Himachal Pradesh High Court
Ishwar Thakur & Ors vs State Of H.P. & Anr on 31 March, 2026
Author: Sandeep Sharma
Bench: Sandeep Sharma
( 2026:HHC:9628 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 89 of 2025.
Date of Decision: 31.03.2026.
.
Ishwar Thakur & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of H.P. & Anr. ...Respondents
of
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
rt
For the Petitioners : Mr. Sudhir Thakur, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Karun Negi and
Mr. Somesh Sharma, Advocates.
For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional
Advocate General.
For Respondent No.2 : Mr. R.L. Verma, Advocate. .
Sandeep Sharma, J.
The instant criminal revision petition filed under
Section 438 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023,
lays challenge to order dated 07.01.2025 passed by the learned
Special Judge, Solan, District Solan, H.P. in Case No. 5-S/7 of
2019, titled as State of H.P. vs. Ishwar Thakur & Ors., whereby
the afore Court while rejecting the prayer made on behalf of the
petitioners (hereinafter, “accused”) for their discharge,
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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proceeded to frame charges against them for the offences
punishable under Sections 307, 341 of the IPC and Section 3(1)
.
(s), 2(va) of the Scheduled Castes and The Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter, ‘Act’).
2. Precisely the grouse of the petitioners, as has been
highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Shri Sudhir
of
Thakur, learned Senior Advocate representing the accused is
that the Court below while framing charge under Section 307 of
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the IPC and Section 3(1)(s), 2(va) of the Act has fallen in grave
error, for the reason that no cogent and convincing evidence
ever came to be adduced on record by the prosecution suggestive
of the fact that the alleged injuries inflicted by the petitioners on
the person of the complainant besides being grievous, were
dangerous to his life. While referring to Section 307 of the IPC,
Mr. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel further argued that to
invoke provisions of Section 307 of the IPC, it is incumbent upon
the prosecution to prove the intention and knowledge of the
accused, if any, to inflict injury on the person of the complainant
which could be dangerous to his life. While referring to MLC
adduced on record by the prosecution to prove the injuries
sustained by the complainant in the alleged incident, Mr.
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Thakur, learned Senior Counsel vehemently argued that doctor
attending upon the complainant nowhere opined the injuries,
.
which were though opined to be grievous, to be dangerous to
life. If it is so, no case under Section 307 of the IPC is made out
against the accused named in the FIR and at the best accused
could have been charged under Section 325 of the IPC for theirs
of
having inflicted grievous injuries on the person/body of the
complainant. While referring to MLC, Mr. Thakur, learned
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Senior Counsel further argued that no injury was ever inflicted
by the accused on the vital organs/parts of the body of the
complainant, rather as per the own case of the prosecution blow
of danda/stick was given by the accused on the arms and
shoulders of the complainant, as a result of which, he suffered
dislocation and fracture which was subsequently opined to be
grievous injury. He further argued that bare perusal of
statement of the complainant recorded under Section 154 of the
Cr.P.C. and thereafter under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.,
suggestive of the fact that the accused inflicted injuries on the
person of the complainant with the intention to kill him, are not
sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 307 of the IPC. Mr.
Thakur, further argued that bare perusal of statement of
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complainant under Section 154 Cr.P.C., nowhere suggests that
casteist remarks/abuses, if any, were made/hurled by the
.
accused, rather in his statement under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C.,
he simply stated that accused, namely, Ankush Dharmender
Thakur and Pushpender Sharma came to him and forcefully
took him to Garima Dhaba, where accused Ishwar Thakur was
of
already present. He alleged that accused named in the FIR
thereafter gave him beatings with danda, fist and kicks.
rt Mr.
Thakur, learned senior counsel submitted that there is no
specific mention with regard to hurling of abuses and making of
casteist remarks, if any, by the accused in the FIR, but
subsequently, with a view to falsely implicate the accused
named in the FIR, in his supplementary statement recorded
under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C, he alleged that, while giving
beatings the accused also hurled abuses and called him
‘chamar’. Mr. Thakur, submitted that though FIR, which is
lodged at the first instance immediately after the incident, was
lodged on 29.01.2019, wherein there is no specific mention with
regard to casteist remarks made by the accused, but on
30.01.2019, the complainant made allegations of casteist
remarks allegedly made by the accused on the date of incident.
