Chattisgarh High Court
Ramesh Dewangan vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 22 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
MANPREET
KAUR
2026:CGHC:18372-DB
NAFR
Digitally signed
by MANPREET
KAUR
Date: 2026.04.23
17:51:39 +0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 487 of 2024
Ramesh Dewangan S/o. Moharlal Dewangan, Aged About 25 Years
R/o. Village Ucchdih Devallapara, Police Outpost Basdelyi, P.S. And
District Surajpur Chhattisgarh.
... Appellant(s)
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Outpost Basdeyi, P.S. And District
Surajpur Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Shishir Dixit, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer
Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, CJ
22.04.2026
1. This appeal arises out of the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 06.10.2023 passed by the Additional Sessions
Judge, Fast Track Special Court Sujrapur, District- Surajpur (C.G.)
in Special Sessions Case No. 42/2022, whereby the appellant has
been convicted for offences as under:
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Conviction Sentence
Under Section 363 of R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-,
the IPC. in default of payment of fine amount,
additional R.I. for 06 months.
Under Section 366 of Imprisonment for life till natural death
the IPC. and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default of
payment of fine amount, additional R.I.
for 01 year.
Under Section 376(3) Imprisonment for life till natural death
of the IPC. and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default of
payment of fine additional R.I. for 01
year.
Under Section 342 of Imprisonment for life till natural death
the IPC and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of
payment of fine additional R.I. for 06
months.
Under Section 6 of Imprisonment for 20 years with fine
POCSO Act amount of Rs.200/-, in default of
payment of fine additional R.I. for 06
months.
All the sentences were directed to run concurrently
2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the child victim lodged a
written report (Ex.P/07) on 01.07.2022 at Police Outpost Basdei,
Police Station Surajpur, against the accused. It was alleged
therein that on 30.06.2022 at about 08:00 a.m., the child victim
had gone to a nearby field for routine work, when the accused, on
the pretext of marrying her, induced and took her to his house. It
is further alleged that the accused wrongfully confined her and
subjected her to repeated acts of sexual assault during the
3
intervening period. On the morning of 01.07.2022, upon search
being made by her family members, the child victim was traced
and brought back home, whereupon she disclosed the incident to
them, leading to the lodging of the report.
3. On the basis of the written report (Ex.P/07), an unnumbered First
Information Report (Ex.P/08) was initially registered at Police
Outpost Basdei against the accused for offences punishable
under Sections 363, 366, 342, 376(3), 376(2)(d) of the Indian
Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act, 2012. Subsequently, the matter was
transferred to Police Station Surajpur, where a numbered FIR
bearing Crime No. 296/2022 was registered. Upon completion of
investigation and arrest of the accused, charge-sheet No.
279/2022 came to be filed before the competent Court.
4. The learned trial Court framed charges against the accused,
namely Ramesh Dewangan, for offences punishable under
Sections 363, 366, 376(3), and 342 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860, along with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The charges were read over and
explained to the accused, who denied the same and claimed to be
tried.
5. In his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, the accused denied all incriminating
circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence,
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pleaded false implication, and stated that he would adduce
evidence in defence. However, no evidence was led on behalf of
the defence.
6. In order to establish the charge against the appellant, the
prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited the
documents (Exs.P-1 to P-31). After appreciation of evidence
available on record, the learned trial Court has convicted the
accused/appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in para 1 of
the judgment. Hence, this appeal.
7. Mr. Shishir Dixit, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the
impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed
by the learned trial Court is contrary to law and facts on record,
and suffers from serious infirmities in appreciation of evidence. It
is contended that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt
of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, and the findings
recorded by the trial Court are based on conjectures and surmises
rather than cogent and reliable evidence. It is further submitted
that the testimony of the victim does not inspire confidence and is
not of such sterling quality as to warrant conviction in the absence
of independent corroboration. Learned counsel also assails the
prosecution case on the ground that the age of the victim has not
been duly proved in accordance with law, inasmuch as no
ossification test or other reliable documentary evidence has been
brought on record to conclusively establish that she was a minor
5
at the time of the alleged incident, thereby rendering the
applicability of the provisions of the Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act, 2012 doubtful. It is further argued that
material contradictions and inconsistencies in the prosecution
evidence have not been properly appreciated by the trial Court.
Lastly, it is submitted that the appellant reserves the liberty to
raise additional grounds at the time of hearing, and in view of the
aforesaid deficiencies, the conviction recorded against the
appellant deserves to be set aside.
