Chattisgarh High Court
Mohammad Salman vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 3 August, 2026
Digitally signed
by YOGESH
YOGESH TIWARI
TIWARI Date:
2026.08.03
18:04:46 +0530
1
CGHC010380242024 2026:CGHC:33378
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Order Reserved on : 07.07.2026
Order Delivered on : 03.08.2026
WPC No. 5555 of 2024
Mohammad Salman S/o Mohammad Subhan Aged About 32 Years R/o
Gandhi Chowk, Camp-2, Bhilai, Tehsil And District Durg, Chhattisgarh.
--- Petitioner
Versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh, through Secretary, Department of Urban
Administration and Development, Mantralay, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal
Nagar, Naya Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2 - Division Commissioner Durg, District Durg, Chhattisgarh
3 - Municipal Corporation Through Commissioner, Bhilai, District Durg,
Chhattisgarh.
4 - Bhojram S/o Late Kushnaji Aged About 46 Years, Parshad, Ward
No. 17, R/o Street No. 1, Paanch Rasta, Supela, Bhiali, Tehsil And
District Bhilai, Chhattisgarh
5 - Chandan Yadav S/o Late Shankar Lal Yadav Aged About 33 Years
R/o Sharda Para, Camp-2, Bhilai, Tehsil And District Bhilai,
Chhattisgarh.
6 - Chhattisgarh State Election Commission, Through Secretary,
Sector-19, Kotara Bhantha, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh (Intervenors).
7 - District Election Officer, Durg, District Durg Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondents
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(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Mr. B.P. Singh and Mr. Roshan Singh
Lamba, Advocates
For State/Respondents : Mr. Rajkumar Gupta, Additional Advocate
No.1 and 2 General
For Respondent No.3 : Mr. Rajesh Kumar Kesharwani, Advocate
For Respondents No.4 : Mr. Animesh Verma, Advocate
and 5
For Respondents No.6 : Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas, Senior Advocate
and 7 assisted by Ms. Shruti Bariar, Advocate
WPC No. 1808 of 2025
Chandan Yadav S/o Shankar Lal Yadav Aged About 34 Years R/o H.No.
394, Kishan Chowk, Shardapara, Camp 2, Sector 1, Bhilai, District
Durg, Chhattisgarh- 490026.
—Petitioner
Versus
1 – State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department of Urban
Administration, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Atal Nagar, Post
Office Rakhi, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2 – Divisional Commissioner Division Durg, District Durg, Chhattisgarh.
3 – Collector-Cum-District Election Officer District Durg, Chhattisgarh.
4 – Municipal Corporation Bhilai through its Commissioner, Bhilai,
District Durg, Chhattisgarh.
5 – Shri Neeraj Pal Mayor, Municipal Corporation Bhilai, District Durg,
Chhattisgarh.
6 – Mohammad Salman alias Engineer Salman S/o Mohammad
Subhan Aged About 32 Years R/o 115, Sharda Para, Naya Ward 35,
Camp 2, Bhairaw Basti, Near Janta School, Bhilai, Tehsil And District
Durg, Chhattisgarh.
— Respondents
3
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Mr. Animesh Verma, Advocate
For State/Respondents : Mr. Rajkumar Gupta, Additional Advocate
No.1 to 3 General
For Respondent No.4 : Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas, Senior Advocate
assisted by Ms. Shruti Bariar, Advocate
For Respondent No.6 : Mr. B.P. Singh and Mr. Roshan Singh
Lamba, Advocates
Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
CAV Order
1. Since both the writ petitions arise out of the same set of facts,
involve an interconnected controversy, and raise common
questions of law and facts, they are being heard together and are
being decided by this common order. For the sake of convenience
and clarity, the parties shall be referred to by their respective
names instead of their array in the respective writ petitions.
2. In Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024, Mohammad Salman is the
petitioner, whereas in Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025, he has
been arrayed as respondent No.6. Similarly, Chandan Yadav, who
is the petitioner in Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025, was arrayed
as respondent No.5 in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024. The
State authorities are common parties in both the writ petitions;
however, their array differs in the respective petitions. In Writ
Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024, the State of Chhattisgarh is arrayed
through respondents No.1 and 2, whereas in Writ Petition (C)
No.1808 of 2025, the State authorities have been arrayed as
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respondents No.1 to 3. The Municipal Corporation, Durg, is
respondent No.3 in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024. The State
Election Commission has been impleaded as respondents No.6
and 7 in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024 and as respondent
No.4 in Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025.
3. The controversy involved in the present writ petitions centres
around the election to the office of Councillor of Ward No. 35,
Sharda Para, Bhilai Municipal Corporation, District Durg (C.G.),
and the subsequent proceedings culminating in the removal of the
returned candidate, Mohammad Salman, on the allegation that
the Social Status (Other Backward Class) Certificate on the
strength of which he contested the election was fraudulently
procured and had never been issued by the competent authority.
4. The controversy involved in the present writ petitions pertains to
the election to the office of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda
Para, Bhilai Municipal Corporation, District Durg (C.G.).
Mohammad Salman, being a citizen of India, participated in the
said democratic process and contested the election for the post of
Councillor from the aforesaid ward, claiming himself to belong to
the Kunjda caste, which is recognized as a caste falling under the
category of Other Backward Class (OBC). On the basis of the
said caste status and eligibility, Mohammad Salman contested the
election and was declared elected by the voters of Ward No.35.
The subsequent challenge to his caste status, the proceedings
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initiated pursuant thereto, and the consequential actions taken by
the authorities constitute the subject matter of the present
litigation. After participating in the democratic process,
Mohammad Salman was declared elected by the electorate and
assumed the office of Councillor of Ward No.35. He thereafter
continued to discharge his duties and functions as an elected
representative.
5. Subsequently, an objection was raised by Chandan Yadav and
another person before the competent authority challenging the
entitlement of Mohammad Salman to hold the office of Councillor.
It was alleged by them that Mohammad Salman did not actually
belong to the Kunjda caste and that the caste certificate relied
upon by him for contesting the election had been obtained
fraudulently and by misrepresentation of facts. On the basis of the
said complaint/appeal, proceedings were initiated against
Mohammad Salman before the competent authority for verification
of his caste status of the complaint made against him.
6. After completion of the proceedings, the competent authority, vide
order dated 06.05.2024, directed removal of Mohammad Salman
from the post of Councillor of Ward No.35. Aggrieved by the said
order, Mohammad Salman preferred an appeal before the
competent appellate authority. However, the said appeal was
dismissed vide order dated 04.09.2024, thereby affirming the
order dated 06.05.2024 passed by the competent authority. The
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challenge to the aforesaid orders dated 06.05.2024 and
04.09.2024 forms the subject matter of Writ Petition (C) No.5555
of 2024, filed by Mohammad Salman.
7. During the pendency of the aforesaid controversy, Chandan
Yadav, who had raised the dispute regarding the election and
caste status of Mohammad Salman, approached this Court by
filing Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025. The grievance raised by
Chandan Yadav in the said writ petition is that despite his being
declared as the returned candidate in the election process and
despite the removal of Mohammad Salman from the office of
Councillor, the authorities have failed to conduct and permit the
oath-taking ceremony of Chandan Yadav as Councillor of Ward
No.35, Sharda Para, Bhilai Municipal Corporation.
8. Chandan Yadav has contended that after completion of the
election process, he was declared elected in accordance with law
and his name was duly notified in the official Gazette. According
to him, the mandate given by the voters through a democratic
election process cannot be defeated by the inaction of the
authorities. He has further challenged the action of the
respondents in issuing the communication/order dated
18.03.2025, whereby Mohammad Salman, despite having been
removed from the post of Councillor, was nominated as a member
of the Mayor-in-Council. According to Chandan Yadav, such action
of the authorities is arbitrary, illegal, contrary to the statutory
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scheme, and amounts to permitting a person who has ceased to
hold the office of Councillor to continue enjoying the benefits and
privileges attached to the said office.
9. Thus, while Mohammad Salman, in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of
2024, has questioned the legality and validity of the orders dated
06.05.2024 and 04.09.2024 whereby he was removed from the
office of Councillor, Chandan Yadav, in Writ Petition (C) No.1808
of 2025, has questioned the subsequent inaction of the authorities
in recognizing and administering oath to him as the elected
Councillor and has also challenged the consequential action of
permitting Mohammad Salman to continue as a member of the
Mayor-in-Council.
10. Both the writ petitions, therefore, arise from the same election
dispute concerning Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Bhilai Municipal
Corporation, involve the same set of parties, and the reliefs
claimed by the parties are directly connected with each other. The
decision in one petition would have a direct bearing upon the
adjudication of the other. Accordingly, both the writ petitions are
clubbed together and are being decided by this common order.
11. In Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024, the petitioner has prayed for
following relief(s) :-
“10.1 That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to quash the order dated 04/09/2024
(ANNXURE P1) and Order dated 06/05/2024
8(ANNEXURE P2) passed by the respondent
no. 1 and 2 against the petitioner.
10.2 That any other relief which this Hon’ble
Court deems fit and proper may also be
granted in favor of the petitioner safeguarding
their interest.”
12. In Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025, the petitioner has prayed for
following relief(s) :-
“10.1 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order,
direction thereby calling for the records of the
entire case.
10.2 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order,
direction in the form of mandamus thereby
directing the respondents to immediately
arrange for oath taking ceremony of the
petitioner for taking oath as Councillor of
Ward No.35, Shardapara Ward of Bhilai
Municipal Corporation, District Durg (C.G.).