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While referring to supplementary statement recorded under
Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., Mr. Thakur, learned senior counsel
.
further argued that the allegations in the afore statements are
made by the complainant with a view to falsely implicate the
accused. He further submitted that since none of the persons
had an occasion to see the alleged incident as has been stated by
of
the complainant himself, the alleged casteist remarks, claimed
to have been made by the accused, otherwise cannot be said to
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have been made in public view, which is otherwise necessary
ingredient for invoking the provisions of Section 3(1)(s), (2)(va)
of the Act. Mr. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate further
submitted that no evidence has been adduced on record by the
prosecution to prove the aforesaid allegations of casteist
remarks allegedly made by the accused. He submitted that since
there is no independent witness to corroborate the version of
the complainant coupled with the fact that there are material
contradictions in the statements given by the complainant
under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.,
trial, if permitted to be continued against the accused named in
the FIR for the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(s), (2)(va)
of the Act, would amount to sheer abuse of process of law. He
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further submitted that otherwise also for want of evidence, the
case of the prosecution is likely to fail and as such no fruitful
.
purpose would be served by subjecting the accused to protracted
trial. In support of his afore contentions, learned senior counsel
placed reliance on certain judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court
which shall be discussed in the later part of this judgment.
of
3. To the contrary, Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned
Additional Advocate General and Mr. R.L. Verma, learned
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counsel representing the respondent/complainant supported
the impugned order passed by the learned Special Judge thereby
framing charges against the petitioners for the offences
punishable under Sections 325, 341 of the IPC and Section 3(1)
(s), (2)(va) of the Act.
4. Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional Advocate
General for the State and Mr. Verma, learned counsel for the
complainant argued that very opinion of the doctor that the
injuries suffered by the complainant are grievous in nature
coupled with the fact that had the complainant not raised his
arms to save himself, he would have received injuries on his
head which could further result in serious consequences are
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sufficient to invoke Section 307 of the IPC. Learned Additional
Advocate General and Mr. Verma, learned counsel further
.
argued that there is ample material adduced on record
suggestive of the fact that the accused named in the FIR actually
had made an attempt to inflict injuries on the head of the
complainant but since complainant had raised his arms to save
of
himself, he received injuries on his arms. They further
submitted that whether the accused had any intention or
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knowledge to commit the crime punishable under Section 307 of
the IPC, is a question to be decided by the Court below in totality
of evidence, but here in the present case mere availability of
MLC on record is sufficient to conclude the complicity of the
accused in the commission of offence punishable under Section
307 of the IPC. Learned Additional Advocate General for the
respondent-State and Mr. Verma, learned counsel representing
the complainant further argued that once it is not in dispute
that the complainant was given beatings in open place i.e. bazar
and they had also made casteist remarks, it cannot be said that
casteist remarks were not made in public view. It is further
submitted by the aforesaid counsel that the complainant alleged
that the accused, while giving beatings to him, also made
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casteist remarks. They further argued that the statement of
complainant itself is sufficient to prove the guilt, if any, of the
.
accused in the commission of offence punishable under Section
3(1)(s), (2) (va) of the Act and even if the afore version is not
corroborated by independent witness, the act can be said to be
done in public view, as such it would be sufficient to charge the
of
accused under Section 3(1)(s), (2) (va) of the Act. They further
submitted that otherwise also it is matter of trial whether the
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casteist remarks were made in public view and were heard by
any other person or not?
5. Learned Additional Advocate General for the
State/respondent No.1 and Mr. Verma, learned counsel
representing the complainant/respondent No.2 further argued
that it is well settled law that, while framing the charge, the
court is not required to appreciate the evidence, rather at that
stage it is to be be seen, whether prima facie case, if any, is
made out from the documents filed along with the final report
submitted under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C., or not?
6. Learned Additional Advocate General as well as
learned counsel representing the complainant further
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contended that this Court, while exercising the revisional
jurisdiction has no wider powers to re-appreciate the evidence.
.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have
also gone through the entire record carefully.
8. Since, specific issue with regard to the limited
of
jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 438 of
the BNSS) has been raised at the behest of the respondents, this
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Court deems it fit to deal with it at the first instance.
9. True it is that this Court has limited jurisdiction
under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 438 of the BNSS) to
re-appreciate evidence in view of the law laid down by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala vs. P:uttumana IIIath
Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 SCC 452, wherein it has ben
held as under:-
“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call
for and examine the record of any proceedings for the
purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order.
In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory
jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting
miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power
cannot be equated with the power of an appellate
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jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be
appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the
evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same
.
when the evidence has already been appreciated by
the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal,
unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of
the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to
gross miscarriage of justice.”
of
10. Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another v.
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has
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held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or
misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the
abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct
irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal
Court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order.
11. Now being guided by the aforesaid principle of law,
this Court, while exercising the powers under Section 397 of the
Cr.P.C. (now Section 438 of the BNSS), shall make an endavour
to find out, whether the Court below while passing the
impugned order, has failed to deliver justice or misused the
judicial mechanism or procedure.
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12. In nut shell, the case of the petitioners is that no
cause is made out against them under Section 307 of the IPC and
.
Section 3 (1)(s), (2) (va) of the Act since the injuries suffered by
the complainant in the alleged incident have been opined to be
grievous by the doctor attending upon him and there is no
specific mention that the injuries opined to be grievous in
of
nature could be dangerous to life, accused could not have been
charged under Section 307 of the IPC, rather at the best they
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could have been charged under Section 325 of the IPC. At this
stage, it would be apt to take note of Section 307 of the IPC.
