
(5) The Lok Adalat may conduct the proceedings in such manner as
it considers appropriate, taking into account the circumstances of
the case, wishes of the parties including any request by a party to
the Lok Adalat to hear oral statements, and the need for a speedy
settlement of the dispute.

(6) The Lok Adalat shall not determine a reference at its own
instance, but shall determine only on the basis of a compromise or
settlement between the parties by making an award in terms of the
compromise or settlement arrived at:

Provided that no Lok Adalat has the power to hear the parties to
adjudicate their dispute as a regular court:

Provided further that the award of the Lok Adalat is neither a
verdict nor an opinion arrived at by any decision-making process.”

46. A conjoint and purposive reading of the aforesaid provision,

particularly Rule 13(1) and the second proviso to Rule 13(6) of the

National Legal Services Authority (Lok Adalats) Regulations, 2009,

makes it clear that the Members of Lok Adalat function solely as

statutory conciliators and are divested of any adjudicatory role. The

award that emanates from such proceedings is not the result of a

judicial determination but merely a voluntary settlement arrived at

between the parties.

47. This Court deems it appropriate to observe that the Legal Services

Authorities Act, 1987 envisages Lok Adalats as an efficacious

mechanism of alternate dispute resolution, intended to foster amicable

settlements, reduce adversarial litigation, and consequently ease the

mounting burden on regular courts, thereby conserving valuable

judicial time.

Page 14 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026

48. However, the practical experience has, in certain cases, belied this

salutary object. Instead of acting as an effective instrument for

reducing pendency, Lok Adalats, on occasion, appear to have

contributed to further litigation, thereby frustrating the very purpose

for which they were conceived.

49. This Court is constrained to observe that, day in and day out, it is

coming across cases where parties seek to challenge awards passed by

Lok Adalats. This growing tendency leads to the unnecessary

invocation of the writ jurisdiction of this Court and results in a waste

of valuable judicial time, which ought to be devoted to genuine and

deserving matters. The very object behind the establishment of Lok

Adalats, that is, to ensure expeditious, amicable and cost-effective

resolution of disputes and to reduce the burden on regular courts, is

defeated when such awards are routinely and indiscriminately brought

under challenge.

50. This leads to the moot question as to what has gone awry in the

functioning of Lok Adalats so as to render their foundational objective,

that is, amicable settlement and reduction of judicial burden, largely

illusory.

51. The answer, in the considered view of this Court, lies in the manner of

discharge of duties both by the parties as well as by the Members

constituting the Lok Adalat. The statutory scheme casts a

corresponding obligation on both. The parties are expected to approach

the Lok Adalat with bona fides and a genuine intent to resolve their

disputes. They cannot be permitted to act in a mischievous or evasive

Page 15 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
manner by ostensibly consenting to a settlement during the

proceedings and thereafter resiling from the same, thereby setting at

naught the sanctity of the process and inviting further rounds of

litigation.

52. Equally, the Members constituting the Lok Adalat are under a solemn

duty to ensure that the settlement arrived at is voluntary, informed, and

lawful, and not the result of any coercion, undue influence or

misapprehension. They must scrupulously adhere to the mandate of

Rule 13 of the National Legal Services Authority (Lok Adalats)

Regulations, 2009 and refrain from assuming any adjudicatory posture

or from imposing terms upon the parties. The role of the Members is

facilitative and not determinative, and any deviation therefrom would

vitiate the very foundation of the award.

53. At the same time, this Court deems it necessary to emphasise that Lok

Adalats, while facilitating settlements and passing awards, must

exercise due care to ensure that the terms and conditions incorporated

therein are unambiguous, practicable, and capable of effective

enforcement. Any stipulation that is inherently impracticable, or

incapable of execution is bound to generate further disputes, thereby

defeating the very object of settlement and giving rise to avoidable

rounds of litigation.

54. An award must be capable of implementation in its true letter and spirit.

Terms which are vague, unduly onerous, or contingent upon uncertain

events beyond the control of the parties render the settlement illusory

and incapable of execution. The inclusion of such impracticable

Page 16 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
conditions not only diminishes the efficacy of the award but also sows

the seeds for further disputes at the stage of enforcement.

55. The members of the Lok Adalat must, therefore, ensure that the terms

embodied in the award are precise, realistic, and capable of compliance

within the framework of law. Directions which the parties cannot

reasonably perform, or which are inherently incapable of enforcement,

ought not to find place in the award. What is unenforceable in law

should not be stipulated in the first instance.

56. Ultimately, the efficacy and credibility of a Lok Adalat award lie in its

workability and enforceability. The members would do well to confine

the settlement to lawful, practicable, and executable terms, so that the

award achieves its intended purpose of bringing finality to the dispute,

rather than engendering further litigation.

57. It is imperative that the rules engrafted under Rule 13 of National

Legal Services Authority (Lok Adalats) Regulations, 2009 are strictly

observed in its letter and spirit. Only such awards as are founded upon

a genuine, lawful and consensual compromise between the parties can

sustain the test of legality. Any award which travels beyond this

limited jurisdiction, or which is impracticable, unconscionable or

contrary to law, cannot be sustained and would be liable to be

interfered with in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction.

58. It is, therefore, incumbent upon both the parties participating in the

Lok Adalat proccedings and the Members constituting the Lok Adalat

to remain conscious of the nature and limits of the proceedings. While

the parties must ensure that any settlement entered into is voluntary,

Page 17 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026
lawful and capable of enforcement, the Members constituting the Lok

Adalat are equally obliged to confine themselves strictly to recording

such settlement as arrived at, without superimposing any extraneous,

coercive or legally impermissible conditions. Any deviation on either

count not only renders the award susceptible to judicial scrutiny but

also erodes the credibility and efficacy of the Lok Adalat mechanism

as an effective forum for alternative dispute resolution.

(WASIM SADIQ NARGAL)
JUDGE
SRINAGAR:

28.04.2026
Shamim Ah. Dar/PS

Whether the order is speaking: Yes
Whether the order is reportable: Yes

Page 18 of 18 CM(M) No. 118/2026



Source link