OR ALTERNATIVELY
That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order,
direction thereby directing the respondents to
take decision on the representation of the
petitioner for taking oath dated 13/03/2025
within stipulated period.
10.3 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order,
9direction in the form of certiorarified
mandamus thereby quashing and setting
aside the letter dated 18/03/2025 and further
directing the respondents to permit joining of
the private respondent as Councillor of Ward
No.35, Shardapara Ward Bhilai Municipal
Corporation, District Durg (C.G.).
10.4 Any other relief, which this Hon’ble Court
deems fit and proper, may also kindly be
granted to the petitioner, in the interest of
justice.”
Common Facts of Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024 and Writ
Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025
13. The facts, in brief, are that the Municipal Corporation, Bhilai
consists of elected Councillors and is governed by the provisions
of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (for short,
‘Act of 1956’). In exercise of the powers conferred under the
relevant provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder, the
State Government issued a Gazette Notification dated
22.03.2021, notifying the ward-wise reservation for the election of
Councillors of Municipal Corporation, Bhilai. As per the said
notification, Ward No.35, Sharda Para Ward, was reserved for
candidates belonging to the Other Backward Class category.
14. Pursuant to the election programme, Mohammad Salman, also
known as Engineer Salman, submitted his nomination form for
contesting the election to the post of Councillor from Ward No.35,
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Sharda Para, on 02.12.2021 along with the requisite documents.
In his declaration submitted along with the nomination form,
Mohammad Salman claimed himself to be belonging to the Other
Backward Class category, namely Kunjda caste. Chandan Yadav
also submitted his nomination form for contesting the said election
from the same ward.
15. After completion of the election process and declaration of results,
Mohammad Salman was declared as the returned candidate for
Ward No.35, Sharda Para, and his election was notified in the
official Gazette dated 24.12.2021. Thereafter, he joined as
Councillor and continued to discharge his duties as an elected
representative. Chandan Yadav was declared as the candidate
securing the second highest number of votes, immediately next to
Mohammad Salman.
16. Subsequently, allegations were raised against Mohammad
Salman regarding his caste status. It was alleged that although
Ward No.35 was reserved for Other Backward Class candidates,
Mohammad Salman did not possess a valid caste certificate
issued by the competent authority and, therefore, was not eligible
to contest and hold the office of Councillor from the said reserved
category. On the basis of such allegations, Chandan Yadav and
others initiated proceedings seeking removal of Mohammad
Salman from the office of Councillor under the provisions of the
Act of 1956.
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17. As no effective action was taken on the representation/application
filed by Chandan Yadav, he approached this Court by filing Writ
Petition (C) No.1015 of 2024. This Court, vide order dated
19.02.2024, directed the Divisional Commissioner, Durg, to
consider and decide the proceedings initiated under Section 19(1)
(a-1) of the Act of 1956 within a stipulated period. The said order
was subsequently challenged by Mohammad Salman by filing
Review Petition No.78 of 2024, however, the same was dismissed
vide order dated 25.04.2024, and the proceedings before the
Divisional Commissioner were permitted to continue.
18. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Divisional
Commissioner, Durg, Mohammad Salman also approached this
Court by filing Writ Petition (C) No.1309 of 2024, questioning the
initiation and continuance of proceedings under Section 19(1)(a-1)
of the Act of 1956. However, the said writ petition was disposed of
by order dated 05.03.2024, and thereafter the review petition and
writ appeal preferred against the said order were also
dismissed/withdrawn.
19. Thereafter, the Divisional Commissioner, Durg proceeded with the
matter, recorded the statements and affidavits of the respective
parties, and after hearing both sides, passed an order dated
06.05.2024, whereby the application preferred by Chandan Yadav
and others was allowed and Mohammad Salman was removed
from the post of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Bhilai
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Municipal Corporation.
20. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of removal, Mohammad Salman
approached this Court by filing Writ Petition (C) No.2642 of 2024.
However, this Court, vide order dated 11.06.2024, declined to
interfere with the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner
and granted liberty to Mohammad Salman to avail the statutory
remedy of appeal before the competent authority.
21. Pursuant thereto, Mohammad Salman preferred an appeal before
the competent appellate authority. After considering the rival
submissions and material available on record, the appellate
authority, vide order dated 04.09.2024, dismissed the appeal
preferred by Mohammad Salman and affirmed the order of
removal passed by the Divisional Commissioner. The appellate
authority recorded that Mohammad Salman failed to establish his
entitlement to contest the election from the reserved category and
also failed to produce a valid caste certificate issued under the
provisions of the Chhattisgarh Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Tribes and Other Backward Classes (Regulation of Social Status
Certification) Act, 2013 (for short, ‘Act of 2013’).
22. The aforesaid orders dated 06.05.2024 and 04.09.2024 have
been challenged by Mohammad Salman in Writ Petition (C)
No.5555 of 2024, wherein he has questioned the legality, validity
and correctness of the proceedings resulting in his removal from
the post of Councillor.
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23. After removal of Mohammad Salman, the office of Councillor of
Ward No.35, Sharda Para, fell vacant. The vacancy was
thereafter communicated to the State Election Commission, which
issued an election programme for filling up the vacant post of
Councillor in accordance with Article 243 of the Constitution of
India and Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956. Pursuant to the
election notification dated 20.01.2025, the election process was
initiated for Ward No.35.
24. In the said election process, Chandan Yadav submitted his
nomination form and participated in the election. He was declared
elected by the Returning Officer, and an election certificate in
Form-14 under Rule 39(1) of the Chhattisgarh Municipal
Corporation Rules, 1994 (for short, ‘Rules of 1994’), dated
31.01.2025, was issued in his favour declaring him as the elected
Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para. The election of Chandan
Yadav was thereafter notified by the State Election Commission
through Gazette Notification dated 24.02.2025.
25. However, despite being declared elected and his election having
been notified in the official Gazette, Chandan Yadav was not
permitted to take oath and assume charge as Councillor of Ward
No.35. According to Chandan Yadav, such inaction on the part of
the authorities has resulted in denial of the mandate given by the
electorate and has prevented him from discharging his
constitutional and statutory duties as an elected representative.
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26. It is also the grievance of Chandan Yadav that during the
pendency of the proceedings, Mohammad Salman, after
challenging his removal, obtained interim protection in Writ
Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024. However, upon the Court being
apprised of the subsequent election process and the constitutional
bar contained under Article 243-ZG of the Constitution of India, it
was clarified that the interim order would operate only in respect
of the benefits claimed by Mohammad Salman on the basis of
OBC status and would not affect the election process.
27. Chandan Yadav has further challenged the subsequent action
whereby, despite removal of Mohammad Salman from the post of
Councillor and withdrawal of all charges and responsibilities from
him, the Mayor of the Municipal Corporation, vide communication
dated 18.03.2025, nominated Mohammad Salman as an in-
charge member of the Culture, Tourism, Entertainment and
Heritage Production Department under the Mayor-in-Council.
According to Chandan Yadav, such nomination is contrary to
Section 37 of the Act of 1956, as members of the Mayor-in-
Council can only be nominated from amongst elected Councillors.
28. Thus, while Mohammad Salman, in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of
2024, has questioned the orders dated 06.05.2024 and
04.09.2024 whereby he was removed from the post of Councillor,
Chandan Yadav, in Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025, has sought
enforcement of his rights as an elected Councillor and has
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challenged the failure of the authorities to administer oath to him
as well as the consequential nomination of Mohammad Salman in
the Mayor-in-Council despite his removal.
Submissions on behalf of Mohammad Salman (Petitioner in W.P.
(C) No.5555/2024 and Respondent No.6 in W.P.(C) No.1808/2025)
29. Mr. B.P. Singh and Mr. Roshan Singh Lamba, learned counsel
appearing for Mohammad Salman, the petitioner in Writ Petition
(C) No.5555 of 2024 and respondent No.6 in Writ Petition (C)
No.1808 of 2025, would submit that the entire controversy in the
present batch of writ petitions arises out of the election held for
the post of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Bhilai
Municipal Corporation, District Durg (C.G.), which was reserved
for candidates belonging to the Other Backward Class (OBC)
category. It is submitted that Mohammad Salman, who belongs to
the Kunjda caste, a community recognized as falling within the
OBC category, contested the election from the said reserved ward
after due verification of all requisite documents by the competent
election authorities and was duly declared elected by the
electorate. It is submitted that his election was conducted strictly
in accordance with law and after scrutiny of his nomination
papers, including the documents relating to his caste status.
Therefore, there was no occasion for any subsequent authority to
question his eligibility to contest the election merely on the basis
of vague and unsubstantiated allegations. They would further
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submit that Mohammad Salman has been a resident of Bhilai,
District Durg, Chhattisgarh, and belongs to the Kunjda caste. The
said caste has been recognized as an Other Backward Class
community under the applicable Government notifications. It is
submitted that Mohammad Salman has never attempted to obtain
any undue benefit by creating a false caste identity, as there was
no occasion for him to do so. It is argued that a person belonging
to the Kunjda caste would have no reason whatsoever to fabricate
a caste certificate of the same caste, particularly when his caste
status is consistently reflected in his educational and other
contemporaneous documents.