Section 307 of the IPC reads as under:-
“Whoever does any act with such intention or
knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he bythat act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by suchact, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment
for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore
mentioned.”
13. A bare perusal of the afore provisionsof law clearly
reveals that the prosecution is under obligation to prove that
the person charged with the aforesaid provisions of law had
intention or knowledge that any act of him may cause death of a
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person, against whom such act is done. In the case at hand, as
per the complainant, accused namely Ankush Verma,
.
Dharmender Thakur and Pushpender firstly took him to Garima
Dhaba where fourth accused Ishwar Thakur was already present
and thereafter they gave him beatings. If statements of the
complainant recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C. and Section 161
of
of the Cr.P.C. are read in conjunction, it transpires that he
nowhere stated that accused named in the FIR gave him
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beatings with an intention to kill him. It appears from the
statement of the complainant recorded under Section 161 of the
Cr.P.C. that there was some rivalry inter se Ishwar Thakur and
the complainant on account of gram panchayat elections, but
such fact, if any, may not be sufficient to conclude the intention
or knowledge of the petitioners to do away the life of
complainant. Complainant, nowhere specifically stated that
while he was being given beatings by the accused, they also
threatened to kill him, rather, as per own case of complainant,
accused gave him beatings with the help of a danda/stick and he
with a view to save his head, raised his arms, as a result of which
he suffered injuries on his arms/shoulder. MLC adduced on
record nowhere suggests injuries on the vital part of the body.
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Though, the injuries suffered by the complainant on his arms
and shoulder were found to be grievous in nature but doctor
.
nowhere mentioned the kind of weapon, used to cause the
injuries and whether the injuries inflicted could be dangerous to
life, which is otherwise essential to attract the provisions of
Section 307 of the IPC.
of
14. At this stage, Mr. R.L. Verma, learned counsel
representing the complainant, made a reference to the judgment
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of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as Shoyeb Raja vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh & Ors., Cr. Appeal No. 3327 of 2024, decided on
25.09.2024 wherein it came to be ruled that the nature or extent
of injury suffered are irrelevant factors for conviction under
Section 307 of the IPC , so long as the injury is inflicted with
animus. However, on careful perusal of the afore judgment, this
Court finds no application of the same, as far as the case of the
complainant is concerned, rather the same is applicable to the
case of the petitioners. Hon’ble Apex Court while taking the
note of the judgments passed in State of Maharashtra vs.
Kashirao, (2003)10 SCC 434 has held as under:-
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“11.1 In State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao, the Court
identified the essential ingredients for the applicability of
the section. The relevant extract is as below:
.
“The essential ingredients required to be proved
in the case of an offence under Section 307 are:
(i) that the death of a human being was attempted;
(ii) that such death was attempted to be caused by,
or in consequence of the act of the accused; andof
(iii) that such act was done with the intention of
causing death; or that it was done with the
intention of causing such bodily injury as : (a) the
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accused knew to be likely to cause death; or (b)
was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature tocause death, or that the accused attempted to
cause death by doing an act known to him to be so
imminently dangerous that it must in allprobability cause (a) death, or (b) such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death, the accusedhaving no excuse for incurring the risk of causing
such death or injury.”
11.2 This Court in Om Prakash v. State of Punjab,1961 SCC
OnLine SC 72 as far back as 1961, observed the
constituents of the Section, having referred to various
judgments of the Privy Council, as under:
“a person commits an offence under Section 307
when he has an intention to commit murder and,
in pursuance of that intention, does an act
towards its commission irrespective of the fact
whether that act is the penultimate act or not. It
is to be clearly understood, however, that the
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15 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )that the person concerned has the intention to do
certain act with the necessary intention or
knowledge mentioned in Section 300. The.
intention to commit an offence is different from
the intention or knowledge requisite for
constituting the act as that offence. Theexpression “whoever attempts to commit an
offence” in Section 511, can only mean
“whoever : intends to do a certain act with theof
intent or knowledge necessary for the
commission of that offence”. The same is meant
by the expression “whoever does an act with such
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intention or knowledge and under such
circumstances that if he, by that act, causeddeath, he would be guilty of murder” in Section
307. This simply means that the act must be done
with the intent or knowledge requisite for thecommission of the offence of murder. The
expression “by that act” does not mean that theimmediate effect of the act committed must be
death. Such a result must be the result of that actwhether immediately or after a lapse of time.”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. As per the aforesaid judgment most relevant
ingredients of Section 307 of the IPC are that the death of a
human being was attempted and such an act was done with the
intention of causing death or that it was done with the intention
of causing such bodily injury which the accused knows is likely
to cause death or is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature,
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to cause death or that the accused attempted to cause death by
doing an act known to him to be so imminently dangerous, that
.
it must, in all probabilities cause death, or such bodily injury, as
is likely to cause death, the accused having no excuse for
incurring the risk of causing such death or injury.
