27.02.2026 vs State Of H.P. And Another on 9 March, 2026

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Reserved On: 27.02.2026 vs State Of H.P. And Another on 9 March, 2026

                                                                                     2026:HHC:6246




      IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA




                                                                                   .
                                              Cr. MMO No. 1111 of 2025





                                              Reserved on: 27.02.2026
                                              Date of Decision: 09.03.2026.





    G. Haneef                                                                    ...Petitioner




                                                     of
                                           Versus

    State of H.P. and another                                                ...Respondents


    Coram
                           rt

    Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
    Whether approved for reporting?1                   No

    For the Petitioner                                 :       Mr S.C. Sharma, Senior



                                                               Advocate, with M/s
                                                               Jyotirmay Bhatt and
                                                               Sushmit Bhatt, Advocates.




    For Respondents No.1 & 2/State                     :       Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy
                                                               Advocate General.





    For respondent No.3                                :       Mr Narender Singh





                                                               Thakur, Advocate.


    Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for

quashing of FIR No. 64 of 2023, dated 31.3.2023, registered at

Police Station Theog, District Shimla, H.P., for the commission of

1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
2

2026:HHC:6246

an offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code

(IPC).

.

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

petition are that the respondent No.3/informant was running a

business of sale and purchase of apples at Parala, Sabji Mandi,

of
Tehsil Theog. SFC Karnatka, PSP Puducherry, FF Shaik Sadik

Tirupati, YNC Noshad (V) Warangal and EFC Najmal Kerala had
rt
purchased apples from him, but had not paid him the money.

They cheated the informant and deprived him of an amount of

₹2,54,83,017/-. Hence, the informant filed a complaint before the

police, praying that an action be taken against the merchants as

per the law. The police registered the FIR and investigated the

matter.

3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the

accused/petitioner has filed the present petition seeking the

quashing of the FIR. It has been asserted that the contents of the

FIR do not satisfy the requirement Section 420 of the IPC. There

was a delay in reporting the matter to the police. The allegations

in the FIR, even if accepted to be correct discloses a civil dispute

related to the business transaction, and there is no criminality

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
3
2026:HHC:6246

involved in the present case. A mere breach of contract or non-

payment of dues does not amount to cheating. Therefore, it was

.

prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be

quashed qua the petitioner.

4. The petition is opposed by respondents No.1 and 2 by

of
filing a reply making preliminary submissions regarding the lack

of maintainability and locus standi. The contents of the petition
rt
were admitted regarding the filing of the FIR. It was asserted that

the petitioner had been absconding since 2019 and had not paid

an amount of ₹1,04,28,946/- to the informant. The allegations in

the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The

investigation is complete, and the charge sheet is to be filed

against the petitioner. It was specifically denied that the dispute

between the parties pertained to a commercial dispute and did

not involve any criminality. Hence, it was prayed that the present

petition be dismissed.

5. A separate reply was filed by respondent

No.3/informant admitting that an FIR was registered by

respondent No.3/informant against the petitioner and other apple

traders. It was asserted that the apple traders had defaulted in

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
4
2026:HHC:6246

paying the money to the informant, and he was left with no other

option but to register the FIR. The petitioner remained absconded

.

for 2 years and did not join the investigation. Therefore, it was

prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

6. I have heard Mr S.C. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate

of
with M/s Jyotirmay Bhatt and Sushmit Bhatt, learned counsel for

the petitioner, Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General
rt
for respondents No.1 and 2, and Mr Narender Singh Thakur,

learned counsel, for respondent No.3.

7. Mr S.C. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the

petitioner, submitted that the allegations in the FIR do not

disclose the commission of any offence. False allegations were

made against him. The contents of the FIR, even if accepted to be

correct, do not constitute the commission of any cognizable

offence. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed

and the FIR be quashed. He relied upon the judgments of Kunti

and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2023) 6 SCC 109,

Sarabjit Kaur vs. State of Punjab and another 2023 STPL 3358 SC,

Rikhab Birani and Anr versus State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr 2025

INSC 512 in support of his submission.

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
5

2026:HHC:6246

8. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for

the respondents No.1 and 2/State submitted that the petitioner

.

had taken the apples from the informant after promising to pay

the money to him. However, he failed to do so, which shows that

his intention was fraudulent to begin with. The investigation is

complete, and the charge sheet is to be filed before this Court.

of
This Court should not exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction

vested in it under Section 528 of BNSS. Hence, he prayed that the
rt
present petition be dismissed.

9. Mr Narender Singh Thakur, learned counsel for

respondent No.3, adopted the submissions of Mr Ajit Sharma,

learned Deputy Advocate General for respondents No.1 and 2 and

prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

11. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC

OnLine SC 7 as under: –

“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it
is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to
be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
6
2026:HHC:6246

decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised
some of the principles under which

.

FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the

following words:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter

XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court
in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent

of
powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
rt
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any

precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such
power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are

taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or

make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying

the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
7

2026:HHC:6246

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a

.

police officer without an order of a Magistrate as

contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently

improbable based on which no prudent person
can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the

of
accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
rt any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings,
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code

or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly

attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the

accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4), and (6)
would be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused, then the
FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
8
2026:HHC:6246

contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in
such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an

.

express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the

CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”

12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

of
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its
extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may
rt
issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to
secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are

neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound nature
of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly.

The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded

within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High
Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where
intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
several decades, has laid down the principles and

guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing
criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-

empting the Prosecution from building its case before the
Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia,
contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal
complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR
represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie
offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.)
the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations;
and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the
dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335)

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
9
2026:HHC:6246

13. The present petition is to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

.

14. The FIR was registered for the commission of an

offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC. The ingredients

of cheating were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.W.

of
Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 241, as under:

“10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are: (i) there
should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person
rt
by deceiving him, (ii)(a) the person so deceived should be
induced to deliver any property to any person or to consent

that any person shall retain any property; or (b) the person
so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit
to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were

not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii)(b), the act
of omission should be one which causes or is likely to cause
damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind,

reputation or property.

11. One of us (D.P. Mohapatra, J.), speaking for the Bench,

in HridayaRanjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4
SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786] on facts of that case, has
expressed thus: (SCC p. 177, para 15)

“15. In determining the question, it has to be kept in
mind that the distinction between mere breach of
contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It
depends upon the intention of the accused at the
time of inducement, which may be judged by his
subsequent conduct, but for this, subsequent
conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract
cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating
unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown
right at the beginning of the transaction, that is, the

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
10
2026:HHC:6246

time when the offence is said to have been
committed. Therefore, it is the intention which is the
gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating,

.

it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or

dishonest intention at the time of making the promise.
From his mere failure to keep up a promise,
subsequently, such a culpable intention right at the

beginning, that is, when he made the promise, cannot be
presumed.” (emphasis supplied)

of

12. Finding that the ingredients of the offence of cheating
and its allied offences had not been made out, this Court
interfered with the order of the High Court and quashed
the criminal proceedings.

rt

13. In G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [(2000) 3 SCC 693: 2000 SCC
(Cri) 733], this Court in para 7 has stated thus: (SCC pp.

696-97)

“7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts.
While in the first part, the person must ‘dishonestly’

or ‘fraudulently’ induce the complainant to deliver
any property; in the second part, the person should
intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to

do a thing. That is to say, in the first part,
inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the

second part, the inducement should be intentional.

As observed by this Court in

JaswantraiManilalAkhaney v. State of Bombay [AIR
1956 SC 575: 1956 Cri LJ 1116], a guilty intention is an
essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In
order, therefore, to secure the conviction of a person
for the offence of cheating, ‘mens rea’ on the part of
that person must be established. It was also observed
in Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B. [AIR 1954 SC 724:

1954 Cri LJ 1806] that in order to constitute the offence
of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in
existence at the time when the inducement was
offered.” (emphasis supplied)

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
11
2026:HHC:6246

14. In Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal [(1999) 8
SCC 686: 2000 SCC (Cri) 47] dealing with the effect of
existence of arbitration clause in the agreement on

.

criminal prosecution on the ground that civil proceedings

are also maintainable, this Court has held that quashing of
FIR or a complaint exercising power under Section 482
CrPC should be limited to a very extreme exception; merely

because an act has a civil profile is not enough to stop
action on the criminal side. It is further held that a
provision made in the agreement for referring the disputes

of
to arbitration is not an effective substitute for a criminal
prosecution when the disputed act constitutes a criminal
offence.

15.
rt
A similar view was taken in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad,

(2000) 3 SCC 693, as under:

“4. Cheating” is defined in Section 415 of the Penal Code,
1860, which provides as under:

“415. Cheating.–Whoever, by deceiving any person,
fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so

deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to
consent that any person shall retain any property, or

intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or
omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if
he were not so deceived, and which act or omission

causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that
person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said
to ‘cheat’.

Explanation.–A dishonest concealment of facts is a
deception within the meaning of this section.”

5. The High Court quashed the proceedings principally on
the ground that Chapter XVII of the Penal Code, 1860, deals
with the offences against properties and, therefore, Section
415 must also necessarily relate to the property which, in
the instant case, is not involved and, consequently, the FIR

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
12
2026:HHC:6246

was liable to be quashed. The broad proposition on which
the High Court proceeded is not correct. While the first part
of the definition relates to property, the second part does

.

not necessarily relate to property. The second part is

reproduced below:

“415. … intentionally induces the person so deceived

to do or omit to do anything which he would not do
or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or
omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm

of
to that person in body, mind, reputation or property,
is said to ‘cheat’.”

6. This part speaks of intentional deception which must be
intended not only to induce the person deceived to do or
rt
omit to do something but also to cause damage or harm to
that person in body, mind, reputation or property. The

intentional deception presupposes the existence of a
dominant motive of the person making the inducement.
Such inducement should have led the person deceived or

induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not
have done or omitted to do if he were not deceived. The
further requirement is that such an act or omission should

have caused damage or harm to body, mind, reputation or
property.

7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in
the first part, the person must “dishonestly” or

“fraudulently” induce the complainant to deliver any
property; in the second part, the person should
intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a
thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be
dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the
inducement should be intentional. As observed by this
Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [AIR
1956 SC 575: 1956 Cri LJ 1116: 1956 SCR 483], a guilty
intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of
cheating. In order, therefore, to secure the conviction of a
person for the offence of cheating, “mens rea” on the part

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
13
2026:HHC:6246

of that person must be established. It was also observed in
Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B. [AIR 1954 SC 724: 1954 Cri LJ
1806] that in order to constitute the offence of cheating,

.

the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time

when the inducement was offered.

8. Thus, so far as the second part of Section 415 is

concerned, “property”, at no stage, is involved. Here, it is
the doing of an act or omission to do an act by the
complainant, as a result of intentional inducement by the

of
accused, which is material. Such inducement should result
in the doing of an act or omission to do an act as a result of
which the person concerned should have suffered or was
likely to suffer damage or harm in body, mind, reputation
rt
or property. In an old decision of the Allahabad High Court
in Empress v. Sheoram [(1882) 2 AWN 237], it was held by

Mahmood, J.:

“That to palm off a young woman as belonging to a
caste different to the one to which she really belongs,

with the object of obtaining money, amounts to the
offence of cheating by personation as defined in
Section 416 of the Penal Code, 1860, which must be

read in the light of the preceding Section 415.”

16. In the present case, there are no averments in the FIR

that any representation was made by the petitioner to the

informant, which led the informant to supply the apple to the

petitioner. The informant’s simple case is that he had supplied

the apple to the petitioner and other apple traders, and they had

not made the payment to him. It was rightly submitted on behalf

of the petitioner that this was a dispute regarding the payment of

money and does not involve any criminality.

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
14

2026:HHC:6246

17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Anukul Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2060, that

.

criminal proceedings cannot be used for enforcing civil rights. It

was observed: –

17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions, deprecated
the tendency to convert civil disputes into criminal

of
proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd.

(2006) 6 SCC 736, it was held that criminal law cannot be
used as a tool to settle scores in commercial or contractual
matters, and that such misuse amounts to abuse of process.

rt
xxxxx

10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice

of a growing tendency in business circles to convert
purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is
obviously on account of a prevalent impression that
civil law remedies are time-consuming and do not

adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors.
Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes,
also leading to an irretrievable breakdown of

marriages/families. There is also an impression that
if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal

prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent
settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and

claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by
applying pressure through criminal prosecution
should be deprecated and discouraged.”

18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal
(2007) 12 SCC 1: AIR 2008 SC 251, it was emphasised that
criminal prosecution must not be permitted as an
instrument of harassment or private vendetta. In Ganga
Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam (2015) 9 SCC 647, this Court
again reiterated that criminal complaints in respect of
property disputes of a civil nature, filed solely to harass the

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
15
2026:HHC:6246

accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation, constitute an
abuse of process.

19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @ Shailesh R.

.

Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2025 INSC 869, this Court

disapproved the practice of using criminal proceedings as a
substitute for civil remedies, observing that money
recovery cannot be enforced through criminal prosecution

where the dispute is essentially civil. The Court cautioned
High Courts not to direct settlements in such matters but to
apply the settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The following

of
paragraphs are relevant in this context:

“9. What we have been able to understand is that
there is an oral agreement between the parties. The
rt
Respondent No. 4 might have parted with some
money in accordance with the oral agreement, and it
may be that the appellant, herein, owes a particular

amount to be paid to the Respondent No. 4. However,
the question is whether, prima facie, any offence of
cheating could be said to have been committed by the

appellant.

10. How many times are the High Courts to be
reminded that to constitute an offence of cheating,

there has to be something more than prima facie on
record to indicate that the intention of the accused

was to cheat the complainant right from the
inception. The plain reading of the FIR does not
disclose any element of criminality.

11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent
pronouncement of this Court in the case of “Delhi
Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh“,
(2024) 10 SCC 690. In the said decision, the entire law
as to what constitutes cheating and criminal breach
of trust, respectively, has been exhaustively
explained. It appears that this very decision was
relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner before the High Court. However, instead of
looking into the matter on its own merits, the High

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
16
2026:HHC:6246

Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for
mediation and that too by making payment of Rs.

25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition

.

precedent. We fail to understand why the High Court

should undertake such an exercise. The High Court
may either allow the petition, saying that no offence
is disclosed or may reject the petition, saying that no

case for quashing is made out. Why should the High
Court attempt to help the complainant to recover the
amount due and payable by the accused? It is for the

of
Civil Court or Commercial Court, as the case may be,
to look into a suit that may be filed for recovery of
money or in any other proceedings, be it under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions of the
rt
IB Code, 2016.

12. Why the High Court was not able to understand

that the entire dispute between the parties is of a civil
nature.

13. We also enquired with the learned counsel

appearing for the Respondent No. 4 whether his
client has filed any civil suit or has initiated any other
proceedings for recovery of the money. It appears

that no civil suit has been filed for the recovery of
money to date. Money cannot be recovered, more

particularly, in a civil dispute between the parties by
filing a First Information Report and seeking the help
of the Police. This amounts to abuse of the process of

law.

14. We could have said many things, but we refrain
from observing anything further. If the Respondent
No. 4 has to recover a particular amount, he may file
a civil suit or seek any other appropriate remedy
available to him in law. He cannot be permitted to
take recourse to criminal proceedings.

15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the
High Court has passed the impugned order. The High
Court first directed the appellant to pay Rs.

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
17

2026:HHC:6246

25,00,000/- to the Respondent No. 4 and thereafter
directed him to appear before the Mediation and
Conciliation Centre for the purpose of settlement.

.

That’s not what is expected of a High Court to do in a

Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution or a miscellaneous application filed
under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code,

1973, for quashing of FIR or any other criminal
proceedings. What is expected of the High Court is to
look into the averments and the allegations levelled

of
in the FIR, along with the other material on record, if
any. The High Court seems to have forgotten the
well-settled principles as enunciated in the decision
of this Court in the “State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal“,
rt
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.

18. In the present case, an attempt is being made to

convert a civil dispute regarding the payment of money into a

criminal case, which is impermissible.

19. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Kapil Agarwal vs.

Sanjay Sharma, (2021) 5 SCC 524: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 154 that

criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to become a weapon of

harassment. It was observed:

“18.1. As observed and held by this Court in a catena of
decisions, inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC
and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution is designed to
achieve a salutary purpose that criminal proceedings ought
not to be permitted to degenerate into weapons of
harassment. When the Court is satisfied that criminal
proceedings amount to an abuse of process of law or that it
amounts to bringing pressure upon the accused, in the
exercise of inherent powers, such proceedings can be
quashed.”

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
18

2026:HHC:6246

20. It was submitted that the petitioner had failed to pay

the money to the informant, which shows that his intention was

.

fraudulent to begin with. This submission cannot be accepted. It

was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satishchandra

Ratanlal Shah v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 9 SCC 148 : (2019) 3 SCC

(Cri) 697: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 196 that mere inability to return the

of
amount cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating

unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the
rt
beginning of the transaction, as it is this mens rea which is the

crux of the offence. This position was reiterated in Ashok Kumar

Jain v. State of Gujarat, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 998, and it was held

that the fraudulent intention cannot be inferred by mere failure

to honour the contract. A similar view was taken in Kunti (supra),

Sarabjit Kaur (supra) and Rikhan Birani (supra). The informant

has filed the party’s ledger (Annexure R-1), which shows that the

money was being paid by the petitioner to the informant on

various dates, and in the absence of any evidence regarding the

fraudulent intention of the petitioner at the beginning, he cannot

be held liable for cheating simply because he was unable to fulfil

the terms and conditions of the contract.

21. No other point was urged.

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS
19

2026:HHC:6246

22. In view of the above, the continuation of the

proceedings qua the petitioner would amount to an abuse of the

.

process of the law. Hence, the present petition is allowed and FIR

No. 64 of 2023, dated 31.3.2023, registered at Police Station

Theog, District Shimla, H.P., for the commission of an offence

punishable under Section 420 of IPC. is ordered to be quashed qua

of
the petitioner.

23.
rt
Petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so also

pending miscellaneous applications, if any.

24. Parties are permitted to produce a copy of this

judgment, downloaded from the webpage of the High Court of

Himachal Pradesh, before the authorities concerned, and the said

authorities shall not insist on the production of a certified copy,

but if required, may verify passing of the order from the Website

of the High Court.

(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
9th March, 2026
(Nikita)

::: Downloaded on – 09/03/2026 20:33:44 :::CIS