Chattisgarh High Court
Deepak Dewangan vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 24 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:18937-DB
NAFR
BABLU
RAJENDRA
BHANARKAR
Digitally signed by
BABLU RAJENDRA
BHANARKAR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Date: 2026.04.27
10:14:47 +0530
CRA No. 976 of 2024
Deepak Dewangan S/o Bhagwat Dewangan Aged About 31 Years R/o
Rikando Basti Atal Aawas, Chingrajpara Police Station Sarkanda,
District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
...Appellant
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station, Sarkanda, District :
Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent
For Appellant : Mr.Rajesh Roshan Singh, Advocate
For Respondent : Mr.Saumya Rai, Deputy Government
Advocate
For Objector : None present
Hon’ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Per Ramesh Sinha, CJ
24/04/2026
1. Mr. Amit Kumar Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the
objector in the present case, has not appeared despite repeated
calls.
2. Though the matter is listed for hearing on I.A.No.02/2024
application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, but
2
considering the fact that the appellant is in jail since 3.4.2022, this
Court proceeds to hear the appeal finally.
3. The criminal appeal arises out of the judgment of conviction and
order of sentence dated 12.01.2024 passed by the Additional
Sessions Judge/First F.T.S.C, Bilaspur in Special Sessions Case
(POCSO Act) No.62/2022, whereby the appellant has been
convicted and sentenced in the following manner :
Sl. Conviction Sentence
No.
1. Under Section RI for 3 years and fine of Rs.100/-, in
363 of the IPC default of payment of fine to further
undergo imprisonment for 10 days.
2. Under Section RI for 5 years and fine of Rs.200/-, in
366 of the IPC default of payment of fine to further
undergo imprisonment for 20 days.
3. Under Section RI for 20 years and fine of Rs.500/-, in
376(3) of the IPC default of payment of fine to further
undergo imprisonment for 50 days.
4. Under Section 5(l) RI for 20 years and fine of Rs.500/-, in
/ 6 of Protection default of payment of fine to further
of Children from undergo imprisonment for 50 days.
Sexual Offences
Act, 2012
4. The prosecution story, in brief, is that on the night of 16.01.2022
the complainant and her family members had dinner and went to
sleep. At approximately 12 A.M., the complainant woke up to go to
the bathroom and saw that her daughter/victim was not at home.
When the victim was not found after searching everywhere in the
3
house, in the neighbourhood and among relatives and nearby, the
complainant/mother of the victim lodged the FIR in Crime
No.66/2022 for offence under Section 363 of the IPC at Police
Station Sarkanda, District Bilaspur vide Ex.P-1 on the basis of
missing report vide Ex.P-37. Spot map was prepared by the
investigating officer vide Ex.P-2. Recovery panchnama was
prepared vide Ex.P-3. Statement of the victim was recorded under
Section 161 CrPC vide Ex.P-4. Consent for medical examination
was obtained vide Ex.P-5. Statement of the victim under Section
164 CrPC was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Bilaspur vide Ex.P-7 and P-7A. MLC of the victim was conducted
vide Ex.P-11 in which the doctor has found no injury. Patwari also
prepared the spot map vide Ex.P-14. The appellant was arrested
on 02.04.2022 vide arrest memo Ex.P-16. The appellant was also
examined by the doctor vide Ex.P-18 in which the appellant was
found capable to commit intercourse. Underwear and vaginal
slides of the victim were seized vide Ex.P-19. Certified copy of
dakhil kharij register was seized vide Ex.P-27C. Entry form of the
victim was seized vide Ex.P-30C. Underwear of the appellant was
seized vide Ex.P-36. Seized articles were sent to FSL for chemical
examination and as per FSL report (Ex.P-42), semen stains and
human sperm were found on underwear Article A seized from the
victim and underwear Article C seized from the appellant. After
completion of investigation, the charge-sheet was filed before the
jurisdictional criminal Court.
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5. The trial Court has framed charges against the appellant under
Sections 363, 366, 376(3), 376(2)(n) of the IPC and Section 5(l)/6
of POCSO Act. The appellant abjured his guilt and pleaded
innocence.
6. In order to establish the charge against the appellant, the
prosecution examined 18 witnesses. The statement of the
appellant under Section 313 of the CrPC was also recorded in
which he denied the material appearing against him and stated
that he is innocent and he has been falsely implicated in the case.
After appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned
trail Court has convicted the accused/appellant and sentenced
him as mentioned in para 3 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the prosecution has
failed to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable
doubts. There is no legally admissible evidence with regard to the
age of the victim that on the date of incident she was minor and
less than 18 years of age. In absence of examination of author of
the dakhil-kharij register, the same cannot be taken into
consideration for determination of age of the victim. Dakhil-kharij
register is a weak type of evidence. No any Kotwari register or
ossification report are produced by the prosecution to determine
the actual age of the victim that on the date of incident she was
below 18 years of age. It is further argued by the learned counsel
for the appellant that the learned trial Court has failed to
5
appreciate that the victim (PW-2) lived with the appellant without
any protest for the period of more than one month and looking to
her conduct, it is clearly evident that she has willing and
consenting party, therefore, the impugned conviction of the
appellant being unsustainable in law, deserves to be quashed. He
also submits that if the entire case of the prosecution is taken as it
is, then also the alleged offences are not made out against the
appellant and he is entitled for acquittal.
8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the
submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and
submits that the victim was minor and below 18 years of age at
the time of incident, which is proved by the School dakhil-kharij
register Ex.P-27(c) which contains the date of birth of the victim as
6.6.2006. The dakhil-kharij register is admissible piece of
evidence to determine the age of the victim. Therefore, there is no
illegality or infirmity in the findings of the learned trial Court. The
victim was abducted by the appellant and kept away from the
lawful guardianship. The appellant kept her in illegal confinement
for a considerable period and forcefully committed sexual
intercourse with her. As such, the impugned judgment needs no
interference.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record of the trial Court with utmost circumspection.
6
10. In order to consider the age of the victim, we have examined the
evidence available on record produced by the prosecution. The
prosecution relied upon the School dakhil-kharij register
Ex.P-17(c) which is sought to be proved by PW-9 Retired
Headmistress Smt.Ratna Tiwari. Smt.Ratna Tiwari (PW-9) has
stated in para 2 of her deposition that on 28.02.22, in Crime No.
66/22 of Police Station Sarkanda under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)
IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act, the original dakhil
kharij register demand letter Ex.P. 25 was sent, on which her
signature is as recipient as part A. On 21.03.22, when the original
dakhil kharij register related to the victim was produced by her, it
was seized in front of witnesses and seizure memo Ex.P.-26 was
prepared, on which her signature is on part A. In para 3 of her
deposition, she stated that in the dakhil kharij register, number
843, the victim’s name, parents’ names, caste, address, and the
victim’s date of birth (06.06.2006) are written in words and figures.
The date of admission is 23.05.18, in the sixth grade. In para 5 of
her cross-examination, she admitted that she has not entered the
entry regarding the victim in the Dakhil Kharij register. She denied
she cannot tell on the basis of which document the entry
regarding the victim has been made. She voluntarily said that it
has been entered on the basis of the admission application which
she has brought today. In para 6 of her cross-examination, she
admitted that she cannot disclose what documents the victim’s
parents provided regarding her birth. She admitted that Ex.P-30
7
does not mention the victim’s birth documents. She admitted that
she cannot explain the basis on which the victim’s parents
recorded her date of birth at the primary school. She denied that
the police did not seize anything from her.
11. At the time of admission of the victim in the school, the birth
certificate or Kotwari Panji have not been produced by her father
and on the oral information given by father of the victim the entry
was made in the School dakhil kharij register. No other evidence
of birth certificate or Kotwari register or ossification report are
produced by the prosecution to prove the actual age of the victim.
12.After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case
and evidence available on record, it emerges that the prosecution
could not produce the clinching and legally admissible evidence
with respect to the date of birth or age of the victim so as to hold
that on the date of incident she was minor and below 18 years of
age. Only on the basis of school dakhil-kharij register it would not
be safe to hold that the victim was minor on the date of incident.
The statement of the victim, as also the statement of Smt.Ratna
Tiwari (PW-9) are contradictory to each other and does not inspire
confidence upon this Court to hold that the date of birth of the
victim is 06.06.2006.
13. In the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of UP, (2006)
5 SCC 584, relying upon its earlier judgment in case of Birad Mal
8
Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 supp. SCC 604, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held as under :
“26. To render a document admissible under Section 35,
three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is
relied on must be one in a public or other official book,
register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a
fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made
by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any
other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the
school register is relevant and admissible under Section
35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person
in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to
prove the age of the person in the absence of the
material on which the age was recorded.”