16. In the case in hand, the description of the weapon of
of
offence has not been mentioned and it is also not opined that
with which weapon the injuries have been caused. There is also
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no specific opinion that the injuries caused could be dangerous
to life. The doctor attending upon the complainant after having
examined the complainant opined the injuries to be grievous in
nature, which does not appear to be sufficient to invoke the
provisions of Section 307 of the IPC, rather at best case under
Section 325 could have been registered against the accused.
17. Another argument raised at the behest of the accused
is that no case is made out under Section3(1) (s), 2(va) of the Act
for the reason that the alleged casteist remarks were neither
made in public view nor in the presence of any independent
witness. To ascertain correctness of the afore claim made by the
learned senior counsel representing the petitioners, this Court
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perused the record of the court below, which was summoned.
Bare perusal of the statement of the complainant recorded
.
under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. clearly suggests that the
complainant nowhere alleged that the accused named in the FIR
while giving him beatings also made casteist remarks. It is after
a day from his recording of statement under Section 154 Cr.P.C,
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he got recorded supplementary statement under Section 161 of
the Cr.P.C. on 30th January, 2019 alleging therein that the
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accused also made casteist marks and called him ‘chamar’. No
doubt, supplementary statement recorded under Section 161 of
the Cr.P.C. is the part of the final report submitted under Section
173 of the Cr.P.C. and as such it cannot be overlooked, but this
Court is persuaded to accept the submission made by the
learned senior counsel for the petitioners that there is no
explanation that what prevented the complainant from stating
with regard to the alleged “casteist remarks” made by the
accused at the first instance. Omission on the part of the
complainant to make specific mention with regard to “casteist
remarks” allegedly made by the accused at first instance
certainly compels this Court to agree with the learned senior
counsel, that an attempt has been made by the prosecution to
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improve the case. Most importantly, as per the own statement
of the complainant, none was present at the time of his being
.
beaten by the accused, hurling of abuses and making of casteist
remarks. Though, there is no reason to disagree with the
submission of Mr. R.L. Verma, learned counsel representing the
complainant that the statement of complainant, wherein he has
of
alleged that accused made casteist remarks, is sufficient to
invoke the provisions of Section 3(1) (s), (2)(va) of the Act, but
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in the entirety of the facts as discussed above coupled with the
fact that there is no witness to corroborate the version of the
complainant, this Court is of the view that no fruitful purpose
would be served in case charge under Section 3(1) (s), (2)(va) of
the Act is permitted to sustain at this stage, rather in that
situation petitioners/accused herein would be unnecessarily
subjected to protracted trial.
18. Though, this Court is not persuaded to agree with the
Mr. Sudhir Thakur, learned senior counsel representing the
petitioners that the place of occurrence cannot be said to be
“public place” in terms of Section 3 (1)(s), (2)(va) of the Act
merely on the ground that none save and except the
complainant heard utterances of casteist remarks, if any, made
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by the accused named in the FIR, but since, it is not in dispute
that the complainant was allegedly given beatings in the bazar
.
that too in front of one ‘dhaba’, the place of occurrence beside
being a “public place” can also be construed to be a place in
public view in terms of Section 3(1) (s),(2)(va) of the Act but
relevant factor for construing the case, if any, under Section 3
of
(1)(s), (2)(va) of the Act against the accused is whether casteist
remarks allegedly made in public view were heard by any third
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person or not. In FIR, which came to be lodged at the first
instance, there is no specific mention with regard to casteist
remarks, if any, made by the accused. Secondly, as per the own
statement of the complainant, none at the time of alleged
incident was present on the spot. Otherwise also documents
adduced on record along with the chargesheet filed under
Section 173 of the Cr.P.C., nowhere suggest that any third person
had an occasion to see the alleged incident. Though, the place
of occurrence was a public place and the alleged incident also
can be said to have happened in public view, but since, none save
and except the accused and the complainant, were witness to
such incident, the version put forth by the complainant with
regard to the casteist remarks allegedly made by the accused
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named in the FIR, has become doubtful on account of omission
on the part of the complainant to report such act at the first
.
instance i.e at the time of lodging of FIR.
19. Similarly, the bare perusal of supplementary
statement of the complainant recorded under Section 161 of the
Cr.P.C., which was recorded after 23 days of lodging of FIR,
of
further reveals that the allegations of making casteist remarks,
if any, by the accused named in the FIR, has been made in most
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casual manner by the complainant, which act of his certainly
compels this Court to draw an inference that the act of adducing
new facts thereby levelling serious allegation of hurling abuses
and making casteist remarks is afterthought. At this juncture, it
would be apt to take note of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in case of Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs. The State of Uttar
Pradesh & Ors., Cr. Appeal No. 1617/2023, decided on 19.05.2023,
wherein it has been held as under:-
“16. The first F.I.R., registered at the instance of the
complainant, is silent about the place of occurrence and
who, being a member of the public, was present when the
appellant is alleged to have hurled caste related abuses at
the complainant. However, on a reading of the second
F.I.R. registered at the behest of the appellant, it appears
that the incident took place at the house of the appellant.
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17. The first question that calls for an answer is
whether it was at a place within public view that the
appellant hurled caste related abuses at the complainant.
with an intent to insult or intimidate with an intent to
humiliate him. From the charge-sheet dated 21 st
January, 2016 filed by the I.O., it appears that theprosecution would seek to rely on the evidence of three
witnesses to drive home the charge against the appellant
of committing offences under Sections 323 and 506 IPCof
and 3(1)(x), SC/ST Act. These three witnesses are none
other than the complainant, his wife and their son.
Neither the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet refers to the
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presence of a fifth individual (a member of the public) at
the place of occurrence (apart from the appellant, thecomplainant, his wife and their son). Since the
utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not “in
any place within public view”, the basic ingredient forattracting Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was
missing/absent. We, therefore, hold that at the relevantpoint of time of the incident (of hurling of caste related
abuse at the complainant by the appellant), no memberof the public was present.
18. That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant
had hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with a
view to insult or humiliate him, the same does not
advance the case of the complainant any further to bring
it within the ambit of Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. We
have noted from the first F.I.R. as well as the charge-
sheet that the same makes no reference to the utterances
of the appellant during the course of verbal altercation or
to the caste to which the complainant belonged, except
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22 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )were hurled. The legislative intent seems to be clear that
every insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person
would not amount to an offence under Section 3(1)(x)of.
the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult or
intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being
a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If onecalls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a
thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would
obviously constitute an act intended to insult orof
humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language. Even
if the same be directed generally to a person, who
happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may
rt
not be sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(x) unless such
words are laced with casteist remarks. Since Section 18 ofthe SC/ST Act bars invocation of the court’s jurisdiction
under Section 438 Cr.PC and having regard to the
overriding effect of the SC/ST Act over other laws, it isdesirable that before an accused is subjected to a trial for
alleged commission of offence under Section 3(1)(x) theutterances made by him in any place within public view
are outlined, if not in the F.I.R. (which is not required tobe an encyclopaedia of all facts and events), but at least
in the charge-sheet (which is prepared based either onstatements of witnesses recorded in course of
investigation or otherwise) so as to enable the court to
ascertain whether the charge sheet makes out a case of
an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed
for forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the
situation before it, prior to taking cognisance of the
offence. Even for the limited test that has to be applied in
a case of the present nature, the charge-sheet dated 21 st
January, 2016 does not make out any case of an offence::: Downloaded on – 10/04/2026 20:34:52 :::CIS
23 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )having been committed by the appellant under section
3(1)(x) warranting him to stand a trial.”
20. In the afore case Hon’ble Apex Court though held
.
that the place outside the house of the complainant can be said
to be a public place or the alleged incident has occurred within
public view, but since in the instant case, the alleged incident of
of
hurling abuses and making casteist remarks was not seen by any
third party, as fairly admitted by the complainant in his
rt
statement, the provisions of Section 3(1)(s),(2)(va) of the Act
cannot be invoked.
21. Reliance is also placed upon a judgment of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Hitesh Verma vs. The State of Uttarakhand
and Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 707 of 2020, decided on 05.11.2020,
wherein it has been held that the key ingredient of the offence
under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is insult or intimidation in any
place within public view. The Hon’ble Apex Court taking note of
of earlier decision in Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State though
Standing Counsel and Ors., (2008)8 SCC 435, has held that if an
offence is committed outside the building or in a lawn outside a
house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or
lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be
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24 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )
a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is
made inside a building, but some members of the public are
.
there, not merely relatives or friends, then it would not be an
offence since it is not in the public view. In the afore case
before Hon’ble Apex Court, the allegations of abusing the
informant were within the four walls of her building and the
of
informant nowhere stated that there was any member of public
present at the time of incident, rather in that case the alleged
rt
incident was seen by the family members. Hence, the Hon’ble
Apex Court has held that since the alleged incident had taken
place within the four walls of the building, as such it cannot be
said to be a “place within public view”. In the instant case none
was present at the place of incident though the alleged incident
took place at a public place which can also be said to be within
public view but none other than the accused and the
complainant had the occasion to see the alleged incident.
22. In afore case the Hon’ble Apex Court further held
that offence must have been committed against the person on
the ground that such persons is a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe. Though, in the instant case there is no
dispute that the complainant belongs to scheduled caste
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25 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )
category but there is no evidence to show that the offence was
committed only on the ground that the complainant was a
.
member of scheduled caste, therefore, the case under Section 3
(1)(s), (2)(va) of the Act is not sustainable. Most importantly, in
the afore judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court it has been held
that the offence under Act is not established merely on the fact
of
that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there
is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or
rt
Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such
caste. Though, in the instant case, as per the own statement of
complainant no person was there on the spot to witness the
incident but if the supplementary statement of the complainant
recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. is perused, he made a
specific averment that he had past rivalry with one of co-
accused Ishwar Thakur on account of gram panchayat elections.
The relevant paras No.15 to 23 of Hitesh Verma’s case (supra)
read as under:-
“15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the
informant were within the four walls of her building. It is
not the case of the informant that there was any member
of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time
of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic::: Downloaded on – 10/04/2026 20:34:52 :::CIS
26 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )
ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place
within public view” is not made out. In the list of
witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain
.
witnesses are named but it could not be said that those
were the persons present within the four walls of the
building. The offence is alleged to have taken place
within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view
of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh, it cannot
be said to be a place within public view as none was said
of
to be present within the four walls of the building as per
the FIR and/or charge-sheet.
16.
rt
There is a dispute about the possession of the land
which is the subject matter of civil dispute between the
parties as per respondent No.2 herself. Due to dispute,
appellant and others were not permitting respondent
No.2 to cultivate the land for the last six months. Since
the matter is regarding possession of property pending
before the Civil Court, any dispute arising on account of
possession of the said property would not disclose an
offence under the Act unless the victim is abused,
intimated or harassed only for the reason that she
belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.
17. In another judgment reported as Khuman Singh v.
State of Madhya Pradesh,2019 SCC OnLine SC 1104 this
Court held that in a case for applicability of Section 3(2)
(v) of the Act, the fact that the deceased belonged to
Scheduled Caste would not be enough to inflict enhanced
punishment. This Court held that there was nothing to
suggest that the offence was committed by the appellant
only because the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste.
The Court held as under:
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27 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )
“15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must
be such so as to attract the offence under Section
3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have been.
committed against the person on the ground that
such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribe. In the present case, the fact that
the deceased was belonging to “Khangar”-
Scheduled Caste is not disputed. There is no
evidence to show that the offence was committed
of
only on the ground that the victim was a member of
the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the conviction
of the appellant-accused under Section 3(2)(v) of
rt
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.”
18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established
merely on the fact that the informant is a member of
Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate
a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the
reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the
present case, the parties are litigating over possession of
the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a
person who claims title over the property. If such person
happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence
under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out.
19. This Court in a judgment reported as Dr. Subhash
Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.(2018)
6 SCC 454 issued certain directions in respect of
investigations required to be conducted under the Act. In
a review filed by the Union against the said judgment,
this Court in a judgment reported as Union of India v.
State of Maharashtra & Ors.,(2020) 4 SCC 761 reviewed
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28 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )
the directions issued by this Court and held that if there
is a false and unsubstantiated FIR, the proceedings under
Section 482 of the Code can be invoked. The Court held as
.
under:
“52. There is no presumption that the members of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes maymisuse the provisions of law as a class and it is not
resorted to by the members of the upper castes orof
the members of the elite class. For lodging a false
report, it cannot be said that the caste of a person
is the cause. It is due to the human failing and not
rt
due to the caste factor. Caste is not attributable to
such an act. On the other hand, members of theScheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes due to
backwardness hardly muster the courage to lodge
even a first information report, much less, a falseone. In case it is found to be false/unsubstantiated,
it may be due to the faulty investigation or for
other various reasons including human failingsirrespective of caste factor. There may be certain
cases which may be false that can be a ground for
interference by the Court, but the law cannot be
changed due to such misuse. In such a situation, itcan be taken care of in proceeding under Section
482 CrPC.”
20. Later, while examining the constitutionality of the
provisions of the Amending Act (Central Act No. 27 of
2018), this Court in a judgment reported as Prathvi Raj
Chauhan v. Union of India & Ors.,(2020) 4 SCC 727 held
that proceedings can be quashed under Section 482 of the
Code. It was held as under:
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29 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )
“12. The Court can, in exceptional cases, exercise
power under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the
cases to prevent misuse of provisions on settled.
parameters, as already observed while deciding
the review petitions. The legal position is clear,
and no argument to the contrary has been
raised.”
21. In Gerige Pentaiah, one of the arguments raised was
of
non-disclosure of the caste of the accused but the facts
were almost similar as there was civil dispute between
parties pending and the allegation was that the accused
rt
has called abuses in the name of the caste of the victim.
The High Court herein has misread the judgment of this
Court in Ashabai Machindra Adhagale as it was not a case
about the caste of the victim but the fact that the accused
was belonging to upper caste was not mentioned in the
FIR. The High Court of Bombay had quashed the
proceedings for the reason that the caste of the accused
was not mentioned in the FIR, therefore, the offence
under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Act is not made out. In an
appeal against the decision of the Bombay High Court,
this Court held that this will be the matter of
investigation as to whether the accused either belongs to
or does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.
Therefore, the High Court erred in law to dismiss the
quashing petition relying upon later larger Bench
judgment.
22. The appellant had sought quashing of the charge-
sheet on the ground that the allegation does not make
out an offence under the Act against the appellant merely
because respondent No. 2 was a Scheduled Caste since the
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30 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )
property dispute was not on account of the fact that
respondent No. 2 was a Scheduled Caste. The property
disputes between a vulnerable section of the society and a
.
person of upper caste will not disclose any offence under
the Act unless, the allegations are on account of the
victim being a Scheduled Caste. Still further, the finding
that the appellant was aware of the caste of the
informant is wholly inconsequential as the knowledge
does not bar, any person to protect his rights by way of a
of
procedure established by law.
23. This Court in a judgment reported as Ishwar Pratap
rt
Singh & Ors.v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2018) 13 SCC
612 held that there is no prohibition under the law for
quashing the charge-sheet in part. In a petition filed
under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court is required
to examine as to whether its intervention is required for
prevention of abuse of process of law or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice. The Court held as under:
“9. Having regard to the settled legal position on
external interference in investigation and thespecific facts of this case, we are of the view that
the High Court ought to have exercised itsjurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to secure the
ends of justice. There is no prohibition under law
for quashing a charge-sheet in part. A person
may be accused of several offences under
different penal statutes, as in the instant case. He
could be aggrieved of prosecution only on a
particular charge or charges, on any ground
available to him in law. Under Section 482, all
that the High Court is required to examine is::: Downloaded on – 10/04/2026 20:34:52 :::CIS
31 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )whether its intervention is required for
implementing orders under the Criminal
Procedure Code or for prevention of abuse of.
process, or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice. A charge-sheet filed at the dictate of
somebody other than the police would amount toabuse of the process of law and hence the High
Court ought to have exercised its inherent powers
under Section 482 to the extent of the abuse.
of
There is no requirement that the charge-sheet
has to be quashed as a whole and not in part.
Accordingly,
rt this appeal is allowed. The
supplementary report filed by the police, at the
direction of the Commission, is quashed.”
23. Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Konde
Nageshwar Rao vs. A. Srirama Chandra Murty and Ors., Criminal
Appeal No. 555 of 2018, decided on 23.07.2025, held that merely
because the complainant belongs to the Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe cannot be sole ground for prosecution. The
offences alleged must have been committed solely on the basis
of the victim’s caste status. Misuse of the statute to settle
personal scores or to harass individuals cannot be permitted if it
is apparent. Most importantly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that the prosecution needs to be quashed at an early stage
to prevent undue harassment of the accused where there is clear
legal infirmity in the prosecution case, such as the allegations,
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32 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )
even if taken at their face value, do not disclose an offence or the
entire case is a bad faith exercise weaponized to settle personal
.
scores, rather than seeking justice. The relevant paragraphs No.
22 to 24 of the aforesaid judgment read as under:-
“22. Perusal of the complaint would also indicate that
the grievance was not really relatable to the false andof
malicious involvement in the criminal proceedings
against the Appellant and his family members because of
them belonging to Scheduled Caste. The very intent being
rt
absent, the offences for which the prosecution has been
launched are not made out. That apart, merely because anumber of cases and various litigations are pending
between the Appellant and Respondent No. 2, in itself
cannot be a ground for presuming that the prosecutioninitiated against the appellant was at the behest of and
with a false and malicious intent, by now deceased
Respondent No. 1. For attracting the offences, as allegedto have been committed by the private respondents,
specific instances and incidents supported by evidence
are required to be present, which is missing in this case.
23. In Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State of
Maharashtra, (2000) 3 SCC 5571, this Court has
emphasized that merely because the complainant belongs
to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes cannot be the
sole ground for prosecution. The offences alleged must
have been committed solely on the basis of the victim’s
caste status. Misuse of the statute to settle personal
scores or to harass individuals cannot be permitted if it is
apparent. The Court should in such situation be not
hesitant to step in and stop the said misuse. Prosecution::: Downloaded on – 10/04/2026 20:34:52 :::CIS
33 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )needs to be quashed at an early stage to prevent undue
harassment of the accused where there is clear legal
infirmity in the prosecution case, such as the allegations,.
even if taken at their face value, do not disclose an offence
or the entire case is a bad faith exercise weaponized to
settle personal scores, rather than seeking justice(Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh and others, (2013) 9 SCC
245 ‘).
of
24. This court in Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v.
State of Maharashtra and another, (2018) 6 SCC 454 had
also observed that there has been an alarming increase in
false complaints under the SC/ST Act, particularly against
rt
public servants and judicial officers with an obliquemotive to settle personal scores or to harass individuals.
Such acts cannot be allowed to be perpetuated and need to
be stopped at the very outset so that there is no
miscarriage of justice.”
24. True it is that the complainant cannot be expected to
disclose each and every fact at the time of his recording FIR and
as such the police at the time of preparing or presenting the
challan under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. is permitted to take note
of the supplementary statement, if any, recorded under Section
161 of the Cr.P.C. of the complainant as well as of the other
witnesses, who had the occasion to see the alleged incident or
had the knowledge of the same. However, in the instant case the
very omission on the part of the complainant to lodge the
complaint with regard to his having been humiliated or insulted
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34 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )
on account of his being from Scheduled Caste category coupled
with the fact that the allegations with regard of casteist remarks
.
allegedly made by the accused were reported on the next day of
the lodging of the FIR certainly compels this Court to draw an
inference that an attempt has been made by the complainant to
misuse the provisions of the Act on account of his being a
of
member of Scheduled Caste category. Otherwise also for the
detailed discussion made above, no case is made out against the
rt
accused named in the FIR under Section 3(1)(s), (2)(va) of the
Act.
25. Though, at this stage, Mr. R.L. Verma, learned
counsel representing the complainant made an attempt to argue
that at the time of framing of charge the court cannot sift entire
evidence but he was unable to dispute that at the time of
framing of charge the court concerned is required to sift/peruse
the material adduced on record along with final report for
inferring prima facie case, if any. For inferring a prima facie
case, the court concerned is expected to arrive at a conclusion
that the basic ingredients of sections with which the accused are
proposed to be charged are met. As such, at the time of framing
of charge in a criminal case, the Court concerned after going
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35 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )
through the material on record can also proceed to discharge the
accused in case it comes to the conclusion that no prima facie
.
case is made out against the accused named in the FIR. Since,
the consequence of framing of charge is serious because in that
situation the accused may have to face the ordeal of protracted
trial, the court concerned while framing charge is expected to
of
apply its mind to ascertain that the material adduced on record
to bring home the guilt of accused is sufficient to frame charge.
rt
26. Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dr. Anand Rai vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., Special Leave Petition (Criminal)
No. 10711 of 2025, decided on 10.02.2026 has held as under:-
“19. A different discipline governs cases arising at the
stage of discharge, framing of charge, or prima facie
satisfaction. The Court has consistently held that at thisstage the Court is not concerned with proof of guilt or
the sufficiency of evidence for conviction. In State ofBihar v. Ramesh Singh(1977) 4 SCC 39 and later in Union
of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (1979) 3 SCC 4 , the
Court clarified that the test is whether the material on
record, taken at face value, discloses the essential
ingredients of the alleged offence and gives rise to a
strong or grave suspicion against the accused. The Court
is expressly cautioned against conducting a roving
inquiry or weighing the evidence as if at trial. When
these generally applicable principles are applied to an
appeal under Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act arising from::: Downloaded on – 10/04/2026 20:34:52 :::CIS
36 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )a threshold order, the High Court’s role, though
appellate in nature, stands circumscribed by the limits
governing discharge. The High Court may examine.
whether the allegations disclose the basic statutory
ingredients of the offence under the Act, including
whether the alleged act was committed on account ofthe victim’s caste and whether other foundational
requirements are satisfied. Where these ingredients are
conspicuously absent, interference is justified, asof
continuation of proceedings would amount to an abuse
of the process of law. This form of scrutiny does not
amount to appreciation of the material but is an exercise
rt
in legal evaluation of the allegations as they
stand………………”
27. After having gone through the entire material
adduced on record along with the final report filed under Section
173 of the Cr.P.C., before the Court below, this Court is fully
convinced that no case is made out under Section 307 of the IPC
and Section 3(1)(s), (2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act against the
accused, as such this Court, while exercising its revisional
jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C., can interefere to
prevent the abuse of process of law or miscarriage of justice.
Further this Court, is of the view that the material adduced on
record along with final report suggests prima facie case under
Sections 325 and 341 of the IPC against the accused named in the
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37 ( 2026:HHC:9628 )
FIR and as such they are only required to be charged with the
aforesaid provisions of law.
.
28. Consequently the instant petition is allowed. Order
dated 7.1.2025 passed by learned Special Judge, Solan is set
aside. Accused shall be discharged from commission of offence
punishable under Section 307 IPC and S. 3(1)(s), (2)(va) of the
of
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act. However, since this court has already observed
rt
that case under Section 325 and 341 read with Section 34 of the
IPC is made out for framing of charge, learned Special Judge,
Solan is directed to assign/transfer the case to the court of
competent jurisdiction, for proceeding further, in accordance
with law.
(Sandeep Sharma)
Judge
31st March, 2026
(jai)
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