13.03.2026 vs Piar Singh & Another on 13 March, 2026

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Decided On : 13.03.2026 vs Piar Singh & Another on 13 March, 2026

1 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
RSA No. : 88 of 2024
Decided on : 13.03.2026

State of H.P. & anr. ….Appellant.

.

Versus

Piar Singh & another. …Respondents
_________________________________
Coram:

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma. Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1

of
For the appellants Mr. Diwakar Dev Sharma,
Additional Advocate General

For the respondents
rt Ms.Shwetima Dogra,Advocate,
vice Mr. Vinod Gupta, Advocate, for
respondent No.1.

Mr.Bharat Bhushan, Senior Panel

Counsel, for respondent
No.2/Union of India.

__________________________________________
Romesh Verma, Judge(oral)

The present Regular Second Appeal arises out of

the judgment and decree as passed by the learned District

Judge, Hamirpur, H.P. dated 18.10.2022, whereby the appeal

preferred by the State has been ordered to be dismissed

and the judgment and decree as passed by the learned Civil

Judge, Court No.2, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, dated

11.11.2022 has been affirmed.

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS

2 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff-

respondent has filed a suit for permanent prohibitory

injunction and mandatory under Section 9,26 Order 7 Rule

.

1.C.P.C and Sections 34, 38 and 39 of Specific Relief Act.

3. It was averred in the plaint that the suit land

comprised in Khata No. 130, Khatauni No. 134, Khasra No.

41, area measuring 2K-15M, situated in Tika Kariana, Tappa

of
Mehlta, Tehsil & District Hamirpur (hereinafter to be

referred as the suit land) is owned and possessed by the
rt
plaintiff alongwith other co-sharers and defendants are

strangers to the same.

4. It was averred that the suit land is on the

National highway and taking undue advantage of the

plaintiff being away on account of his job, defendants have

constructed some portion for National highway through the

suit land without due process of law. When the said fact

came to the knowledge of the plaintiff after his retirement,

he went to the authorities and raised his grievances on

which assurance was given by the defendants/present

appellants to pay appropriate compensation to him. It was

stated that though defendants were issued notices, however

the defendants threatened the plaintiff to dis-mental the

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
3 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

structure and to take the forcible possession of the suit land

without acquiring it under the provisions of Law Acquisition

Act. Therefore, the suit was filed by the plaintiff for

.

Permanent Prohibitory Injunction restraining the

defendants being strangers to the suit land to interfere over

it or to cause any obstruction in the construction or

structure raised by the plaintiff after leaving necessary

of
space of five meters from the spot. In alternative, plaintiff

has also claimed the relief of mandatory injunction
rt
directing the defendants to restore the suit land to its

original position, in case any portion of the National

Highway is found over the suit land.

5. The suit was contested by the defendants in the

present appeal by raising the preliminary objections of

maintainability, estoppel, cause of action and non-joinder

of necessary parties. On merits, it was stated that Shimla-

Mattour road is being maintained by defendant No.2 since

2004, prior to which this road was being maintained by

H.P.P.W.D Division Hamirpur for the last 30 years. Since the

road is in existence from quite long time, on the basis of

principle of estoppel and acquiescence, the plaintiff has

silently consented to the construction of the road. It was

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
4 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

further stated that the plaintiff dug a deep pit adjoining to

NH-88 which leads from Shimla-Mattour and when this

fact came to the knowledge of the defendants, a notice was

.

served upon the plaintiff to stop doing unauthorized

digging on the road side. It was further alleged that

Shimla-Mattour road is in existence over the suit land for

the last 30 years and an area measuring 0-2M in Khasra

of
No.41 has been shown as Gair Mumkin road in revenue

records. Further, it was submitted that defendants have
rt
submitted land acquisition papers under the Land

Acquisition Act with respect to the suit land, and due

compensation will be paid to the plaintiff in due course of

time.

6. The plaintiff filed replication to the said suit

and all the averments as made in the plaint was reiterated.