8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the
submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and
submits that the prosecution has proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt and the victim (PW-3) has clearly deposed the
conduct of the appellant in her statement recorded under Section
164 CrPC and in the Court statement and the learned trial Court
after considering the material available on record has rightly
convicted and sentenced the appellant, in which no interference is
called for.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record with utmost circumspection.
10. The issue that arises for consideration in the present appeal is
whether the testimony of the victim/prosecutrix deserves
acceptance and whether the prosecution has established the case
of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
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11. It is pertinent to observe that the question whether conviction of
the accused can be based on the sole testimony of the victim in
cases of sexual assault/rape is no longer res integra. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court has dealt with the issue in a catena of judgments
and has held that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if found
reliable can be the sole ground for convicting the accused and
that the creditworthy testimony of the victim in cases of such
nature deserves acceptance.
12. The next issue that arises for consideration in the present appeal
is whether the age of the victim on the date of commission of the
offence concerned, was below 18 years of age.
13. Regarding the age of the victim, the prosecution has relied upon
both oral and documentary evidence. The Investigating Officer,
Brijesh Kumar Yadav (PW-9), has deposed that upon production
of the child victim on 01.07.2022, an attested copy of her Class
VIII certificate (Article P-1) was seized vide seizure memo
Ex.P/02. He has further stated that a requisition (Ex.P/13A) was
sent to the Headmaster of Primary School Uchdih for furnishing
relevant school records pertaining to the child victim.
14. Sangeeta Dabe (PW-6), Head Teacher of Primary School Uchdih,
has supported the prosecution case and deposed that, in
response to the requisition, she produced the relevant school
records, including the admission/mutation register, a certified copy
of which is Ex.P/14C. As per the said record, the date of birth of
7
the child victim is recorded as 25.07.2006. The said record was
seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/03, and the certificate issued by
the school authority has been marked as Ex.P/15.
15. It is true that during cross-examination, the said witness stated
that she was not the author of the original entry in the register and
could not specify the basis on which the date of birth had been
recorded. However, such a statement, by itself, does not render
the document inadmissible or unreliable, particularly when the
register is maintained in the ordinary course of official duties and
forms part of institutional records. The defence has not brought on
record any material to discredit the authenticity of the said
documents or to suggest any manipulation therein.
16. At this juncture, it is apposite to note that Section 2(d) of the
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 defines a
“child” as any person below the age of 18 years. Further, as per
Section 94(2)(i) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015, the date of birth certificate from the school
first attended is to be treated as primary and reliable evidence for
determination of age. The principles underlying the said provision
have been consistently applied by courts for determining the age
of a victim as well.
17. In the present case, the school records, namely the admission
register (Ex.P/14C), the certificate issued by the Headmaster
(Ex.P/15), and the Class VIII certificate (Article P-1), consistently
8
reflect the date of birth of the child victim as 25.07.2006. These
documents, being public documents maintained in the regular
course of business, carry a presumption of correctness.
Significantly, the defence has not produced any contrary evidence
to rebut the same.
18. In view of the aforesaid evidence, this Court finds no reason to
discard the documentary proof of age relied upon by the
prosecution. Accordingly, the date of birth of the child victim is
held to be 25.07.2006. On the date of the incident, i.e.,
30.06.2022, the child victim was aged about 15 years and 11
months, thus clearly below 18 years of age.
19. Consequently, it is held that the victim falls within the definition of
“child” under Section 2(d) of the Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and the provisions of the said Act
have been rightly invoked by the learned trial Court.
20. The next question that arises for determination in the present
appeal is whether the accused, on 30.06.2022 at about 08:00
a.m., at Village Uchchdih Devallapara, within the jurisdiction of
Outpost Basdei, Police Station and District Surajpur (C.G.),
enticed and took away the child victim, who was below 18 years
of age, from the lawful custody of her guardian, and thereafter
wrongfully confined her and subjected her to acts constituting
aggravated penetrative sexual assault, as defined under the
9
relevant provisions of the Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012.
21. In this regard, before adverting to the appreciation of evidence, it
is necessary to note that the present case pertains to offences
under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.
In such cases, Sections 29 and 30 of the said Act incorporate
statutory presumptions regarding the commission of offence and
existence of culpable mental state. Once the foundational facts
are established by the prosecution, the burden shifts upon the
accused to rebut the same by cogent evidence or by creating
reasonable doubt in the prosecution case.
22. The child victim (PW-3) is the star witness of the prosecution. She
has deposed that she was acquainted with the accused prior to
the incident. On the date of occurrence, while she had gone out
for routine work in the vicinity of her house, the accused
approached her, forcibly took her to his house, and wrongfully
confined her therein. She has further stated that the accused
subjected her to repeated acts of sexual assault during the
intervening period and threatened her with dire consequences.