30. Learned counsel would submit that the caste claim of Mohammad
Salman is not based on any recent declaration made only for the
purpose of contesting the election. It is submitted that the school
records and other documents pertaining to Mohammad Salman
clearly mention his caste as Kunjda. Thus, the allegation levelled
by the private respondents that Mohammad Salman has
fraudulently projected himself as belonging to the Kunjda caste is
wholly baseless and contrary to the documentary evidence
available on record. It is further submitted that Mohammad
Salman was elected as Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para in
the year 2021, and at the relevant point of time there was no
objection raised by any person regarding his caste status. His
nomination papers were accepted only after scrutiny by the
Returning Officer and the competent election authorities. Learned
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counsel would submit that had there been any defect or alleged
invalidity in the caste certificate produced by Mohammad Salman,
his nomination itself would have been rejected at the initial stage
and he would not have been permitted to contest the election.
31. Learned counsel would contend that after Mohammad Salman
successfully completed his tenure as an elected Councillor for a
substantial period, the private respondents, who were
unsuccessful candidates in the election, initiated proceedings
after an unexplained delay of nearly three years. It is submitted
that such proceedings are nothing but an abuse of the process of
law, initiated with an ulterior motive to remove an elected
representative after losing the democratic mandate. The
challenge raised by the private respondents is not based upon
any genuine grievance but is motivated by personal rivalry and
political considerations. It is further submitted that the proceedings
initiated against Mohammad Salman before the Divisional
Commissioner were wholly without jurisdiction. Learned counsel
would submit that the issue relating to validity, genuineness and
cancellation of a caste certificate is governed by the provisions of
the Act of 2013 and the Rules framed thereunder. Under the
statutory scheme, only the competent Caste Scrutiny Committee
is empowered to examine the correctness of a social status
certificate and to declare the same to be false or invalid after
following the prescribed procedure. The Divisional Commissioner,
while exercising powers under the Act of 1956 could not have
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assumed the role of a Caste Scrutiny Committee and could not
have adjudicated upon the caste status of Mohammad Salman.
32. Learned counsel would submit that under Section 6(3) of the Act
of 2013, the District Level Certificate Verification Committee is
required to examine the relevant material and thereafter refer the
matter to the High Power Certification Scrutiny Committee
wherever necessary. Unless the caste certificate is cancelled by
the competent Scrutiny Committee, the same continues to hold
validity and the holder of such certificate cannot be treated as
disqualified. It is submitted that, in the present case, the caste
certificate of Mohammad Salman has never been cancelled by the
District Level Verification Committee or by the High Power Caste
Scrutiny Committee. Therefore, the very foundation of the
proceedings initiated by the Divisional Commissioner is legally
unsustainable. Learned counsel would submit that the Divisional
Commissioner has proceeded on an erroneous assumption of
jurisdiction and has passed the order of removal without there
being any declaration by the competent authority that Mohammad
Salman does not belong to the OBC category.
33. Learned counsel would further submit that Section 19(1)(a-1) of
the Act of 1956, which empowers removal of a Councillor in
certain circumstances, can be invoked only when it is established
that the Councillor has incurred disqualification in accordance with
law. The expression “if it is found that” occurring in the said
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provision necessarily requires a prior lawful determination by the
competent authority regarding the alleged disqualification. In the
absence of any order passed by the Caste Scrutiny Committee
declaring the caste certificate of Mohammad Salman to be false,
the Divisional Commissioner had no authority to remove him from
the elected office of Councillor. They would submit that the
impugned orders dated 06.05.2024 passed by the Divisional
Commissioner and 04.09.2024 passed by the appellate authority
are therefore liable to be set aside as being without jurisdiction,
contrary to the statutory provisions and violative of the principles
of natural justice. The authorities have failed to appreciate that the
caste dispute could not have been decided in proceedings relating
to removal of a Councillor and that such determination falls
exclusively within the domain of the Caste Scrutiny Committee. It
is further submitted that the election of Mohammad Salman could
not have been questioned by filing proceedings before the
Divisional Commissioner after expiry of the prescribed period.
Learned counsel would submit that the Constitution of India,
under Article 243-ZG of the Constitution of India, creates a
specific bar against interference by Courts or authorities in
electoral matters except through the mechanism of an election
petition. The validity of an election to a Municipality can only be
challenged before the competent Election Tribunal in the manner
prescribed by law.
34. In this regard, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the
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judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Babita
Balmiki Vs. Amrika Bai & Others, reported in 2017 (1) CGLJ
603, and submitted that the issue regarding qualification or
disqualification of an elected candidate, including whether such
candidate belongs to the reserved category for which the seat
was notified, can only be examined by the Election Tribunal in an
election petition.
35. Learned counsel would submit that the private respondents
neither challenged the election of Mohammad Salman by filing an
election petition under Section 441 of the Act of 1956, nor
approached the competent Election Tribunal within the prescribed
period of limitation. Instead, after a delay of nearly three years,
they initiated proceedings before the Divisional Commissioner,
which was impermissible in law. They would further submit that
the reliance placed by the private respondents on certain alleged
discrepancies in the records maintained by the revenue
authorities is wholly misplaced. It is argued that Mohammad
Salman cannot be held responsible for any alleged mistake or
discrepancy in the official records maintained by the revenue
department. The burden cannot be shifted upon the elected
Councillor for any alleged administrative error committed by the
authorities maintaining such records. It is also submitted that the
caste documents produced by Mohammad Salman and his
ancestors clearly demonstrate that the caste of his family has
consistently been recorded as Kunjda. Several documents
21
pertaining to his father, grandfather and forefathers, including old
documents dating back decades, reflect the same caste status.
Therefore, there was no basis to conclude that the caste
certificate obtained by Mohammad Salman was fabricated or
forged.
36. Learned counsel would further submit that the subsequent
developments during the pendency of Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of
2024 are also relevant. This Court, after hearing all the parties,
including Chandan Yadav, passed an interim order dated
28.01.2025 staying the operation and effect of the orders dated
06.05.2024 and 04.09.2024 whereby Mohammad Salman had
been removed from the post of Councillor. Pursuant thereto,
Mohammad Salman resumed his duties as Councillor of Ward
No.35. It is submitted that after restoration of the status of
Mohammad Salman as Councillor pursuant to the interim order
passed by this Court, the election process initiated for filling up
the said seat could not have been proceeded with. The authorities
themselves acknowledged the effect of the interim order and
stayed the election process. Therefore, Chandan Yadav cannot
seek a direction for oath-taking as Councillor when Mohammad
Salman continues to hold the office by virtue of the interim
protection granted by this Court.
37. Learned counsel would submit that permitting Chandan Yadav to
take oath as Councillor would result in a situation where two
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persons would simultaneously claim the office of Councillor for the
same ward, which is legally impermissible. Any such direction
would virtually nullify the interim order passed by this Court in Writ
Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024. It is further submitted that the
subsequent nomination of Mohammad Salman as a member of
the Mayor-in-Council was made only after he resumed the office
of Councillor and was legally holding the said office. Therefore,
the challenge raised by Chandan Yadav to the said nomination is
misconceived and based upon an incorrect assumption that
Mohammad Salman had ceased to be a Councillor.
38. Learned counsel would lastly submit that Chandan Yadav has not
approached this Court with clean hands and has deliberately
suppressed the material facts relating to the interim order dated
28.01.2025 passed in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024 and the
subsequent proceedings. It is submitted that the writ petition filed
by Chandan Yadav is nothing but an attempt to indirectly nullify
the orders passed by this Court and to secure a relief which would
defeat the interim protection granted to Mohammad Salman.
Therefore, learned counsel prays that Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of
2024 filed by Mohammad Salman be allowed and the orders
dated 06.05.2024 and 04.09.2024 be quashed, and consequently
Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025 filed by Chandan Yadav be
dismissed as being devoid of merit and contrary to the settled
legal position.
23
Submissions on behalf of the State/Respondents No.1 to 2 in W.P.
(C) No.5555 of 2024 and Respondents No.1 to 3 in W.P.(C) No.1808
of 2025
39. On the other hand, Mr. Rajkumar Gupta, learned Additional
Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the State
authorities/respondents No.1 and 2 in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of
2024 and respondents No.1 to 3 in Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of
2025, would submit that the writ petitions preferred by the
respective petitioners are devoid of merit and no interference
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is warranted in the
facts and circumstances of the present case. He would submit
that the present controversy has arisen out of the election
conducted for the post of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para,
Bhilai Municipal Corporation, which was reserved for the
candidates belonging to the Other Backward Class category. It is
submitted that Mohammad Salman contested the election from
the said reserved ward claiming himself to belong to the Kunjda
caste, which falls under the OBC category, and was declared
elected as Councillor. However, subsequently, a complaint was
made before the competent authority raising serious objections
regarding his caste status and alleging that he was not entitled to
contest the election from the reserved category.
40. Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the
proceedings initiated against Mohammad Salman were not
24
initiated arbitrarily or without authority of law. The same were
commenced on the basis of the complaint made by the aggrieved
persons and were conducted by the competent authority in
exercise of the powers conferred under the provisions of the Act
of 1956. It is submitted that the Divisional Commissioner, Durg,
after providing adequate and sufficient opportunity of hearing to all
concerned parties, considered the material available on record
and thereafter passed a detailed order dated 06.05.2024,
whereby Mohammad Salman was removed from the post of
Councillor. It is further submitted that the order passed by the
Divisional Commissioner was challenged by Mohammad Salman
before the competent appellate authority and the said appeal was
also considered in accordance with law. After examining the entire
material available on record, the appellate authority, vide order
dated 04.09.2024, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order
passed by the Divisional Commissioner. Therefore, according to
the learned Additional Advocate General, both the orders
impugned in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024 are well-reasoned
quasi-judicial orders passed after due consideration of the
relevant facts and applicable statutory provisions.
41. Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the scope
of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
against an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority is limited.
