Punjab-Haryana High Court
Lovepreet Singh Alias Ravi vs National Investigation Agency on 16 March, 2026
Author: Gurvinder Singh Gill
Bench: Gurvinder Singh Gill
CRA-D-774-2023 (O&M) 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRA-D-774 of 2023 (O&M)
Reserved on :26.02.2026
Pronounced on: 16.03.2026
Lovepreet Singh alias Ravi ... Appellant
Versus
National Investigation Agency ... Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GURVINDER SINGH GILL
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE RAMESH KUMARI
Present: Mr. Baldev Singh Maan, Advocate for the appellant.
Mr. Sukhdeep Singh Sandhu, Special Public Prosecutor for
the respondent-NIA.
Mr. Adeshwar Singh Pannu, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab.
RAMESH KUMARI, J.
In the instant appeal, the appellant-Lovepreet Singh @ Ravi
(hereinafter referred to as an accused) has prayed for grant of regular bail in
RC No. 10/2021/NIA/DLI dated 10.06.2021 arising out of FIR No. 38 dated
22.04.2021 under Sections 120-B, 115, 170, 201, 385, 386, 387 and 471 of the
Indian Penal Code; under Section 22(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, Section 25(1A), 25(6), 25(7) and 29 of
the Arms Act; and Section 17,18, 18-B, 20, 21 and 23 of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, registered at Police Station Mehna, District
Moga.
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2. It is the case of the prosecution that accused Arshdeep Singh alias Arsh alias
Prabh (A-6), presently in Surrey, Canada alongwith present appellant-accused
Lovepreet Singh alias Ravi and other co-accused persons had formed a gang
for threatening and extorting money from people under the directions of
Hardeep Singh Nijjar (A-7), Chief of Khalistan Tiger Force (KTF). In
pursuance of above criminal conspiracy, accused Lovepreet Singh alias Ravi
(A-1), Ram Singh alias Sona (A-2), Kamaljeet Sharma alias Kamal (A-3)
committed targeted killings of prominent people and persons of other faiths, to
create a sense of fear and disharmony in the society. Several arms,
ammunition and vehicles were recovered from their possession on their
disclosure statements while in police custody, which were used in different
crimes committed by accused persons. As per the criminal conspiracy hatched
by Arshdeep Singh alias Arsh alias Prabh, accused-appellant Lovepreet Singh
alias Ravi (A-1), alongwith Kamaljeet Sharma alias Kamal (A-3) actively
participated in killing of gangster Sukhpreet Singh alias Sukha Lamha and
disposed off his body after mutilating in furtherance of planning and
conspiracy to execute criminal activities of extortion and killing. Investigation
established that accused-appellant Lovepreet Singh alias Ravi being the part of
criminal conspiracy with the association of other co-accused Ram Singh alias
Sona (A-2), Kamaljeet Sharma alias Kamal (A-3) and Arshdeep Singh alias
Arsh alias Prabh (A-6) knowingly held the amount, which was derived or
obtained by the members of terror gang from the commission of terror
acts/extortions. To create terror in the minds of people,co-accused Arshdeep
Singh alias Arsh alias Prabh (A-6), Lovepreet Singh alias Ravi (A-1) and
Kamaljit Sharma alias Kamal (A-3) hatched a criminal conspiracy and killed
Tejinder Singh alias Pinka of Supershine Jeans Showroom, Moga. Accused-
appellant Lovepreet Singh alias Ravi (A-1) was arrested on 23.05.2021 at
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CRA-D-774-2023 (O&M) 3
Mehna, Moga in the instant case alongwith accused Ram Singh alias Sona (A-
2). Appellant-accused Lovepreet Singh is a classified class-1 prisoner in view
of the provisions contained in the Prisons Act, 1894 and the Rules framed
thereunder as he has committed heinous organized crime.
3. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant-accused Lovepreet Singh
is that he has not committed any offence and has been falsely implicated in
this case. He had been arrested on 22.05.2021 and he is in judicial custody for
the last more than four and half years. The investigation is over; challan has
been presented and custodial interrogation of the appellant is not required. The
culpability of the appellant is a matter of trial. The prosecution has cited 131
prosecution witnesses, out of which only 35 witnesses have been examined.