She has categorically denied the suggestion that she had gone
with the accused voluntarily.
23. The witness has further proved her written report (Ex.P/07), on the
basis of which the First Information Report (Ex.P/08) came to be
registered. Her signatures on the said documents have been duly
10
identified. The version narrated by her in Court is consistent with
the contents of the written report, thereby lending assurance to
her testimony.
24. During cross-examination, certain suggestions were put to the
witness regarding the possibility of resistance and presence of
nearby houses. The witness explained that she had attempted to
resist the accused. Importantly, nothing material has been elicited
in her cross-examination so as to discredit her version or to
suggest that the allegations are false or motivated. Her testimony
remains cogent, consistent, and trustworthy.
25. Father of the victim (PW-1) has deposed that on the date of the
incident, the child victim had gone out but did not return,
whereafter he, along with other family members, searched for her.
On the following morning, he came to know that she was present
at the house of the accused. Upon reaching there, he found her
confined and brought her back home.
26. Though this witness did not fully support the prosecution version
in Court and was declared hostile, he has admitted material facts
regarding the absence of the child victim from home and her
recovery from the house of the accused. These admissions lend
corroboration to the prosecution case to that extent.
27. Mother of the victim (PW-2) has similarly deposed that the child
victim was missing for a considerable period and was
subsequently found at the house of the accused. Though she did
11
not fully support the prosecution case and was declared hostile,
her testimony corroborates the factum of the child victim being
found at the accused’s house.
28. Brother of the victim (PW-4) has stated that upon receiving
information regarding the whereabouts of the child victim, he went
to the house of the accused and brought her back. This witness
was also declared hostile, however, his statement supports the
prosecution case insofar as the presence of the child victim in the
house of the accused is concerned.
29. Medical Officer (PW-8) has deposed that on 01.07.2022, the child
victim was medically examined, and her report (Ex.P/19) was
prepared. The doctor has stated that the hymen was found
ruptured and samples were collected for forensic examination. No
external injuries were found.
30. The absence of external injuries does not negate the prosecution
case, particularly in cases involving a minor, where resistance
may be minimal or overpowered.
31. Medical Officer (PW-7) has proved the medical examination report
of the accused (Ex.P/18), wherein it is opined that the accused
was capable of performing sexual intercourse.
32. Investigating Officer (PW-9) has proved the entire course of
investigation. He has deposed regarding:
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* Seizure of written report (Ex.P/07) and registration of FIR
(Ex.P/08)* Seizure of school documents (Ex.P/02, Ex.P/03)
* Sending requisitions for medical examination (Ex.P/20,
Ex.P/21)* Seizure of articles and forwarding them for forensic
examination (Ex.P/22, Ex.P/23)* Receipt of FSL report (Ex.P/31)
His testimony remains unshaken in cross-examination.
33. The FSL report (Ex.P/31) reveals the presence of human sperm
on the vaginal slide of the child victim. This scientific evidence
provides strong corroboration to the testimony of the child victim
regarding sexual assault.
34. Though PW-1, PW-2, and PW-4 were declared hostile, it is settled
law that the testimony of a hostile witness is not to be rejected in
totality. Their evidence can be relied upon to the extent it supports
the prosecution case. In the present case, their statements
corroborate the presence and recovery of the child victim from the
house of the accused.
35. In view of the credible testimony of PW-3 (child victim), duly
corroborated by medical evidence (Ex.P/19) and scientific
evidence (Ex.P/31), the foundational facts stand established.
Consequently, the presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of the
POCSO Act operates against the accused.
13
36. The accused has failed to rebut the said presumption. No defence
evidence has been led, and no plausible explanation has been
offered in his statement under Section 313 CrPC.
37. At this stage, it is necessary to evaluate the evidentiary worth of
the testimony of PW-3, the child victim. It is a settled principle of
law that conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the
victim, if it is found to be reliable, cogent, and of unimpeachable
character. The testimony of a child victim in cases under the
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 stands on
an even higher pedestal, considering the vulnerability of the victim
and the nature of the offence.
38. The Supreme Court in the matter of Rai Sandeep @ Deenu v.
State of NCT of Delhi, 2012 (8) SCC 21 held as under:-
“22. In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling witness’
should be of a very high quality and caliber whose
version should, therefore, be unassailable. The Court
considering the version of such witness should be in a
position to accept it for its face value without any
hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the
status of the witness would be immaterial and what
would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement
made by such a witness. What would be more relevant
would be the consistency of the statement right from
the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when
the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately
before the Court. It should be natural and consistent
with the case of the prosecution qua the accused.