Learned trial Court framed the following isues on

04.09.2013 :

Whether, plaintiff is entitled for relief for
permanent prohibitory injunction, as prayed
for?OPP

2. Whether, plaintiff is entitled for relief of
mandatory injunction, as prayed for?OPP.

3. Whether, plaintiff is having cause of action to
file the present suit?OPD.

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS

5 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

4. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not
maintainable?OPD.

5. Whether plaintiff is estopped to file the
present suit by his own act and conduct, as

.

alleged?OPD.

6. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is bad for

non-joinder of necessary parties, as alleged?
OPD

of

7. The learned trial Court directed the respective

parties to adduce evidence in support of contentions and

on 11.11.2020, the learned Civil Judge, Court No.2,
rt
Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, HP partly decreed the suit

of the plaintiff by passing a decree of mandatory

injunction. It was ordered that by means of decree for

mandatory injunction, the defendants were directed to

acquire, the portion of the suit land on which National

Highway-88 has been constructed as per law and to award

due compensation to the plaintiff for the land so acquired

within two years from the date of the decree.

8. Feeling dissatisfied, the State/appellants

preferred an appeal in the Court of learned District Judge,

Hamirpur on 14.12.2020. The learned First Appellate Court

dismissed the appeal vide its judgment and decree as

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
6 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

preferred by the appellants/defendants and affirmed the

judgment and decree as passed by the learned trial Court.

Still feeling aggrieved by the impugned judgment passed

.

by the First Appellate Court, the present Regular Second

Appeal has been filed.

9. It is contended by the learned Additional

Advocate General appearing for the State-appellants that

of
the Courts below have erred by passing decree of

mandatory injunction and directing the appellants to
rt
acquire the land of the present respondents and to pay

award of compensation to the respondent. He submits that

since the claim as put forward by the respondent was stale

or highly belated, therefore, no relief could have been

granted to the said respondent.

10. He further submitted that on account of

acquiescence and estoppel, there was oral consent on the

part of the respondent, therefore, no decree of mandatory

injunction could have been passed in favour of the

respondent.

11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the

respondent has defended the judgment and decree as

passed by the Courts below and he has submitted that

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
7 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

there is no error in the judgments passed by the Courts

below.

12. With the consent of the parties, the appeal is

.

finally heard at the admission stage.

13. The precise case of the plaintiff before the

learned trial Court is that being in service at his back, the

appellants/defendants have utilized the suit land without

of
adopting the due process of law, therefore, the

defendants/appellants may be directed to acquire the suit
rt
land and to pay the amount of compensation which has

been refuted by the defendants on the ground of limitation

and acquiescence.

14. Admittedly, the respondent/plaintiff is the title

holder of the suit property. Being owner of the suit

property, he can file a suit at any stage until and unless the

said right is defeated by the present appellants/ defendants

by perfection of title by way of adverse possession.

15 Being the owner of the suit land, the

plaintiff/respondent was well within his right to file a suit

for injunction and mandatory injunction since the suit land

was utilized by the State for construction of the road

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
8 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

without adopting due process of law including the payment

of amount of compensation.

16 Admittedly, the defendants were not in

.

possession of any document to show and to substantiate

that there was any kind of consent for construction of the

road through their land. Nothing has been placed on record

to prove the case of consent by the State.

of
17 The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidya Devi vs. State

of Himachal Pradesh & others (2020) 2 SCC 569 has held
rt
that no person can be forcibly dispossess of his property

without any legal sanction and without following the due

process of law and depriving him payment of just and fair

compensation. The State being a welfare State governed by

the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond

what is provided by the Constitution. The Court has held as

follows:

“12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and
perused the record.

12.1. The Appellant was forcibly expropriated of her
property in 1967, when the right to property was a
fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of
the Constitution. Vidaya Devi vs The State Of Himachal
Pradesh on 8 January, 2020 Article 31 guaranteed the
right to private property 1, which could not be deprived

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
9 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

without due process of law and upon just and fair
compensation.

12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental
right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment)

.

Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right 2
in a welfare State, and a Constitutional right under
Article 300 A of the Constitution. Article 300 A provides

that no person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen

of
of his property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay
compensation, though not expressly included in Article
300 A, can be inferred in that Article The State of West
rt
Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Ors. AIR 1954 SC 92. 2

Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC

353.

12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private

property, without following due process of law, would
be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional

right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Reliance is
placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum

Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai4, wherein
this Court held that:

” 6. … Having regard to the provisions
contained in Article 300A of the
Constitution, the State in exercise of its
power of “eminent domain” may interfere
with the right of property of a person by
acquiring the same but the same must be

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
10 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

for a public purpose and reasonable
compensation therefor must be paid.”

(emphasis supplied)

12.4 In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy5,

.

this Court held that:

“21. If the right of property is a human right as

also a constitutional right, the same cannot be
taken away except in accordance with law.
Article 300A of the Constitution protects such

of
right. The provisions of the Act seeking to
divest such right, keeping in view of the
provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution
rt
of India, must be strictly construed.”

(emphasis supplied) 4 (2005) 7 SCC 627.

12.5 In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v.
State of U.P. & Ors.6, this Court recognized the right to

property as a basic human right in the following words:

“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by
different political thinkers that some amount of

property right is an indispensable safeguard

against tyranny and economic oppression of the
Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty
cannot long subsist without the support of

property.

“Property must be secured, else liberty cannot
subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed
the view that property itself is the seed bed which
must be conserved if other constitutional values

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
11 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

are to flourish is the consensus among political
thinkers and jurists.” (emphasis supplied)

12.6 In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of
Gujarat,7 this Court held as follows :

.

“48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the
powers of the State that no person shall be

deprived of his property save by authority of law.

There has to be no deprivation without any
sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is

of
not acquisition or taking possession under Article
300A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no
deprivation.” (emphasis supplied) 10.3. In this
rt
case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly
dispossessed of her property without any legal

sanction, and without following due process of
law, there is no deprivation.”

12.6 In In this case, the Appellant could not have
been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any
legal sanction, and without following due process of law,

and depriving her 6 (2011) 9 SCC 354. 7 (1995) Supp. 1 SCC

596. payment of just compensation, being a fundamental
right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.

12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant
or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the
acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack
of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting
the Appellant of her property by the State.

12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of
law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
12 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on
the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v.
M.I.D.C. & Ors. wherein it was held that the State must
comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or
any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a

.

welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate
to itself a status beyond what is provided by the
Constitution.

12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh
Kumar held that the right to property is now considered to

of
be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a
human right. 8 (2013) 1 SCC 353. Human rights have been
considered in the realm of individual rights such as right
rt
to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human
rights have gained a multi− faceted dimension.

12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before
the High Court, that since it has been in continuous

possession of the land for over 42 years, it would
tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State being a
welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of

adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person

guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such
property for over 12 years. The State cannot be permitted

to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of
adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens,
as has been done in the present case.

12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay
and laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also
liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a
case of a continuing cause of action, or if the

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
13 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court.
Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion,
which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the
facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the
breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed,

.

and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of
limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their
constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.

12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise its

of
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat
it.

12.14.

rt In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. &
Ors.,10 this Court while dealing with a similar fact

situation, held as follows : “There are authorities which
state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth
a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service

jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to
them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for
educational facilities and other categories of similar cases,

etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that

lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from
seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been

violated, under Article 9 P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of
T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152. 10 (2013) 1 SCC 353. 32 or 226 of the
Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different
scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over
possession of the land belonging to the Appellants without
any sanction of law. The Appellants had asked repeatedly
for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must
either comply with the procedure laid down for

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
14 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible
statutory mode.” (emphasis supplied) 11

13. In the present case, the Appellant being an illiterate
person, who is a widow coming from a rural area has been

.

deprived of her private property by the State without

resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. The
Appellant has been divested of her right to property

without being paid any compensation whatsoever for over
half a century. The cause of action in the present case is a
continuing one, since the Appellant was compulsorily

of
expropriated of her property in 1967 without legal
sanction or following due process of law. The present case
is one where the demand for justice is so compelling since
rt
the State has admitted that the land was taken over
without initiating acquisition proceedings, or any

procedure known to law. We exercise our extraordinary
jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution,
and direct the State to pay compensation to the appellant.

