Patna High Court
Ritlal Rai @ Ritlal Yadav vs The State Of Bihar, Through The Chief … on 27 April, 2026
Author: Alok Kumar Pandey
Bench: Alok Kumar Pandey
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No.3170 of 2025
======================================================
Ritlal Rai @ Ritlal Yadav Son of Late Ramashish Rai Resident of Khothwan,
Malighat, P.S.- Khagaul, District - Patna, Bihar
... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Bihar, through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna.
2. The Principal Secretary, Home Department, Government of Bihar, Patna.
3. The Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar, Patna.
4. The Assistant Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar,
Patna.
5. The District Magistrate, Patna, Bihar.
6. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna, Bihar.
... ... Respondents
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner : Mr. Rajiv Kumar Verma, Sr. Advocate
Mrs. Priyanka Singh, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Kinkar Kumar, S.C.-9
Mrs. Vagisha Pragya Vacaknavi, AC to SC-9
Ms. Sushmita Sharma, AC to SC-9
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK KUMAR PANDEY
CAV JUDGMENT
Date : 27-04-2026
In the instant petition, petitioner seeks following
relief(s):-
"A. A writ in the nature of certiorari or any other
appropriate writ/s, order/s, direction/s, quashing the
following: -
(i) The order dated 30.10.2025 issued by the
Assistant Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional
Services, Bihar, Patna, purportedly in exercise of powers
under Section 29(3) of the Prisoners Act, 1900 read with
Rule 781(vii) of the Bihar Prison Manual, 2012, whereby
the earlier transfer order dated 30.04.2025, transferring the
petitioner from Adarsh Central Jail, Beur, Patna to Special
Central Jail, Bhagalpur (Tritya Khand) has been extended
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
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for a further period of six months, on the basis of the
report/recommendation of the District Magistrate, Patna and
the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna, as contained in
Annexure-P/1 to the present petition.
B. A writ in the nature of Mandamus, or any
other appropriate writ/s, order/s, direction/s, commanding
the respondents as follows:-
(i) To declare the impugned order dated
30.10.2025
(Annexure-P/1) as illegal, void and non est in
the eye of law;
(ii) To restrain the Respondents from giving
effect to or acting in furtherance of the impugned order
dated 30.10.2025 (Annexure-P/1);
(iii) To hold and declare that the impugned order
cannot operate or be given effect to, the same being in the
teeth of the judicial order dated 07.08.2025 passed in
Special Case No. 271 of 2018 by the learned District and
Additional Sessions Judge-III cum Special Judge,
M.P./M.L.A. Court, Patna;
(iv) To forthwith direct the Respondents to
lodge and keep the petitioner at Adarsh Central Jail, Beur,
Patna, and not at Special Central Jail, Bhagalpur.
(C). To any other relief/s which the petitioner is
found entitled to.”
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a
plain reading of Rule 781(vii) of the Bihar Prison Manual, 2012
unequivocally vests the power of transfer of prisoners
exclusively in the Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional
Services, to be exercised in conformity with Section 29(3) of the
Prisoners Act, 1900 and in accordance with general or special
orders issued by the State Government. In the present case,
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
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however, the impugned order has been passed by the Assistant
Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar,
Patna who lacks the statutory competence and jurisdiction to
exercise such power. Consequently, the impugned order, as
contained in Annexure-P/1, is ultra vires, illegal and in direct
violation of Rule 781 (vii) of the Bihar Prison Manual, 2012. He
further submits that impugned order passed by the Assistant
Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar,
Patna was not in consonance with the statutory provisions.
3. On the aforesaid aspect, learned counsel for the
petitioner has placed his reliance on the judgment passed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh
Vs. Singhara Singh and Others reported in AIR 1964 SC 358
(V 51 C 45) in which at para 7 and 8 it has been held as under :-
“7. In Nazir Ahmed’s case, 63 Ind App
372 : (AIR 1936 PC 253(2)) the Judicial
Committee observed that the principle applied in
Taylor v. Taylor, (1876) 1 Ch. D 426 to a Court,
namely, that where a power is given to do a certain
thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in
that way or not at all and that other methods of
performance are necessarily forbidden, applied to
judicial officers making a record under Section 164
and, therefore, held that the magistrate could not
give oral evidence of the confession made to him
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
4/35which he had purported to record under Section
164 of the Code. It was said that otherwise all the
precautions and safeguards laid down in Ss. 164
and 364, both of which had to be read together,
would become of such trifling value as to be almost
idle and that “it would be an unnatural construction
to hold that any other procedure was permitted than
that which is laid down with such minute
particularity in the sections themselves.”
8. The rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor
(1876) 1 Ch. D 426 is well recognised and is
founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a
statute had conferred a power to do an act and had
laid down the method in which that power has to be
exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the
act in any other manner than that which has been
prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if
this were not so, the statutory provision might as
well not have been enacted. A magistrate, therefore,
cannot in the course of investigation record a
confession except in the manner laid down in S.
164. The power to record the confession had
obviously been given so that the confession might
be proved by the record of it made in the manner
laid down. If proof of the confession by other
means was permissible, the whole provision of S.
164 including the safeguards contained in it for the
protection of accused persons would be rendered
nugatory. The section, therefore, by conferring on
magistrates the power to record statements or
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
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confessions, by necessary implication, prohibited a
magistrate from giving oral evidence of the
statements or confessions made to him.”
4. While quoting the said citation, learned counsel for
the petitioner submits that if authority is assigned to do a certain
thing in a manner which is provided under statutory provisions
the same must be done in a way which is provided under
statutory provisions. Learned counsel for the petitioner further
submits that rule of executive business cannot override the
statutory provisions as the Constitution is the mother of all laws.
5. On the aforesaid aspect, learned counsel for the
petitioner has placed his reliance on the judgment passed by
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Partha Das and Others
Vs. State of Tripura and Others with Sujan Roy and Others
Vs. State of Tripura and Others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 1844 in which at para 40 it has been held as under :-
“40. Applying the above principles of law, it
can safely be concluded that executive instructions
issued under Article 166(1) Constitution of India cannot
override the act done under the statute and the rules
made thereunder. The executive instructions can only
supplement the provisions of the act and the rules in
case of any ambiguity or if gaps are to be filled but such
executive instructions cannot supplant the specific
provisons which already occupy the field….”