14
There should not be any prevarication in the version of
such a witness. The witness should be in a position to
withstand the cross-examination of any length and
howsoever strenuous it may be and under no
circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the
factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as
well as, the sequence of it. Such a version should
have co-relation with each and everyone of other
supporting material such as the recoveries made, the
weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the
scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said
version should consistently match with the version of
every other witness. It can even be stated that it
should be akin to the test applied in the case of
circumstantial evidence where there should not be any
missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the
accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only
if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test
as well as all other similar such tests to be applied, it
can be held that such a witness can be called as a
‘sterling witness’ whose version can be accepted by
the Court without any corroboration and based on
which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise,
the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of
the crime should remain intact while all other attendant
materials, namely, oral, documentary and material
objects should match the said version in material
particulars in order to enable the Court trying the
offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other
supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of
the charge alleged.”
15
39. In the matter of Alakh Alok Srivastava v. Union of India & Ors.,
(2018) 17 SCC 291, in paras 14 and 20, it is observed as under:
“14. At the very outset, it has to be stated with authority
that the Pocso Act is a gender legislation. This Act has
been divided into various chapters and parts therein.
Chapter II of the Act titled “Sexual Offences Against
Children” is segregated into five parts. Part A of the
said Chapter contains two sections, namely, Section 3
and Section 4. Section 3 defines the offence of
“Penetrative Sexual Assault” whereas Section 4 lays
down the punishment for the said offence. Likewise,
Part B of the said Chapter titled “Aggravated
Penetrative Sexual Assault and Punishment therefor”
contains two sections, namely, Section 5 and Section
6. The various subsections of Section 5 copiously deal
with various situations, circumstances and categories
of persons where the offence of penetrative sexual
assault would take the character of the offence of
aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Section 5(k), in
particular, while laying emphasis on the mental stability
of a child stipulates that where an offender commits
penetrative sexual assault on a child, by taking
advantage of the child’s mental or physical disability, it
shall amount to an offence of aggravated penetrative
sexual assault.”
“20. Speaking about the child, a three Judge Bench in
M.C. Mehta v. State of T.N. (1996) 6 SCC 756 “1. …
“child is the father of man”. To enable fathering of a
valiant and vibrant man, the child must be groomed
well in the formative years of his life. He must receive
16education, acquire knowledge of man and materials
and blossom in such an atmosphere that on reaching
age, he is found to be a man with a mission, a man
who matters so far as the society is concerned.”
40. The Supreme Court in the matter of Nawabuddin v. State
of Uttarakhand (CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.144 OF 2022), decided
on 8.2.2022 has held as under:-
“10. Keeping in mind the aforesaid objects and to
achieve what has been provided under Article 15 and
39 of the Constitution to protect children from the
offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment, the
POCSO Act, 2012 has been enacted. Any act of sexual
assault or sexual harassment to the children should be
viewed very seriously and all such offences of sexual
assault, sexual harassment on the children have to be
dealt with in a stringent manner and no leniency should
be shown to a person who has committed the offence
under the POCSO Act. By awarding a suitable
punishment commensurate with the act of sexual
assault, sexual harassment, a message must be
conveyed to the society at large that, if anybody
commits any offence under the POCSO Act of sexual
assault, sexual harassment or use of children for
pornographic purposes they shall be punished suitably
and no leniency shall be shown to them. Cases of
sexual assault or sexual harassment on the children
are instances of perverse lust for sex where even
innocent children are not spared in pursuit of such
debased sexual pleasure.
Children are precious human resources of our country;
they are the country’s future. The hope of tomorrow
17rests on them. But unfortunately, in our country, a girl
child is in a very vulnerable position. There are
different modes of her exploitation, including sexual
assault and/or sexual abuse. In our view, exploitation
of children in such a manner is a crime against
humanity and the society. Therefore, the children and
more particularly the girl child deserve full protection
and need greater care and protection whether in the
urban or rural areas. As observed and held by this
Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Om
Prakash, (2002) 5 SCC 745, children need special
care and protection and, in such cases, responsibility
on the shoulders of the Courts is more onerous so as
to provide proper legal protection to these children. In
the case of Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2
SCC 703, it is observed by this Court that a minor who
is subjected to sexual abuse needs to be protected
even more than a major victim because a major victim
being an adult may still be able to withstand the social
ostracization and mental harassment meted out by
society, but a minor victim will find it difficult to do so.
