Madhya Pradesh High Court
Krishna Pati Tripathi vs Abhay Kumar Mishra on 20 March, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VINAY SARAF
ELECTION PETITION No. 8 of 2024
KRISHNA PATI TRIPATHI
Versus
ABHAY KUMAR MISHRA
Appearance:
Shri R. K. Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel with Shri Siddharth Kumar
Sharma, advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Sanjay Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel with Ms. Neerja Agrawal,
advocate for the respondent.
Reserved on: 06.02.2026
Post for : 20.03.2026
_________________________________________________________________
Order
1. This order will disposed of I.A. No. 22204/2024 dated 17.10.2024 filed on
behalf of the respondent for rejection of petition under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
2. This election petition has been filed by the petitioner Krishna Pati Tripathi
under Sections 80, 80-A, 81 and Section 100(1)(d)(i) & (iv) of the Representation
of People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as ‘RP Act’) questioning the election
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of the respondent Abhay Kumar Mishra as member of M.P. Legislative Assembly
from 69 Semariya Vidhan Sabha Constituency, District Rewa, Madhya Pradesh.
3. On 21.10.2023, the gazette notification was issued for general election of
the Legislative Assemblies of Madhya Pradesh- 2023 under Section 15(2) of the
RP Act, by which the initial date for nomination was declared as 21.10.2023 and
last date for submission of nomination was fixed as 30.10.2023. The Polling was
scheduled for 17.11.2023 however date for counting and declaration was fixed as
03.12.2023.
4. The petitioner contested the said election as candidate of Bhartiya Janta
Party (BJP) from Semariya 69, District Rewa, wherein the respondent contested
the election as candidate of Indian National Congress (INC) and both of them
filed their nomination before the Returning Officer along with Form No. 26 as
prescribed in Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
Rules, 1961’). The election was conducted on 17.11.2023 and result was declared
by the election commission on 03.12.2023, wherein the respondent was declared
as winning/returned candidate in the State Legislative Assemblies Elections from
Semariya 69, District Rewa Constituency. The respondent secured 56024 votes,
whereas the petitioner secured 55387 votes and the respondent defeated the
petitioner with the margin of 637 votes. There was total 15 candidates, who
contested the election from Semariya 69 Constituency.
5. After declaration of result on 16.01.2024, the instant election petition has
been filed by the petitioner before Registrar Judicial-II of this Court questioning
the election of the respondent and for declaring the election of the respondent to
be void. The grounds raised by the petitioner in the election petition inter alia:-
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(a) That the affidavit (Form 26) annexed with the nomination paper was not in
consonance with the Rules, 1961 and in the affidavit the respondent did not
disclose his criminal antecedents, whereas the same was mandatory as per the
Rules. The respondent in paragraphs 5 and 6 has casually mentioned “Not
applicable” despite the fact that in the past, several criminal cases were registered
against the respondent. The petitioner annexed the list of criminal cases obtained
under RTI Act along with the petition as Annexure P-6, which reflects that nine
criminal cases were registered against the respondent in the past.
(b) The respondent in the affidavit (Form 26) filed along with nomination
paper did not declare the outstanding liabilities due to financial institution/Banks
and this important piece of information was deliberately suppressed by the
respondent in his affidavit filed with the nomination form. As per petitioner, the
respondent availed loan facility from the ICICI Bank Ltd. in the year 2003 for
equipment purchase and such loan amount was not repaid by respondent till date.
The petitioner attached the copy of loan account statement of account no.
LQJBL00001515951 after obtaining from ICICI Bank Limited on 08.01.2024 and
filed the same along with the petition as Annexure P-8, which reflects that Mr.
Abhay Kumar Mishra was sanctioned term loan of Rs. 23,00,000/- on 17.09.2023
and Rs. 50,87,672/- was due as on 10.01.2023. As per the petition, the said
liability was suppressed by the respondent in his affidavit. It is also alleged that
the respondent has deliberately disclosed the financial liability of State Bank of
India only and outstanding liability of equipment payable towards the ICICI Bank
Ltd was not disclosed purposely.
(c) In the nomination form and the affidavit (Form 26) enclosed with the
nomination form, the respondent has suppressed the complete details of
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profession or occupation of himself and his spouse in point no. 9(a) and 9(b) and
details of sources of income in point 9(A). The respondent mentioned his source
of income as pension from M.P. State Legislative Assembly and salary from
Private Limited Companies. However the names of the companies were not
disclosed in the nomination paper or in the affidavit, which is a material defect,
which plays a vital role in materially affecting the result of the election.
(d) Section 9(a) of R.P. Act, 1959 provides disqualification of person, if there
subsists an active contract between the contesting candidate and appropriate
government for the supply of goods or for the execution of the work undertaken
by the government. There is an active subsisting contract between PWD-NH
Division and the company in which respondent was holding the shares and
therefore, the respondent was disqualified from contesting the State Legislative
Assembly Election.
6. The election petition has been filed stating that due to the aforesaid
business, the result of the election has been materially affected by improper
acceptance of nomination form of the respondent and the provisions provided
under Section 33 of the RP Act read with Rule 4-A of the Rules, 1961 has not
been complied with by the respondent. On the aforesaid grounds, the instant
election petition has been preferred seeking declaration of election of respondent
as void and nonest.
