Heard The Learned Counsel For The … vs M.Lingamaiah & Ors on 16 April, 2026

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    Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati

    Heard The Learned Counsel For The … vs M.Lingamaiah & Ors on 16 April, 2026

                    HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
    
    MAIN CASE No.: C.C.No.2954 of 2025 & W.P.No.5923 of 2023
    
                                     PROCEEDING SHEET
    
    Sl.No    DATE                                                                OFFICE
                                               ORDER
    

    NOTE
    16.04.2026 NV, J `

    I.A.No.1 of 2025 in C.C.No.2954 of 2025

    SPONSORED

    Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.
    Learned counsel for the petitioner submits
    that this application is filed seeking exemption in
    filing the contempt case as per Section 20 of the
    Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

    Learned counsel for the petitioner relied
    upon the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court
    in S.Tirupathi Rao vs. M.Lingamaiah & Ors, which
    is extracted hereunder:

    “55. The Act, which is a special law on
    the subject of contempt, does not
    expressly or by necessary implication
    exclude the applicability of sections 4
    to 24 of the 1963 Act. This Court,
    in State of West Bengal v. Kartick
    Chandra Das44
    has held that in terms of
    section 29(2) of the 1963 Act,
    provisions contained in section 5 of the
    1963 Act can be called in aid by a party
    who seeks condonation of delay in
    presentation of an appeal under
    section 19(1) of the Act. Similarly, in
    exceptional cases, provisions like
    sections 12, 14, 17, 22, etc. of the
    1963 Act could be invoked to seek
    exemption from the law of limitation,
    which is distinct from condonation of
    delay. In an appropriate case, it would
    be open to the party who has not
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    petitioned the court within the period
    of one year, as stipulated in section 20
    of the Act, to seek exemption from the
    law of limitation in line with the
    principle flowing from Order VII Rule 6,
    CPC45, by showing the ground upon
    which such exemption is claimed. We
    have no hesitation to hold that in a
    case where a civil contempt is alleged
    by a party by referring to a “continuing
    wrong/breach/offence” and such
    allegation prima facie satisfies the
    court, the action for contempt is not
    liable to be nipped in the bud merely
    on the ground of it being presented
    beyond the period of one year as in
    section 20 of the Act. Applicability of
    the principle underlying Order VII Rule
    6, CPC for granting exemption would
    only be just and proper having regard
    to the object and purpose for which
    the jurisdiction to punish for contempt
    is exercised by the courts if, of course,
    the court is satisfied that benefit of
    such an exemption ought to be
    extended in a given case. At the same
    time, it must be remembered that the
    court cannot grant exemption from
    limitation on equitable consideration
    or on the ground of hardship.

    Inspiration in this regard may be drawn
    from the decision of the Privy Council
    in Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap
    Narain Singh46
    . However, as observed
    earlier, contempt proceedings being in
    the nature of original proceedings,
    akin to a suit, application of section 5
    of the 1963 Act to seek condonation of
    delay is excluded.

    56. A caveat needs to be added here.

    For a “continuing
    wrong/breach/offence” to be accepted
    as a ground for seeking exemption in
    an action for contempt, the party
    petitioning the court not only has to
    comprehend what the phrase actually
    means but would also be required to
    show, from his pleadings, the ground
    resting whereon he seeks exemption
    from limitation. Should the party fail
    3

    to satisfy the court, the petition is
    liable to outright rejection. Also, the
    court has to be vigilant. Stale claims of
    contempt, camouflaged as a
    “continuing wrong/breach/offence”

    ought not to be entertained, having
    regard to the legislative intent for
    introducing section 20 in the Act which
    has been noticed above. Contempt
    being a personal action directed
    against a particular person alleged to
    be in contempt, much of the efficacy
    of the proceedings would be lost by
    passage of time. Even if a contempt is
    committed and within the stipulated
    period of one year from such
    commission no action is brought before
    the court on the specious ground that
    the contempt has been continuing, no
    party should be encouraged to wait
    indefinitely to choose his own time to
    approach the court. If the bogey of
    “continuing wrong/breach/offence” is
    mechanically accepted whenever it is
    advanced as a ground for claiming
    exemption, an applicant may knock the
    doors of the Court any time suiting his
    convenience. If an action for contempt
    is brought belatedly, say any time
    after the initial period of limitation
    and years after the date of first
    breach, it is the prestige of the court
    that would seem to become a casualty
    during the period the breach
    continues. Once the dignity of the
    court is lowered in the eyes of the
    public by non-compliance of its order,
    it would be farcical to suddenly
    initiate proceedings after long lapse of
    time. Not only would the delay
    militate against the legislative intent
    of inserting section 20 in the Act (a
    provision not found in the predecessor
    statutes of the Act) rendering the
    section a dead letter, the damage
    caused to the majesty of the court
    could be rendered irreparable. It is,
    therefore, the essence of justice that
    in a case of proved civil contempt, the
    contemnor is suitably dealt with,
    4

    including imposition of punishment,
    and direction as well is issued to bridge
    the breach.”

    Learned counsel for the petitioner further
    submits that the delay in filing contempt petition is
    caused due to Writ Appeal filed by the respondents
    herein and the same is pending for consideration,
    the petitioner herein waited for the orders in the
    Writ Appeal. But after hearing, the Writ Appeal was
    posted for final hearing without there being any
    interim orders. After having clarification that this
    Court not passed any orders in Writ Appeal, then
    the petitioner submitted representation for
    implementation of the orders. In view of pendency
    of the writ appeal, it cannot be said that the cause
    of action as well as the contempt is started within
    one year from the date of the orders of this Court.
    Therefore, the contempt petition cannot be thrown
    away on the ground it is not filed within one year
    from the date of alleged contemptuous act said to
    have been started as per Section 20 of the
    Contempt of Courts Act.

    Considering the submissions of the learned
    counsel for the petitioner and on perusal of the
    ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as
    mentioned supra, the petitioner is entitled for
    exemption under section 20 of the Contempt of
    Courts Act.

    Accordingly, I.A.No.1 of 2025 is ordered.
    C.C.No.2954 of 2025 & W.P.No.5923 of 2023
    Office is directed to print the name of Sri
    K.Srinivasa Prasad, learned counsel for the
    respondent in the cause list.

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    List these matters on 28.04.2026.

    ________
    NV, J
    TPS



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