Sharwan Kumar vs State Of Maharashtra Thr Pso., Ps ... on 27 April, 2026

Bombay High Court

Sharwan Kumar vs State Of Maharashtra Thr Pso., Ps … on 27 April, 2026

2026:BHC-NAG:6483

1 ABA 275.2026..odt

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR

CRIMINAL APPLICATION (ABA) NO. 275 OF 2026

SANJAY CHOUDHARI
VS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
AND
CRIMINAL APPLICATION (ABA) NO. 272 OF 2026

ALOK CHOUDHARI
VS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

AND
CRIMINAL APPLICATION (ABA) NO. 232 OF 2026

SATYAWATI PARASHAR
VS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

AND
CRIMINAL APPLICATION (ABA) NO. 270 OF 2026

RAVINDRA POKHARNA
VS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
AND
CRIMINAL APPLICATION (ABA) NO. 271 OF 2026

MANOJ KUMAR PRASAD
VS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
AND
CRIMINAL APPLICATION (ABA) NO. 210 OF 2026

KEDAR S/O ARVIND PACHPUTRE
VS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
AND
CRIMINAL APPLICATION (ABA) NO. 223 OF 2026

ALOK AWADHIYA
VS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
AND
2 ABA 275.2026..odt

CRIMINAL APPLICATION (ABA) NO.268 OF 2026

SHRAWAN KUMAR
VS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Court's or Judge's orders
Coram, Appearances, Court's
orders or directions and Registrar's
orders

ABA No. 275/2026
Shri Mahesh Jethmalani, Senior Advocate a/b. Aditya Chaudhari and Prafull Kumar,
Advocates for the applicant.
Shri A.M.Ghogare, APP for respondent/State.
ABA No. 272/2026
Shri Pranav P. Badheka, Sr. Advocate a/b. Aditya Chaudhari and Prafull Kumar,
Advocates for the applicant(s).
Shri A.M.Ghogare, APP for respondent/State.
ABA Nos. 232/2026 & 270/2026
Shri Ravi Sharma, Shri Aditya Chaudhari, Prafull Kumar and Anjali, Advocates for the
applicant(s).
Shri A.M.Ghogare, APP for respondent/State.
ABA No. 271/2026
Shri Ravi Sharma, Shri Aditya Chaudhari and Prafull Kumar, Advocates for the
applicant.
Shri A.M.Ghogare, APP for respondent/State.
ABA No. 210/2026
Shri Amol Mardikar, Advocates for the applicant.
Shri A.M.Ghogare, APP for respondent/State.
ABA No. 223/2026 & 268/2026.
Shri Adityaa Chaudhari, Advocates for the applicant.
Shri A.M.Ghogare, APP for respondent/State.

CORAM: RAJNISH R. VYAS, J.

RESERVED ON : 23.04.2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 27.04.2026.

All these applications are preferred under Section 482 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, 'BNSS')
praying for grant of anticipatory bail in connection with First
Information Report/Crime No. 228/2026, dated 01/03/2026,
registered with Kalmeshwar Police Station, District Nagpur (Rural)
for the offences punishable under Sections 105, 125(a), 125(b), 288
of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, 'BNS'). The following
3 ABA 275.2026..odt

chart shows the posts occupied by the respective applicants:-

Sr.N ABA No. Name Posts
o.
1 275/2026 Sanjay Choudhari Managing Director
2 272/2026 Alok Choudhari CEO/Director
3 232/2026 Satyawati Parashar Lady Non-Executive
Independent Director
4 270/2026 Ravindra Pokharna Non Executive
Independent Director
5 271/2026 Manoj Kumar Prasad Independent Director
(Appointed on 24.5.2024)
6 210/2026 Kedar Arvind Dy. Manager (Safety)
Pachaputre
7 223/2026 Alok Awadhiya Director
8 268/2026 Shrawan Kumar Director

Facts:

2. The criminal law was set in motion on the basis of
information supplied by one Mr. Manoj Krishnaji Kalbande, Police
Inspector attached to Kalmeshwar Police Station. It is alleged in the
FIR that, on 01/03/2026, between 07.00 to 07.30 hours in the
morning, the information was received that the explosion had taken
place within the jurisdiction of Kalmeshwar Police Station, more
particularly in factory Shed No. 16-B of SBL Company, situated in
Rahulgaon Shivar. The complainant/informant along with other
Police Officers and the Superior Officers, reached and inspected the
spot. In a preliminary enquiry, it revealed that, the seventeen (17)
workers had died and twenty four (24) workers had either received
the grievous or simple injuries.

3. Accordingly, the Marg No. 20/2026 under Section 194 of the
BNSS was registered on 01/03/2026. Since the identification of
seventeen (17) workers who died in the accident could not be
4 ABA 275.2026..odt

established, the blood samples of the relatives, as well as the
samples of the deceased, were collected and forwarded for
identification.

4. During the course of inquiry into Marg, to know the cause of the
explosion, the correspondence was exchanged with the Chief
Controller of Explosives, Gondkhairi, Nagpur, and the Directorate of
Industrial Safety and Health (DISH), Nagpur. The Deputy Controller
of Explosives, Nagpur, as well as DISH, then gave the reasons for
the explosion, which are mentioned in the FIR, reproduced as
under:-

"1) Special precaution to avoid accident/explosion/fire
in or about any place where an explosive is
manufactured/stored was not taken by the firm.2)
Explosive processed in the building were not
immediately removed/shifted to the next process
building / explosive magazine. The firm allowed
explosives to accumulate in the subject building.

R;kpizek.ks vkS/;ksfxd o lqj{kk o vkjksX; lapuky; ¼fM'k½ ukxiwj ;kauh
foLQksVdkps dkj.k [kkyhyizek.ks fnys vkgs-
Probable case of accident - It seems that this explosion occurred in
the packing section of the building. This explosion further
detonate the stored NONELS in the packing area as well as the
detonators and shock tubes kept for crimping in the crimping
cubicals. The fire initiated after explosion further engulfed the
shock tubes stored for crimping. Due to this explosion / fire
multiple fatalities and injuries have accrued in the NONEL
crimping plant building no. 16 B/14.

;kp izdkjs fM'k ;kauh R;kps vgokykr egkjk"Vz~ QWDVzh :y o QDVzh vf/kfu;e
e/;s ueqn vlysys fu;ekps o dyekaps fofo/k izdkjs mYya/ku dsY;kps ueqn
dsysys vkgsr- fM'k ;kauh lnj daiuh e/;s fnukad 21/06/2024 jksth HksV
nsoqu daiuh lqj{kk fu;ekaps mYya?ku dj.ks laca/kkus eqn~ns lqpfoys gksrs- R;k
fu;ekaps iqrZrk laca/kkus vkt fnukad 01/03/2026 P;k izkFkfed fujh{k.k e/;s
5 ABA 275.2026..odt

[kkyhy ckchaps mYya?ku dsY;kps fnlwu vkY;kps ueqn dsys vkgsr-

1) Not complied (Risk assessment not carried out)
2) Not complied (Fire trailer pump is not provided)
3) Not complied (Only one safety officer Shri Kedar Panchputre is
appointed instead of two safety officers)
4) Not complied (Factory medical officer is not appointed)
5) Not complied (leave with wages records are not submitted to
DISH office)
6) Not complied (Flameproof CCTVS are not installed.)
7) Not complied (Internal safety audit is not submitted to DISH
office.)
8) Partially Not complied (Medical health check up conducted on
14/02/2025 through certifying surgen Dr. Shashank Dandge for
183 workers out of 809 workers.
9) Not complied (No training records submitted to DISH office)"

5. It was thus alleged in the FIR that all the accused persons
named in the FIR, ignoring the directions given by the DISH as well
as the Petroleum and Explosives Safety Organisation (PESO), did
not comply with the same and though they had knowledge that due
to non-compliance, a human life could be lost, the work in the
company was allowed to be continued.

6. The said accident took place in NONEL Crimping Unit NO. 16-
B of the Company. It is this information that triggered the
investigation.

Arguments By Applicants

7. Heard Mr Mahesh Jethmalani and Mr Pranav Badhekha, the
learned Senior Counsels and the learned respective counsels for the
applicant(s). They argued the following points:-
6 ABA 275.2026..odt

i) The applicants were not present on the spot when the accident
had taken place, and thus, the ingredients of Section 105 of BNS are
not attracted.

ii) They had no knowledge about the deficiencies pointed out.

iii) The knowledge cannot be attributed to them.

iv) The concept of vicarious liability is unknown to criminal law
unless and until specifically introduced by the Act.

v) The custodial interrogation of the applicants is not required.

vi) It is the occupier who is responsible under the Factories Act and
not every Director, the Managing Director, or the employee.

vii) The police authorities have acted maliciously.

viii) Prima facie case against them is not made out.

ix) To attract the ingredients of the said offence, something more
positive than a mere omission, lapse or negligence on the part of the
named accused will have to be present, and such statements are
conspicuously absent in the FIR filed in the present case.

x) So far as arguments in Criminal Bail Application (ABA) No.
223/2026 are concerned, the following points were raised:

xi) The accused Alok Awadhiya, though he is shown as a Director of
the Company, the sequence of events would reveal that he was, in
fact, a Director on paper only. To support his contention, he has
taken me to page 128 of the application and contended that
initially, the Director of Factories and Boilers, Orrisa, had issued a
7 ABA 275.2026..odt

Registration and Grant/Renewal of License in the name of Alok
Awadhiya to work in a factory under the name of M/S. Mahanadi
Metals and Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. The said factory manufactured slurry
explosives by a mixing process, and a license was issued for the
period 1.1.2022 to 31.12.2031.

xii) The learned counsel for the accused named Alok then argued,
relying upon page 129 of his application, that he was appointed as
an occupier of Mahanadi Metals for the period 10.2.2022 till
31.3.2027. The said Mahanadi Metals and Chemicals Pvt. SBL
Energy Limited thereafter purchased Ltd, and a copy of the Asset
Purchase Agreement was executed on 22.2.2024. The said
agreement was duly signed by the accused, Alok Awadhiya, and the
Director of SBL Private Limited, Alok Choudhary.

xiii) He then contended that it is due to this reason that the
purchase of Mahanadi Company, the applicant, was inducted as
Director of SBL Energy so that the license granted to him would be
continued till a further period.

xiv) He made an additional submission that the applicant was
appointed as an occupier for a plant in Raurkela and was not at all
concerned with the operations which were carried out at Nagpur.

xv) So far as the applicant in Criminal Application (ABA) No.
268/2026 by name Shravankumar is concerned, it was argued that
he came to be appointed as a Director of SBL Company in
December, 2025 with a view to appointing him as an occupier with
the plant proposed to be opened in the town of Churu (Rajasthan).
The learned counsel then invited my attention to page 148 of the
Criminal Application filed by accused Alok Awadhye, and contended
8 ABA 275.2026..odt

that the Board of Directors, at a Board Meeting held on 30.12.2025,
had considered and approved the appointment of applicant
Shrawankumar as an Executive Director of the Company. He also
drew my attention to page 149, which contains the Resolution
passed at the Board of Directors' meeting on 30.12.2025, to consider
and appoint him as an Occupier of the proposed manufacturing
plant situated in Churu (Rajasthan). He then contended that the
aforesaid two Resolutions would clearly reveal that the intention
behind impleading the accused Shravankumar as a Director was
with a view to look after the proposed manufacturing plant at Churu
(Rajasthan), as an occupier.

xvi) The learned counsel has then contented that the Board of
Directors were serious enough to remove the deficiencies, and they,
in fact, removed the deficiencies and a report to that effect is also
submitted by B.K. Son Consultant. He submitted that if the report is
submitted to SBL Energy Limited by B.K. Upon further review, it
would reveal that the risk assessment, which was earlier shown to
be high, was diluted to "low".

xvii) He fairly admitted that this report was not submitted to the
competent authority before the incident, which was not intentional.
He then contended that documents filed on record, more
particularly, page 189 to 281 of Criminal Application (ABA) No.
223/2026 show that training was given to all the workers who were
handling the duties assigned to them in plant 16-B where incident
taken place and the training record gives details about the training
particulars, department, plant, date of training, name of workers
and signature of them. According to him, this clearly refutes the
prosecution's case. He submitted that though these documents were
9 ABA 275.2026..odt

not submitted before or at the time of the incident, they were
subsequently forwarded.

xviii) The learned counsel for the applicant then argued that if the
say filed by the Investigating Agency before the Sessions Court is
perused, it will reveal that the application was opposed on the
ground that the accused was an adult and Director of the Company.
Due to his failure to fulfil the responsibilities, which were his duties,
there was a loss of life. He further contended that in reply to oppose
the Bail Application before the Sessions Court, the Investigating
Officer has stated that it needs to be investigated whether the
applicant has committed such a mistake intentionally or not. Thus,
the learned counsel argued that the prosecution itself is unsure of its
case.

xix) The learned counsel then invited my attention to page 282 of
Criminal Application (ABA) No. 223/2025, which is issued by DISH
to the Occupier/Manager of SBL Energy Limited, dated 11.8.2025
and has contended that point 9 clearly shows that an external safety
audit was conducted on 27.1.2024 and 28.1.2024 through External
Safety Auditor Shri Dnyanesh Mase. He further relied upon clause
10 to argue that a mock drill was conducted on 13.4.2024 and a
Safety Committee Meeting was conducted on 27.7.2025.

xx) He also submitted that at that time, two Safety Officers by name
Shri Kedar Panchputre and Shubham Chaudhary were working as
Safety Officers, but subsequently, Shubham Chaudhary resigned on
13.9.2025. According to him, thereafter, though, the company has
tried its best but could not secure the services of a Safety Officer and
consequently could not appoint one. He submitted that the
10 ABA 275.2026..odt

applicants have no criminal antecedents and there is no question of
tampering with the evidence. According to him, the applicant has
never visited the factory premises, much less the city of Nagpur.

8. The workers are also paid the amount of compensation.

9. Insofar as applicant Satyawati in ABA 232/2026 is concerned,
so also, applicant Ravindra Pokharna in ABA No. 270/2026 is
concerned, they claim to be Non-Executive Independent Director of
the company in question. Additionally, applicant Satyawati has
contended that she is suffering from stage-III of breast cancer and,
for that, has relied upon two documents, i.e. a report of All India
Institute of Medical Sciences, Raipur, dated 17.11.2025 and the
liver function test, and report of renal function test dated
11.10.2025. It is also stated that presently, she is undergoing an
intensive and specialised treatment in chemotherapy, which has
severely compromised her immune system.

10. Both these applicants have contended that since they were
appointed as Non-Executive Independent Directors, they are
absolutely not responsible for the incident that had taken place. It
was further argued that they are paid on a meeting-by-meeting basis
and therefore cannot be held responsible for the day-to-day affairs
of the company. Further applicant Manoj in criminal anticipatory
bail application 271/ 2026 has also contented that he is the
independent director of the company and was inducted on
24. 5.2024.

11. In order to support their stand that they are independent
directors, all these three applicants have relied upon page 110 of
11 ABA 275.2026..odt

ABA no. 271/2026 showing details given by the Ministry of
Corporate Affairs.

12. They have relied upon the judgment passed by the Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court at Aurangabad in Cri. Application No.
1281/2020 in the case of Sunny s/o. Guruparshad Sharma Vs. The
State of Maharashtra and others contend that a Non-Executive
Director is not in the company's whole-time employment. They have
further contended that Section 149(12) of the Companies Act
speaks about the company having a Board of Directors and by clause
(12), which is reproduced as under, crystallises the role of Non-
Executive Director:

Section 149 - Company to have Board of Directors.
(1)....
(2)....
(12) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act -
(I) an independent director;
(ii) a non-executive director not being promoter or key
managerial personnel, shall be held liable, only in respect
of such acts of omission or commission by a company
which had occurred with his knowledge, attributable
through Board process, and with his consent or connivance
or where he had not acted diligently.

13. According to them, thus, a Non-Executive Director not
being a "promoter" or a "key managerial personnel" can be held
liable only in respect of such acts of omissions or commissions by a
company which had occurred (i) with his knowledge, "attributable
through board process" and with his consent or connivance or (ii)
where he had not acted diligently.
12 ABA 275.2026..odt

i) Mr. Amol Mardikar, appearing for the applicant Kedar
Pachaputre, in ABA 210/2026, who has argued for original accused
no. 6, has not only adopted the arguments advanced as stated above
but on 23.4.2026 has also argued that accused Kedar was appointed
as a Deputy Manager (Safety) by appointment order dated 4.3.2024
and his appointment order, more particularly clauses 3 and 5 limits
his duties. According to him, under clauses 3 and 5 of the
appointment order, as an employee of the company, he was
required to maintain confidentiality. He was also responsible for the
team's tasks, operations, and the results of assigned targets.

ii) He, to support the claim of anticipatory bail, has contended
that, in fact, on the day of the incident, he was travelling along with
his family members to Tirupati and, for that, has relied upon the
electronic reservation slips. Mr Mardikar has further contended that
he was never concerned with the activities that were carried out in
the section/area 16B, where the accident took place. According to
him, his custody is also not required, as everything is already seized.
He argued that, though a standing warrant had been issued against
him much earlier, he was before the Sessions Court seeking
anticipatory bail.

iii) He also invited my attention to the order passed by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court in Bail Application No. 447/2026, by
which the regular bail was granted to some of the employees who
were not concerned with the operation which was carried out in
factory shed 16B. He thus prayed for the application to be allowed.
13 ABA 275.2026..odt

Arguments by the State:
14. Per contra, the learned APP for the State has argued as
under:-

i) A prima facie case is available against the accused
persons/applicants.

ii) The custodial interrogation is necessary, and the accused
are influential persons.

iii) Before this incident, an incident had also taken place in
the factory wherein workers had sustained injuries.

iv) Despite calling upon the occupier/Manager of SBL Energy
Limited by the DISH through communication dated
01/07/2024, the deficiencies were not removed.

v) A communication dated 01/07/2024 is based on the visit
to the factory premises on 21/06/2024. Thus, the accused
persons knew that, if the deficiencies were not removed, it
was likely to cost human lives.

vi) Just because the compensation is paid, that would not
dilute the criminal liability . Till today, a total of 26 persons
succumbed to injuries, including 22 women.

vii) The statement of the workers, many of whom are injured,
is recorded during the course of the investigation, which
shows that the training was not given to them for handling
the hazardous material. The learned APP has also contended
that there is non-compliance with Section 166 of the
Companies Act.
14 ABA 275.2026..odt

15. The learned APP, to oppose an application preferred by the
accused Kedar Pachaputre, has argued that he was the sole Safety
Manager appointed in the factory and it was his obligation also to
remove the deficiencies pointed out in the communication issued by
DISH. The learned APP has contended that the steps Mr Kedar has
taken to ensure the safety of the work have not been brought on
record, which shows that he has not performed his duty. According
to the learned APP, whether applicant Kedar was travelling on the
date in question can be decided in the present proceedings, and
even otherwise, it would not be a ground to shrink the
responsibilities.

16. He further submitted that under Maharashtra Safety Officer
(Duties, Qualifications and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1982, it is
the duty of the Safety Officer as enshrined under Rule 8, which is
reproduced as under:

Rule 8(1) - The duties of the Safety Officer shall be to
advise and assist the factory manager in the fulfillment of
its obligation statutory or otherwise, concerned,
prevention of personal injuries and maintaining working
environment.
These duties shall include following:
namely....."
He thus prayed for rejection of application.

17. According to the learned APP, though, under Section 172
of the Companies Act, four board meetings are required to be
conducted in one calendar year, from June, 2024 till 1.3.2026, no
material has come on record as to how many meetings were
conducted.
15 ABA 275.2026..odt

18. According to him, the occupier of the factory was earlier
prosecuted for injuries sustained by the workers in the factory
premises in June 2024 and therefore, saying that the Directors and
Managing Directors were not aware of the incident, would not
appeal to a man of ordinary prudence. He further submitted that the
communication issued by DISH on 21.6.2024, though addressed to
the Factory Manager, cannot be said to have been in the applicants'
knowledge, as any mode can impart knowledge.

19. The communication dated 3.12.2025, issued by the Dy.
Superintendent of Police (Home), Office of Superintendent of Police
(Rural), Nagpur, would reveal that a report was submitted for the
rejection of the renewal of License No. 1/Form 2/Arms/2001/NR
for the applicants for Sulfur, Ammonia, Perchlorate, Sodium
Perchlorite and Potassium Chloride.

20. He further submitted that the incident had taken place in
packing unit 16B, which shows that the product was at the final
stage. High standards of precaution and safety measures were
required.

21. On the day of the incident, the authorities had visited the
spot of the incident and had found several deficiencies.

22. He then relied upon the judgment delivered by the
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in Criminal Application (ABA) No.
16 ABA 275.2026..odt

375/2024 (Ritu w/o Dinesh Malu Vs. State of Maharashtra, thr.
PSO, Tahsil, Nagpur), dated 26.6.2024, more particularly,
paragraph 25.

23. The learned APP submitted that a standing warrant is also
issued against the accused. But he submitted that against one of the
accused it is already stayed. To point out the deficiencies, he has
specifically mentioned in paragraph 5 of the affidavit-in-reply dated
2.4.2026 in ABA No.210/2026 and also other ABA's which are
reproduced as under:

Sr. List of Contraventions Current Status
No.
I Rule 4(3) of the MaharashtraNot complied (Risk
Factories Rules, 1963 assessment not carried out.
II Rule 71-B(2) of the MaharashtraNot complied (Fire trailer
Factories Rules, 1963 pump is not provided)
III Section 40-B(1)(ii) of theNot complied (only one
Factories Act, 1948 safety officer Shri Kedar
Panchputre is appointed
instead of 2 safety officers).
IV Clause8-A of the Schedule XIIComplied (Flange guards to
annexed to Rule 114 of the Mah. acide piplines are provided).
Factories Rules, 1963
V Rule 73W(1)(c)(i) of the Mah.Not complied (Factory
Factories Rules, 1962 medical officer is not
appointed).
VI Rule 73-X(1) of the MaharashtraComplied (One ambulance
Factories Rules, 1963 van Reg no. MH40CT5601 is
provided)
VII Rule 73W(1)(c)(ii) of theComplied (OHC is provided)
Maharashtra Factories Rules,
1963
VIII Rule 105(1) of the MaharashtraNot complied (Leave with
Factories Rules, 1963 wages records are not
submitted to DISH office).
17 ABA 275.2026..odt

IX Rule 2(1) of the MaharashtraComplied (One welfare
Welfare Officer (Duties,officer Shri Vikas Mishra is
Qualifications and Conditions ofappointed)
Service) Rule, 1966 read with
Section 49 of the Factory Act,
1948.
X Rule 10(4)(a) of the MaharashtraNot complied (Flameproof
Factories Rules, 1963 CCTV are not installed)
XI Rule 3(a) of the MaharashtraNot complied (internal
Factories (Safety Audit) Rules,safety audit is not submitted
1963 to DISH office)
XII Rule 4(2) of the MaharashtraComplied (Revised plan
Factories Rules, 1963 dated 20.10.2025 is
approved).
XIII Rule 18-A of the MaharashtraPartially not complied
Factories Rules, 1963. (Medical health check up is
conducted on 14.2.2025
through certifying surgeon
Dr. Shashank Dandge for
183 workers of of 809
workers)
XIV Section 41C(b) of the FactoriesNot complied (No training
Act, 1948 records submitted to DISH
office).

Rebuttal By The Applicants:

24. In rebuttal, Mr Mahesh Jethmalani, learned Senior Counsel,
has argued that for showing involvement of the applicants, there has
to be some positive act on the part of the applicant. According to
him, there must first be a duty imposed by law, a breach of that
duty, and the fact that failure to perform the duty has resulted in an
accident. The prosecution must show the sequence based on
material that has not been disclosed.

25. He then invited my attention to Section 32 of IPC,
corresponding Section 3(iv) BNS and contended that the
18 ABA 275.2026..odt

prosecution will have to show that there were illegal omissions on
the part of the applicant.

26. He also submitted that duties cast upon the Directors under
the Companies Act are general in nature and are limited to the
Companies Act itself.

27. He has also invited my attention to Section 80 of the IPC
corresponding to Section 18 of the BNS and contended that nothing
is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune, and without
any criminal intention or knowledge in doing a lawful act in a
lawful manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution.
According to him, no investigation has been conducted to rule out
the possibility that it was an accident.

28. Mr Jethmalani, learned Senior Counsel and Mr Pranav
Badheka, learned Counsel, relied upon the judgments passed by the
Hon'ble Apex Court and High Court, along with the other
applicants, to support their contention. Those judgments would be
considered in the later part of this order.

29. Mr Pranav Badheka, in rebuttal, has argued that the negative
facts cannot be proved by the applicant and therefore, asking
applicants to show that they were not aware of the communication
pointing out deficiencies is something unknown to the law.

30. He submitted that the earlier FIR in which the two workers
19 ABA 275.2026..odt

had sustained injuries was filed against the supervisor, and this
time, all the Directors were impleaded along with a few employees.

31. According to him, prosecution cannot say that the applicants are
absconding. However, a standing warrant and a lookout notice were
issued against them since the applicants were prosecuting their legal
remedies and were before the Sessions Court or this Court, praying
for anticipatory bail.

32. As the learned Counsels cited the various judgments for the
applicants. It would also be necessary to deal with the same. All the
learned counsels have relied upon the following judgments. Though
leading to advanced arguments regarding the applicability of the
judgments was taken by learned Senior Counsel Shri Mahesh
Jethmalani and Mr Pranav Badheka, other Counsels have also taken
efforts to convince the Court about applying the ratio to the present
case. The following judgments were relied upon:

i) Sushil Ansal Vs. State through Central Bureau of Investigation,
(2014)6 SCC 173;

ii) Sunny s/o Gurparshad Sharma Vs. The State of Maharashtra, Cri.
Appln. No. 1281 of 2020;

iii) Sunil Bharti Mittal Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2015) 4
SCC 609;

iv) Keshub Mehendra Vs. State of M.P. (1996) 6 SCC 129;

v) Shiv Kumar Jatia Vs. State of NCT of Delhi, (2019) 17 SCC 193;

vi) Gudikanti Narsimhhulu and Ors Vs. Public Prosecutor, High
Court of Andhra Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 240;
20 ABA 275.2026..odt

vii) Sharad Kumar Sanghi Vs. Sangita Rane, (2015)12 SCC 781;

viii) Bhalchandra and Anr Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC
1319;

ix) Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra,
(1994)4 SCC 602;

x) Shantibhai J. Vaghela and anr Vs. State of Gujarat and ors,
(2012) 13 SCC 231; paras 14,15,25 were relied upon.

xi) P.B. Desai Vs. State of Maharashtra and anr, (2013) 15 SCC 481;
paragraphs 29 to 33.

xii) Pavneet Singh Sethi and Ors Vs. The State of Maharashtra,
(2017) SCC OnLine Bom 9108;para 9 and 10

xiii) Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther and anr Vs. State of Maharashtra,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 520;paragraphs 4.1, 4.3, 12.4, 13,14, 17 and
17.2 were relied upon.

xiv) Rohit Ramchandra Kad Vs. State of Maharashtra (ABA No.
1455/2023).paragraphs 13 to 16.

Analysis And Reasoning:

33. In the aforesaid background, I have heard respective counsels
and have given thoughtful consideration to the arguments
advanced.

34. Since the present applications are for anticipatory bail, the
parameters for deciding the bail are required to be taken into
consideration.

35. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of (I) Siddharam
Satlingappa Mhetre V/s. State of Maharashtra and ors. { AIR 2011
SC 312}, has dealt with the scope of Section 438 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and parameters for granting anticipatory bail.
21 ABA 275.2026..odt

The parameters for grant of anticipatory bail in the light of the
aforesaid judgment can be said to be:

1. Nature and gravity of the offence

2. Severity for punishment is prescribed.

3. Prima facie case.

4. Possibility of Absconding

5. Likelihood of tampering with evidence or influencing a
witness.

6. Criminal antecedents.

7. Stage of investigation or trial.

8. Health, age, and humanitarian considerations.

9. Larger interest of justice (balance between personal
liberty and societal interest)

36. The main argument is that, simply because the applicants are
Directors or employees, and one of them is the Managing Director,
they cannot be held responsible under the principles of vicarious
liability.

37. At this stage, it is necessary to mention here that the question
is not whether the applicants are vicariously liable or not. The
question is whether the averments made in the FIR and the material
on record prima facie make out the offences against the applicants.

38. The offences in FIR are Section 105 of BNS, which speaks
about punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
22 ABA 275.2026..odt

Section 125(a) speaks about an act endangering the life or personal
safety of others. Section 125 clauses (a) and (b) prescribe
punishment for hurt and grievous hurt. Section 288 concerns
negligent conduct involving an explosive substance.

39. It is not in dispute that the factory in which the unit was
situated was dealing with a hazardous process. The hazardous
process is defined under the Factories Act, 1948, more particularly,
in Section 2(cb), which reads thus:

Section 2(cb) - "hazardous process" means any process or
activity in relation to an industry specified in the First
Schedule where, unless special care is taken, raw
materials used therein or the intermediate or finished
products, bye-products, wastes or effluents thereof would-
(i) cause material impairment to the health of the persons
engaged in or connected therewith, or
(ii) result in the pollution of the general environment:
Provided that the State Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, amend the First
Schedule by way of addition, omission or variation, of any
industry specified in the said Schedule.]

40. If, in this background, it is considered that earlier also, the
incident had taken place in which two workers were injured, and
the FIR was registered, then it would reveal that the earlier FIR,
though lodged against the Supervisor of the factory, was not
seriously taken into consideration by the Managing Director,
Directors and Safety Officers. Further, the communication issued by
DISH on 21.6.2024, which pointed out several serious deficiencies,
was also not addressed with the seriousness it deserved. The fact
remains that the statements of the workers who worked in the Unit
23 ABA 275.2026..odt

shows that they were never given any training to handle hazardous
goods/substances.

41. Just because the communication dated 21.6.2024 is addressed
to the Factory Manager, it would not mean that the applicant cannot
be named in the FIR as an accused, and it would be the occupier
only who can be said to be responsible under the Factories Act. Most
of the Sections of the Factories Act deal with regulatory breaches,
whereas the BNS penalises illegal acts.

42. The communication dated 3.12.2025, issued by Deputy
Superintendent of Police (Home), Nagpur (Rural), addressed to
District Collector, Nagpur, shows that in the License No.01
regarding the factory at mouza Kotwal Bardi, Survey No. 116/01 of
the SBL company report was submitted for rejection of renewal.
This shows that the applicants turned a blind eye to the deficiencies.
The contention of the learned counsels that deficiencies were not
pointed out to them and, therefore, they cannot be held responsible,
ignores the fact that the scope of Section 482 of the BNS does not
permit a minute examination of the material. Once it is clear that on
21.6.2024 deficiencies were pointed out to the occupier/one of the
Directors, the manner in which the said Director apprised the other
Directors would be the matter of investigation. Contending that the
applicants were unaware of the said deficiencies would not be
sufficient.

43. The learned Senior Counsels, as also other counsels, have
argued about the applicability of the offence about culpable
24 ABA 275.2026..odt

homicide not amounting to murder and contended that a positive
act is required to be attributed to the applicants. In this regard, it is
necessary to state that even according to the definition clause, i.e.
Section 2(1), "act" denotes as well a series of acts as a single act.
Sub Section (25) of Section 2 defines "omission" as well as a series
of omissions as a single omission. According to Section 3(4) of BNS,
words which refer to acts done extend also to illegal omission.

44. In this regard, it is necessary to go through the provisions of
Sub Section 15 of Section 2 of the BNS Act, which reads as follows:

Section 2(15) "illegal" and "legally bound to do".- The
word "illegal" is applicable to everything which is an
offence or which is prohibited by law, or which
furnishes ground for a civil action; and a person is said
to be "legally bound to do" whatever it is illegal in him
to omit;
Corresponding Law. - Section 2(15) corresponds to
section 43 of the Indian penal Code, 1980.

45. The aforesaid provisions clearly show that, the term, illegal
applies to everything which is prohibited by law or which furnishes
ground for civil action. The law prohibited handling hazardous
substances without proper precautions and care. Thus, the manner
in which the workers were given work who had absolutely no
training shows they were exposed to danger. Just because the
Company has also suffered losses does not mean human life is less
important than anything else.

46. Mr Jethmalani, the learned Senior Counsel, has argued about
the applicability of Section 18 of the BNS Act. Suffice it to say that
25 ABA 275.2026..odt

the said Section would be applicable when the offence is done by
accident or misfortune and without any criminal intention or
knowledge in doing "a lawful act" in "a lawful manner" by "lawful
means" and with proper care and caution.

47. Thus, it cannot be said that asking workers who were not
properly trained to handle hazardous material for the unit would be
lawful, given the proper care and caution.

48. So far as the applicant named Kedar Pachaputre is concerned,
it is not disputed that he was Dy. Manager (Safety). The State,
through the learned APP, has taken a specific stand that he was the
only Safety Officer in the factory and, therefore, responsible for
ensuring that there were no deficiencies that would be essential to
maintaining a safe working environment. Even if, for the sake of
argument, it is presumed that the applicant was travelling on the
date of the incident, that would not be a ground enough to extend
him the benefit of the anticipatory bail.

49. A fact cannot be ignored that he was duty-bound under the
rules of 1982 (stated supra) to advise and assist the Factory
Manager in fulfilment of its obligation, statutory or otherwise,
concerned with the prevention of personal injuries and maintaining
a safe working environment. Thus, prima facie, material is available
against the applicant. The issuance of a standing warrant must also
be considered. The fact remains that, to this date, nothing has been
brought on record to show that the standing warrant has been
challenged by taking appropriate proceedings.
26 ABA 275.2026..odt

50. The applicant's contention that the incident didn't happen in
their presence and they are not responsible overlooks the fact that
when culpable homicide not amounting to murder is committed, the
accused doesn't necessarily have to be present at the scene. For
instance, the illustration in Section 100 of the BNS, which is
reproduced here, would make this point abundantly clear.

Illustration - (a) A lays stick and turf over a pit, with the
intention of thereby causing death, or with the knowledge
that death is likely to be thereby caused. Z, believing the
ground to be firm, treads on it, falls in and is killed. A has
committed the offence of culpable homicide.

Thus, the said argument will not assist the applicants.

51. The second contention that the applicants were unaware of
the deficiencies was also unsubstantiated. It is evident that an FIR
was registered against the Supervisor earlier, when a factory worker
sustained injuries. The communication dated 1.7.2024, issued by
the Deputy Director, Industrial Safety and Health, Nagpur, to the
occupier/Manager of SBL Energy Limited, further supports this. The
Directors cannot evade their responsibility by claiming ignorance of
this communication. The manner in which it was brought to their
attention would be a matter of investigation. Since the "act"
includes "omission" and a breach of statutory duty in a hazardous
unit, the applicants, prima facie, would fall within the ambit of
Section 100 of the BNS.

52. So far as the non-applicability of the concept of vicarious
liability is concerned, it is nobody's case that the applicants are
27 ABA 275.2026..odt

vicariously liable. Since Section 105 is already invoked, it can be
said that the police officer has, prima facie, found that the
applicants have "knowledge" that non-removal of deficiencies
pointed out in the communication dated 1.7.2024 is likely to cause
death.

53. So far as the question of custodial interrogation is concerned,
it falls within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.

54. The submission that the occupier is responsible under the
Factories Act and not the applicants ignores the fact that the
offences are committed under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023
and not under the Factories Act. As regards the question of
malafides alleged against the police, as earlier, when the blast had
taken place in different companies, Section 105 was not invoked;
suffice it to say that, in itself, it would not be a ground for granting
anticipatory bail, more particularly when no specific material is
brought on record.

55. The learned counsel for the applicants in ABA 232/2026,
271/26, and 270/2026 argues that they are Independent Directors
and therefore cannot be held responsible. The contention deserves
to be accepted since while independent directors are expected to
uphold corporate governance standards, their criminal liability does
not arise solely from their designation. To establish criminal
liability, as per Section 149(12) of the Companies Act, it must be
proven that the alleged act or omission occurred with their
knowledge, attributable through board processes, and with their
28 ABA 275.2026..odt

consent, connivance, or lack of due diligence.

56. The applicant Satyawati's claim that she is battling stage III
cancer and undergoing chemotherapy is also be taken into
consideration.

57. So far as the contention of other applicants that the report of
B K Sons shows that deficiencies were fulfilled, the same cannot be
taken into consideration, as the applicants had admitted that the
said report was submittedafter the incident.

58. The contention of applicant Mr Alok Awadhiya that since he
was appointed as an occupier of M/s. The SBL Company purchased
Mahanadi Metals, and the said company was therefore inducted as a
Director of SBL. However, the defence of the accused, based on
documents of a private nature (an agreement between Mahanadi
and SBL), cannot be taken into consideration while deciding
anticipatory bail.

59. The contention of the applicant in ABA No. 268/2026 by
name Shrawan Kumar that with a view to appoint him as an
occupier with the plant proposed to be opened in Rajasthan, he was
appointed as a Director of SBL Company in December 2025, is
nothing but the stand taken by way of defence by him. The fact
cannot be ignored that he was the Company's Director.

60. As regards the contention that an external safety audit was
29 ABA 275.2026..odt

conducted on 27.1.2024 and 28.1.2024, which shows that the
company was serious, it ignores the status report dated 1.3.2026
submitted by DISH. The applicants cannot be choosy about
removing the deficiencies.

61. The further contention of the applicant accused that earlier
two safety officers by name Kedar Pachaputre and Shubham
Choudhary were appointed, but Mr Choudhary resigned on
13.9.2025, and thereafter, they could not appoint a safety officer,
which further shows the manner in which seriousness was shown to
the safety of the workers. If the law mandates the appointment of
two officers, then the safety officers ought to have been appointed.
Further, nothing has been brought on record to show that any
effective steps were taken to appoint the safety officer, and, despite
that, the candidate did not appear.

62. Coming to the various judgments cited by the learned Senior
Counsels, the same are discussed herein below:

i) In the case of Shantibhai J. Vaghela, two boys of 10 years and
9 years were residential students in the Ashram. On 3.7.2008, they
went missing, and on 5.7.2008, their bodies were discovered in the
bed of the river. Finally, on 7.11.2009, the FIR was lodged naming 7
Ashram inmates for an offence punishable under Section 304 read
with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 23 of
the Juvenile Justice Act. Challenging the registration of FIR, the
accused preferred an application before the Hon'ble Gujarat High
Court. The victim party also sought direction to transfer the
investigation to the CBI. The High Court quashed the case under
30 ABA 275.2026..odt

Section 304 IPC and allowed the investigation to continue only
under Section 304-A of IPC and 23 of the Juvenile Justice Act. A
plea for a CBI enquiry was dismissed. The State and the parents of
the children approached the Hon'ble Apex Court, and ultimately, the
Apex Court has observed that commission of the offence of culpable
homicide would require a more positive act on the part of the
accused as distinguished from silence, inaction or a mere lapse. It
was also observed that allegations of not carrying out a prompt
search of the missing children, delay in lodging a formal complaint
with the police and failure to take adequate measures to guard the
access from the ashram to the river, which are the principal
allegations made in the FIR, cannot make out a case of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 of
the IPC. It was held that to attract the ingredients of the said
offence, something more positive than a mere omission, lapse or
negligence on the part of the named accused will have to be present,
and such statements are conspicuously absent in the FIR filed in the
present case.

ii) The ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court cannot be
disputed at all. The proceedings concerned the quashing of the FIR,
and during their pendency, a charge sheet was filed. Here, the
investigation is at a preliminary stage. The one more difference was
that there was no statutory duty to take adequate measures to guard
the access from the Ashram to the river. In the present case, as
already said, the nature of the job, i.e. handling hazardous
substances, required compliance with the statutory provision.

iii) Coming to the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal (supra), more
31 ABA 275.2026..odt

particularly, paragraph 42, which is relied upon, it can be said that
the Hon'ble Apex Court has stated that no doubt a corporate entity
is an artificial person which acts through its officers, directors,
managing director, chairman, etc. If such a company commit an
offence involving mens rea, it would normally be the intent and
action of that individual who would act on behalf of the company. It
would be even more so when the criminal act is conspiracy.
However, at the same time, it is the cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute
specifically provides. The said proposition laid down by the Hon'ble
Apex Court cannot be disputed at all. But the fact remains that here,
the accused are charged for culpable homicide not amounting to
murder and knowledge is attributed. Illustration (a) of Section 100
of BNS has already been discussed, and therefore, even that
judgment would not be applicable.

iv) In the case of Shiv Kumar Jatia Vs. State of NCT of Delhi
(supra) was again relied upon, with paragraphs 10, 10.1, and 19. In
that case, Shivkumar was the Managing Director of M/s. Asian
Hotels (North) Limited, the fully known independent Executive
Director of the Company, Asim Kapoor, the General Manager of the
Hotel, and others were charged in an FIR under Section 308 of the
IPC. While dealing with the question of quashment, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has observed that the Penal Code does not contain
any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the
Managing Directors of the Company when the accused is a
Company. The vicarious liability of the Managing Director and
Director would arise, provided any provision exists in that behalf in
statute. As already stated, the applicants are charged based on
32 ABA 275.2026..odt

knowledge, not vicarious liability; therefore, the ratio would not be
applicable.

v) As far as judgment in the case of Gudikanti is concerned, it
deals with the parameters for granting bail and lays down the
principle for the grant or refusal of bail. In that case, bail was
granted at the appellate stage. The Hon'ble Apex Court has stated
that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the
evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may
be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the
issue.

vii) In the present case, the allegations are extremely serious. The
law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the said judgment
cannot be made applicable to the present case.

viii) Coming to the case of Sharad Sanghvi, in that case, an
application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. was preferred, which was
rejected by the High Court. A prayer before the High Court was to
quash the criminal case under Section 420 of the IPC against the
accused person.

ix) The accused person, aggrieved by the High Court's order,
approached the Hon'ble Apex Court, which quashed the complaint.
The gist of the aforesaid case is that the Penal Code does not
contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of
the Managing Director or Director of the company when the accused
is a company. Statutes indisputably must contain a provision fixing
33 ABA 275.2026..odt

such vicarious liability. It is in this background that the complaint
was quashed. As already stated, the State has registered an offence
punishable under Section 105 and has not relied upon or argued the
applicability of the principle of vicarious liability.

x) Coming to the case of Bhalchandra(supra), in the said case,
the question was whether the appellants were rightly convicted for
the offences under Section 304-A and 337 of the Indian Penal Code.
In that case, the appellants had a factory for manufacturing
explosives, and an explosion occurred on 5.5.1962, 11 people died,
and 7 were injured. The trial court convicted them, and the
appellate court had also refused to disturb the judgment. The order
of conviction was confirmed by the High Court, as also the sentence
on all the counts except under Section 304-A, where the substantive
sentence was reduced. The Hon'ble Apex Court dismissed the
appeal. The arguing counsel cited the judgment without making any
arguments.

xi) So far as the judgment of Hitendra Thakur (supra) is
concerned, para 13 was relied upon, which is reproduced as under:

"13. We would, therefore, at this stage, like to administer a
word of caution to the designated courts regarding
invoking the provisions of TADA, merely because the IO at
some stage of the investigation chooses to add an offence
under the same (sic some) provisions of TADA against an
accused person, more often than not, while opposing the
grant of bail, anticipatory bail or otherwise. The designated
courts should always consider the material available on the
record carefully and apply their mind to see whether
provisions of TADA are even prima facie attracted. In that
regard, it is necessary to mention here that at present,
34 ABA 275.2026..odt

sufficient material is not available as the investigation is
still at a preliminary stage.

xii) As regards judgment in the case of Shatibhai Waghela, more
particularly, the paragraph quoted above, it can be stated that what
the learned Senior Counsel has argued is that commission of the
offence of culpable homicide under Section 304 requires some
positive act on the part of the accused as distinguished from silence,
inaction or mere lapses. Negligence, by itself, may not furnish the
necessary mens rea. No doubt, the ratio of the judgment cannot be
disputed at all, but the manner in which the statutory deficiencies in
the hazardous unit were ignored would make a lot of difference.
What is required at this stage is a prima facie case.

xiii) As far as case of Pavneet Singh is concerned, in that case, a
Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and 482
of Cr.P.C. was preferred for quashment of FIR registered under
Section 279, 337, 338, 304(A), 304(II) read with Section 34 of the
IPC. The accused persons therein were the officers of SION Panvel
Tollways Pvt Ltd, which was awarded a contract for the construction
of a bridge and the maintenance of the road. The accident occurred
due to improper laying of tarcoal in June, when the monsoon had
commenced, making the bridge slippery. Therefore, the vehicles,
even though they were travelling at low speed, could not control
their speed, and as a result, they collided, leading to the accident. It
is in this background that the court observed that the commission of
the offence of culpable homicide under Section 304 (II) IPC require
some positive act on the part of the accused as distinguished from
silence, inaction or lapses. The allegations of not carrying out the
repair of the road cannot, thus, make out a case of culpable
35 ABA 275.2026..odt

homicide not amounting to murder. The court observed that such
statements of positive acts are conspicuously absent from the FIR
and thus quashed the FIR.

xiv) As already stated, the applicants were the managing director,
Directors/employees of a company that handled hazardous
substances, and the blast occurred at the final stage, i.e., packaging.
The non-appointment of safety officers and the non-removal of
deficiencies would be enough to deny the applicants anticipatory
bail.

xv) A judgment of Rohit delivered by the Coordinate Bench of this
Court at Bombay deals with the grant of pre-arrest bail in
connection with an FIR registered under Sections 304(II), 286, 337
and 338 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 9(D) of the
Explosive Act. In that case, the Mumbai Railway Vikas Corporation
awarded the contract to RAILCON-SREPL to execute the project to
lay the Panvel-Karjat rail line. The RAILCON-SREPL, in turn,
awarded the contract to one Adit Infra, of which the applicant in
that case was the proprietor. An excavation was carried out to lay a
railway line, and the contract for the work was awarded to Jai Ambe
Drilling. On 23.12.2022, blasting was carried out, resulting in stones
hitting some persons who were passing by. Two of them died. It is
in this background that the proprietor of Adit Infra preferred
anticipatory bail. The court, in the aforesaid background, observed
that prima facie, criminal intent or knowledge cannot be attributed
to the applicant as he was executing the work in discharge of
contractual obligation. The judgment in the case of Shantibhai
Waghela was also taken into consideration, as was the judgment of
Pavneet Singh. It was further observed that, since the chargesheet
36 ABA 275.2026..odt

had already been filed, the anticipatory bail application was
allowed.

xvi) The ratio of said judgment cannot be applied to the case in
hand, as in that case the applicant had awarded an explosion
contract to another company. In that case, there was a question of
contractual obligation. In the instant case, the question is whether a
statutory duty is being performed. The chargesheet was filed in that
case, whereas in the case at hand, the investigation is at the
preliminary stage.

xvii) Coming to the case of P.B. Desai (supra), the Hon'ble Apex
Court has observed that an omission is sometimes called a negative
act, but this seems a dangerous practice, for it too easily permits an
omission to be substituted for an act without requiring the special
requirement for omission liability, such as legal duty and the
physical capacity to perform the act. It was further observed that
criminal liability for an omission is also well accepted where the
actor has a legal duty and the capacity to act. The relevant
paragraphs of the judgments are already discussed supra. The
Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that while dealing with the
imposition of liability for omission, certain considerations are
required to be kept in mind. Does Section 338 IPC recognise that the
particular offence may be committed by omission?. Some categories
of offences mean some, and some may not; does it include the
medical profession? If the offence is capable of being committed by
omission, who all were under a duty to act? Who owned the
primary duty? What are the criteria for selecting the culprit? Where
the definition of crime requires proof that the actor caused a certain
reason, and can he be said to have caused that reason by doing
37 ABA 275.2026..odt

nothing?. These questions cannot be completely separated, and
sometimes one or all three of them arise in the same material that
follows. Each of them, perhaps, also gives rise to yet another
question: is the actors' conduct properly categorised as an omission
or an act? Thus, it is clear that there must be some legal duty. In this
case, the duty was to run the company in accordance with the law,
complying with all statutory provisions, providing a safe
environment for poor workers, and, at last, acting with utmost
responsibility, as the unit was hazardous.

63. The aforesaid discussion, thus, would make it clear that there
is a prima facie case which is available against the applicant. The
Latin expression, "prima facie", means "at first sight", "at first view"
or based on first impression. In both civil and criminal law, the term
denotes that, upon initial examination, a legal claim has sufficient
evidence to proceed to trial or judgment. The knowledge
attributable to the applicants is sufficient to establish a prima facie
case against them. The offence of culpable homicide involves the
doing of an act (which term includes an illegal omission). Section
105 of BNS speaks about "if the act is done with the knowledge that
it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death,
or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death".

64. The word "likely" means probably, and it is distinguished
from more possible. While the chances of it happening are even or
greater than the chances of it not happening, it can be said that it
will "probably happen". In arriving at the conclusion, the Court has
to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether
the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to
cause death.
38 ABA 275.2026..odt

65. In hazardous industries, persistent statutory non-compliance,
even after prior notice, transforms omission into culpable conduct,
attracting criminal liability beyond mere negligence.

66. Liability is not vicarious but arises from prima facie
knowledge, statutory duty, and continued omission.

67. The learned counsels' contention that custodial interrogation
is not required cannot be considered at this stage. The honourable
Apex Court's observations in the case of Sumitha Pradeep vs
Arunkumar CK and Another, (2022) 17 SCC 391, para. 12, are
relevant and are reproduced:

12............In many anticipatory bail matters, we have
noticed one common argument being canvassed that no
custodial interrogation is required and, therefore, anticipatory
bail may be granted. There appears to be a serious
misconception of law that if no case for custodial
interrogation is made out by the prosecution, then that alone
would be a good ground to grant anticipatoy bail. Custodial
interrogation can be one of the relevant aspects to be
considered along with other grounds while deciding an
application seeking anticipatory bail. There may be many
cases in which the custodial interrogation of the accused may
not be required, but that does not mean that the prima facie
case against the accused should be ignored or overlooked and
he should be granted anticipatory bail. The fist and foremost
thing that the court hearing an anticipatory bail application
should consider is the prima facie case put up agianst the
accused. Thereafter, the nature of offence should be looked
into along with the severity of the punishment. Custodial
interrogation can be one of the grounds to delcine
anticipatory bail. However, even if custodial interrogation is
not required or necessiated, by itself, cannot be a ground to
grant anticipatory bail.
39 ABA 275.2026..odt

68. Needless to mention that this Court has not expressed any
final opinion; the findings are for deciding applications for
anticipatory bail only.

69. The learned APP has rightly relied upon paragraph 25 of
Criminal Application (ABA) No. 375/2024, decided by Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court on 26.6.2024, in case of Ritu w/o Dinesh Maloo
Vs. State of Maharashtra, the PSO, PS Tahsil, Nagpur, which reads
thus:

"25. In the case of Alister Anthony Pareira vs. State of
Maharashtra supra, the Honourable Apex Court
observed that a person, responsible for a reckless or rash
or negligent act that causes death which he had
knowledge as a reasonable man that such act was
dangerous enough to lead to some untoward thing and
the death was likely to be caused, may be attributed
with the knowledge of the consequence and may be
fastened with culpability of homicide not amounting to
murder and punishable under Section 304 Part-II of the
Indian Penal Code. The court also proceeded to observe
that there is a presumption that a man knows the
natural and likely consequences of his acts. Moreover,
an act does not become involuntary act simply because
its consequences were unforeseen. It has also been
observed that in a case where negligence or rashness is
the cause of death and nothing more, Section 304A may
be attracted but where the rash or negligent act is
preceded with the knowledge that such act is likely to
cause death, Section 304 Part-II of the Indian Penal
Code may be attracted".

70. In light of the above considerations, I find no merit, so far as
Criminal Application (ABA) No. 275/2026, preferred by Managing
Director Mr. Sanjay Choudhari; Criminal Application (ABA) No.
272/2026, preferred by Director (CEO) Mr. Alok Choudhari, the
Criminal Application (ABA) No. 210/2026 employee i.e. Deputy
40 ABA 275.2026..odt

Manager (Safety), Criminal Application (ABA) No. 223/2026
preferred by the Director Mr. Alok Awadhiya and Criminal
Application (ABA) No. 268/2026, preferred by Director Mr.
Shrawan Kumar. So far as independent directors are concerned,
their applications stand allowed. It cannot be ignored that one of
the independent Directors by name Ms. Satyawati Parashar is
suffering from stage-III cancer. Thus, following order is passed.

ORDER

i) The Criminal Application (ABA) No. 232/2026, Criminal
Application (ABA) No. 270/2026, Criminal Application (ABA) No.
271/2026 are allowed.

ii) In the event of arrest, in connection with Crime
No. 228/2026, dated 01/03/2026, registered with Kalmeshwar
Police Station, District Nagpur (Rural) for the offences punishable
under Sections 105, 125(a), 125(b), 288 of Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023, the applicants in Criminal Application (ABA)
232/2026 named Ms. Satyawati Parashar, Criminal Application
(ABA) No. 270/2023, named Ravindra Pokharna, Criminal
Application (ABA) No. 271/2026, named Manoj Kumar Prasad, be
released on bail on furnishing PB and SB of Rs. 2 lakhs each.

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