18. To the similar effect, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held

in (2022) 7 SCC 508 titled as Sukh Dutt Ratra and another

vs. State of H.P. and others has held as under:

14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law,
that nobody can be deprived of liberty or property
without due process, or authorization of law. The
recognition of this dates back to the 1700s to the
decision of the King’s Bench in Entick v. Carrington17
and by this court in Wazir Chand v. The State of
Himachal Pradesh18. Further, in several judgments,
this court has repeatedly held that rather than
enjoying a wider bandwidth of lenience, the State often

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
15 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

has a higher responsibility in demonstrating that it
has acted within the confines of legality, and
therefore, not tarnished the basic principle of the rule
of law.

15. When it comes to the subject of private property,

.

this court has upheld the high threshold of legality that

must be met, to dispossess an individual of their
property, and even more so when done by the State. In

Bishandas v. State of Punjab19 this court rejected the
contention that the petitioners in the case were
trespassers and could be removed by an executive
order, and instead concluded that the executive action

of
taken by the State and its officers, was destructive of
the basic principle of the rule of law. This court, in
another case – State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v.

rt
Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors. 20 , held: “A lessor,
with the best of title, has no right to resume possession

extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even
after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by
forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression ‘re-
entry’ in the lease-deed does not authorise

extrajudicial methods to resume possession. Under
law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or
its earlier termination is juridical possession and

forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be
dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In

the present case, the fact that the lessor is the State
does not place it in any higher or better position. On the
contrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemming

from the requirement that all actions of Government
and Governmental authorities should have a ‘legal
pedigree'”.

16. Given the important protection extended to an
individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied
earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in
Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State must
meet while acquiring land, the question remains – can

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
16 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

the State, merely on the ground of delay and laches,
evade its legal responsibility towards those from whom
private property has been expropriated? In these facts
and circumstances, we find this conclusion to be
unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the
grounds of equity and fairness.

.

17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the
State’s actions, or lack thereof, have in fact

compounded the injustice meted out to the appellants
and compelled them to approach this court, albeit
belatedly. The initiation of acquisition proceedings
initially in the 1990s occurred only at the behest of the

of
High Court. Even after such judicial intervention, the
State continued to only extend the benefit of the
court’s directions to those who specifically approached
rt
the courts. The State’s lackadaisical conduct is
discernible from this action of initiating acquisition

proceedings selectively, only in respect to the lands of
those writ petitioners who had approached the court in
earlier proceedings, and not other land owners,
pursuant to the orders dated 23.04.2007 (in CWP No.

1192/2004) and 20.12.2013 (in CWP No. 1356/2010)
respectively. In this manner, at every stage, the State
sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring land

required for public use in the manner prescribed by
law.

18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches
which conclude either way – as contended by both

sides in the present dispute – however, the specific
factual matrix compels this court to weigh in favour of
the appellant-land owners. The State cannot shield
itself behind the ground of delay and laches in such a
situation; there cannot be a ‘limitation’ to doing
justice. This court in a much earlier case – Maharashtra
State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular
Motor Service21, held:

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS

17 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

’11……”Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of
Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine.

Where it would be practically unjust to give a
remedy, either because the party has, by his
conduct, done that which might fairly be
regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where

.

by his conduct and neglect he has, though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the
other party in a situation in which it would not

be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material.

of
But in every case, if an argument against relief,
which otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting
rt
to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity
of that defence must be tried upon principles

substantially equitable. Two circumstances,
always important in such cases, are, the length
of the delay and the nature of the acts done
during the interval, which might affect either

party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in
taking the one course or the other, so far as
relates to the remedy.”