14. In the matter of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by
Inspector of Police, (2011) 2 SCC 385, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by
government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would
be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act
1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of
not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the prosecutrix in
the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was
recorded. It was observed as under
“40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates
that the girl’s date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore,
even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be
above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on
the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The
transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School
and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it
9would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the
Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a
document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove
the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis
of which the age was recorded.
48. We may further notice that even with reference to
Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document
has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as
well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be
appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in
the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as
follows:-
“The age of a person as recorded in the school
register or otherwise may be used for various
purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for
obtaining an appointment; for contesting election;
registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit
under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of
litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being
represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a
suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a
minor he was not appropriately represented therein or
any transaction made on his behalf was void as he
was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of
determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to
the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35
of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same
standard. No different standard can be applied in case
of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or
similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix
although might have consented with the accused, if
on the basis of the entries made in the register
maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is
recorded, the accused would be deprived of his
constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution,
as in that case the accused may unjustly be
convicted.”
15. In the matter of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh & Others, (2022) 8 SCC 602, while considering various
judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33
as under :
10
“33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the
aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:
33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming
juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the
JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with
sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the
purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person
as nearly as may be.
XXXX XXXX XXX
33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is
on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to
discharge the initial burden. However, the documents
mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules
2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of
section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie
satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid
documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.
33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof
of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by
contra evidence let in by the opposite side.
33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the
same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile
sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for
trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an
inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when
there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of
section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of
evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be
deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it.
Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that
required in a proceeding where the determination and
declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the
basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of
such acceptance.
33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an
abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to
be on the basis of the material on record and on
appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each
case.
33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical
approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced
11
on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a
juvenile.
33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the
court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a
juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that
the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the
juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court
should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by
persons to escape punishment after having committed
serious offences.
33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of
evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the
same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the
Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official
document maintained in the discharge of official duty would
have greater credibility than private documents.
33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public
documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be
accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public
document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of
the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other
provisions.
33.11 Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age
determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a
person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical
opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not
conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to
be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in
Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.”
16. Recently, in the matter of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented
by Inspector of Police, 2023 SCC Online SC 846, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under :
“14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that
the date of birth certificate from the school or
matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned
examination board has to be firstly preferred in the
absence of which the birth certificate issued by the
Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is
only thereafter in the absence of these such documents
the age is to be determined through “an ossification test”
12
or “any other latest medical age determination test”
conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e.
Committee or Board or Court. In the present case,
concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of
birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate
was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer
certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as
11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was
produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court
summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always
upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges;
therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen
back upon a document which it had never relied upon.
Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official
(Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for
the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were
missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any
class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it
was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have
been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at
the time of commission of the offence.
15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the
procedure to be followed in cases where age
determination is required. The court was dealing with
Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is
in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as
follows:
“20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the
procedure to be followed in determination of age.
The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to
be decided prima facie on the basis of physical
appearance, or documents, if available. But an
inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or
the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by
obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent
certificates, if available and in the absence
whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the
school (other than a play school) first attended; and
in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate
given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a
panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and
(iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought
from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare
the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided
that while determination was being made, benefit
could be given to the child or juvenile by
13considering the age on lower side within the margin
of one year.”
16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice
Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of
the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs.
The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that:
“Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth
certificate from the school and the matriculation or
equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502
[2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in
the same category (namely (i) above). In the
absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining
the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal
authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of
(i) and (ii) that age determination by means of
medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i)
indicates a significant change over the provisions
which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules
of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule
12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate
was given precedence and it was only in the event
of the certificate not being available that the date of
birth certificate from the school first attended, could
be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of
birth certificate from the school as well as the
matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in
the same category.
17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of
West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench,
held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile
(or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming
it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the
hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order
of preference.”
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17. Reverting to the facts of the present case and due consideration
of the prosecution evidence, we find that no any clinching and
legally admissible evidence have been brought by the prosecution
to prove the fact that the victim was minor on the date of incident,
yet the trial Court in the impugned judgment has held her minor,
hence, we set aside the finding given by the trail Court that on the
date of incident the victim was minor.