The appellant has no link with other co-accused as he had not taken part in
any illegal activity. The allegations against him are not true and he belongs to
a responsible family and has deep roots in the society. The apprehension of the
prosecution that he shall flee from justice are without any basis. Because of
his long incarceration he deserves the benefit of regular bail. It is further
submitted that the appellant was earlier implicated in several FIRs but he was
acquitted in those cases and as on date no case except the present case is
pending against him.
4. Per contra, Mr. Sukhdeep Singh Sandhu, learned Special Public Prosecutor
appearing for the NIA, submits that the appellant-accused had actively
participated in the commission of offence. Regarding involvement of
commission of offence, learned counsel for NIA contended that appellant-
accused Lovepreet Singh alias Ravi is the key associate of co-accused
Arshdeep Singh (A-6) who is still absconding. He alongwith other co-accused
Arshdeep Singh alias Arsh alias Prabh (A-6) formed a terror gang for
threatening and extorting money from the local people under the directions of
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CRA-D-774-2023 (O&M) 4
Hardeep Singh Nijjar (A-7), Chief of Khalistan Tiger Force, who is reported
to be no more. It is further contended that on the disclosure statement of
appellant-accused Lovepreet Singh alias Ravi several incriminating arms,
ammunition were recovered vide memos dated 23.05.2021, 24.05.2021,
01.06.2021 and 08.06.2021 which were used in the commission of offences.
The appellant-accused Lovepreet Singh alias Ravi in furtherance of criminal
conspiracy hatched by co-accused Arshdeep Singh alias Arsh @ Prabh (A-6)
alongwith Kamaljit Sharma alias Kamal (A-3) actively participated in the
killing of gangster Sukhpreet Singh alias Sukha Lamha and disposed of his
body after mutilating the same. FIR No. 62 dated 25.05.2021 under Section
302/34 IPC was registered at P.S.Badhni Kalan, Moga in this regard. He
knowingly held the amount which was obtained by the members of terror
group of gangsters from the commission of terror acts of extortion. Appellant-
accused Lovepreet Singh alias Ravi also received terror funds of
approximately Rs. 1.50 lacs at different intervals of time through Western
Union Money Transfer sent by co-accused Arshdeep Singh alias Arsh. The
appellant is a known gangster and has criminal background and he used to
exert pressure on the witnesses and secured acquittal and the State of Punjab
has filed appeals in those cases. Learned counsel for NIA further submits that
appellant-accused is not entitled for concession of regular bail.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length.
6. As per the latest custody certificate, the appellant-accused Lovepreet Singh
alias Ravi has undergone actual custody of four years eight months and 10
days. In the following eight cases, the appellant-accused Lovepreet Singh alias
Ravi has been acquitted/discharged:-
i) FIR No. 62/2021 dated 25.05.2021, under Sections
302/201/34 IPC, P.S.Badhni Kalan, District Moga.
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ii) FIR No. 122/2020 dated 14.07.2020 under Sections
302/120-B/34 IPC and u/s 25/54/59 of the Arms Act,
P.S. City South Moga.
iii) FIR No. 9/2021 dated 09.02.2021 under Sections
307387/34 IPC and under Sections 25/54/59 of Arms
Act, P.S. Mehna.
iv) FIR No. 39/2020 dated 27.06.2020 under Sections
336, 427-B IPC, u/s 25/54/59 of Arms Act,
P.S.Hathour.
v) FIR No. 62/2021 dated 15.07.2021 under Sections 21-
C, 29-61-85 of NDPS Act, P.S. Khalra,
vi) FIR No. 90 dated 19.09.2018 under Sections 302 IPC,
P.S. Sadar Banga.
vii) FIR No. 24 dated 23.11.2021 under Sections 25-A of
the Arms Act, Sections 3,4,5 of the Explosive Act;
under Section 120-B IPC, P.S. State Special Operation
Cell.
viii) FIR No. 55/2022 dated 30.05.2022 under Sections
387, 506 IPC, P.S.Mehna.
Besides the present case, appellant-accused Lovepreet Singh is facing
trial in the following two cases:-
i) FIR No. 11/2025 dated 09.02.2025 under Sections
25-54-59 of the Arms Act, P.S.Mehna.
ii) FIR No. 03/2026 dated 07.01.2026 under Sections
25,54,of the Arms Act and Sections 111(1), 111(3),
111(4), 111(5), 111(6), 308, 309, 351(2), 351(3),
61(2) of BNS-2023, 66, 66-F(1)(A) of IT Act,
P.S.Mehna.
7. Learned State counsel also submitted a compendium of judgments vide which
the appellant-accused Lovepreet Singh has been acquitted. In case FIR No.
120/2020 dated 14.07.2020, PW1 Dharamvir Singh who was brother of the
deceased turned hostile and the present appellant alongwith two other co-
accused was acquitted. In case FIR No. 9/2021 dated 09.02.2021, complainant
Jashandeep Sharma did not support the prosecution case and therefore, the
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appellant Lovepreet Singh alongwith co-accused has been acquitted. In case
FIR No. 39/2020 dated 27.06.2020, PW4 Devender Singh supported the case
of the prosecution but PW5 Satpal turned hostile and appellant alongwith co-
accused Kamaljit alias Kamal was acquitted.
8. Learned State counsel has drawn our attention towards Section 59(5) of the
Prisons Act, 1894 which enables the Government to frame Rules for award of
marks and shortening of sentences for prisoners. This Section further provides
for classification of prisoners according to the intensity and gravity of the
offences. According to this classification, class-1 prisoners are those who had
committed heinous organized crimes or specially dangerous criminals; class-2
prisoners include dacoits or persons who commit heinous organized crimes
and class-3 prisoners are those who do not fall within class 1 or class 2. The
appellant-accused Lovepreet Singh has been put in the category of class-1
prisoner because of his role in the commission of offences and previous
antecedents.
9. The record reveals that during investigation, on 23.05.202103, pistols of .32
bore, 38 live rounds of .32 bore, 01 local country made pistol of .315 bore, 05
live rounds of .315 bore and 2000 tablets make VERTRA-100 were recovered
from motorcycle Bajaj CT 100 bearing registration No. PB29-AB-2642 of the
appellant-accused and Ram Singh alias Rona (A-2) was pillion rider. No
document regarding the ownership of the said motor cycle was recovered.
During police custody, on 01.06.2021, the appellant-accused as per his
disclosure statement got recovered one pistol of .32 bore alongwith one live
cartridge and two magazines. On 03.06.2021, another motor cycle mark
Passion bearing No. PB29Q-7035 had been recovered on the basis of
disclosure statement of appellant-accused. The search of that motor cycle
yielded recovery of a Dongle and sim card of Jio Company.
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10. Learned State counsel referred to Section 43D(5) of UA (P) Act and the
relevant extract thereof reads as under:-
“43D(5)-Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code (Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973), no person accused of an offence
punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall be
released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public
Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on
the application for such release. Provided that such accused
person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if
the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the Report made
under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation
against such person is prima facie true.”
11. A bare perusal of Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act reveals that the provision
imposes a specific statutory embargo on grant of bail to an accused person
charged with offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of the Act, which
pertain to terrorist activities and terrorist organizations. The section mandates
that unless the Court, upon perusal of the case diary or charge-sheet, is
satisfied that there is no reasonable ground to believe that the accusations are
prima facie true, bail cannot be granted. The legislative intent is clear: in cases
involving terrorism related offences, the threshold for bail is heightened in
comparison to other criminal cases. The safeguard to prevent misuse of this
provision is built into the requirement that the State must be given an
opportunity of being heard.
12. While interpreting the provisions of Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA in SLP
(Crl.) No.10047 of 2023 titled as ‘Gurwinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab and
another‘ Hon’ble the Supreme Court held as follows:
“16. The source of the power to grant bail in respect of non
bailable offences punishable with death or life
imprisonment emanates from Section 439 CrPC. It can
be noticed that Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act modifies
the application of the general bail provisions in respect7 of 17
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CRA-D-774-2023 (O&M) 8of offences punishable under Chapter IV and Chapter
VI of the UAP Act.
17. A bare reading of Sub-section (5) of Section 43D shows
that apart from the fact that Sub-section (5) bars a
Special Court from releasing an accused on bail
without affording the Public Prosecutor an opportunity
of being heard on the application seeking release of an
accused on bail, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of
Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of
the Special Court to release an accused on bail. It lays
down that if the Court, ‘on perusal of the case diary or
the report made under Section 173 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure’, is of the opinion that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation,
against such person, as regards commission of offence
or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the
UAP Act is prima facie true, such accused person shall
not be released on bail or on his own bond. It is
interesting to note that there is no analogous provision
traceable in any other statute to the one found in
Section 43D(5) of the UAPAct. In that sense, the
language of bail limitation adopted therein remains
unique to the UAP Act.
18. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-Ã -vis
ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts
must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase – ‘bail is the
rule, jail is the exception’ – unless circumstances justify
otherwise – does not find any place while dealing with
bail applications under UAP Act. The ‘exercise’ of the
general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is
severely restrictive in scope. The form of the words
used in proviso to Section 43D (5)- ‘shall not be
released’in contrast with the form of the words as
found in Section 437(1) CrPC – ‘may be released’-
suggests the intention of the Legislature to make bail,
the exception and jail, the rule.
19. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive
task on hand. In dealing with bail applications under
UAP Act, the courts are merely examining if there is
justification to reject bail. The ‘justifications’ must be
searched from the case diary and the final report8 of 17
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CRA-D-774-2023 (O&M) 9submitted before the Special Court. The legislature has
prescribed a low, ‘prima facie’ standard, as a measure
of the degree of satisfaction, to be recorded by Court
when scrutinising the justifications [materials on
record]. This standard can be contrasted with the
standard of ‘strong suspicion’, which is used by Courts
while hearing applications for ‘discharge’. In fact, the
Supreme Court in Zahoor Ali Watali 2 (2019) 5 SCC has
noticed this difference, where it said:
“In any case, the degree of satisfaction to
be recorded by the Court for opining that
there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accusation against the accused is
prima facie true, is lighter than the degree
of satisfaction to be recorded for
considering a discharge application or
framing of charges in relation to offences
under the 1967 Act.”
20. In this background, the test for rejection of bail is quite
plain. Bail must be rejected as a ‘rule’, if after hearing
the public prosecutor and after perusing the final report
or Caste Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accusations are prima facie true. It is only if the test for
rejection of bail is not satisfied- that the Courts would
proceed to decide the bail application in accordance
with the ‘tripod test’ (flight risk, influencing witnesses,
tampering with evidence). This position is made clear
by Sub-section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down
that the restrictions, on granting of bail specified in
Sub-section (5), are in addition to the restrictions under
the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the
time being in force on grant of bail.
21. On a textual reading of Section 43 D(5) UAP Act, the
inquiry that a bail court must undertake while deciding
bail applications under the UAP Act can be
summarised in the form of a twin-prong test :
1) Whether the test for rejection of the bail is satisfied?
1.1 Examine if, prima facie, the alleged
‘accusations’ make out an offence under Chapter
IV or VI of the UAP Act
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1.2 Such examination should be limited to case
diary and final report submitted under Section
173 CrPC;
2) Whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on
bail in light of the general principles relating to
grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC (‘tripod
test’)?
On a consideration of various factors such as nature of
offence, length of punishment (if convicted), age,
character, status of accused etc., the Courts must ask
itself :
2.1 Whether the accused is a flight risk?
2.2. Whether there is apprehension of the
accused tampering with the evidence?
2.3 Whether there is apprehension of accused
influencing witnesses?
22. The question of entering the ‘second test’ of the inquiry
will not arise if the ‘first test’ is satisfied. And merely
because the first test is satisfied, that does not mean
however that the accused is automatically entitled to
bail. The accused will have to show that he
successfully passes the ‘tripod test’.
Test for Rejection of Bail: Guidelines as laid
down by Supreme Court in Watali’s Case
23. In the previous section, based on a textual reading, we
have discussed the broad inquiry which Courts seized
of bail applications under 14 Section 43D(5) UAP Act
r/w Section 439 CrPC must indulge in. Setting out the
framework of the law seems rather easy, yet the
application of it, presents its own complexities. For
greater clarity in the application of the test set out
above, it would be helpful to seek guidance from
binding precedents. In this regard, we need to look no
further than Watali’s case which has laid down
elaborate guidelines on the approach that Courts must
partake in, in their application of the bail limitations
under the UAP Act. On a perusal of paragraphs 23 to
29 and 32, the following 8-point propositions emerge
and they are summarised as follows:
Meaning of ‘Prima facie true’
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CRA-D-774-2023 (O&M) 11(para-23): On the face of it, the materials must show
the complicity of the accused in commission of the
offence. The materials/evidence must be good and
sufficient to establish a given fact or chain of facts
constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or
contradicted by other evidence.
Degree of Satisfaction at Pre-Chargesheet, Post
Chargesheet and Post Charges – Compared
[para 23]: Once charges are framed, it would be safe to
assume that a very strong suspicion was founded
upon the materials before the Court, which prompted
the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the
existence of the factual ingredients constituting the
offence alleged against the accused, to justify the
framing of charge. In that situation, the accused may
have to undertake an arduous task to satisfy the Court
that 15 despite the framing of charge, the materials
presented along with the charge sheet (report under
Section 173 Cr.P.C), do not make out reasonable
grounds for believing that the accusation against him is
prima facie true. Similar opinion is required to be
formed by the Court whilst considering the prayer for
bail, made after filing of the first report made under
Section 173 of the Code, as in the present case.
Reasoning, necessary but no detailed evaluation
of evidence [para 24]: The exercise to be undertaken
by the Court at this stage–of giving reasons for grant or
non-grant of bail–is markedly different from discussing
merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate
examination or dissection of the evidence is not
required to be done at this stage.
•Record a finding on broad probabilities, not
based on proof beyond doubt
[para 24]: “The Court is merely expected to record a
finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding
the involvement of the accused in the commission of the
stated offence or otherwise.”
•Duration of the limitation under Section 43D(5)
[para 26]: The special provision, Section 43-D of the
1967 Act, applies right from the stage of registration of
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FIR for the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the
1967 Act until the conclusion of the trial thereof.
Material on record must be analysed as a ‘whole’;
no piecemeal analysis
[para 27]: The totality of the material gathered by the
investigating agency and presented along with the
report and including the case diary, is required to be
reckoned and not by analysing individual pieces of
evidence or circumstance.
Contents of documents to be presumed as true
[para 27]: The Court must look at the contents of the
document and take such document into account as it
is.
Admissibility of documents relied upon by
Prosecution cannot be questioned
[para 27]: The materials/evidence collected by the
investigation agency in support of the accusation
against the accused in the first information report must
prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved
by other evidence……. In any case, the question of
discarding the document at this stage, on the ground of
being inadmissible in evidence, is not permissible.”
13. Still further, in the matter of Keljroesatip Tep and Ors Vs. National
Investigation Agency (2023) 6 SCC 58, Hon’ble the Supreme Court held as
follows:
“While dealing with the bail petition filed by the accused
against whom offences under chapter IV and VI of UAPA
have been made, the court has to consider as to whether
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accusation against the accused is prima facie true. The
bench also observed that distinction between the words
“not guilty” as used in TADA, MCOCA and NDPS Act as
against the words “prima facie” in the UAPA as held in
Watali’s Caste (supra) to state that a degree of
satisfaction required in the case of “not guilty” is much
stronger than the satisfaction required in a case where
the words used are “prima facie”.
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14. In Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2026 INSC 2 (SC),
total five criminal appeals seeking regular bail were taken up, wherein
Hon’ble Apex Court enlarged three accused on regular bail and dismissed
criminal appeals of two accused, namely, Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam
while analysing the individual role of each accused and differentiating
between prime conspirators and others. In the said case, Hon’ble Apex
Court emphasised that liberty enshrined under Article 21 commands the
manner of application of the statute. Article 21of the Constitution does not
dissolve the statutory restraint itself. It is held as under:
“426. The present batch of appeals has required the
Court to engage with questions that lie at the
intersection of personal liberty and collective
security. The guarantee of liberty enshrined under
Article 21 of the Constitution is of foundational
importance, and no constitutional court can be
unmindful of the gravity of restraining liberty before
guilt is adjudicated. At the same time, the
Constitution does not conceive liberty in isolation.