6. While quoting the aforesaid judgment, learned
counsel for the petitioner submits that if there are no gaps in the
statutory provisions, on the said aspect executive instruction
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
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cannot be added to supplant specific provision which has
already occupied the field and, in no way, executive business
can override the statutory provisions where there is specific and
clear-cut statutory provisions.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed
his reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of State of Maharashtra & Ors. etc. etc. Vs.
Saeed Sohail Sheikh etc. etc. reported in AIR 2013 SC 168 in
which at para 25 it has been held as under :-
“25. Reference may also be, at this stage made,
to Section 309 of the Code which, inter alia, empowers the
Court after taking cognizance of an offence or
commencement of the trial to remand the accused in
custody in cases where the Court finds it necessary to
postpone the commencement of trial or inquiry. The
rationale underlying both these provisions is that the
continued detention of the prisoner in jail during the trial or
inquiry is legal and valid only under the authority of the
Court/Magistrate before whom the accused is produced or
before whom he is being tried. An undertrial remains in
custody by reasons of such order of remand passed by the
concerned Court and such remand is by a warrant addressed
to the authority who is to hold him in custody. The remand
orders are invariably addressed to the Superintendents of
jails where the undertrials are detained till their production
before the Court on the date fixed for that purpose. The
prison where the undertrial is detained is thus a prison
identified by the competent Court either in terms of Section
167 or Section 309 of the Code. It is axiomatic that transfer
of the prisoner from any such place of detention would be
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
7/35permissible only with the permission of the Court under
whose warrant the under trial has been remanded to
custody.”
8. By quoting the said judgment, learned counsel for
the petitioner has stressed that the transfer of the prisoner from
any such place of detention would be permissible only with the
permission of the Court under whose warrant the under trial has
been remanded to custody. In this way, by citing the said
judgment, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that
the court is the authority to make the order of transfer. In this
way, the impugned order, which is annexed as Annexure P/1, is
illegal, void and non est in the eye of law.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
impugned order dated 30.10.2025 is without having any
jurisdiction of law as the Assistant Inspector General, Prisons
and Correctional Services, Bihar, Patna is not authorized to pass
the order of transfer from Adarsh Central Jail, Beur, Patna to
Special Central Jail, Bhagalpur (Tritya Khand). He further
submits that according to Section 29(3) of the Prisoners Act,
1900 read with Rule 781 (vii) of the Bihar Prison Manual,
2012, the impugned order cannot be sustained when the very
foundation, namely, recommendation is neither justifiable nor
tenable as they are founded merely on general expressions such
as “law and order”, “public interest” and “administrative
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
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grounds” without any factual foundation or application of mind
and, hence, impugned order suffers from patent arbitrariness and
non-application of mind and is liable to be treated as a ‘nullity’
in the eye of law. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also
raised issue of speedy trial and investigation is fundamental
right emanating from Article 21 of the Constitution of India and
the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in catena of decisions, has
consistently emphasized that speedy trial is an integral
component of the fair, just and reasonable procedure guaranteed
under Article 21, and any action that results in undue delay
amounts to a violation of the said fundamental right. Learned
counsel for the petitioner is aggrieved by the act of authority
which amounts to violation of said fundamental right and the
respondent did not take the permission of judicial courts before
extending the petitioner’s detention at Special Central Jail,
Bhagalpur for a further period of six months and the impugned
order is merely a mechanical order and the same is non-
speaking, vague and cryptic.
10. Learned counsel for the State submits that through
counter affidavit he has quoted para 7 where it is mentioned that
the petitioner was transferred to Special Central Jail (Sector III),
Bhagalpur along with two other prisoners on the basis of
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recommendation contained in letter No. 1140/sa dated
26.04.2025 of the District Magistrate, Patna and letter No.
4426/Go dated 17.04.2025 of the Senior Superintendent of
Police, Patna, in view of their involvement in several criminal
cases and apprehended law and order issues at Model Central,
Jail, Beur, Patna. He further submits through para 8 that the
petitioner was initially transferred for a period of six months on
administrative grounds, vide letter No. 4821 dated 01.05.2025,
considering the law and order situation at Model Central Jail,
Beur, Patna as well as public interest (copy of letter No. 4821
dated 01.05.2025 is annexed and marked as Annexure-R-1 to
4/A). He further submits through para 9 that upon expiry of the
six month’ period on 29.10.2025, the petitioner’s transfer was
extended for further six months vide Memo No. 7935 dated
30.10.2025 (Annexure-P/1), on the basis of recommendation
contained in letter no. 2517/General dated 30.10.2025 of the
District Magistrate, Patna and letter No. 14159/confidential
dated 29.10.2025 of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna.
The transfer extension was necessitated due to credible
information regarding criminal conspiracy during the
petitioner’s stay in Model Central Jail, Beur, Patna. He further
submits through paras 10 and 11 that the transfer of the
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
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petitioner was made in exercise of powers conferred under
Section 29(2) of the Prisoners Act, 1900 and Rule 781(vii) of
the Bihar Prison Manual, 2012 duly approved by the Inspector
General of Prisons. Copy of Rule 781(vii) of Bihar Prison
Manual, 2012 is annexed as Annexure R-1 to 4/B to the present
counter affidavit. The petitioner has multiple criminal cases
pending against him, which includes 11 cases mentioned in para
22 of the writ petition, 25 cases as per register dated 23.11.2025
and 8 cases as per entry register dated 10.02.2020 and on
account of said reason, the administrative decision has been
taken for further extension of transfer. He further submits
through para 12 that in pursuance of the department order, as
soon as the date for production of the petitioner is received by
the Superintendent, Special Central Jail, Bhagalpur, letter is
immediately written to Superintendent, Adarsh Central Jail,
Beur, Patna to ensure physical production and if physical
production is not required, then, produce the petitioner through
V.C. He further submits that the petitioner has been produced
physically/through V.C. in Courts on different dates as informed
by the Jail Superintendent, Special Central Jail, Bhagalpur vide
letter No. 612 dated 20.01.2026. Copy of letter no. 612 dated
20.01.2026 is annexed as Annexure-R-1 to 4/C to the present
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
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counter affidavit. He further submits that so far as the
petitioner’s allegations of illegality and violation of judicial
orders are concerned, the same are wholly baseless and
misconceived. The transfer order is purely administrative in
nature and the same is necessitated in the interest of law and
order, public safety and security of other prisoners and the
contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is not justified in
the light of aforesaid aspects. He further submits that there is no
violation of any judicial order dated 07.08.2025 passed in
Special Case No. 271 of 2018 by the learned Special Judge,
M.P./M.L.A. Court, Patna. The said judicial order did not
restrict or limit the power of the competent authority to make
administrative transfers under the Prisoners Act, 1900 and Bihar
Prison Manual, 2012.