18. So far as the issue of forceful sexual intercourse by the appellant
upon the victim is concerned, we have carefully perused the
statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 CrPC (Ex.P-
7). In her 164 CrPC statement (Ex.P-7), the victim has stated that
she is studying in Class 10. She has known Deepak Dewangan
for the past two years. He used to visit his friend in their
neighborhood. They met during that time. They used to talk and
like each other. Deepak used to tell her that they would get
married, and she started believing him. Deepak used to come to
visit her and they would meet outside. On the night of 16.01.2022
at 12 o’clock, he came to her house and lured her, promising to
marry her and take her to Shahdol, Madhya Pradesh. She went
with him. He took her on a train from Bilaspur Railway Station to
Shahdol, Madhya Pradesh. In Shahdol, he took her to Birsinghpur
Pali, and they rented a house in Birsinghpur Pali village. They
lived like husband and wife. During this time Deepak had physical
relations with her and they stayed there for about 1 month, during
this time he continued to have physical relations with her. Then
15
they had a fight, she told the accused that she want to get
married, then he told her that she is not of marriageable age yet.
Then he refused to marry her and said that come, he will drop her
at her home. After which, on 24.02.2022, he took her with him to
Bilaspur station and left her there and ran away. Then at the
station, she called her mother from someone else’s phone and at
the railway station her mother came to pick me up, and she told
her about the incident.
19. In her 164 CrPC statement, she has not stated that the appellant
allured or threatened her or used any force while travelling along
with him and while making physical relationship with her against
her will or consent.
20. In para 2 of her evidence, the victim (PW-2) has stated that they
used to live in Sarkanda police station area earlier. Next to their
house was the house of the accused’s friend Akash Gandharva.
She has known him for two years because of his frequent visits to
his house. Due to their frequent visits to his house, she used to
talk to the accused and after that, due to their frequent
conversations, they fell in love with each other. Her family was not
aware of all these things. Later, the accused called her on her
mobile phone and asked her to marry him. The accused’s mobile
number is 6264244536. She do not have a phone at present,
earlier she used to have phones with her. In para 3 of her
deposition, she stated that on 16.01.22, at around 11 P.M., the
16
accused called her and told her he was under the shed and that
she should come. She went downstairs without informing her
family. She then accompanied the accused in his car to his home
at Bahtarai Chowk and then took an auto-rickshaw with him to
Bilaspur Railway Station and from there, they went to
Birasingpurpali and lived in a rented house. They stayed there for
about a month. They lived there as husband and wife and had
physical relations. They were not married because she was under
the legal age. She told the accused about this, and he told her to
take care of everything. In para 4 of her deposition, she deposed
that the accused and she had a fight and he had said that he
would drop her at Bilaspur and they came to Bilaspur by train.
After reaching Bilaspur, she called her mother from the accused’s
phone and told her that she was at the railway station and she
would come to pick her up, then her mother and father came to
pick her up. Before her mother and father could arrive, the
accused left her there and went away. Her mother and father
brought her home and took her to Sarkanda police station. There
the police prepared the recovery panchnama Ex.P-3 after doing
the paperwork.
21. In para 9 of cross-examination, the victim (PW-2) admitted that
there were other people on the train while traveling to Shahdol.
She admitted that she did not complain to anyone on the train
about the accused kidnapping her. In para 11 of her cross-
examination, she admitted that after the accused had sex with her
17
for the first time, she did not inform the landlord or anyone around
her. She denied that she did not go to Birsinghpurpali with the
accused, nor that he had sex with her. In para 12 of her cross-
examination, she admitted that the accused / appellant often left
the house when she was alone and even then, she did not try to
escape or tell anyone.
22.The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be
maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim.
However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony
of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony
of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is
not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The
prosecution has to bring home the charges levelled against the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has
failed to do in the instant case.
23. Considering the entire evidence available on record and the
conduct of the victim, we are of the opinion that the victim was
more than 18 years of age at the time of incident, further she was
a consenting party with the appellant. Therefore, in the above
facts and circumstances of the case, offence under Sections 363,
366 & 376(3) of the IPC and Section 5(l)/6 of the POCSO Act
would not be made out against the appellant.
24. For the foregoing reasons, the criminal appeal is allowed and the
impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
18
12.01.2024 is set aside. The appellant stands acquitted from all
the charges. The appellant is in jail. He be released forthwith, if
not required in any other case.
25. In view of above, I.A.No.02/2024, application for suspension of
sentence and grant of bail stands disposed of.
26. Keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (Now
Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the
appellant is directed to furnish a personal bonds in terms of from
No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of
Rs.25000/- with 2 reliable sureties in the like amount before the
Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six
months alongwith an undertaking that in the event of filing of
special leave petition against the instant judgment or for grant of
leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereon shall
appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
27. The Trial Court record alongwith the copy of this judgment be sent
back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and
necessary action.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Bablu