19. The facts of the present case reveal that the

State has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner,
actively tried to limit disbursal of compensation
as required by law, only to those for which it was

specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to
all those who are entitled. This arbitrary action,
which is also violative of the appellants’
prevailing Article 31 right (at the time of cause of
action), undoubtedly warranted consideration,
and intervention by the High Court, under its
Article 226 jurisdiction. This court, in Manohar
(supra) – a similar case where the name of the
aggrieved had been deleted from revenue records

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
18 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

leading to his dispossession from the land
without payment of compensation – held:

6″Having heard the learned counsel for
the appellants, we are satisfied that the case
projected before the court by the appellants is
utterly untenable and not worthy of emanating

.

from any State which professes the least regard
to being a welfare State. When we pointed out to
the learned counsel that, at this stage at least,

the State should be gracious enough to accept its
mistake and promptly pay the compensation to
the respondent, the State has taken an

of
intractable attitude and persisted in opposing
what appears to be a just and reasonable claim of
the respondent.

7

rtOurs is a constitutional democracy and
the rights available to the citizens are declared

by the Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f) was
deleted by the Forty-fourth Amendment to the
Constitution, Article 300-A has been placed in
the Constitution, which reads as follows:

“300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property
save by authority of law.–No person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of

law.”

8.This is a case where we find utter lack of legal
authority for deprivation of the respondent’s
property by the appellants who are State

authorities. In our view, this case was an
eminently fit one for exercising the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution…

20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra) while
dealing with a similar fact situation, this court
held as follows: (SCC p. 359 para11)

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
19 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

11″There are authorities which state that
delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth
a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to
service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for
a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of
statutory dues, claim for educational facilities

.

and other categories of similar cases, etc.
Though, it is true that there are a few authorities
that lay down that delay and laches debar a

citizen from seeking remedy, even if his
fundamental right has been violated, under
Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at

of
hand deals with a different scenario altogether.
The functionaries of the State took over
possession of the land belonging to the
appellants without any sanction of law. The
rt
appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the
benefit of compensation. The State must either

comply with the procedure laid down for
acquisition, or requisition, or any other
permissible statutory mode.”

21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this
court finds that the contentions raised by the
State, do not inspire confidence and deserve to

be rejected. The State has merely averred to the
appellants’ alleged verbal consent or the lack of

objection, but has not placed any material on
record to substantiate this plea. Further, the
State was unable to produce any evidence

indicating that the land of the appellants had
been taken over or acquired in the manner
known to law, or that they had ever paid any
compensation. It is pertinent to note that this
was the State’s position, and subsequent
findings of the High Court in 2007 as well, in the
other writ proceedings.”

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS

20 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

19 The similar position has been reiterated after

relying relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court by the

Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 491 of

.

2022, titled as Sakuntla Devi and another vs. State of

Himachal Pradesh & another dated 20.10.2023. After relying

upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Vidya Devi &

SukhDutt Ratra‘s case, the Court held as follows:

of

7. In the aforesaid judgments, Hon’ble Apex Court
has categorically held that contention advanced by
the State of delay and laches of the appellant in
rt
moving the Court is liable to be rejected especially
when it is not in dispute that petitioner are

suffering continuous loss coupled with the fact that
they repeatedly requested the authorities to initiate
acquisition proceedings.

8. If the aforesaid judgments are read in their
entirety, it clearly emerges that land owners cannot
be deprived of their land, without following due

process of law. If it is so, ground raised by the
respondents that petitioners have made their land

available with consent, is of no consequence rather,
this court, having taken note of the fact that the
land of petitioners stands utilized for the

construction of road in question, is compelled to
agree with the submission of learned counsel for
the petitioners that her clients are entitled for
compensation qua the land utilized by respondents
for construction of road in question.

10. Admittedly, land of the petitioners stands
utilized for construction of road but till date, they
have not been paid any amount, which action of the

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
21 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

respondent-State certainly amounts to forcible
dispossession of the petitioners from their land,
which is violative of provision contained under Art.

300-A of the Constitution of India.

14. In case titled, State of Himachal Pradesh v.

.