Unless the petitioner demonstrates patent illegality, jurisdictional
error, violation of principles of natural justice, or perversity in the
25
decision-making process, this Court would not substitute its own
view in place of the findings recorded by the competent
authorities. It is submitted that Mohammad Salman was granted
adequate opportunity during the proceedings before the Divisional
Commissioner as well as the appellate authority. All relevant
documents relied upon by him were taken into consideration and
he was permitted to place his defence. Therefore, the allegation
that the proceedings were conducted in violation of the principles
of natural justice is wholly misconceived. The authorities have
followed the procedure prescribed under law and have passed the
orders after affording full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
42. Learned Additional Advocate General would further submit that
Mohammad Salman, while invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction
of this Court, has not approached with clean hands and has
suppressed material facts. It is submitted that a person seeking
equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must
disclose all relevant facts and cannot seek discretionary relief
while withholding material information from the Court. It is
submitted that the order passed by the State
Government/appellate authority dated 04.09.2024 was passed
after considering the entire factual background, including the fact
that Mohammad Salman failed to establish his entitlement to hold
the reserved post of Councillor. The appellate authority found that
there was no valid caste certificate produced by Mohammad
Salman which could establish his entitlement to contest the
26
election from the OBC reserved category.
43. Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the
contention raised by Mohammad Salman regarding the
jurisdiction of the Divisional Commissioner is misconceived. It is
submitted that the proceedings were not merely relating to
verification of caste status but were proceedings under the
provisions of the Act of 1956 concerning the continuance of an
elected Councillor who was alleged to have incurred
disqualification. The competent authority was therefore justified in
examining whether Mohammad Salman was legally entitled to
continue on the post of Councillor. It is further submitted that the
argument regarding the necessity of reference of the matter to the
High Power Caste Scrutiny Committee is also misconceived in the
present proceedings. According to the learned Additional
Advocate General, the authorities were required to examine
whether Mohammad Salman possessed the necessary
qualification and eligibility for holding the office of Councillor from
the reserved category, and after considering the material available
on record, the competent authorities rightly arrived at the
conclusion that he was not entitled to continue.
44. Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the
subsequent events are also required to be taken into
consideration while deciding both the writ petitions. It is submitted
that after removal of Mohammad Salman from the post of
27
Councillor, the post of Councillor of Ward No.35 became vacant.
Consequently, the vacancy was communicated to the State
Election Commission, which initiated the process of by-election for
filling up the vacant seat. It is submitted that pursuant to the
election notification issued by the Chhattisgarh State Election
Commission, Chandan Yadav participated in the election process
and was declared elected as Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda
Para, Bhilai Municipal Corporation. His election was duly notified
by the State Election Commission through Gazette Notification
dated 24.02.2025. Therefore, according to the learned Additional
Advocate General, the grievance raised by Chandan Yadav in
Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025 has arisen out of subsequent
developments and deserves to be considered in that background.
45. Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that Writ
Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025 filed by Chandan Yadav has become
infructuous in view of the subsequent order dated 28.01.2025
passed in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024, whereby this Court
stayed the effect and operation of the orders dated 06.05.2024
and 04.09.2024 passed against Mohammad Salman. It is
submitted that the said interim order was passed without the
complete factual position regarding the initiation of the by-election
process being brought to the notice of the Court. It is submitted
that the interim order dated 28.01.2025 was passed purely as an
interim measure and the same cannot be construed as conferring
any final right upon Mohammad Salman to continue as Councillor.
28
The validity and effect of the said interim order would be subject
to the final adjudication of Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024.
46. Learned Additional Advocate General would further submit that in
view of the interim protection granted to Mohammad Salman, the
authorities were placed in a difficult situation as the election
process had already commenced pursuant to the vacancy caused
by his removal. The subsequent election notification and
declaration of result in favour of Chandan Yadav were statutory
acts performed in accordance with law. It is submitted that the
constitutional scheme under Article 243-ZG of the Constitution of
India provides a specific mechanism for challenging municipal
elections and the Court may consider the effect of such
constitutional provisions while examining the reliefs claimed by
the parties.
47. Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that so far as
the challenge raised by Chandan Yadav regarding the oath-taking
ceremony is concerned, the same cannot be considered in
isolation and has to be examined in the light of the interim order
passed by this Court in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024. Any
direction permitting Chandan Yadav to take oath would have the
effect of rendering the interim order passed in favour of
Mohammad Salman ineffective, which cannot be permitted unless
the interim order itself is modified or vacated. It is further
submitted that the nomination of Mohammad Salman as a
29
member of the Mayor-in-Council was a consequential
administrative action taken on the basis of the then existing status
and position of Mohammad Salman. Since the order of removal
had been stayed by this Court, Mohammad Salman was treated
as continuing in office, and therefore, no illegality can be
attributed to the action of the authorities.
48. Learned Additional Advocate General would lastly submit that both
the writ petitions deserve to be considered in the light of the
subsequent developments and the statutory framework governing
municipal elections. It is prayed that Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of
2024 filed by Mohammad Salman be dismissed as no
jurisdictional error or illegality has been demonstrated in the
orders passed by the competent authorities, and consequently,
Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025 filed by Chandan Yadav also
does not call for any interference. Alternatively, the matters may
be decided keeping in view the interim order passed by this Court
and the subsequent election process undertaken by the State
Election Commission.
Submission on behalf of Municipal Corporation, Bhilai
Respondent No.3 in W.P.(C) No.5555/2024
49. Mr. Rajesh Kumar Kesharwani, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.3/Municipal Corporation, Bhilai, would submit that
the Municipal Corporation, Bhilai is only a formal party in the
present proceedings and no substantive relief has been claimed
30
against it by the petitioner. Learned counsel would submit that the
grievance raised by the petitioner is essentially against the actions
and orders passed by respondent Nos.1 and 2/State authorities,
and the answering respondent-Municipal Corporation has neither
passed any order adverse to the petitioner nor taken any
independent action against him. It is further submitted that the
Municipal Corporation, Bhilai is an autonomous statutory body
having its own independent identity and functions within the
framework of the Act of 1956. Since no relief has been sought
against the answering respondent and no specific allegation has
been made against it, the Municipal Corporation has chosen not
to file any detailed reply.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondents No.4- Bhojram and
Respondent No.5-Chandan Yadav in W.P.(C) No.5555 of 2024 and
Petitioner-Chandan Yadav in W.P.(C) No.1808 of 2025
50. Mr. Animesh Verma, learned counsel appearing for respondent
Nos. 4 and 5 in Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 and petitioner in
Writ Petition (C) No.1808/2025, would submit that the controversy
involved in the present batch of writ petitions is required to be
examined from two perspectives. Firstly, the legality of the
removal of the private respondent from the post of Councillor of
Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Municipal Corporation Bhilai, and
secondly, the consequential right of the petitioner, who has been
duly elected in the by-election conducted pursuant to the vacancy
31
created thereafter, to assume office and discharge his duties as
Councillor. He submits that the petitioner in Writ Petition (C)
No.1808/2025 has been elected after following the complete
statutory procedure prescribed under the Act of 1956 and the
election programme notified by the Chhattisgarh State Election
Commission. The election was conducted under the supervision
and control of the State Election Commission, and thereafter, the
petitioner was declared elected as Councillor of Ward No.35,
Sharda Para, Municipal Corporation Bhilai, vide Gazette
Notification dated 24.02.2025 issued under Section 22 of the Act
of 1956. Therefore, the petitioner has acquired a statutory and
constitutional right to hold the office and discharge the functions
attached thereto.
51. Learned counsel submits that despite such declaration, the
petitioner has not been permitted to take oath and assume charge
only on account of the pendency of Writ Petition (C)
No.5555/2024 and the interim order dated 28.01.2025 passed
therein. It is submitted that the said interim order cannot be
interpreted as conferring any automatic right upon the removed
Councillor to continue in office or as nullifying the election process
which had already commenced and culminated in the declaration
of the petitioner as elected Councillor. He further submits that the
effect and operation of the orders dated 06.05.2024 passed by the
learned Divisional Commissioner and dated 04.09.2024 passed
by the appellate authority were stayed by this Court only as an
32
interim measure, but the said order does not amount to
restoration of the earlier Councillor to office. Once the order of
removal had been acted upon, the seat had fallen vacant, the
vacancy was notified by the State Election Commission and a
fresh election was conducted, the petitioner having been declared
elected cannot be denied the benefit of such democratic process.
52. Learned counsel submits that the entire election process is
governed by the constitutional mandate contained under Article
243-ZA of the Constitution of India. The State Election
Commission has the exclusive authority of superintendence,
direction and control over municipal elections. Therefore, once the
election process was completed and the petitioner was declared
elected, the executive authorities were bound to recognise and
give effect to such declaration. In support of the aforesaid
submission, learned counsel places reliance upon the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Election Commission of India v.
Ashok Kumar, (2000) 8 SCC 216, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that the Courts should not ordinarily interfere with
the election process once it has commenced and the process
must be permitted to culminate in accordance with law. Learned
counsel submits that the principle underlying the said judgment is
that the sanctity of the electoral process has to be maintained and
the mandate expressed by the electorate cannot be defeated by
administrative action.
33
53. Learned counsel further places reliance upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief
Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has recognised the wide powers of the Election
Commission to ensure free and fair elections and has held that
the electoral process is a matter of constitutional importance. It is
submitted that the election conducted pursuant to the vacancy of
Ward No.35 was within the exclusive domain of the State Election
Commission and the declaration of the petitioner as elected
Councillor cannot be rendered ineffective by any administrative
inaction.