7. The respondent appeared in the case and on 17.10.2024 filed an application
under Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the CPC (I.A.No.22204/2024) stating that the
allegation of the petitioner that the respondent has made false declaration in Form
26 affidavit, is not correct and the respondent has disclosed all the details in the
affidavit. It is stated in the application that the details obtained from the police
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authorities in respect of criminal cases registered against the respondent was of
12.07.2006, whereas thereafter the respondent has been acquitted in all the nine
cases and not a single criminal case was pending on the date of submission of
nomination paper and the respondent has not been convicted in any case
therefore, there was no need to provide details of the disposed of cases, wherein
the respondent has been acquitted. Copies of the some of the judgments delivered
in these cases were filed by the respondent along with the application.
8. It is also stated in the application that loan was obtained by M/s Abhay
Mishra, Contractor, a Partnership firm constituted by deed of partnership in the
year 2002, wherein the respondent was one of the partner till his retirement and
w.e.f. 17.10.2008 he has been retired from the firm with immediate effect. The
loan was not obtained by the respondent in his personal capacity and it was
obtained by partnership firm in the year 2003 and thereafter the respondent retired
from the firm on 17.10.2008 therefore, the outstanding amount of loan is not
liability of the respondent and there was no obligation upon the respondent to
disclose this liability in the nomination paper and affidavit filed along with the
nomination form. Copies of the partnership deed as well as Form 5 obtained from
the office of Assistant Registrar filed by the respondent along with the application
in support of his contention. The respondent has also obtained the letter from the
Bank and the same has also been enclosed along with the application.
9. Regarding the allegation of non-disclosure of source of income, the
respondent submits that he has rightly disclosed his source of income i.e. pension
from M.P. State Legislative Assembly and salary from the Private Limited
Companies and nothing has been suppressed. The respondent has already
resigned from the directorship of these companies much before the submission of
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the nomination form and this fact was duly recorded on the official website of the
Ministry of Corporate Affairs. The copies of the document downloaded from the
official website of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs are also enclosed along with
the application.
10. It is submitted in the application that there may be active contract between
the appropriate government and the company in which the respondent was earlier
Director but as he has already resigned from the Directorship of the Company and
these resignation was duly informed to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs and
therefore, the allegation of disqualification is also incorrect.
11. Upon the aforesaid grounds and the documents filed in support of the
contentions of the respondent along with the application, the respondent prayed
for rejection of the election petition on the ground that the same does not disclose
any cause of action and there was no cause arose to sue or file such election
petition, which is manifestly vexatious and meritless. The respondent prayed for
rejection of the petition.
12. The election petitioner in his reply to I.A. No. 22204/2024 refuted the
contentions made in the application and reiterated the grounds raised in the
election petition. It is stated in the reply that nondisclosure of the criminal
antecedents is accepted by the respondent himself and it is also accepted by
respondent that as many as nine criminal cases were registered against him in the
past, therefore, it is a matter of evidence that whether those cases are still pending
or already disposed of. Similarly, the respondent has resigned from the
partnership firm or companies also requires recording of evidence. The
application filed under Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the CPC has been preferred just to
delay the trial and the same is liable to be dismissed.
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13. Heard Shri R.K. Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and Shri
Sanjay Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent.
14. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the election petition has
been preferred on the ground of nondisclosure of the criminal antecedents and
financial status, whereas from the perusal of the documents enclosed along with
the application I.A. No. 22204/2024, it is apparent that no ground is actually
available to the petitioner to file subject election petition and the same has been
filed to take revenge from the returned candidate. All the documents are in public
domain and can be downloaded from the official website. The respondent already
resigned from various companies and this fact was duly intimated to the Ministry
of Corporate Affairs. No criminal case was pending against the respondent and
the respondent had not been convicted in any criminal case in the past therefore,
respondent was not under obligation to disclose the fact that nine criminal cases
were registered against him in the past, wherein he had already been acquitted. He
further submits that the respondent has not obtained the loan from ICICI Bank in
his personal capacity and loan facility was availed by the partnership firm,
wherein now the respondent is not a partner, therefore, the allegation of non-
disclosure of outstanding financial liability is also misconceived. Similarly, the
respondent has already resigned from various companies including the company
which is in contract with State Government for construction of road. The
Company is a separate entity and the respondent is not connected with that
company as on today.
15. Shri Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondent submits that under the
provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 (a) of the CPC, the election petition, which is
prima facie vexatious, can be rejected as the same does not disclose any cause of
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action. He further submits that court must be vigilant against the suppression of
facts or abuse of process of law. He further submits that applying the provisions
of Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the CPC to the facts of the case at hand, the election
petition is liable to be rejected being vexatious and based on illusionary cause of
action.
16. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has relied on the judgments
delivered by the Supreme Court and various High Courts in the matters of T.
Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, Dahi Ben Vs. Arvind
Bhai (2020) 7 SCC 366, Ramisetty Venkatana & Anr. Vs. Nasyam Jamal
Saheb (2023 SCC Online SC 521), S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jaganath
AIR 1994 SC 853, RBANMS Educational Institution Vs. B. Gunashekar 2025
SCC OnLine 793, Ballam Trifla Singh Vs. Gyan Prakash Shukla 2025 SCC
OnLine Bom. 1171, Vshisht Narain Sharma Vs. Dev Chandra (1954) 2 SCC
32, Kamta Prasad Upadhyay Vs. Sarjoo Prasad Tiwari (1969) 3 SCC 622,
Mangani Lal Mandal Vs. Bishnu Deo Bhandari (2012) 3 SCC 314,
Kanimozhi Karunanidhi Vs. A. Santhana Kumar (2024) 18 SCC 592,
Dasanglu Pul Vs. Lupalum Kri (2024) 18 SCC 817, Karikho Kri Vs. Nuney
Tayang (2024) 15 SCC 112, Ram Sukh Vs. Dinesh Aggrawal (2009) 10 SCC
541, Suresh Chandra Bhandari Vs. Smt. Neena Vikram decided on
15.07.2024 (E.P.No. 16 of 2024) by M.P. High Court, Indore Bench, Ram
Gareeb Vs. Ajay Arjun Singh (E.P.No.6/2024) and Rakesh Kumar Pandey
Vs. Ajay Arjun Singh (E.P.No.7/2024) on 22.08.2024 and Civil Appeal
No.13015/2024 Ajmera Shyam Vs. Smt. Kova Laxmi on 14.08.2025. Shri
Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel prays for rejection of the election petition by
allowing the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) of the CPC .
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17. Per contra, Shri R.K. Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel vehemently opposed
the application and submits that the election petition has been filed on the basis of
the definite and specific allegations. In the election petition, the petitioner has
alleged that nine criminal cases were registered against the respondent in the past,
however, the respondent did not disclose any criminal case and simply mentioned
“Not Applicable” in the nomination form. He further submits that the voters of
the constituency have right to know about the criminal antecedents of the
candidate and by suppressing the same, the respondent has deprived the voters to
know the candidate. He further submits that registration of the criminal case is not
disputed in the case as the respondent himself has claimed acquittal in all the
cases, which is a matter of evidence. Shri Sanghi submits that ICICI Bank Ltd.
has issued loan statement in respect of Bank account of Mr. Abhay Mishra and as
per the loan amount of Rs. 50,87,672/- was outstanding against the borrower as
on 10.01.2023 and therefore, the respondent was under obligation to disclose the
liability in the affidavit which, has not been disclosed. The fact that the loan was
obtained by a firm and after obtaining the loan, the respondent retired from the
partnership firm, is a subject matter of evidence and these defenses of the
respondent are not acceptable at this stage. He further submits that though the
respondent disclosed in the nomination paper and in the affidavit filed along with
the form that he is earning pension from M.P. State Legislative Assembly and
salaries from Private Limited Companies, the respondent deliberately did not
disclose the details of these private limited companies and suppressed these facts
in the nomination form deliberately.
18. Learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the judgments delivered by the
Supreme Court in the matter of Krishnamoorthy Vs. Sivakumar (2015) 3 SCC
467, Bhim Rao Baswanth Rao Patil Vs. Madan Mohan Rao, (2023) 18 SCC
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231, Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju Vs. Peddireddigari Ramachandra
Reddy (2018) 14 SCC 1, Union of India Vs. Assn. for Democratic Reforms
(2002) 5 SCC 294, Shri Ram Naresh Yadav Vs. The State of M.P. (2015) 5
SCC 467, Resurgence India Vs. Election Commission of India & Anr. (2014)
14 SCC 189 and submits that the application preferred for rejection of the
election petition is liable to be dismissed with heavy costs.
19. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondent and perused the
record. Since in the subject election petition, the application has been moved
under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) of the CPC for rejection of election petition on the
ground of non-disclosure of cause of action, it would be relevant to consider the
scope of Order 7 Rule 11 (a) of the CPC and provisions, which reads as under:
” Order VII
11. Rejection of plaint.– The plaint shall be rejected in the
following cases:–
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;”
20. The provision of Order 7 Rule 11 (a) of the CPC is independent and
provides a special remedy to the defendant. The special remedy, by which the
courts are empowered to summarily dismiss the suit at the threshold without
proceeding to record evidence and conducting a trial, if it is satisfy that no cause
of action is disclosed in the suit. However, if the allegations in the petition prima
facie show cause of action, the court cannot embark on an enquiry whether the
allegations are true or not. The Supreme Court has discussed the provisions of
Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC in Salim Bhai Vs. State of Maharastra, (2003) 1
SCC 557 and held that general facts for deciding such an application are the
averments in the plaint and not the pleas taken in the written statement. It is
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further held that a perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC makes it clear that
relevant facts, which need to be looked into for deciding an application
thereunder, are averments in the plaint. The trial court can reject the plaint under
Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC at any stage of suit and the averments in the plaint
can only be looked into and the pleas taken by the defendant would be wholly
irrelevant at that stage. This preposition further explained by the Supreme Court
in Dahiben (supra), wherein the Supreme Court has held that to ascertain that the
plaint discloses cause of action or not, the Court has to exercise in conjunction
with the document relied upon the plaint as a whole without addition or
subtraction of any words and if cause of action prima facie discloses, the court
are not required to further enquire about truthfulness of allegation of facts and the
pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement also not relevant at that
stage. However, Court finds suit to be manifestly vexatious not disclosing any
right to sue, may reject the plaint.
21. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment in Dahiben (supra) are as under:
“23. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the
plaint and documents filed therewith, as also the written submissions
filed on behalf of the parties.