The security of the community, the integrity of the
trial process, and the preservation of public order
are equally legitimate constitutional concerns. When
bail is sought in prosecutions governed by a special
statute, the Court is required to undertake a difficult
and sensitive balancing exercise, conscious that
neither liberty nor security admits of absolutism.
427. While undertaking this exercise, the Court
cannot proceed on any consideration except
restricting the contours of inquiry confining to law.
Where Parliament has prescribed a distinct statutory
threshold for the grant of bail, and where the
prosecution places prima facie material suggesting
organised and deliberate activity affecting public13 of 17
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CRA-D-774-2023 (O&M) 14order and security of the Nation, the Court cannot
turn a Nelson’s eye to such material merely because
incarceration is prolonged or liberty is invoked in
the abstract. Equally, where continued detention is
not shown to be necessary to serve a legitimate
purpose recognised by law, the Court must not
hesitate to restore liberty, subject to stringent
conditions that safeguard the larger public interest.
428. The position of law that emerges may be stated
with clarity. The right to personal liberty enshrined
under Article 21 is of seminal importance, and
prolonged pre-trial incarceration is a matter of
serious constitutional concern. At the same time,
where Parliament has, in the context of a special
statute, conditioned the grant of bail upon the
satisfaction of a defined statutory threshold, a
constitutional court cannot treat such restraint as
avoidable. Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967, represents a legislative
judgment that offences alleged to implicate the
security of the State warrant a distinct bail regime.
The constitutional role of the Court, therefore, is
neither to mechanically enforce the statutory
embargo nor to neutralise it by invocation of liberty
as straight-jacket formula, but to apply it with
disciplined scrutiny. Where the prosecution material,
taken at face value, discloses reasonable grounds for
believing the accusation to be prima facie true, the
statutory restraint must ordinarily operate. Where it
does not, liberty must prevail. Article 21 thus
commands the manner of application of the statute;
it does not dissolve the statutory condition itself.”
15. As observed earlier, in this case, during investigation, the appellant-accused
was found in possession of arms, ammunition and one motor cycle without
documents and another motor cycle with one Dongle and sim card of Jio
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CRA-D-774-2023 (O&M) 15
Company. The appellant-accused has actively participated in the commission
of offence of murder of Sukhpreet Singh alias Sukha and sufficient
incriminating evidence was collected to show that he alongwith other co-
accused was member of a terrorist gang and considering his background he is
classified as a class-1 prisoner. He actively participated in the commission of
offence. In such a situation, long incarceration solely by itself, cannot be a
ground for grant of regular bail.
16. In view of the fact that the trial is in progress and considering the antecedents
of the appellant-accused and the evidence collected against him during the
investigation as well as considering the gravity of the offences, the appellant-
accused Lovepreet Singh alias Ravi is not entitled for the concession of
regular bail.
17. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any merit in the bail
application filed by the appellant-accused and the same stands dismissed.
18. Nothing stated herein shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the
merits of the case as the observations have been made for the limited purpose
of deciding the bail application. Learned trial Court shall decide the case on
the basis of the evidence led by both the parties.
19. Since till date only 35 prosecution witnesses, out of cited 131 prosecution
witnesses, have been examined by the trial Court, the trial Court is directed to
take the following steps for expeditious conclusion of the trial:
(i) The trial Court shall frame a schedule of dates in advance for
summoning the witnesses and shall also endeavour to record
the statements of the PWs whose presence is duly secured.
Special Messengers be deputed for securing the presence of
the prosecution witnesses. If deemed necessary, a letter may
be written to the Senior Superintendent of Police, concerned,
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for getting the needful done for ensuring timely presence of
prosecution witnesses; and
(ii) The prosecution is directed to ensure the presence of all the
prosecution witnesses before the trial Court on the dates as
may be fixed by the trial Court for recording prosecution
evidence. The District Attorney concerned to take necessary
steps for the purpose of securing the presence of the
remaining prosecution witnesses. Pending application(s), if
any, is/are also dismissed.
( GURVINDER SINGH GILL ) ( RAMESH KUMARI )
JUDGE JUDGE
16.03.2026
ravinder
Whether Speaking/Reasoned Yes/No
Whether Reportable Yes/No
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