54. Learned counsel further relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Lakshmi Charan Sen v. A.K.M. Hassan
Uzzaman, (1985) 4 SCC 689, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has observed that the democratic process must be
protected and Courts should not adopt an approach which results
in frustrating the mandate of the electorate. Learned counsel
submits that the residents of Ward No.35 have exercised their
franchise and elected the petitioner, and therefore, denying him
the opportunity to function as Councillor amounts to denying
representation to the electorate.
55. Learned counsel submits that the private respondent cannot claim
automatic restoration merely on the basis of the interim order
passed in Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024. The interim order only
34
suspends the operation of the impugned orders and does not
create a positive direction restoring the private respondent to
office. The petitioner, on the other hand, derives his right from a
completed election process. He places reliance upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Assam v.
Barak Upatyaka Damsanghathan, (2015) 3 SCC 628, wherein
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that an interim order must be
understood in the context in which it is passed and cannot be
construed to grant substantive relief which has not been finally
adjudicated. Learned counsel submits that applying the said
principle, the interim order dated 28.01.2025 cannot be
interpreted to revive the office of the removed Councillor or nullify
the subsequent election.
56. Learned counsel further submits that if the private respondent was
aggrieved by the election of the petitioner, the remedy available to
him was by way of an election petition as provided under Section
441 of the Act of 1956. The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, cannot be utilised to indirectly challenge
the election of a returned candidate. In support of this submission,
learned counsel relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal, (1982) 1 SCC 691, wherein
it has been held that the right to challenge an election is purely a
statutory right and can be exercised only in the manner prescribed
by law. Learned counsel submits that respondent No.6 cannot
bypass the statutory remedy of election petition and seek to
35
obstruct the functioning of the petitioner through collateral
proceedings.
57. Learned counsel further submits that the allegations regarding the
caste status of the private respondent are already the subject
matter of adjudication in Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024. However,
even assuming that the private respondent succeeds in the said
writ petition, such proceedings cannot automatically confer any
right upon him to displace the petitioner, who has already been
elected through a fresh election conducted by the competent
constitutional authority. He further submits that the challenge
raised by the private respondent regarding the caste certificate is
also without substance. The learned Divisional Commissioner had
not undertaken any exercise of determining the caste of the
private respondent. The enquiry was limited only to ascertain
whether the private respondent possessed a valid caste certificate
issued by the competent authority. Upon verification, the
concerned SDO (Revenue) informed that the alleged caste
certificate relied upon by the private respondent was not issued
from his office and the revenue case number mentioned therein
related to another person.
58. Learned counsel submits that the provisions of the Act of 2013
and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kumari
Madhuri Patil v. Additional Commissioner, Tribal
Development, (1994) 6 SCC 241, would have no application in
36
the present case. It is submitted that the directions issued in
Madhuri Patil (supra) apply where a caste certificate has been
duly issued by the competent authority and thereafter its validity is
required to be verified. In the present case, the very issuance of
the certificate is disputed and the competent authority has stated
that no such certificate was ever issued in favour of the private
respondent. He further places reliance upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhubaneswar Development
Authority v. Madhumita Das, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 644,
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that protecting an
ineligible person results in perpetuation of illegality and adversely
affects the rights of eligible persons. Learned counsel submits that
the same principle would apply conversely in the present matter,
as the petitioner is a duly elected candidate and his right cannot
be defeated on account of an interim order obtained in collateral
proceedings. He also places reliance upon the judgments of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court in Bharat Singh Batham v. Life
Insurance Corporation of India, (2021) 3 MPLJ 337, Hemant
Batham v. State of Madhya Pradesh (W.P. No.30444/2025) and
Abhishek Agariya v. State of Madhya Pradesh (W.P.
No.28917/2021), wherein it has been held that where the very
foundation of a caste certificate is under challenge and the
document itself is alleged to be forged or fabricated, the matter
stands on a different footing and the procedure applicable to
verification of a genuine caste certificate would not apply.
37
59. Learned counsel submits that the present case is not a case of
cancellation of a genuine caste certificate but a case where the
alleged certificate relied upon by the private respondent was
never issued by the competent authority. Therefore, the private
respondent cannot claim protection under the law meant for
genuine certificate holders. He further submits that the petitioner
in Writ Petition (C) No.1808/2025 has no connection with the
dispute regarding caste certificate and is only seeking
enforcement of his right flowing from a valid election. The
petitioner has been elected by the voters of Ward No.35 and his
oath-taking cannot be withheld indefinitely on account of a dispute
between the private respondent and the authorities. It is also
submitted that the continuation of the present situation would
result in Ward No.35 remaining without effective representation,
thereby causing prejudice to the residents of the ward. The
elected representative cannot be prevented from functioning
unless there exists a valid order setting aside his election.
60. Therefore, learned counsel prays that Writ Petition (C)
No.1808/2025 filed by the petitioner be allowed and the
respondents be directed to administer oath to the petitioner as
Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Municipal Corporation
Bhilai, and permit him to discharge his duties in accordance with
law. It is further prayed that Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 filed
by the private respondent challenging the orders dated
06.05.2024 and 04.09.2024 be dismissed and the interim order
38
passed therein be suitably modified so as not to obstruct the
functioning of the duly elected Councillor.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondents No.6 and 7-
Chhattisgarh State Election Commission in W.P.(C) No.5555 of
2024 and Respondent No.4 in W.P.(C) No.1808 of 2025
61. Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas, learned Senior Advocate assisted by
Ms. Shruti Bariar, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.
6 and 7 in Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 and respondent No.4 in
Writ Petition (C) No.1808/2025, would submit that the writ petition
filed by Mohammad Salman in Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 is
devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed, whereas the writ
petition filed by Chandan Yadav in Writ Petition (C) No.1808/2025
is also not maintainable in view of the subsequent developments
and the statutory bar contained under the Constitution of India. It
is submitted that both the petitions arise out of the dispute relating
to the post of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Municipal
Corporation, Bhilai, and the subsequent election conducted
pursuant to the vacancy created after the removal of petitioner
Mohammad Salman from the said post.
62. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that Mohammad Salman,
who was elected as Councillor from Ward No.35, Sharda Para,
Municipal Corporation, Bhilai, had contested the election from an
OBC reserved seat. However, on the basis of proceedings
initiated under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956, the Divisional
39
Commissioner, Durg, after due consideration of the material
available on record, passed an order dated 06.05.2024 removing
him from the post of Councillor. The said order was thereafter
affirmed by the appellate authority vide order dated 04.09.2024. It
is submitted that pursuant to the removal of Mohammad Salman,
a vacancy arose in Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Municipal
Corporation, Bhilai. The said vacancy was duly communicated to
the Chhattisgarh State Election Commission, which, in exercise of
its constitutional powers under Article 243-ZA of the Constitution
of India, initiated the process for conducting a bye-election.
Accordingly, the State Election Commission issued election
notification dated 20.01.2025.
63. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that during the
pendency of Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 preferred by
Mohammad Salman, this Court passed an interim order dated
28.01.2025 staying the effect and operation of the orders dated
06.05.2024 and 04.09.2024. However, the fact regarding issuance
of election notification dated 20.01.2025 and commencement of
the election process was not brought to the notice of this Court by
the petitioner. Therefore, Mohammad Salman cannot claim any
advantage on the basis of an interim order obtained without
placing the complete factual position before the Court.
64. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that the interim order dated
28.01.2025 passed in Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 did not
40
result in automatic restoration of Mohammad Salman as
Councillor nor did it nullify the election process which had already
commenced. Once the vacancy was notified and the constitutional
authority i.e. the State Election Commission had commenced the
election process, the same could not have been interfered with
except in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the
election law. It is submitted that as per the election programme,
28.01.2025 was the last date for filing nomination papers. Two
candidates submitted their nomination forms and Mohammad
Salman was not one of the candidates. Thereafter, on 31.01.2025,
after withdrawal of nomination by one candidate, Chandan Yadav,
petitioner in Writ Petition (C) No.1808/2025, was declared elected
as Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Municipal Corporation,
Bhilai, by the Returning Officer. It is further submitted by learned
Senior Counsel that Chandan Yadav, having been duly elected in
the election conducted by the competent constitutional authority,
cannot seek assumption of office through a writ petition when the
very election and declaration of result are governed by the
provisions of election law. Any challenge to the election can only
be made by way of an election petition and not by invoking
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
65. Learned Senior Counsel would place reliance upon the judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Election Commission of India
Vs. Ashok Kumar, (2000) 8 SCC 216, wherein it has been held
41
that once the election process has commenced, Courts should not
interfere with the election proceedings and the jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution must be exercised with restraint so
as not to interrupt, obstruct or protract the election process.
66. Reliance is also placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Anugrah Narain Singh & Another Vs. State
of U.P. & Others, (1996) 6 SCC 303, wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that matters relating to elections cannot
be adjudicated in writ proceedings once the election process has
commenced and the aggrieved person must avail the statutory
remedy of election petition.
67. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that Article 243-
ZG(b) of the Constitution of India creates an express
constitutional bar against interference by Courts in municipal
elections except by way of an election petition. It is submitted that
the word “election” includes the entire process commencing from
issuance of election notification till declaration of result. Therefore,
after commencement of the election process pursuant to
notification dated 20.01.2025, no interference could have been
made by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. He would
submit that Chandan Yadav, petitioner in Writ Petition (C)
No.1808/2025, has an alternative statutory remedy under the Act
of 1956, if he intends to question any aspect relating to the
election. Therefore, a direction for conducting oath ceremony or
42
permitting him to function as Councillor cannot be issued in the
present writ petition.
68. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that Mohammad
Salman cannot claim restoration of his position merely on the
basis of pendency of Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 because the
post of Councillor had already fallen vacant, the vacancy had
been notified, and the election process had culminated in
declaration of Chandan Yadav as the returned candidate. The
rights flowing from a valid election cannot be defeated by a mere
interim order passed in collateral proceedings. It is lastly
submitted that the State Election Commission and other
authorities have acted strictly in accordance with the constitutional
mandate and statutory provisions. The election of Chandan Yadav
has been conducted in accordance with law and, therefore, no
direction as sought by him in Writ Petition (C) No.1808/2025 is
warranted. Similarly, the challenge raised by Mohammad Salman
in Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 has become devoid of
substance in view of subsequent events and the election
conducted for filling up the vacancy.
69. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties
and perused the pleadings and material on record with utmost
circumspection.
70. From perusal of the order dated 04.09.2024 passed by the
Secretary, Urban Administration and Development Department,
43
Government of Chhattisgarh, in an appeal preferred under
Section 19(3) of the Act of 1956, it transpires that the appellate
authority considered the challenge made by petitioner Mohammad
Salman against the order dated 06.05.2024 passed by the
Divisional Commissioner, Durg, whereby he was removed from
the post of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Municipal
Corporation, Bhilai, on the ground that he failed to establish that
he belonged to the OBC reserved category. The appellate
authority, after considering the material available on record,
including the Social Status Certificate relied upon by the petitioner
and the report of the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Durg,
recorded a finding that no valid caste certificate under Section 4 of
the Act of 2013 had been issued in favour of the petitioner. It was
further observed that in terms of Section 14 of the Act of 2013, the
burden of proving the claim of belonging to the reserved category
was upon the petitioner, which he failed to discharge.
Consequently, the appellate authority upheld the order dated
06.05.2024 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Durg,
removing the petitioner from the post of Councillor under Section
19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956.
71. Further, from perusal of the order dated 06.05.2024 passed by the
learned Divisional Commissioner, Durg Division, Durg in Case
No.133/B-128/2023-24, it appears that the proceedings were
initiated on an application filed by Bhojraj and Chandan Yadav
under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956, seeking removal of
44
the petitioner Mohd. Salman, elected Councillor of Ward No.35,
Sharda Para, Municipal Corporation, Bhilai, on the ground that he
had contested the election from an OBC reserved seat on the
basis of an invalid caste certificate. The learned Divisional
Commissioner, after granting opportunity of hearing to the parties
and considering the material available on record, proceeded to
examine the validity of the caste certificate relied upon by the
petitioner.
72. It is reflected from the order that the learned Commissioner relied
upon the report submitted by the Sub-Divisional Officer
(Revenue), Durg, whereby it was informed that the caste
certificate issued is the basis of case bearing No.363/B-121/2015-
16 dated 15.06.2016, relied upon by the petitioner, was not
recorded in the relevant Daaira Register in the name of Mohd.
Salman, but was found recorded in the name of one Nomita
Deshmukh, daughter of Yuvraj Deshmukh. Taking note of the
provisions of Section 14 of the Act of 2013, the learned
Commissioner held that the burden to establish that the petitioner
belonged to the reserved category was upon him and that the
petitioner had failed to prove the genuineness and validity of the
OBC certificate issued by the competent authority.
73. While dealing with the objection raised by the petitioner regarding
reference of the matter to the High Level Scrutiny Committee, the
learned Commissioner considered the law laid down by the
45
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra), wherein
the procedure for verification of caste certificates was prescribed.
However, it was observed that the said mechanism would apply
only when a caste certificate has been issued by the competent
authority and the issue relates to its genuineness. The learned
Commissioner further relied upon the judgment of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in Abhishek Agariya v. State of Madhya
Pradesh & Others, W.P.(C) No.28917 of 2021, decided on
05.10.2023, wherein it was held that all non-genuine documents
cannot be treated as forged documents, but where the issuing
authority itself certifies that the caste certificate was never issued
from its office, the matter would not fall within the ambit of
verification by the Scrutiny Committee as contemplated in
Madhuri Patil (supra).
74. The learned Commissioner also considered the judgment of this
Court in Smt. Babita Balmiki v. Amrika Bai & Others, 2017 (1)
C.G.L.J. 603 (DB) and the judgment in Vidyadhar Aghariya v.
State of Chhattisgarh & Others, AIR 2015 (NOC) 724
(Chhattisgarh), relied upon by the petitioner, but distinguished
the same on facts. It was held that in the present case the very
issuance of the caste certificate by the competent authority was in
dispute and, therefore, the question of sending the matter for
caste scrutiny did not arise.
75. Consequently, the learned Divisional Commissioner recorded a
46
finding that the petitioner had failed to establish that he belonged
to the OBC category for which Ward No.35, Sharda Para,
Municipal Corporation, Bhilai, was reserved and, exercising
jurisdiction under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956, directed
his removal from the office of Councillor. The said order was
subsequently affirmed by the Secretary, Urban Administration and
Development Department, Chhattisgarh, vide order dated
04.09.2024 passed in an appeal preferred under Section 19(3) of
the Act of 1956.
76. It transpires from the order dated 28.01.2025 passed by Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in Writ Petition (C) No.5555/2024 that
an interim protection was granted in favour of the petitioner
Mohammad Salman. The petitioner had challenged the order
dated 06.05.2024 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Durg
Division, Durg, whereby he was removed from the post of
Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Bhilai, under Section
19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956, as well as the subsequent appellate
order dated 04.09.2024 passed by the State Government. The
Court, while considering the rival submissions, observed that the
finding recorded by the Divisional Commissioner regarding the
caste status of the petitioner was based solely on the report dated
07.03.2024 submitted by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue),
Durg. The Court further observed that the issue relating to the
validity of the social status certificate ought to have been
examined by the District Level Caste Scrutiny Committee
47
constituted under the Act of 2013, and that without such scrutiny,
an adverse conclusion regarding the caste status of the petitioner
could not have been drawn.
77. Accordingly, considering the facts and circumstances of the case,
the Court, as an interim measure, stayed the effect and operation
of the order dated 06.05.2024 passed by the Divisional
Commissioner, Durg, and the appellate order dated 04.09.2024
passed by the State Government, till further orders. Thus, the
interim order dated 28.01.2025 operates in favour of the
petitioner-Mohammad Salman by restoring interim protection
against his removal from the post of Councillor.
78. It is pertinent to note that although this Hon’ble Court, vide order
dated 28.01.2025 passed in Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of 2024,
had stayed the effect and operation of the order dated 06.05.2024
passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Durg Division, Durg, and
the subsequent appellate order dated 04.09.2024 passed by the
State Government, the said interim order could not be brought to
the notice of the election authorities before completion of the
election process. In the meantime, pursuant to the election
notification dated 20.01.2025, the process for conducting the by-
election had already commenced and the last date for filing
nomination was 28.01.2025. Since no communication regarding
the interim order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
was received by the concerned authorities at the relevant point of
48
time, the election proceedings continued in accordance with the
notified election programme. Consequently, after withdrawal of
nomination by one of the candidates on 31.01.2025, the Returning
Officer declared the remaining candidate, namely Chandan
Yadav, as the returned candidate for Ward No.35, Sharda Para,
Bhilai, on the same day. Thus, the declaration of election result in
favour of Chandan Yadav was not in defiance of the order dated
28.01.2025, but was a consequence of the election process which
had already reached its concluding stage before receipt of
intimation of the interim order by the election authorities.
79. At this stage, it would be apposite to examine the statutory
framework governing the controversy. The principal issue involved
in the present batch of writ petitions centres around the scope and
ambit of Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956. The said provision
confers power upon the Divisional Commissioner to remove an
elected Councillor where it is found that the Councillor does not
belong to the category for which the particular seat was reserved.
The provision has been incorporated by the Legislature with the
avowed object of preserving the sanctity of reservation in local
self-government institutions and to ensure that a public office
reserved for a particular class of citizens is not occupied by a
person who is not legally entitled to claim such reservation.
80. The legislative intent behind incorporation of Section 19(1)(a-1) of
the Act of 1956 is manifest. Reservation in favour of Scheduled
49
Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes and other
reserved categories is a constitutional mechanism intended to
secure adequate representation to historically disadvantaged
sections of society. Such constitutional protection would become
illusory if persons not belonging to the reserved category are
permitted to occupy offices reserved exclusively for those
communities by producing incorrect, fabricated or otherwise
invalid documents. Therefore, the Legislature has consciously
created a separate statutory remedy empowering the Divisional
Commissioner to examine whether an elected Councillor
possessed the requisite eligibility to contest from a reserved
constituency.
81. The principal contention advanced on behalf of Mohammad
Salman is that the Divisional Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to
examine his eligibility and that the dispute necessarily required
reference to the District Level Verification Committee or the High
Power Caste Scrutiny Committee constituted under the Act of
2013. This submission, though attractive at first blush, cannot
withstand judicial scrutiny in the peculiar facts of the present case.
82. In the present case, Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Municipal
Corporation, Bhilai, stood reserved for candidates belonging to
the Other Backward Class category. Mohammad Salman
contested the election claiming himself to belong to the Kunjda
caste, which is recognised as an OBC community in the State of
50
Chhattisgarh. It was only on the strength of such claim that he
became eligible to contest the election from the said reserved
ward. Consequently, once serious allegations were raised that the
social status certificate relied upon by him had never been issued
by the competent authority and did not genuinely belong to him,
the statutory jurisdiction under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of
1956 stood rightly invoked.