Most crimes against minor victims are not even
reported as very often, the perpetrator of the crime is a
member of the family of the victim or a close friend.
Therefore, the child needs extra protection. Therefore,
no leniency can be shown to an accused who has
committed the offences under the POCSO Act, 2012
and particularly when the same is proved by adequate
evidence before a court of law.”
41. When considering the evidence of a victim subjected to a sexual
offence, the Court does not necessarily demand an almost
accurate account of the incident. Instead, the emphasis is on
18
allowing the victim to provide her version based on her
recollection of events, to the extent reasonably possible for her to
recollect. If the Court deems such evidence credible and free from
doubt, there is hardly any insistence on corroboration of that
version. In State of H.P. v. Shree Kant Shekar (2004) 8 SCC 153
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held as follows:”
“21. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of
having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an
accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that
her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in
material particulars. She stands on a higher pedestal
than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is
injury on the physical form, while in the former it is
physical as well as psychological and emotional.
However, if the court on facts finds it difficult to accept
the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may
search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which
would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance,
short of corroboration, as understood in the context of
an accomplice, would suffice.”
42. On these lines, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivasharanappa
and Others v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 5 SCC 705 observed
as follows:
“17. Thus, it is well settled in law that the court can rely
upon the testimony of a child witness and it can form
the basis of conviction if the same is credible, truthful
and is corroborated by other evidence brought on
19record. Needless to say as a rule of prudence, the
court thinks it desirable to see the corroboration from
other reliable evidence placed on record. The
principles that apply for placing reliance on the solitary
statement of the witness, namely, that the statement is
true and correct and is of quality and cannot be
discarded solely on the ground of lack of corroboration,
apply to a child witness who is competent and whose
version is reliable.”
43. The Supreme court in the matter of State of UP v. Sonu
Kushwaha, (2023) 7 SCC 475 has held as under :
“12. The POCSO Act was enacted to provide more
stringent punishments for the offences of child abuse
of various kinds and that is why minimum punishments
have been prescribed in Sections 4, 6, 8 and 10 of the
POCSO Act for various categories of sexual assaults
on children. Hence, Section 6,on its plain language,
leaves no discretion to the Court and there is no option
but to impose the minimum sentence as done by the
Trial Court. When a penal provision uses the
phraseology “shall not be less than….”, the Courts
cannot do offence to the Section and impose a lesser
sentence. The Courts are powerless to do that unless
there is a specific statutory provision enabling the
Court to impose a lesser sentence. However, we find
no such provision in the POCSO Act. Therefore,
notwithstanding the fact that the respondent may have
moved ahead in life after undergoing the sentence as
modified by the High Court, there is no question of
20showing any leniency to him. Apart from the fact that
the law provides for a minimum sentence, the crime
committed by the respondent is very gruesome which
calls for very stringent punishment. The impact of the
obnoxious act on the mind of the victim/child will be
lifelong. The impact is bound to adversely affect the
healthy growth of the victim. There is no dispute that
the age of the victim was less than twelve years at the
time of the incident. Therefore, we have no option but
to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court
and restore the judgment of the Trial Court.”
44. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case,
the testimony of PW-3 (child victim) clearly qualifies as that of a
sterling witness. Her deposition is consistent with the contents of
the written report (Ex.P/07) and the First Information Report
(Ex.P/08). She has withstood the test of cross-examination
without any material contradiction or improvement affecting the
core of the prosecution case. Her version is natural, credible, and
inspires full confidence.
45. Furthermore, her testimony stands duly corroborated by medical
evidence (Ex.P/19) and scientific evidence in the form of FSL
report (Ex.P/31), which lends additional assurance to her version.
Even in the absence of such corroboration, her testimony, being
of sterling quality, would be sufficient to sustain the conviction.
46. Therefore, this Court holds that the evidence of the child victim is
wholly reliable and of sterling quality, and there is no reason to
21
discard or doubt her testimony. The same forms a sound and safe
basis for affirming the conviction of the accused.
47. In the result, this Court comes to the conclusion that the
prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond all
reasonable doubts against the appellant. The conviction and
sentence as awarded by the trial court to the appellant is hereby
upheld. The present criminal appeal lacks merit and is accordingly
dismissed.
48. It is stated at the Bar that the appellant is in jail. He shall serve out
the sentence as ordered by the trial Court.
49. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the
concerned Superintendent of Jail where the Appellant is
undergoing the jail term, to serve the same on the Appellant
informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment
passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services
Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
50. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to
the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and
compliance.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Manpreet