23.1. We will first briefly touch upon the law applicable for deciding
an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, which reads as under:
“11. Rejection of plaint.–The plaint shall be rejected in the following
cases–
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being
required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by
the court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written
upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by
12the court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by
the court, fails to do so;
(d)where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by
any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9:
Provided that the time fixed by the court for the correction of the valuation
or supplying of the requisite stamp-papers shall not be extended unless the
court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was
prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the
valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-papers, as the case may be,
within the time fixed by the court and that refusal to extend such time
would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.”
23.2. The remedy under Order 7 Rule 11 is an independent and
special remedy, wherein the court is empowered to summarily dismiss
a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and
conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is
satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds
contained in this provision.
23.3. The underlying object of Order 7 Rule 11(a) is that if in a suit,
no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation
under Rule 11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff to
unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it
would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further
judicial time is not wasted.
23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi [Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv
Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji
Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 281 :
(1998) 2 GLH 823] this Court held that the whole purpose of
conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation
which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be
permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words :
(SCC p. 324, para 12)
“12. … The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure
that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive
should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court, and exercise
13the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles need not be kept
hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even
in an ordinary civil litigation, the court readily exercises the power to
reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action.”
23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is,
however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order 7
Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.
23.6. Under Order 7 Rule 11, a duty is cast on the court to determine
whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinising the
averments in the plaint [Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v.
M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512] , read in conjunction with the
documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law.
23.7. Order 7 Rule 14(1) provides for production of documents, on
which the plaintiff places reliance in his suit, which reads as under:
“14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies.–
(1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon
document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he
shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in court
when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time
deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the
plaint.
(2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of
the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose
possession or power it is.
(3) A document which ought to be produced in court by the
plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to
be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered
accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the court, be received
in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
(4) Nothing in this Rule shall apply to document produced for the
cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses, or, handed over to a
witness merely to refresh his memory.”
23.8. Having regard to Order 7 Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed
along with the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for
deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11(a). When a document
referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be
treated as a part of the plaint.
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23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the court would
determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory
law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the
plaint at the threshold is made out.
23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written
statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits,
would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into
consideration. [Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3
SCC 137]
23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 is that
if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in
conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in
a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London
S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I [Liverpool & London S.P. &
I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512] which reads as :
(SCC p. 562, para 139)
“139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially
a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out
from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments
made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test
is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be
correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.”
23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. [Hardesh Ores (P)
Ltd. v. Hede & Co., (2007) 5 SCC 614] the Court further held that it is
not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in
isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be
looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without
addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima
facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an
enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. D. Ramachandran v.
R.V. Janakiraman [D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman, (1999) 3
SCC 267; See also Vijay Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh,
AIR 1962 SC 941] .
23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit
is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a
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right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
23.14. The power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by
the court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint,
or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the
trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of
Maharashtra [Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC
557] . The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must
necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain
case [Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed
in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC
OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823] .
23.15. The provision of Order 7 Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It
states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds
specified in clauses (a) to (e) are made out. If the court finds that the
plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by
any law, the court has no option, but to reject the plaint.
x x x x x
24. “Cause of action” means every fact which would be necessary for
the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to
judgment. It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are
necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs
claimed in the suit.
24.1. In Swamy Atmananda v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam [Swamy
Atmananda v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam, (2005) 10 SCC 51] this
Court held : (SCC p. 60, para 24)
“24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which, if traversed, it
would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his
right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts,
which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to
relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the
defendant since in the absence of such an act, no cause of action can
possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right
sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded.”
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24.2. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [T. Arivandandam v. T.V.
Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467] this Court held that while considering an
application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC what is required to be
decided is whether the plaint discloses a real cause of action, or
something purely illusory, in the following words : (SCC p. 470, para
5)
“5. … The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful–not
formal–reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the
sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power
under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned
therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause
of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing….”
24.3. Subsequently, in ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal
[ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70]
this Court held that law cannot permit clever drafting which creates
illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a clear right
must be made out in the plaint.
24.4. If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has created the
illusion of a cause of action, this Court in Madanuri Sri Rama
Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal [Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy
v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 602] held that
it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the
earliest stage. The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or
suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious,
and an abuse of the process of the court.”
22. In view of the above legal position, it is clear that provisions of Order 7
Rule 11 of the CPC enables the Court to terminate the proceedings at the
threshold where the plaintiff’s case even if accepted in its entirety, do not disclose
any cause of action. However, the Supreme Court in the matter of B.
Gunashekar (supra) has held that power to reject the plaint under this provision
is not merely procedural, but substantive and for preventing abuse of judicial
process and ensuring that the court’s time is not wasted or vexatious claims
failing to disclose any cause of action to sustain the suit.
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23. Considering the above pronouncement of Supreme Court, it requires
careful consideration of the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) of the
CPC and examination of the election petition to ascertain that whether it discloses
the cause of action or not.
24. Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgments delivered by
the Supreme Court in the matter of Vashisht Narain Sharma (supra), Kamta
Prasad Upadhayay (supra), Magnilal Madanlal (supra), Dasan Lupu (supra)
and Tarico Khari (supra), wherein the final judgments were under challenge and
the issue of rejection of claim was not involved. Consideration of material and
evidence adduced by the parties in trial is a different exercise and consideration
of the pleading for the purpose of examining that prima facie it discloses the
cause of action or not is a different exercise. Therefore, these judgments are not
relevant for the purpose of deciding the subject application.