83. Section 19 of the Act of 1956 reads as under:-
“19. Removal of Councillors.-(1) The
Divisional Commissioner may, at any time,
remove any elected [….] councillor :-
(a) if his continuance as a councillor is not, in
the opinion of the Divisional Commissioner,
desirable in the interests of the public or the
Corporation; or(a-1) if it is found that he does not belong to
the reserved category for which the seat was
reserve, or;]
(b) if the Corporation has, by a resolution
supported by at least two-third of the total
number of councillors; recommend that a
councillor is not fit to continue as a councillor
on account of misconduct in the discharge of
his duties or disgraceful conduct and should
therefore be removed.
(2) The Divisional Commissioner may, while
ordering the removal under sub-section (3) of
Section 23 or this section, also order that
51such councillor, shall not be eligible to
become a councillor of a Corporation for a
period which shall be specified in the order
and which shall not exceed five years :
Provided that no resolution recommending
the removal of any councillor shall be passed
by the Corporation nor any such order of
removal shall be passed by the Divisional
Commissioner unless such councillor has
been given a reasonably opportunity of
showing cause why a recommendation
should not be made for his removal or why he
should not be removed from his office.
(3) An appeal against the order passed under
sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of this
section or Section 18 shall lie to the State
Government within 30 days of the date on
which the order is conveyed to the aggrieved
party. The State Government may after giving
a reasonable opportunity of being heard, pass
such order on the appeal as it may think fit.”
84. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it abundantly
clear that the jurisdiction of the Divisional Commissioner is not
intended to adjudicate election disputes in the conventional
sense. Rather, the provision empowers the Commissioner to
enquire into a statutory disqualification arising after or in relation
to the election where it is found that the elected Councillor was
never entitled to occupy the reserved office because he did not
belong to the category for which the seat had been earmarked.
52
85. The expression “if it is found” employed by the Legislature
assumes considerable significance. The Legislature has advisedly
not confined such enquiry to the findings of an Election Tribunal.
Instead, it has authorised the Divisional Commissioner to
independently enquire into the existence of the statutory
disqualification after following principles of natural justice. Thus,
whenever credible material is produced demonstrating that an
elected Councillor does not belong to the reserved category, the
Commissioner is duty-bound to examine the matter and arrive at
an independent conclusion.
86. Such power cannot be rendered otiose by importing limitations
which the Legislature itself has consciously omitted. Acceptance
of the contention advanced on behalf of Mohammad Salman that
the Commissioner could not enquire into the issue at all would
virtually defeat the very object behind insertion of Section 19(1)(a-
1), for every person obtaining election from a reserved
constituency by producing false documents would continue to
hold office merely because no election petition had been filed.
Such an interpretation would defeat both the statutory scheme
and the constitutional mandate underlying reservation.
87. Sub-section (3) of Section 19 further provides a statutory
appellate remedy against every order passed by the Divisional
Commissioner under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956. The
appellate jurisdiction has been conferred upon the State
53
Government, thereby providing a complete mechanism of
adjudication under the statute itself.
88. The jurisdiction conferred upon the Divisional Commissioner
under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956 is neither incidental
nor ancillary to the election process; rather, it is an independent
statutory power intended to examine whether the very eligibility on
the strength of which an elected representative occupied a
reserved seat survives judicial and factual scrutiny. Once the
competent authority, after affording due opportunity of hearing and
after considering the material available on record, records a
finding that the elected Councillor does not belong to the reserved
category for which the seat was reserved, the statute itself
mandates the consequence that such Councillor becomes liable
to be removed from office. The provision, therefore, creates not
merely a procedural mechanism but also a substantive statutory
consequence.
89. Further, Section 23 of the Act of 1956 reads as under :-
“23. Resignation of Speaker & Councillors.-
(1) The Speaker or any Councillor may resign
his office by tendering his resignation in
writing to the Mayor who shall forward the
same to the Divisional Commissioner and if
the Speaker or such Councillor, as the case
may be, desires he may also send a copy of
his resignation directly to the Divisional
Commissioner.
54
(2) On receipt of the resignation under sub-
section (1), the Divisional Commissioner shall
;-
(i) if satisfied about its genuineness, accept
the resignation and notify the fact of such
resignation and the occurrence of casual
vacancy by reason of such resignation in the
Gazette;
(ii) if not satisfied about its genuineness, not
accept the resignation for reasons to be
recorded in writing.
(3) If it appears to the Divisional
Commissioner that any Councillor having
become liable for removal under Section 19
has tendered his resignation to escape such
removal, then notwithstanding anything
contained in this section, the Divisional
Commissioner may order his removal in
accordance with the provisions of the said
section and thereupon the Councillor shall be
deemed to have been removed from the date
he resigned his office.”
90. A bare perusal of Section 23 of the Act of 1956 makes it manifest
that the resignation of the Speaker or a Councillor does not
become effective merely upon submission of a written resignation.
The statutory scheme envisages a complete procedure whereby
the resignation is first tendered in writing to the Mayor, who is
required to forward the same to the Divisional Commissioner.
Upon receipt of such resignation, the Divisional Commissioner is
55
under a statutory obligation to satisfy himself as to its
genuineness. It is only upon recording such satisfaction and
accepting the resignation that the Divisional Commissioner is
required to notify the fact of acceptance and the resultant casual
vacancy in the Official Gazette. Conversely, if the Divisional
Commissioner is not satisfied about the genuineness of the
resignation, he is empowered to refuse acceptance by recording
reasons in writing. Sub-section (3) further confers a special power
upon the Divisional Commissioner to decline to give effect to a
resignation where it appears that the Councillor has tendered the
same with a view to escaping removal under Section 19, and
instead to proceed with removal in accordance with law. Thus, the
legislative intent is clear that a resignation under Section 23
attains legal efficacy only upon its acceptance by the Divisional
Commissioner after due satisfaction regarding its genuineness
and the consequential notification in the Official Gazette; until
such statutory requirements are fulfilled, the resignation cannot be
said to have become operative in the eyes of law.
91. Equally significant is the scheme of Section 23(3) of the Act of
1956. The said provision makes it abundantly clear that once a
Councillor incurs the statutory disqualification and an order of
removal is passed by the competent authority, the office held by
such Councillor cannot continue to remain occupied. The
inevitable consequence is that the seat falls vacant and the
vacancy is required to be filled in accordance with the election law
56
by the competent Election Commission. Thus, Sections 19 and 23
operate in complete harmony with each other, while Section 19 of
the Act of 1956 identifies and adjudicates the statutory
disqualification, Section 23 of the Act of 1956 provides for the
legal consequence flowing from such adjudication. Both
provisions constitute an integrated statutory scheme intended to
maintain the purity of electoral representation in reserved
constituencies.
92. This Court is of the considered opinion that the expression “does
not belong to the reserved category” occurring in Section 19(1)(a-
1) of the Act of 1956 is of wide amplitude. It is not confined merely
to cases where the caste of a candidate is subsequently
invalidated by a Scrutiny Committee. The expression is wide
enough to include a situation where the very document on the
basis of which the candidate claimed eligibility is demonstrated to
be forged, fabricated or never issued by the competent authority.
To hold otherwise would defeat the very object sought to be
achieved by the Legislature and would permit an individual to
continue occupying a constitutionally reserved public office on the
strength of fraudulent documents until separate proceedings
before another authority attain finality. Such an interpretation
would not only frustrate the statutory object but would also
encourage abuse of the reservation policy.
93. Applying the aforesaid statutory scheme to the facts of the present
57
case, this Court finds that the Divisional Commissioner has
exercised the jurisdiction strictly within the four corners of Section
19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956. The proceedings were initiated
pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court in Writ Petition (C)
No.1015 of 2024. Notices were issued to all concerned parties;
adequate opportunity of hearing was afforded; documentary as
well as oral material was considered; and thereafter a categorical
finding of fact has been recorded that the social status certificate
relied upon by Mohammad Salman was never issued by the office
of the competent Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue). The
competent issuing authority itself has unequivocally stated that no
such caste certificate was ever issued in favour of Mohammad
Salman and that the particulars contained therein relate to an
altogether different person. The finding is further fortified by the
registration of FIR No.103 of 2024 alleging use of forged
documents.
94. Once the competent issuing authority itself disowns the issuance
of the caste certificate, the controversy no longer remains one
requiring verification of social status by the High Level Caste
Scrutiny Committee. The present case is fundamentally different
from a case where a genuine caste certificate is issued by the
competent authority but its correctness or validity is questioned.
Here, the very existence and genuineness of the certificate stand
demolished by the issuing authority itself. Therefore, the argument
that the matter ought to have been referred to the District Level
58
Verification Committee or the High Level Caste Scrutiny
Committee deserves outright rejection.
95. Accordingly, after the Divisional Commissioner passed the order
dated 06.05.2024 directing removal of Mohammad Salman from
the office of Councillor, the petitioner availed the statutory remedy
by preferring an appeal before the Secretary, Urban
Administration and Development Department, Government of
Chhattisgarh. The appellate authority re-appreciated the entire
material available on record including the report submitted by the
Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Durg, the documents relied
upon by Mohammad Salman and the findings recorded by the
Divisional Commissioner.