Umed Ram Sharma (1986) 2 SCC 68, Hon’ble Apex

Court has held that entire State of Himachal
Pradesh is a hilly area and without workable roads,

no communication is possible; every person is
entitled to life as enjoined in Article 21 of the
Constitution of India; every person has right under
Article 19 (1) (b) of the Constitution of India to

of
move freely, throughout the territory of India; for
the residents of hilly areas, access to road is access
to life itself. Stand taken by the respondents that
rt
there was a policy for providing roads on demand
of residents as a favour to them on conditions that

they would not claim compensation, cannot be
sustained because such stand is violative of Article
300A of the Constitution of India

15. In case titled Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State
of Maharashtra and others, 2020 9 SCC 356,
Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though right to

property is not a fundamental right, but it is still a
constitutional right under Article 300A of the

Constitution of India and also a human right; in
view of the mandate of Article 300A, no person can
be deprived of his property save by the authority of

law. No doubt, State possesses the power to take or
control the property of the owner of the land for the
benefit of public, but at the same time, it is obliged
to compensate the injury by making just
compensation.”

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS

22 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

20. The Courts below after appreciating the oral as

well as documentary evidence placed on record and on the

basis of the title decreed the suit as filed by the present

.

appellant and has rightly came to the conclusion that they

are entitled for mandatory injunction with the direction to

acquire the portion of the suit land which has been utilized

by the present appellant for the construction of the road.

of
The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that no

person can be deprived of his property without adopting
rt
due process of law, therefore, under such circumstances,

the plea as set up by the appellants-State is not tenable in

the facts and circumstances of the case, once they have

utilized the land of the villagers without adopting due

process of law. Now the plea as raised by the present

appellants is not permissible that too at the stage of

Regular Second Appeal. There are concurrent findings of

fact by the Courts below .

21 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of

judgments has held that the first appellate is the final

court of the fact. No doubt, second appellate court

exercising the power under Section 100 CPC can

interference with the findings of fact on limited grounds

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
23 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

such as – (a) where the finding is based on inadmissible

evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of the relevant

admissible evidence; (c) where it is based on misreading

.

of evidence; (d) where it is perverse, but that is not case

in hand.

22 The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with

scope of interference under Section 100 in Hero Vinoth

of
(minor) vs. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 has held as

under:

rt

18. It has been noted time and again that without
insisting for the statement of such a substantial
question of law in the memorandum of appeal and

formulating the same at the time of admission, the
High Courts have been issuing notices and generally
deciding the second appeals without adhering to the
procedure prescribed under Section 100 of the CPC. It

has further been found in a number of cases that no
efforts are made to distinguish between a question of
law and a substantial question of law. In exercise of

the powers under this section in several cases, the
findings of fact of the first appellate court are found

to have been disturbed. It has to be kept in mind that
the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent
right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive

statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance
with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions
mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled
before a second appeal can be maintained and no
court has the power to add or to enlarge those
grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on
merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of
facts will not be disturbed by the High Court in
exercise of the powers under this section. Further, a
substantial question of law has to be distinguished

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
24 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

from a substantial question of fact. This Court in Sir
Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg.

Co. Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 1314) held that : “The proper test
for determining whether a question of law raised in
the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be
whether it is of general public importance or whether

.

it directly and substantially affects the rights of the

parties and if so whether it is either an open question
in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court
or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is

not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of
alternative views. If the question is settled by the
highest court or the general principles to be applied in

of
determining the question are well settled and there is
a mere question of applying those principles or that
the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would
not be a substantial question of law.

rt
” 19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to
investigate the grounds on which the findings were

arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first
appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate
court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted
by the trial court in respect of credibility but even

where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the
trial court, the same is no ground for interference in
second appeal when it is found that the appellate

court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a
case where from a given set of circumstances two

inferences of fact are possible, one drawn by the lower
appellate court will not be interfered by the High
Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach

is not permissible. The High Court will, however,
interfere where it is found that the conclusions drawn
by the lower appellate court were erroneous being
contrary to the mandatory provisions of law
applicable or its settled position on the basis of
pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was
based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by
ignoring material evidence. 20. to 22 xx xx xx xx