25. The Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India Vs. Assn. for
Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCC 294 considered the right of the voters to
know antecedents including the criminal past of a candidate to membership of
parliament or Legislative Assembly and held that it is fundamental right of every
voter to know the antecedents of the candidate.
26. Thereafter, the necessary amendments were brought in and it made
mandatory to disclose the criminal antecedents and backgrounds and all other
details by the candidates along with the nomination paper and issue was
considered in the matter of Resurgence India Vs. Election Commission of
India & Anr. (2014) 14 SCC 189, wherein the Supreme Court has summarized
the direction as under :-
18
“29. What emerges from the above discussion can be summarised
in the form of the following directions:
29.1. The voter has the elementary right to know full particulars of
a candidate who is to represent him in Parliament/Assemblies and
such right to get information is universally recognised. Thus, it is
held that right to know about the candidate is a natural right
flowing from the concept of democracy and is an integral part of
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
29.2. The ultimate purpose of filing of affidavit along with the
nomination paper is to effectuate the fundamental right of the
citizens under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The
citizens are supposed to have the necessary information at the time
of filing of nomination paper and for that purpose, the Returning
Officer can very well compel a candidate to furnish the relevant
information.
29.3. Filing of affidavit with blank particulars will render the
affidavit nugatory.
29.4. It is the duty of the Returning Officer to check whether the
information required is fully furnished at the time of filing of
affidavit with the nomination paper since such information is very
vital for giving effect to the “right to know” of the citizens. If a
candidate fails to fill the blanks even after the reminder by the
Returning Officer, the nomination paper is fit to be rejected. We do
comprehend that the power of the Returning Officer to reject the
nomination paper must be exercised very sparingly but the bar
should not be laid so high that the justice itself is prejudiced.
29.5. We clarify to the extent that para 73 of People’s Union for
Civil Liberties case [People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of
India, (2003) 4 SCC 399] will not come in the way of the Returning
Officer to reject the nomination paper when the affidavit is filed
with blank particulars.
29.6. The candidate must take the minimum effort to explicitly
remark as “NIL” or “Not Applicable” or “Not known” in the
columns and not to leave the particulars blank.
19
29.7. Filing of affidavit with blanks will be directly hit by Section
125-A(i) of the RP Act. However, as the nomination paper itself is
rejected by the Returning Officer, we find no reason why the
candidate must be again penalised for the same act by prosecuting
him/her.
27. The disclosure of criminal antecedents and financial status are mandatory
as per the amended provision of law and Supreme Court has held that non-
disclosure of evidence creates impediment in free exercise of the electoral right.
Concealment and suppression of this nature deprive the voters to make an
informed and advised choice as a consequence of which come within the
compartment of direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere in the
exercise to go by the electorate on the part of the candidate. It is further held by
the Supreme Court in the matter of Krishnamoorthi (supra) that if the candidate
gives all the particulars and despite that he secures the votes that will be an
informed and advised free exercise by the electorate. In the election petition, the
election petitioner is required to assert about the cases in which the successful
candidate is involved and how there has been non-disclosure in the affidavit.
When that is established, it would amount to corrupt practice. It has to be
determined in an election petition by the election tribunal. In the corrupt practice,
the election tribunal or the High Court is bound to declare null and void, the
election of the returned candidate.
28. The Supreme Court in the matter of Kanimozhi Karunanidhi (supra) has
held as under:
“22. The law so far developed and settled by this Court with regard
to the non-compliance of the requirement of Section 83(1)(a) of the
EP Act, namely, — “an election petition must contain a concise
statement of material facts on which the petitioner relies”, is that
such non-compliance of Section 83(1)(a) read with Order 7 Rule
2011CPC, may entail dismissal of the Election Petition right at the
threshold. “Material facts” are facts which if established would
give the petitioner the relief asked for. The test required to be
answered is whether the court could have given a direct verdict in
favour of the election petitioner in case the returned candidate had
not appeared to oppose the election petition on the basis of the facts
pleaded in the petition. They must be such facts as would afford a
basis for the allegations made in the petition and would constitute
the cause of action as understood in the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908. Material facts would include positive statement of facts as
also positive statement of a negative fact.
23. A three-Judge Bench in Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi
[Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi, (2001) 8 SCC 233] had an
occasion to deal with Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act and the Court
dismissed the election petition holding that the bald and vague
averments made in the election petitions do not satisfy the
requirements of pleading “material facts” within the meaning of
Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act read with the requirements of Order
7 Rule 11CPC. It was observed in paras 23 and 24 as under: (SCC
pp. 251-52)
“23. Section 83(1)(a) of RPA, 1951 mandates that an election
petition shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on
which the petitioner relies. By a series of decisions of this Court, it is
well settled that the material facts required to be stated are those facts
which can be considered as materials supporting the allegations
made. In other words, they must be such facts as would afford a basis
for the allegations made in the petition and would constitute the cause
of action as understood in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The
expression “cause of action” has been compendiously defined to
mean every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove,
if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of court.
Omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of
action and the statement of claim becomes bad. The function of the
party is to present as full a picture of the cause of action with such
further information in detail as to make the opposite party understand
the case he will have to meet. (See Samant N. Balkrishna v. George
Fernandez [Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez, (1969) 3
SCC 238] , Jitendra Bahadur Singh v. Kirshna Behari [Jitendra
Bahadur Singh v. Kirshna Behari, (1969) 2 SCC 433] .) Merely
quoting the words of the section like chanting of a mantra does not
21amount to stating material facts. Material facts would include positive
statement of facts as also positive averment of a negative fact, if
necessary. In V.S. Achuthanandan v. P.J. Francis [V.S.
Achuthanandan v. P.J. Francis, (1999) 3 SCC 737] this Court has
held, on a conspectus of a series of decisions of this Court, that
material facts are such preliminary facts which must be proved at the
trial by a party to establish existence of a cause of action. Failure to
plead “material facts” is fatal to the election petition and no
amendment of the pleadings is permissible to introduce such material
facts after the time-limit prescribed for filing the election petition.
24. It is the duty of the court to examine the petition
irrespective of any written statement or denial and reject the petition
if it does not disclose a cause of action. To enable a court to reject a
plaint on the ground that it does not disclose a cause of action, it
should look at the plaint and nothing else. Courts have always
frowned upon vague pleadings which leave a wide scope to adduce
any evidence. No amount of evidence can cure basic defect in the
pleadings.”
* * * * *
26. In Ram Sukh v. Dinesh Aggarwal [Ram Sukh v. Dinesh
Aggarwal, (2009) 10 SCC 541] , this Court again while examining
the maintainability of election petition filed under Section
100(1)(d)(iv) of the RP Act, elaborately considered the earlier
decisions and observed that it was necessary for the election
petitioner to aver specifically in what manner the result of the
election insofar as it concerned the returned candidate was
materially affected due to omission on the part of the Returning
Officer. The Court in the said case having found that such
averments being missing in the election petition, upheld the
judgment [Ram Sukh v. Dinesh Agarwal, 2008 SCC OnLine Utt 1]
of the High Court/Election Tribunal rejecting the election petition
at the threshold. The Court observed in paras 14 to 21 as under:
(Ram Sukh case [Ram Sukh v. Dinesh Aggarwal, (2009) 10 SCC
541] , SCC pp. 548-51)
“14. The requirement in an election petition as to the statement of
material facts and the consequences of lack of such disclosure with
reference to Sections 81, 83 and 86 of the Act came up for consideration
before a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Samant N. Balkrishna v.
George Fernandez [Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez, (1969) 3
22
SCC 238] . Speaking for the three-Judge Bench, M. Hidayatullah, C.J.,
inter alia, laid down that:
(i) Section 83 of the Act is mandatory and requires first a concise
statement of material facts and then the fullest possible particulars;
(ii) omission of even a single material fact leads to an incomplete
cause of action and statement of claim becomes bad;
(iii) the function of particulars is to present in full a picture of the
cause of action and to make the opposite party understand the case he will
have to meet;
(iv) material facts and particulars are distinct matters–material facts
will mention statements of fact and particulars will set out the names of
persons with date, time and place; and
(v) in stating the material facts it will not do merely to quote the words
of the section because then the efficacy of the material facts will be lost.
15. At this juncture, in order to appreciate the real object and purport
of the phrase “material facts”, particularly with reference to election law,
it would be appropriate to notice the distinction between the phrases
“material facts” as appearing in clause (a) and “particulars” as
appearing in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 83. As stated above,
“material facts” are primary or basic facts which have to be pleaded by
the petitioner to prove his cause of action and by the defendant to prove
his defence. “Particulars”, on the other hand, are details in support of the
material facts, pleaded by the parties. They amplify, refine and embellish
material facts by giving distinctive touch to the basic contours of a picture
already drawn so as to make it full, more clear and more informative.
Unlike “material facts” which provide the basic foundation on which the
entire edifice of the election petition is built, “particulars” are to be stated
to ensure that the opposite party is not taken by surprise.
16. The distinction between “material facts” and “particulars” and
their requirement in an election petition was succinctly brought out by this
Court in Virender Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh [Virender Nath Gautam v.
Satpal Singh, (2007) 3 SCC 617] wherein C.K. Thakker, J., stated thus:
(SCC pp. 631-32, para 50)
’50. There is distinction between facta probanda (the facts
required to be proved i.e. material facts) and facta probantia (the
facts by means of which they are proved i.e. particulars or evidence).
It is settled law that pleadings must contain only facta probanda and
not facta probantia. The material facts on which the party relies for
his claim are called facta probanda and they must be stated in the
23pleadings. But the facts or facts by means of which facta probanda
(material facts) are proved and which are in the nature of facta
probantia (particulars or evidence) need not be set out in the
pleadings. They are not facts in issue, but only relevant facts
required to be proved at the trial in order to establish the fact in
issue.’
17. Now, before examining the rival submissions in the light of the
aforestated legal position, it would be expedient to deal with another
submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court
should not have exercised its power either under Order 6 Rule 16 or Order
7 Rule 11 of the Code to reject the election petition at the threshold. The
argument is twofold viz.:
(i) that even if the election petition was liable to be dismissed
ultimately, it should have been dismissed only after affording an
opportunity to the election petitioner to adduce evidence in support of his
allegation in the petition, and
(ii) since Section 83 does not find a place in Section 86 of the Act,
rejection of the petition at the threshold would amount to reading into sub-
section (1) of Section 86 an additional ground.
In our opinion, both the contentions are misconceived and untenable.
18. Undoubtedly, by virtue of Section 87 of the Act, the provisions of the
Code apply to the trial of an election petition and, therefore, in the absence
of anything to the contrary in the Act, the court trying an election petition
can act in exercise of its power under the Code, including Order 6 Rule 16
and Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. The object of both the provisions is to
ensure that meaningless litigation, which is otherwise bound to prove
abortive, should not be permitted to occupy the judicial time of the courts. If
that is so in matters pertaining to ordinary civil litigation, it must apply with
greater vigour in election matters where the pendency of an election petition
is likely to inhibit the elected representative of the people in the discharge of
his public duties for which the electorate have reposed confidence in him.
The submission, therefore, must fail.
19. Coming to the second limb of the argument viz. absence of Section
83 in Section 86 of the Act, which specifically provides for dismissal of an
election petition which does not comply with certain provisions of the Act, in
our view, the issue is no longer res integra. A similar plea was negatived by
a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh
[Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh, (1972) 1 SCC 214], wherein speaking for
the Bench, A.N. Ray, J. (as His Lordship then was) said: (SCC p. 221, para
23)
24
’23. Counsel on behalf of the respondent submitted that an election
petition could not be dismissed by reason of want of material facts
because Section 86 of the Act conferred power on the High Court to
dismiss the election petition which did not comply with the provisions
of Section 81, or Section 82 or Section 117 of the Act. It was
emphasised that Section 83 did not find place in Section 86. Under
Section 87 of the Act every election petition shall be tried by the High
Court as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure
applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the trial of
suits. A suit which does not furnish cause of action can be dismissed .’
20. The issue was again dealt with by this Court in Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv
Gandhi [Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315] . Referring to
earlier pronouncements of this Court in Samant N. Balkrishna [Samant N.
Balkrishna v. George Fernandez, (1969) 3 SCC 238] and Udhav Singh v.
Madhav Rao Scindia [Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, (1977) 1 SCC
511] wherein it was observed that the omission of a single material fact
would lead to incomplete cause of action and that an election petition
without the material facts is not an election petition at all, the Bench in
Azhar Hussain case [Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315]
held that all the facts which are essential to clothe the petition with
complete cause of action must be pleaded and omission of even a single
material fact would amount to disobedience of the mandate of Section
83(1)(a) of the Act and an election petition can be and must be dismissed if
it suffers from any such vice.
21. We may now advert to the facts at hand to examine whether the election
petition suffered from the vice of non-disclosure of material facts as
stipulated in Section 83(1)(a) of the Act. As already stated, the case of the
election petitioner is confined to the alleged violation of Section
100(1)(d)(iv). For the sake of ready reference, the said provision is
extracted below:
‘100. Grounds for declaring election to be void.–(1) Subject to the
provisions of sub-section
(2) if the High Court is of opinion–
* * * *
(d) that the result of the election, insofar as it concerns a returned
candidate, has been materially affected–
* * * *
(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of this
Act or of any rules or orders made under this Act,
25the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be
void.’
It is plain that in order to get an election declared as void under the said
provision, the election petitioner must aver that on account of non-
compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of this Act or of any
rules or orders made under the Act, the result of the election, insofar as it
concerned the returned candidate, was materially affected.’
27. The legal position enunciated in aforestated cases may be summed
up as under :
27.1. Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act, 1951 mandates that an election
petition shall contain a concise statement of material facts on which
the petitioner relies. If material facts are not stated in an election
petition, the same is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone, as
the case would be covered by clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the
Code.
27.2. The material facts must be such facts as would afford a basis for
the allegations made in the petition and would constitute the cause of
action, that is, every fact which it would be necessary for the
plaintiff/petitioner to prove, if traversed in order to support his right
to the judgment of court. Omission of a single material fact would
lead to an incomplete cause of action and the statement of plaint
would become bad.
27.3. Material facts mean the entire bundle of facts which would
constitute a complete cause of action. Material facts would include
positive statement of facts as also positive averment of a negative fact,
if necessary.
27.4. In order to get an election declared as void under Section
100(1)(d)(iv) of the RP Act, the election petitioner must aver that on
account of non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or
of the Act or any Rules or Orders made under the Act, the result of the
election, insofar as it concerned the returned candidate, was
materially affected.
27.5. The election petition is a serious matter and it cannot be treated
lightly or in a fanciful manner nor is it given to a person who uses it
as a handle for vexatious purpose.
26
27.6. An election petition can be summarily dismissed on the omission
of a single material fact leading to an incomplete cause of action, or
omission to contain a concise statement of material facts on which the
petitioner relies for establishing a cause of action, in exercise of the
powers under clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order 7CPC read with the
mandatory requirements enjoined by Section 83 of the RP Act.
* * * * *
35. As elaborately discussed earlier, Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act
mandates that an election petition shall contain a concise statement of
material facts on which the petitioner relies, and which facts
constitute a cause of action. Such facts would include positive
statement of facts as also positive averment of negative fact. Omission
of a singular fact would lead to incomplete cause of action. So far as
the present petition is concerned, there is no averment made as to how
there was non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of
the RP Act or of the Rules or Order made thereunder and as to how
such non-compliance had materially affected the result of the election,
so as to attract the ground under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the RP Act,
for declaring the election to be void. The omission to state such vital
and basic facts has rendered the petition liable to be dismissed under
Order 7 Rule 11(a)CPC read with Section 83(i)(a) of the RP Act,
1951.”