11. He further submits that, in the light of aforesaid
facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is not entitled
to any reliefs:-
i. Quashing of Memo No. 7935 dated
20.10.2025;
ii. Restraining the respondents from giving
effect to the impugned order;
iii. Directions to lodge the petitioner at Adarsh
Central Jail, Beur, Patna instead of Special
Central Jail, Bhagalpur.
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
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and the writ petition, being devoid of any merit, is fit to be
dismissed.
12. Learned counsel for the State has also
contended that the judgment in the case of Saeed Sohail Sheikh
(supra) is not identical with the present case as in Maharashtra
there is no rule framed by the State of Maharashtra for
transferring the prisoners from one jail to another jail, whereas
in Bihar, there is specific provision by the State Government,
Bihar for transferring the prisoners from one jail to another jail.
So, in the present case, the concerned authority has merely
circulated the order under his name where it is mentioned that
after obtaining necessary approval of Inspector General, Prisons
and Correctional Services, Bihar, Patna on the proposal of
extension of period of incarceration in transferee jail, impugned
order vide Memo No. 7935 dated 30.10.2025 has only been
issued under the signature of Assistant Inspector General,
Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar, Patna for the purpose
of circulation, but the said order has been duly approved by
Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar,
Patna which is already evident from the impugned order itself.
fcgkj ljdkj
dkjk ,oa lq/kkj lsok,Wa fujh{k.kky;
x`g foHkkx ¼dkjk½
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
13/35
vkns’k
ftyk inkf/kdkjh] iVuk ds i=kad&2517@lk0 fnukad&30-10-
2025 ,oa ojh; iqfyl v/kh{kd] iVuk ds i=kad&14159@xks0
fnukad&29-10-2025 ds }kjk izfrosfnr gS dh vkn”kZ dsUnzh; dkjk] csmj]
iVuk esa lalhfer canh jhryky ;kno] is0&Lo0 jkek”kh’k ;kno]
lk0&dkWFkok] Fkkuk&[kxkSy] ftyk&iVuk dks foHkkxh; vkns”k
Kkikad&3161 fnukad&30-04-2025 ds }kjk vkn”kZ dsUnzh; dkjk] csmj]
iVuk ls fo”ks’k dsUnzh; dkjk] Hkkxyiqj ¼r`rh; [kaM½ esa LFkkukarfjr fd;k
x;k FkkA ftldh dyko/kh fnukad&29-10-2025 dks lekIr gks pqdh gSA
buds okil iVuk vkus ij dkjk/khu jgrs gq, vkijkf/kd “kM;a= jpus
dh lwpuk gSA buds fo:) fofHkUu Fkkuksa esa vkijkf/kd dkaM ntZ gSA ;s
vfHk;qDr ncax izo`fr ds gSA buds LFkkuh; dkjk esa jgus ij dkjk esa
yksd O;oLFkk] ‘kkafr O;oLFkk rFkk fof/k&O;oLFkk dh leL;k mRiUu gksus
ds laHkkouk cuh jgrh gSA buds }kjk vklUu fcgkj fo/kku lHkk fuokZpu
ds volj ij izR;{k&vizR;{k :i ernkrk dk izHkkfor djus ,oa dkjk esa
vjktdrk dh fLFkfr mRiUu djus dk iz;kl fd;k tk ldrk gSA ,slh
ifjfLFkfr esa iz’kklfud n`f”Vdks.k budk dsUnzh; dkjk] Hkkxyiqj dh
vof/k foLrkj djus dh vuq’kalk dh tkrh gSA rn~vkyksd esa ftyk
inkf/kdkjh] iVuk ,oa ojh; iqfyl v/kh{kd] iVuk }kjk canh jhryky
;kno] is0&Lo0 jkek’kh”k ;kno dks vof/k foLrkj djus dk vuqjks/k fd;k
x;k gSA
2- ftyk inkf/kdkjh] iVuk ,oa ojh; iqfyl v/kh{kd] iVuk }kjk
iwoZ esa izkIr izfrosnu@vuq’kalk ds vkyksd esa vkn’kZ dsUnzh; dkjk] csmj]
iVuk esa lalhfer fuEu canh dks muds uke ds le{k ;Fkk&LrEHk 04 esa
vafdr dkjk esa LFkkukarfjr fd;k x;k Fkk] tks fuEuor~ gS %&
dz- vkn’kZ dsUnzh; dkjk] csmj] iVuk ls foHkkxh; LFkkukarj.k vkns’k LFkkukUrfjr dkjk dk
LFkkukarfjr canh ds uke@firk dk Kkikad@fnukad@vof/k uke
uke
1 2 3 4
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;kno N% ekg ds fy, Hkkxyiqj ¼r`rh;
[k.M½
3- ftyk inkf/kdkjh] iVuk ,oa ojh; iqfyl v/kh{kd] iVuk ds
izfrosnu@vuq’kalk ds vkyksd esa lE;d~ fopkjksijkar dkjk dh fof/k
O;oLFkk] yksdfgr ,oa tufgr esa iz’kklfud n`f”Vdks.k ls] fcgkj dkjk
gLrd] 2012 ds fu;e&781 dh dafMdk& (vii) ,oa canh vf/kfu;e
dh /kkjk 1900 dh la’kksf/kr /kkjk 29 ¼3½ ds rgr iznRr ‘kfDr;ksa dk
iz;ksx djrs gq, vkn’kZ dsUnzh; dkjk] csmj] iVuk ls fo’ks”k dsUnzh; dkjk]
Hkkxyiqj ¼r`rh; [k.M½ esa LFkkukarfjr canh jhryky ;kno] is0&Lo0
jkek’kh”k ;kno dks vxys N% ekg ds fy, LFkkukarfjr dkjk esa gh vof/k
foLrkj fd;k tkrk gSA
4- ftyk inkf/kdkjh] iVuk ,oa ojh; iqfyl v/kh{kd] iVuk ls
vuqjks/k gS fd foHkkxh; i=kad&1103 fnukad&09-03-2017 ,oa foHkkxh;
i=kad&7125 fnukad&15-12-2017 ds vkyksd esa mDr LFkkukarfjr canh
dks fopkjk/khu oknksa esa fu/kkZfjr frfFk;ksa ij LFkkuh; U;k;ky; esa lle;
miLFkkiu dh O;oLFkk lqfuf’pr fd;k tk;A
5- v/kh{kd] vkn’kZ dsUnzh; dkjk] csmj] iVuk dks funs’k fn;k
tkrk gS fd canh ds LFkkukarj.k ds iwoZ ;g lqfuf’pr dj ysaxs dh
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
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ekuuh; U;k;ky; dk mDr canh ds okn fu”iknu ds laca/k esa dksbZ
fn’kk&funs’k ugha gSA lkFk gh foHkkxh; i=kad&1226 fnukad&17-03-2017
ds }kjk fuxZr funs’k ds vkyksd esa mDr canh ds LFkkukarj.k dh lwpuk
lacaf/kr U;k;ky; dks nsrs gq, izR;sd fu/kkZfjr frfFk ij miLFkkiu ,oa
fjekaM laca/kh dkjZokbZ lqfuf’pr djsaxsA iwu% lacaf/kr v/kh{kd dks
funsf’kr fd;k tkrk gS fd foHkkxh; i=kad&4680 fnukad&01-06-2023 ds
vkyksd esa canh dks fofM;ks&dkWUQzsaflax ds ek/;e ls ekuuh; U;k;ky; esa
miLFkkiu ‘kr&izfr’kr djkuk lqfuf’pr djsaxsA
mijksDr ij egkfujh{kd dkjk ,oa lq/kkj lqok,Wa dk vuqeksnu
izkIr gSA
13. Learned counsel for the State has placed his
reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the case of Union of India and Another Vs. P.K. Roy and
others reported in AIR 1964 Madh Pra 307 in which the
relevant portion of para 10 reads as under :-
10…… “The principle of the maxim
“delegatus non potest delegare” has therefore no application
to the present case. The maxim deals with the extent to
which a statutory authority may permit another to exercise a
discretion entrusted by the statute to itself. It is true that
delegation in its general sense does not imply a parting with
statutory powers by the authority which grants the
delegation, but points rather to the conferring of an
authority to do things which otherwise that administrative
authority would have to do for itself. If, however, the
administrative authority named in the statute has and retains
in its hands general control over the activities of the person
to whom it has entrusted in part the exercise of its statutory
power and the control exercised by the administrative
authority is of a substantial degree there is in the eye of law
no “delegation” at all and the maxim “delegatus non potest
delegare” does not apply (see Fowler (John) and Co.
(Leeds) v. Duncan. 1941 – Ch 450). In other words if a
statutory authority empowers a delegate to undertake
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
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preparatory work and to take an initial decision in matters
entrusted to it but retains in its own hands the power to
approve or disapprove the decision after it has been taken,
the decision will be held to have been validly made if the
degree of control maintained by the authority is close
enough for the decision to be regarded as the authority’s
own……”
14. He has cited relevant portion of para 10 of the
judgment. By quoting the said judgment, it has been submitted
that the Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services,
Bihar, Patna has already passed the order dated 30.10.2025.
Merely order was communicated under the signature of
Assistant Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services,
Bihar, Patna and on the basis of proposal extended by office
after necessary approval of Inspector General, Prisons and
Correctional Services, Bihar, Patna, the said order was
communicated on the same day. In this way, there is no question
of delegation of power. Only earlier order was extended by the
authority who has been assigned to do so under the statutory
provision, but communication was made through the signature
of Assistant Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional
Services, Bihar, Patna. Thus, there is no question that the
Assistant Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services,
Bihar, Patna has acted in the derogation of statutory provision
and the impugned order is justified and legal.
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15. Learned counsel for the State has also placed
reliance on the decision of this Court rendered in LPA No. 2294
of 2015 (Amrawati Devi Vs. State of Bihar Through The
Principal Secretary, Urban Development and Town Planning
Department, Government of Bihar, Patna) in which at para 31 it
has been held as under:-
“31. Rule 22 of the Rules empowers the
Minister to arrange, by way of standing order, with the
Principal Secretary concerned as to what matters or classes
of matters are to be brought to his notice. Therefore, even if
the decision was required to be taken by the Minister in
terms of Rules 21 and 22 of the Rules, the fact remains that
once the Minister had approved the decision of the Principal
Secretary, it was an approval in terms of Rule 22 of the
Rules. The standing orders are required to be issued in a
class of cases to bring certainty to the affairs of the
Department; but in an individual case, the approval of the
Minister would mean delegation to the Principal Secretary
and, thus, there is compliance of the Rules as well. Though
the Rules have been held to be mandatory, the fact remains
that the decision approving an order passed by the Principal
Secretary by the Minister does not contradict any of the
provisions of the Rules; rather, it supplements such Rules. It
is well settled that there cannot be any action contradictory
to the Rules, but the action can always be supplemented.
Therefore, approval by the Minister of an order passed by
the Principal Secretary complies with the rigours of the
Rules as well and, therefore, in either situation, we find that
the order of the learned Single Bench is not sustainable.”
16. By quoting the citation, he has submitted that
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
17/35
once there is approval by the Superior authority, no question can
be raised that it was against the statutory provision as the
decision fulfilled the rigours of statutory provision.
17. After hearing the arguments of the learned
counsel for the parties as well as on perusal of the material
available on record, it is found that Annexure P/1 is the bone of
contention between the petitioner and respondents and other
issues raised by the petitioner are arising out of Annexure P/1.
For deciding the Annexure P/1, it is necessary to cite the
relevant provision of Bihar Prison Manual, 2012 :-
“29. Removal of prisoners – (1) The [State
Government] may, by general or special order provide for
the removal of any prisoner confined in a prison-
(a) under sentence of death, or
(b) under, or in lieu of, a sentence of
imprisonment or transportation, or
(c) in default of payment of a fine, or
(d) in default of giving security for keeping the
peace or for maintaining good behavior, to any other prison
in [the State [x x x].
(2) (Subject to the orders, and under the control,
of the State Government] the Inspector-General of Prisons
may, in like manner, provide for the removal of any prisoner
confined as aforesaid in a prison in the State to any other
prison in the State] [x x x].]
[Bihar Amendment – In its application to the
State of Bihar, in S. 29, after sub-section (2), add the
following sub-section, namely:-
(3) Subject to the orders, and under the control
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
18/35of the State Government any person who is detained in
custody in a prison due to pending inquiry, investigation or
trial under any writ, warrant or order of any Court may, by
order, be directed to be removed-
(a) from one subsidiary jail to another
subsidiary jail or district jail in the district, by the District
Magistrate;
(b) from the one district Jail to another
subsidiary Jail in the district, by the District Magistrate:
(c) from a subsidiary jail or a district Jail in one
district to a subsidiary Jail or a district Jail in another
district, by the District Magistrate of the District from which
the person is removed with the consent of the District
Magistrate of such other district;
(d) by the State Government or the Inspector
General of Prisons:-
(i) from the Central Jail to another Central Jail
or to a District Jail or a subsidiary Jail;
(ii) from the district Jail to another district Jail
or a Central Jail or a subsidiary Jail; or
(iii) from one subsidiary Jail to another
subsidiary Jail or to a district Jail or a Central Jail.”
Rule 781. Inspector General, Prisons and
Correctional Services. – The key functions and powers of
the Inspector General, Prisons & Correctional Services shall
be as follows:
i. Inspector General, Prisons & Correctional
Services shall ensure implementation of the provisions of
the applicable Acts and prison policies as laid down by the
State Government through other officers appointed for
assisting him/her at the headquarters, districts and at the
prisons under his/her control.
ii. Inspector General, Prisons & Correctional
Services shall plan, organise, direct, coordinate and control
the various prison services.
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
19/35iii. Inspector General, Prisons & Correctional
Services shall define the functions and fix lines of authority
and channels of command of prison and headquarter
personnel.
iv. Inspector General, Prisons & Correctional
Services shall inspect prisons with special reference to care,
welfare, training and treatment of inmates, prison security,
staff discipline, staff welfare and adherence to these Rules
in prison administration.
v. Inspector General, Prisons & Correctional
Services shall act as a medium of communication between
State Government and every personnel of the Prisons &
Correctional Services Department. Except in cases specially
excepted, every communication from any officer of the
Prisons & Correctional Services Department, intended for
the perusal of State Government, shall be submitted through
him/her.
vi. Inspector General, Prisons & Correctional
Services shall have authority to sanction all ordinary
working expenses of the Department within the limits of
budget grants.
vii. Inspector General, Prisons & Correctional
Services shall have authority to transfer prisoners from any
prison in Bihar to another prison within the State vide
Section 29(2) of Prisoners Act, 1900, or in accordance with
general or special orders issued by the Government to a
prison in any other State. He/she is also authorised to
sanction the removal of prisoners from the permanent
buildings of any prison into temporary quarters during
emergencies.
789. Assistant Inspector General (H.Q.) – The
post of Assistant Inspector General, (H.Q.) shall be filled by
promotion from Bihar Jail Services cadre.
790. In addition to the duties and
responsibilities elsewhere prescribed in this Manual, the
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
20/35general duties and responsibilities of the Assistant Inspector
General, (H.Q.) shall be as follows:-
(i) Assistant Inspector General, Prison (H.Q.)
will be the drawing and disbursing officer of prison and
correctional department and accounts.
(ii) He/she will be the first appellate authority
under Right to Information Act.
791. Assistant Inspector General, Prisons
(Region) – Assistant Inspector General, Prisons (Region)
shall have power to revise or modify any punishment
awarded by a Superintendent of a prison to prison officers.
792.(v) Assistant Inspector General, Prisons
(Region) shall ensure that all prisons in his/her region duly
observe the provisions of this manual strictly and shall be
responsible for implementing all the directions of the
Deputy Inspector General (Prison Administration),
Inspector General, Prison and Correctional Services and
State Governments in this regard.”
18. In the light of the relevant provisions, there is
statutory provision for removal of prisoners, subject to the
orders and under the control of the State Government any
person who is detained in custody in a prison due to pending
inquiry, investigation or trial under any writ, warrant or order of
any Court may, by order, be directed to be removed by the State
Government or Inspector General from the Central Jail to
another Central Jail or to a District Jail or a subsidiary Jail; from
the district Jail to another district Jail or a Central Jail or a
subsidiary Jail; or from one subsidiary Jail to another subsidiary
Jail or to a district Jail or a Central Jail.
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
21/35
19. The key functions and powers of the Inspector
General, Prisons and Correctional Services have specifically
been provided under Rules 781(i) of the Bihar Prison Manual,
2012 and as per the said Rule, Inspector General, Prisons and
Correctional Services is to ensure the implementation of the
provision of the applicable Act and prison policies.
20. On the bare perusal of Rule 781(i), it is crystal
clear that for the implementation of the provisions of the
applicable acts and prison policies as laid down by the State
Government, vests in Inspector General, Prisons. For such
purposes, I.G. Prisons may take assistance from the officers
appointed to assist him/her at the headquarters, districts and at
the prisons under his/her control. It has also been mentioned in
sub Rule (vii) of the Rule 781 that Inspector General, Prisons &
Correctional Services shall have authority to transfer prisoners
from any prison in Bihar to another prison within the State vide
Section 29(2) of Prisoners Act, 1900, or in accordance with
general or special orders issued by the Government to a prison
in any other State. He/she is also authorized to sanction the
removal of prisoners from the permanent buildings of any
prison into temporary quarters during emergencies.
21. The responsibilities of the Assistant Inspector
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
22/35
General, Prisons (Regions) are prescribed under Rule 792(v) of
the Bihar Prison Manual, 2012. In terms thereof, the Assistant
Inspector General, Prisons (Regions) shall ensure that all
prisons in his/her region duly observe the provisions of this
manual strictly and shall be responsible for implementing all the
directions of the Deputy Inspector General (Prison
Administration), Inspector General, Prison and Correctional
Services and State Governments in this regard.
22. In this way, after discussing the relevant
provisions, the Assistant Inspector General, Prisons (Regions)
has to act in accordance with the direction given by the IG,
Prison and the Annexure P/1 which has been cited by the
petitioner reads as follows:-
fcgkj ljdkj
dkjk ,oa lq/kkj lsok,Wa fujh{k.kky;
x`g foHkkx ¼dkjk½
vkns’k
ftyk inkf/kdkjh] iVuk ds i=kad&2517@lk0 fnukad&30-10-
2025 ,oa ojh; iqfyl v/kh{kd] iVuk ds i=kad&14159@xks0
fnukad&29-10-2025 ds }kjk izfrosfnr gS dh vkn”kZ dsUnzh; dkjk] csmj]
iVuk esa lalhfer canh jhryky ;kno] is0&Lo0 jkek”kh’k ;kno]
lk0&dkWFkok] Fkkuk&[kxkSy] ftyk&iVuk dks foHkkxh; vkns”k
Kkikad&3161 fnukad&30-04-2025 ds }kjk vkn”kZ dsUnzh; dkjk] csmj]
iVuk ls fo”ks’k dsUnzh; dkjk] Hkkxyiqj ¼r`rh; [kaM½ esa LFkkukarfjr fd;k
x;k FkkA ftldh dyko/kh fnukad&29-10-2025 dks lekIr gks pqdh gSA
buds okil iVuk vkus ij dkjk/khu jgrs gq, vkijkf/kd “kM;a= jpus
dh lwpuk gSA buds fo:) fofHkUu Fkkuksa esa vkijkf/kd dkaM ntZ gSA ;s
vfHk;qDr ncax izo`fr ds gSA buds LFkkuh; dkjk esa jgus ij dkjk esa
yksd O;oLFkk] ‘kkafr O;oLFkk rFkk fof/k&O;oLFkk dh leL;k mRiUu gksus
ds laHkkouk cuh jgrh gSA buds }kjk vklUu fcgkj fo/kku lHkk fuokZpu
ds volj ij izR;{k&vizR;{k :i ernkrk dk izHkkfor djus ,oa dkjk esa
vjktdrk dh fLFkfr mRiUu djus dk iz;kl fd;k tk ldrk gSA ,slh
ifjfLFkfr esa iz’kklfud n`f”Vdks.k budk dsUnzh; dkjk] Hkkxyiqj dh
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
23/35vof/k foLrkj djus dh vuq’kalk dh tkrh gSA rn~vkyksd esa ftyk
inkf/kdkjh] iVuk ,oa ojh; iqfyl v/kh{kd] iVuk }kjk canh jhryky
;kno] is0&Lo0 jkek’kh”k ;kno dks vof/k foLrkj djus dk vuqjks/k fd;k
x;k gSA
2- ftyk inkf/kdkjh] iVuk ,oa ojh; iqfyl v/kh{kd] iVuk }kjk
iwoZ esa izkIr izfrosnu@vuq’kalk ds vkyksd esa vkn’kZ dsUnzh; dkjk] csmj]
iVuk esa lalhfer fuEu canh dks muds uke ds le{k ;Fkk&LrEHk 04 esa
vafdr dkjk esa LFkkukarfjr fd;k x;k Fkk] tks fuEuor~ gS %&
dz- vkn’kZ dsUnzh; dkjk] csmj] iVuk ls foHkkxh; LFkkukarj.k vkns’k LFkkukUrfjr dkjk dk
LFkkukarfjr canh ds uke@firk dk Kkikad@fnukad@vof/k uke
uke
1 2 3 4
1 jhryky ;kno] is0&Lo0 jkek’kh”k 3161@30-04-2025 fo’ks”k dsUnzh; dkjk]
;kno N% ekg ds fy, Hkkxyiqj ¼r`rh;
[k.M½
3- ftyk inkf/kdkjh] iVuk ,oa ojh; iqfyl v/kh{kd] iVuk ds
izfrosnu@vuq’kalk ds vkyksd esa lE;d~ fopkjksijkar dkjk dh fof/k
O;oLFkk] yksdfgr ,oa tufgr esa iz’kklfud n`f”Vdks.k ls] fcgkj dkjk
gLrd] 2012 ds fu;e&781 dh dafMdk& (vii) ,oa canh vf/kfu;e
dh /kkjk 1900 dh la’kksf/kr /kkjk 29 ¼3½ ds rgr iznRr ‘kfDr;ksa dk
iz;ksx djrs gq, vkn’kZ dsUnzh; dkjk] csmj] iVuk ls fo’ks”k dsUnzh; dkjk]
Hkkxyiqj ¼r`rh; [k.M½ esa LFkkukarfjr canh jhryky ;kno] is0&Lo0
jkek’kh”k ;kno dks vxys N% ekg ds fy, LFkkukarfjr dkjk esa gh vof/k
foLrkj fd;k tkrk gSA
4- ftyk inkf/kdkjh] iVuk ,oa ojh; iqfyl v/kh{kd] iVuk ls
vuqjks/k gS fd foHkkxh; i=kad&1103 fnukad&09-03-2017 ,oa foHkkxh;
i=kad&7125 fnukad&15-12-2017 ds vkyksd esa mDr LFkkukarfjr canh
dks fopkjk/khu oknksa esa fu/kkZfjr frfFk;ksa ij LFkkuh; U;k;ky; esa lle;
miLFkkiu dh O;oLFkk lqfuf’pr fd;k tk;A
5- v/kh{kd] vkn’kZ dsUnzh; dkjk] csmj] iVuk dks funs’k fn;k
tkrk gS fd canh ds LFkkukarj.k ds iwoZ ;g lqfuf’pr dj ysaxs dh
ekuuh; U;k;ky; dk mDr canh ds okn fu”iknu ds laca/k esa dksbZ
fn’kk&funs’k ugha gSA lkFk gh foHkkxh; i=kad&1226 fnukad&17-03-2017
ds }kjk fuxZr funs’k ds vkyksd esa mDr canh ds LFkkukarj.k dh lwpuk
lacaf/kr U;k;ky; dks nsrs gq, izR;sd fu/kkZfjr frfFk ij miLFkkiu ,oa
fjekaM laca/kh dkjZokbZ lqfuf’pr djsaxsA iwu% lacaf/kr v/kh{kd dks
funsf’kr fd;k tkrk gS fd foHkkxh; i=kad&4680 fnukad&01-06-2023 ds
vkyksd esa canh dks fofM;ks&dkWUQzsaflax ds ek/;e ls ekuuh; U;k;ky; esa
miLFkkiu ‘kr&izfr’kr djkuk lqfuf’pr djsaxsA
mijksDr ij egkfujh{kd dkjk ,oa lq/kkj lqok,Wa dk vuqeksnu
izkIr gSA
(Emphasis supplied on the last line)
23. The approval was made by the Inspector General,
Prisons & Correctional Services, Bihar, Patna on the
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
24/35
aforementioned aspect and said approval remained undisputed.
From the very verbatim of the said Annexure, it is quite evident
that Office has extended the proposal regarding the transfer of
the petitioner from Aadarsh Central Jail, Beur, Patna to Special
Central Jail, Bhagalpur (Tritya Khand) on the basis of
confidential report of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna
coupled with the recommendation of the District Magistrate,
Patna, Inspector General, Prisons & Correctional Services
formed the opinion and approved the said proposal. The
approval granted by the concerned authority clearly reflects that
he has taken the decision on the basis of official proposal and
after approval, the said order was communicated through
Annexure P/1. Rule 781(vii) authorises Inspector General,
Prisons & Correctional Services to transfer the petitioner from
Aadarsh Central Jail, Beur, Patna to Special Central Jail,
Bhagalpur (Tritya Khand) and under Rule 792(v) the Assistant
Inspector General, Prisons (Region) is also responsible for
implementing all the directions of Deputy Inspector General
(Prison Administration), Inspector General, Prison and
Correctional Services and State Government in this regard.
24. In the present case, it is crystal clear that the main
contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
25/35
order of transfer of the petitioner from Aadarsh Central Jail,
Beur, Patna to Special Central Jail, Bhagalpur (Tritya Khand)
was passed by the Assistant Inspector General, Prisons
(Region), but after going through Annexure P/1, it is crystal
clear that Inspector General, Prisons & Correctional Services
has approved the proposal as extended by office on the basis of
material available on record and the Assistant Inspector General,
Prison has merely circulated the said order under his signature.
In this way, communication of order is not delegation and the
said proposal was approved by none else than Inspector
General, Prisons & Correctional Services himself.
25. The core legal distinction between the
communication and delegation: An officer who is authorised
to assist the senior officials by virtue of rule which is mentioned
in Rule 792(v) of the Bihar Prison Manual, 2012 is also bound
to follow the direction. In this way, a subordinate officer who
merely transmits or communicates the decision of a competent
authority acts as a conduit, not as a delegate. He is bound to
follow the direction of the senior under the said rule. It cannot
be held that the subordinate officer has taken a decision. In the
present case, the subordinate officer has performed his statutory
duty by circulating the order of the senior which has been
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
26/35
specifically enshrined in the relevant rule. The statutory power
is exercised by the Inspector General, Prisons & Correctional
Services and the Assistant Inspector General, Prisons (Region)
only gives its expression and this is qualitatively different from
delegation where decision making power itself is transferred.
Here, the decision has been taken by the Inspector General,
Prisons & Correctional Services who has approved the official
proposal on the basis of material available on record and
subsequently the said order was communicated through the
Assistant Inspector General, Prisons (Region) under his
signature.
26. The classical principle is captured in the Latin
maxim Delegatus non potest delegare – a delegate cannot
further delegate. However, this maxim applies only where there
is an actual transfer of decision-making power. In the present
case, decision has already been taken by the Inspector General,
Prisons and Correctional Services. So, the very maxim
“Delegatus non potest delegare”— delegate cannot further
delegate, does not apply here as the Assistant Inspector General,
(Prisons) has not taken any decision. So, the very objection of
the petitioner’s counsel is not justified and legal.
27. From the very impugned order, it is quite evident
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
27/35
that on the approval of the I.G., Prisons and Correctional
Services, the order has been communicated under the signature
of Assistant Inspector General, Prisons which is quite evident
from Annexure P/1. The impugned order is only extension of
order of incarceration in the said jail where he had been
transferred earlier vide Memo No. 3161 dated 30.04.2025 and
the same has been issued only after obtaining the necessary
approval of the I.G., Prisons and Correctional Services, under
the signature of Assistant Inspector General, Prisons (Region).
Even, the petitioner has not raised any objection on the point of
approval. In this way, the impugned order has also quoted the
reason as to why there was extension of earlier order in view of
the letters of Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna. On the
basis of recommendation contained in letter no. 2517/General
dated 30.10.2025 of the District Magistrate, Patna and letter no.
14159/confidential dated 29.10.2025 of the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Patna and the reason for extension
was necessitated due to credible information regarding criminal
conspiracy during the petitioner’s stay in the Model Central Jail,
Beur, Patna. It has been submitted in para 11 of the counter
affidavit that petitioner has multiple criminal cases pending
against him, which includes 11 cases mentioned in para 22 of
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
28/35
the writ petition, 25 cases as per entry register dated 23.11.2025
and 8 cases as per entry register dated 10.02.2020 and on the
said aspect administrative decision was taken to transfer and the
confidential report of Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna
was quite evident in the light of the facts and circumstance of
the case.
28. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also raised
the issue of speedy trial and he has become the victim of
unnecessary delay in the proceeding of the trial.
29. It is necessary to quote Article 21 of the
Constitution of India which reads as under:-
“21. Protection of life and personal
liberty. – No person shall be deprived on his life or
personal libverty except according to procedure
established by law.”
30. Article 21 is not an absolute right. The State can
impose restrictions on the right to life and liberty, but such
restrictions must be fair, reasonable and just, and imposed as per
the procedure established by law.
31. The foundational constitutional text is: “No person
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according
to procedure established by law.” The operative words are
“except according to procedure established by law.” Deprivation
is permissible – what is required is that it follow a just, fair, and
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
29/35
reasonable procedure.
32. On the said aspect of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, learned counsel for the State has already
submitted that whenever direction was given by the Court, the
said aspect was effectively implemented either through the
physical appearance or through VC and the question of Article
21 is the part and parcel of fundamental rights enshrined in the
Constitution of India which has not been ignored in the light of
the facts and circumstances of the present case where the VC
facility as well as physical appearance was provided through the
concerned court in the present case. There was no question of
hampering the trial as petitioner was produced through VC or
physically whenever is required. So, there is no question of
delay in proceeding of trial and no proceeding of court has been
hampered and one cannot ignore the right of the petitioner on
one hand and the right of the society or victim on the other
hand.
33. In the present case, the authority has taken every
precautions not to delay the proceeding of court as submitted by
the learned counsel for the State and order of the Assistant
Inspector General, Prisons, Bihar, Patna which has been
challenged, is not in any way, in derogation of power authorized
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
30/35
under the statutory provisions. The relevant provision has been
quoted which clearly reflects that the person/authority has only
communicated the order after the necessary approval from the
concerned I.G., Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar, Patna
and the Assistant Inspector General, Prisons, Bihar, Patna has
not acted in derogation of power rather he has communicated
under his signature on the basis of approval of I.G., Prisons and
Correctional Services, Bihar, Patna which clearly reflects that
after necessary approval, order was communicated. The
communication of order is not delegation of power which has
been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and
petitioner has not disputed the aspect of necessary approval of
I.G., Prisons and Correctional Services. Furthermore, the
judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner
are inapplicable to the present case, the factual matrix herein
being materially distinct from those cited authorities.
34. It goes without saying precisely that the essential
legal distinction between communication and delegation is well
settled. An officer authorised to assist superior authorities, by
virtue of Rule 792(v) of the Bihar Prison Manual, 2012, is
bound to act in conformity with their directions. A subordinate
officer who merely transmits or communicates the decision of a
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
31/35
competent authority acts as a conduit and not as a delegate, and
is under a statutory obligation to give effect to such directions. It
cannot, therefore, be contended that such subordinate has
exercised independent decision-making authority.
35. In the present case, the subordinate officer has
discharged his statutory function by circulating the order of the
superior authority, as contemplated under the relevant rule. The
statutory power stands exercised by the Inspector General,
Prisons and Correctional Services, whereas the Assistant
Inspector General, Prisons (Region), has merely conveyed or
given effect to the said decision. This is fundamentally distinct
from a case of delegation, where the power of decision-making
itself is transferred. Here, the decision was duly taken by the
Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services, upon
consideration of the material available on record, and the
official proposal was accordingly approved. The subsequent
communication of the said order through the Assistant Inspector
General, Prisons (Region), is thus procedural in nature and does
not dilute or alter the locus of the decision-making authority.
36. The settled principle encapsulated in the Latin
maxim delegatus non potest delegare that a delegate cannot
further delegate-applies only where there is a transfer of
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
32/35
decision-making authority. In the present case, no such transfer
has occurred. The decision stood duly taken by the Inspector
General, Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar, Patna in
exercise of his statutory powers. The Assistant Inspector
General, Prisons (Region), Bihar, Patna has neither exercised
independent discretion nor assumed any decision-making role,
but has merely communicated the decision so taken. In these
circumstances, the aforesaid maxim has no application.
37. A plain reading of the impugned order clearly
establishes that, upon due approval of the Inspector General,
Prisons and Correctional Services, the order was communicated
under the signature of the Assistant Inspector General, Prisons
(Region), as is evident from Annexure-P/1. The impugned order
is, in substance, a continuation of the earlier order of
incarceration in the said jail, pursuant to the petitioner’s prior
transfer vide Memo No. 3161 dated 30.04.2025, and has been
issued only after obtaining the requisite approval of the
Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services.
38. Notably, no objection has been raised by the
petitioner on the aspect of such approval. The impugned order
also discloses the reasons necessitating the continuation of the
earlier arrangement, founded upon the communications of the
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
33/35
Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna. In particular, reliance
has been placed on the recommendation contained in Letter No.
2517/General dated 30.10.2025 of the District Magistrate,
Patna, and Letter No. 14159/confidential dated 29.10.2025 of
the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna. The extension was
necessitated on account of credible information regarding
criminal conspiracy during the petitioner’s stay in Model Central
Jail, Beur, Patna.
39. A bare perusal of the relevant provisions makes it
clear that the concerned authority has merely communicated the
order upon obtaining due and requisite approval from the
Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar,
Patna. The Assistant Inspector General, Prisons (Region), Bihar,
Patna has not exercised any independent decision-making
authority but has acted strictly in accordance with such
approval, and the order bears his signature only by way of
formal communication.
40. It is, therefore, evident that the communication of
the order cannot be equated with delegation of power, as sought
to be contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
Notably, the petitioner has not disputed the factum of prior
approval by the Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
34/35
Services, Bihar, Patna.
41. In the backdrop of the aforesaid discussion, and
upon a careful appraisal of the statutory framework, the
governing legal principles and the material placed on record,
this Court is of the considered view that the impugned action
has been taken strictly in accordance with law. The decision-
making authority has been duly exercised by the competent
officer, and the subsequent communication thereof cannot, in
any manner, be construed as an impermissible delegation of
power. The procedural safeguards mandated under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India stand duly observed and no prejudice
or infraction of the petitioner’s rights is made out. The transfer
of the petitioner, founded upon relevant material including
administrative recommendations and security considerations,
reflects a bona fide and reasoned exercise of statutory power.
The contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner is devoid
of substance and unsupported by the legal position. Hence, the
petitioner has not made out a case so as to interfere with the
impugned order and the contention of the learned counsel for
the State is quite tenable and sustainable in the light of the given
facts and circumstances of the present case.
42. Accordingly, in the considered opinion of this
Patna High Court CR. WJC No.3170 of 2025 dt.27-04-2026
35/35
Court, the impugned order calls for no interference and stands
affirmed in law. Consequently, the present criminal writ petition
stands dismissed.
43. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, shall
also stand disposed of.
(Alok Kumar Pandey, J)
alok/
amit kumar/-
AFR/NAFR AFR CAV DATE 23.04.2026 Uploading Date 27.04.2026 Transmission Date 27.04.2026