23. To be “substantial” a question of law must be
debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
25 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

a binding precedent, and must have a material
bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either
way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are
concerned. To be a question of law “involving in the
case” there must be first a foundation for it laid in the
pleadings and the question should emerge from the

.

sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts

and it must be necessary to decide that question of
law for a just and proper decision of the case. An
entirely new point raised for the first time before the

High Court is not a question involved in the case
unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will,
therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of

of
each case whether a question of law is a substantial
one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount
overall consideration being the need for striking a
judicious balance between the indispensable
obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling
rt
necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any
lis.”

23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annamalai vs.

Vasanthi, 2025 INSC 1267, has held as follows:-

“16. Whether D-1 and D-2 were able to discharge the
aforesaid burden is a question of fact which had to be
determined by a court of fact after appreciating the

evidence available on record. Under CPC, a first
appellate court is the final court of fact. No doubt, a

second appellate court exercising power(s) under
Section 100 CPC can interfere with a finding of fact on
limited grounds, such as, (a) where the finding is

based on inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in
ignorance of relevant admissible evidence; (c) where
it is based on misreading of evidence; and (d) where it
is perverse. But that is not the case here.

17. In the case on hand, the first appellate court, in
paragraph 29 of its judgment, accepted the
endorsement (Exb. A-2) made on the back of a
registered document (Exb. A-1) after considering the
oral evidence led by the plaintiff-appellant and the

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
26 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

circumstance that signature(s)/thumbmark of D-1
and D-2 were not disputed, though claimed as one
obtained on a blank paper. The reasoning of the first
appellate court in paragraph 29 of its judgment was
not addressed by the High Court. In fact, the High
Court, in one line, on a flimsy defense of use of a

.

signed blank paper, observed that genuineness of Exb.

A-2 is not proved. In our view, the High Court fell in
error here. While exercising powers under Section 100
CPC, it ought not to have interfered with the finding

of fact returned by the first appellate court on this
aspect; more so, when the first appellate court had
drawn its conclusion after appreciating the evidence

of
available on record as also the circumstance that
signature(s)/thumbmark(s) appearing on the
document (Exb.A-2) were not disputed. Otherwise
also, while disturbing the finding of the first appellate
court, the High Court did not hold that the finding
rt
returned by the first appellate court is based on a
misreading of evidence, or is in ignorance of relevant

evidence, or is perverse. Thus, there existed no
occasion for the High Court, exercising power under
Section 100 CPC, to interfere with the finding of the
first appellate court regarding payment of additional

Rs. 1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 over and above the sale
consideration fixed for the transaction.

18. Once the finding regarding payment of additional

sum of Rs.1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 recorded by the
first appellate court is sustained, there appears no

logical reason to hold that the plaintiff (Annamalai)
was not ready and willing to perform its part under
the contract particularly when Rs. 4,70,000, out of

total consideration of Rs. 4,80,000, was already paid
and, over and above that, additional sum of
Rs.1,95,000 was paid in lieu of demand made by D-1 &
D-2. This we say so, because an opinion regarding
plaintiff’s readiness and willingness to perform its
part under the contract is to be formed on the entirety
of proven facts and circumstances of a case including
conduct of the parties. The test is that the person
claiming performance must satisfy conscience of the
court that he has treated the contract subsisting with

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
27 ( 2026:HHC:7499 )

preparedness to fulfil his obligation and accept
performance when the time for performance arrives.”

24. No other point urged by the learned counsel for

the appellant.

.

25. That both the Courts below have rightly

appreciated the Point in controversy after considering the

oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record. That

no question of law much less the substantial question of

of
law arises in the present case.

26 In view of above, the present appeal being devoid
rt
of any merit deserves to be dismissed.

27 Pending application(s), if any, also stands

disposed of.

(Romesh Verma),
Judge
13.03.2026 (veena)

::: Downloaded on – 17/03/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS