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HomeHeard The Learned Counsel For The ... vs M.Lingamaiah & Ors on...

Heard The Learned Counsel For The … vs M.Lingamaiah & Ors on 16 April, 2026

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Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati

Heard The Learned Counsel For The … vs M.Lingamaiah & Ors on 16 April, 2026

                HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

MAIN CASE No.: C.C.No.2954 of 2025 & W.P.No.5923 of 2023

                                 PROCEEDING SHEET

Sl.No    DATE                                                                OFFICE
                                           ORDER

NOTE
16.04.2026 NV, J `

I.A.No.1 of 2025 in C.C.No.2954 of 2025

SPONSORED

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that this application is filed seeking exemption in
filing the contempt case as per Section 20 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Learned counsel for the petitioner relied
upon the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in S.Tirupathi Rao vs. M.Lingamaiah & Ors, which
is extracted hereunder:

“55. The Act, which is a special law on
the subject of contempt, does not
expressly or by necessary implication
exclude the applicability of sections 4
to 24 of the 1963 Act. This Court,
in State of West Bengal v. Kartick
Chandra Das44
has held that in terms of
section 29(2) of the 1963 Act,
provisions contained in section 5 of the
1963 Act can be called in aid by a party
who seeks condonation of delay in
presentation of an appeal under
section 19(1) of the Act. Similarly, in
exceptional cases, provisions like
sections 12, 14, 17, 22, etc. of the
1963 Act could be invoked to seek
exemption from the law of limitation,
which is distinct from condonation of
delay. In an appropriate case, it would
be open to the party who has not
2

petitioned the court within the period
of one year, as stipulated in section 20
of the Act, to seek exemption from the
law of limitation in line with the
principle flowing from Order VII Rule 6,
CPC45, by showing the ground upon
which such exemption is claimed. We
have no hesitation to hold that in a
case where a civil contempt is alleged
by a party by referring to a “continuing
wrong/breach/offence” and such
allegation prima facie satisfies the
court, the action for contempt is not
liable to be nipped in the bud merely
on the ground of it being presented
beyond the period of one year as in
section 20 of the Act. Applicability of
the principle underlying Order VII Rule
6, CPC for granting exemption would
only be just and proper having regard
to the object and purpose for which
the jurisdiction to punish for contempt
is exercised by the courts if, of course,
the court is satisfied that benefit of
such an exemption ought to be
extended in a given case. At the same
time, it must be remembered that the
court cannot grant exemption from
limitation on equitable consideration
or on the ground of hardship.

Inspiration in this regard may be drawn
from the decision of the Privy Council
in Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap
Narain Singh46
. However, as observed
earlier, contempt proceedings being in
the nature of original proceedings,
akin to a suit, application of section 5
of the 1963 Act to seek condonation of
delay is excluded.

56. A caveat needs to be added here.

For a “continuing
wrong/breach/offence” to be accepted
as a ground for seeking exemption in
an action for contempt, the party
petitioning the court not only has to
comprehend what the phrase actually
means but would also be required to
show, from his pleadings, the ground
resting whereon he seeks exemption
from limitation. Should the party fail
3

to satisfy the court, the petition is
liable to outright rejection. Also, the
court has to be vigilant. Stale claims of
contempt, camouflaged as a
“continuing wrong/breach/offence”

ought not to be entertained, having
regard to the legislative intent for
introducing section 20 in the Act which
has been noticed above. Contempt
being a personal action directed
against a particular person alleged to
be in contempt, much of the efficacy
of the proceedings would be lost by
passage of time. Even if a contempt is
committed and within the stipulated
period of one year from such
commission no action is brought before
the court on the specious ground that
the contempt has been continuing, no
party should be encouraged to wait
indefinitely to choose his own time to
approach the court. If the bogey of
“continuing wrong/breach/offence” is
mechanically accepted whenever it is
advanced as a ground for claiming
exemption, an applicant may knock the
doors of the Court any time suiting his
convenience. If an action for contempt
is brought belatedly, say any time
after the initial period of limitation
and years after the date of first
breach, it is the prestige of the court
that would seem to become a casualty
during the period the breach
continues. Once the dignity of the
court is lowered in the eyes of the
public by non-compliance of its order,
it would be farcical to suddenly
initiate proceedings after long lapse of
time. Not only would the delay
militate against the legislative intent
of inserting section 20 in the Act (a
provision not found in the predecessor
statutes of the Act) rendering the
section a dead letter, the damage
caused to the majesty of the court
could be rendered irreparable. It is,
therefore, the essence of justice that
in a case of proved civil contempt, the
contemnor is suitably dealt with,
4

including imposition of punishment,
and direction as well is issued to bridge
the breach.”

Learned counsel for the petitioner further
submits that the delay in filing contempt petition is
caused due to Writ Appeal filed by the respondents
herein and the same is pending for consideration,
the petitioner herein waited for the orders in the
Writ Appeal. But after hearing, the Writ Appeal was
posted for final hearing without there being any
interim orders. After having clarification that this
Court not passed any orders in Writ Appeal, then
the petitioner submitted representation for
implementation of the orders. In view of pendency
of the writ appeal, it cannot be said that the cause
of action as well as the contempt is started within
one year from the date of the orders of this Court.
Therefore, the contempt petition cannot be thrown
away on the ground it is not filed within one year
from the date of alleged contemptuous act said to
have been started as per Section 20 of the
Contempt of Courts Act.

Considering the submissions of the learned
counsel for the petitioner and on perusal of the
ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as
mentioned supra, the petitioner is entitled for
exemption under section 20 of the Contempt of
Courts Act.

Accordingly, I.A.No.1 of 2025 is ordered.
C.C.No.2954 of 2025 & W.P.No.5923 of 2023
Office is directed to print the name of Sri
K.Srinivasa Prasad, learned counsel for the
respondent in the cause list.

5

List these matters on 28.04.2026.

________
NV, J
TPS



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