29. Considering the above pronouncement when the facts of the case in hand
are examined, it reveals that undisputedly, some criminal cases were registered
against the returned candidate in the past and in the affidavit the returned
candidate mentioned “Not Applicable”. The petitioner averred in the petition that
criminal cases were registered against the returned candidate in the past and the
same were not disclosed by the returned candidate. To support his contention, the
petitioner filed the list of the criminal cases obtained under RTI, which fortifies
the allegation of the petitioner and therefore, after examining the pleadings and
the documents in support of the pleadings, it prima facie discloses the cause of
action.
27
30. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent submits that in fact the
petitioner obtained the information under RTI several years back and on the date
of filing of the nomination paper, no criminal case was pending, therefore, there
was no obligation upon the returned candidate to disclose those cases. He filed
the copies of some of the judgments and the information of disposal of other
cases obtained under RTI. The documents filed by the respondent in his favour
are not relevant for the purpose of examining the plaint for the purpose of
deciding the issue whether the claim discloses the cause of action or not.
Similarly, it is alleged in the election petition that financial loan was availed by
the respondent form the ICICI Bank in 2003 and there is outstanding of Rs.
50,87,672/-. The copy of loan account statement was also obtained by the
petitioner from the Bank and submitted along with the petition, however, in the
application, it is stated by the returned candidate that loan was not obtained by
Mr. Abhay Mishra but it was obtained by M/s Abhay Mishra Contractor, wherein
returned candidate was originally partner, but retired in the year 2008. Meaning
thereby the fact that the loan was availed from the ICICI Bank and the amount is
still due, are not disputed. The explanation submitted by the returned candidate
may be good defence during the trial, but it cannot be accepted at this stage as the
Bank itself has issued copy of the loan account statement, in which the name of
returned candidate i.e. Mr. Abhay Mishra has been shown as borrower. This court
is considering the matter only for the purpose of examining that whether it
discloses the cause of action or not. The defence of the respondent cannot be
considered. The document filed along with the application for rejection of petition
cannot be made a basis of rejection of petition. Prima facie the said allegation
constitutes a triable issue.
28
31. The third ground raised by the petitioner in the election petition is that the
returning candidate has not disclosed the fact that from which company he is
getting salary. In the nomination form the returned candidate himself disclosed
the source of income i.e. pension from M.P. State Legislative Assembly and
salary from Private Limited Companies, however, the details of Private Limited
Companies were not furnished by the returned candidate and in the application
for rejection of the petition, it is stated that the returned candidate has already
resigned from the Directorship of these Companies and the same was duly
intimated to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs under the provisions of the
Companies Act. The position is same that allegation is there and in the absence of
consideration of defence put up by the retuned candidate, the allegation prima
facie discloses the cause. The allegation of disqualification on the ground of
subsisting contract with PWD/Road Development Corporation is also required to
be tested in trial as the returned candidate has submitted that he is not one of the
Directors of the Company/Firm, which is executing the contracts.
32. In the instant election petition, the petitioner has made specific averments
regarding suppression of material information in the affidavit filed along with the
nomination paper and if the contents of the election petition regarding the
suppression of material are found to be true then not only the election petition
may be accepted but the election of the returned candidate may also be set aside.
The petitioner has specifically stated in the election petition that the entire facts
stated in the election petition are true to the knowledge of the petitioner and the
available documents. The petition is duly supported by the affidavit as per Form
No.25 as prescribed under Rule 94(A) of the Rules, 1961, wherein it is stated by
the deponent that the statements made in the election petition in respect of
suppression of criminal antecedents and improper filing of nomination paper are
29
true to his knowledge. Thus, the election petition contains the concise statements
of material facts and requisites particular in accordance with rules.
33. The respondent is making prayer to consider the defense of the respondent
to the allegation levelled by the petitioner at this stage, which is not permissible
and therefore in the considered view of this Court, this is not a fit case to exercise
the powers under Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the CPC to reject the election petition.
Considering the same and in view of the above conspectus and after examining
the entire bundle of facts, which constitutes prima facie cause of action and which
if established by the election petitioner would entail the relief claimed, it is held
that the petition discloses the cause of action and is not vexatious petition and is
not liable to be rejected at this stage.
34. Consequently, I.A.No. 22204/2024 is liable to be dismissed and is hereby
dismissed.
35. Election petition was filed on 16.01.2024 and till today, written statement
has not been filed by the respondent. However considering the fact that
application filed by the respondent for rejection of the plaint has been decided
today itself, respondent is granted opportunity to file the reply within four weeks
from today. Office is directed to list this matter after four weeks for further
consideration.
(VINAY SARAF)
JUDGE
P/
PREETI
Digitally signed by PREETI TIWARI
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA
PRADESH JABALPUR,
2.5.4.20=4a0b570f240ede8f685b7d95edf2b
d7f3fe2118773f3d1bd909308cd6f3e7b14,
ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
TIWARI
JABALPUR,CID – 7060750,
postalCode=482001, st=Madhya Pradesh,
serialNumber=d5973e76c56cfe4364460f54
e493659d44e46325b6d2929821982e09f8d
b9c70, cn=PREETI TIWARI
Date: 2026.03.20 17:41:12 +05’30’