96. The appellate authority ultimately concurred with the findings
recorded by the Commissioner that the petitioner failed to
establish his entitlement to contest the election from an OBC
reserved constituency. It further recorded that the Social Status
Certificate relied upon by the petitioner was not traceable in the
official records and the competent authority had specifically
reported that no such certificate had ever been issued in favour of
Mohammad Salman. Consequently, the appellate authority
dismissed the appeal by order dated 04.09.2024. Therefore, both
the original authority as well as the appellate authority have
concurrently recorded findings of fact against Mohammad Salman
after granting full opportunity of hearing. It is well settled that
59
concurrent findings recorded by statutory authorities, particularly
findings based upon appreciation of documentary evidence, are
not liable to be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction unless
demonstrated to be perverse, arbitrary or wholly unsupported by
evidence. Upon careful examination of the records produced
before this Court, no such perversity is demonstrated.
97. The contention advanced on behalf of Mohammad Salman that
the entire proceedings were not maintainable and that the only
remedy available to the aggrieved parties was to institute an
election petition under Section 441 of the Act of 1956 does not
merit acceptance. This issue is no longer res integra.
98. It is pertinent to notice that even before the proceedings
culminating in the impugned order were initiated, Chandan Yadav
had approached this Court by filing Writ Petition (C) No.1015 of
2024 seeking consideration of his complaint regarding the
continuance of Mohammad Salman as Councillor despite his
alleged ineligibility to contest from the reserved seat. A Coordinate
Bench of this Court, by order dated 19.02.2024, while considering
the statutory scheme of Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956,
categorically held that where the allegation is that an elected
Councillor does not belong to the reserved category for which the
seat stood reserved, the statute itself provides a specific remedy
before the Divisional Commissioner.
99. The Co-ordinate Bench further distinguished such proceedings
60
from an election dispute under Section 441 of the Act of 1956.
The Court observed that a challenge to the validity of the electoral
process and an enquiry into statutory disqualification arising from
false claim of reserved status operate in entirely different fields.
While an election petition questions the legality of the election
process itself, proceedings under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of
1956 examine whether the elected person possessed the
essential eligibility prescribed by statute to continue in office.
100. The aforesaid distinction is of considerable significance. The
Legislature itself has consciously created two distinct remedies
dealing with two entirely different situations. Therefore, it is
impermissible to obliterate the statutory distinction by insisting that
every case involving fraudulent claim of reservation must
necessarily be tried only through an election petition.
101. The submission that the Divisional Commissioner lacked
jurisdiction to enquire into the caste status of Mohammad Salman
also deserves to be rejected. It is required to be appreciated that
the Commissioner has not undertaken an anthropological
determination of the caste of Mohammad Salman nor has he
adjudicated upon any disputed question relating to his genealogy
or ethnic origin. The enquiry conducted by the Commissioner was
confined to determining whether the petitioner had produced a
valid and legally issued social status certificate entitling him to
contest the election from an OBC reserved constituency.
61
102. The foundation of the petitioner’s eligibility rested entirely upon
one social status certificate bearing Revenue Case No.363/B-
121/2015-16 dated 15.06.2016. During enquiry, the competent
Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Durg, after verification of official
records, categorically reported that the said certificate had never
been issued from his office and that the concerned revenue case
number related to another individual altogether, namely Nomita
Deshmukh.
103. Once the issuing authority itself certifies that the document relied
upon by the elected candidate was never issued from its office,
the Commissioner was fully justified in concluding that the
petitioner had failed to establish his eligibility under Section 19(1)
(a-1) of the Act of 1956. Such an enquiry cannot be equated with
determination of caste by a Caste Scrutiny Committee.
104. The distinction between a case involving verification of an
admittedly issued caste certificate and a case involving a
document which is alleged never to have been issued by the
competent authority assumes decisive importance in the present
matter.
105. The elaborate procedure contemplated in Kumari Madhuri Patil
(supra) and subsequently incorporated in the Act of 2013 is
intended to examine the correctness of an existing caste
certificate validly issued by a competent authority. Such procedure
presupposes the existence of a genuine certificate requiring
62
verification. The present case stands on an entirely different
footing. Here, the competent revenue authority itself has
categorically certified that the caste certificate relied upon by
Mohammad Salman was never issued from its office.
Consequently, there existed no genuine certificate capable of
being referred to the District Level Verification Committee or the
High Level Caste Scrutiny Committee. In absence of an existing
certificate, the question of its verification simply does not arise.
106. The Divisional Commissioner as well as the appellate authority
have rightly relied upon this distinction while declining to refer the
matter to the High Level Caste Scrutiny Committee. This Court
finds no legal infirmity in the said approach. Acceptance of the
contrary argument would lead to an anomalous situation where
even documents found to be non-existent or fabricated in official
records would necessarily require reference to the Scrutiny
Committee, thereby defeating the purpose of the statutory
provisions and encouraging fraudulent claims to public office.
107. Having considered the statutory framework and the rival
submissions, this Court now proceeds to examine whether the
findings recorded by the Divisional Commissioner, as affirmed by
the appellate authority, suffer from any jurisdictional error,
perversity or patent illegality warranting interference under Article
226 of the Constitution of India.
108. From a careful perusal of the order dated 06.05.2024 passed by
63
the Divisional Commissioner, Durg Division, it is evident that the
authority did not proceed on mere suspicion or conjectures.
Rather, the proceedings were conducted after issuing notice to all
concerned parties, permitting them to file pleadings, affidavits and
documentary evidence and thereafter affording adequate
opportunity of hearing. The order demonstrates that the Divisional
Commissioner has dealt with every contention advanced on
behalf of Mohammad Salman and has assigned cogent reasons
while arriving at the conclusion that the petitioner had failed to
establish his eligibility to contest the election from a seat reserved
for the Other Backward Class category.
109. The principal basis of the claim of Mohammad Salman was the
Social Status Certificate purportedly issued by the Sub-Divisional
Officer (Revenue), Durg, bearing Revenue Case No.363/B-
121/2015-16 dated 15.06.2016. During the enquiry, the Divisional
Commissioner sought verification from the issuing authority itself.
The Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Durg, after examining the
original revenue records and Daaira Register maintained in the
office, categorically reported that the aforesaid certificate had
never been issued in favour of Mohammad Salman. On the
contrary, the revenue case number relied upon by him pertained
to another individual, namely Nomita Deshmukh, daughter of
Yuvraj Deshmukh. Thus, the very foundation on which
Mohammad Salman asserted his eligibility stood demolished by
the official records of the issuing authority itself.
64
110. The petitioner was afforded full opportunity to rebut the said
report. However, except making a general assertion that he
belonged to the Kunjda community, he failed to produce any
contemporaneous record issued by the competent authority
substantiating that the disputed social status certificate had in fact
been issued in his favour. No explanation worth acceptance was
forthcoming as to how the revenue case number relating to
another person came to be reflected on the certificate relied upon
by him. Such a serious discrepancy goes to the root of the matter
and strikes at the very legitimacy of the petitioner’s claim to
occupy a seat reserved for the OBC category.
111. Much emphasis was laid by the learned counsel appearing for
Mohammad Salman on the contention that the dispute essentially
related to the determination of his caste and, therefore, the
authorities ought to have referred the matter to the District Level
Verification Committee or the High Level Caste Scrutiny
Committee constituted under the Act of 2013. This submission,
though attractive at first blush, cannot withstand judicial scrutiny
when examined in the backdrop of the facts of the present case.
112. It is trite that the mechanism prescribed under the Act of 2013, as
well as the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra) is attracted where there exists a
social status certificate admittedly issued by the competent
authority and the correctness of the caste claim is required to be
65
verified. Such verification may involve examination of
genealogical records, anthropological traits, historical documents
and other relevant evidence. However, the present case does not
involve such an enquiry. Here, the issuing authority itself has
categorically stated that the certificate relied upon by Mohammad
Salman had never been issued from its office. Therefore, the
controversy is not whether Mohammad Salman actually belongs
to the Kunjda caste, but whether the document on the basis of
which he claimed eligibility to contest from a reserved
constituency is genuine at all.
113. These two issues operate in distinct legal fields. Where the
existence of the certificate itself is denied by the issuing authority,
the matter does not fall within the scope of “verification”
contemplated under the Act of 2013. A verification proceeding
presupposes the existence of a validly issued certificate. If the
official records themselves disclose that no such certificate ever
came into existence, there remains nothing which could be
referred to the Scrutiny Committee for verification.
114. The distinction has rightly been appreciated by the Divisional
Commissioner while placing reliance upon the decision of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court in Abhishek Agariya (supra), wherein
it has been held that cases involving non-existent or fabricated
certificates stand on an entirely different footing from cases
requiring verification of an existing certificate. This Court finds
66
itself in respectful agreement with the aforesaid principle.
115. The submission that the Commissioner could not have relied upon
the report submitted by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) also
deserves to be rejected. The Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue),
Durg, was none other than the competent authority maintaining
the original records relating to issuance of social status
certificates. The report submitted by such authority was based
upon verification of the official registers maintained in the ordinary
course of official business. Such public records enjoy a
presumption of correctness unless displaced by cogent evidence.
116. Significantly, Mohammad Salman did not produce any original
office record, dispatch register, certified extract or any
communication issued by the competent authority demonstrating
that the disputed certificate had actually been issued in his favour.
Nor did he seek production of any contrary official record capable
of discrediting the report submitted by the Sub-Divisional Officer.
117. In writ proceedings, this Court does not sit as an appellate
authority over factual findings recorded by statutory authorities.
Unless such findings are shown to be perverse, arbitrary or based
on no evidence whatsoever, interference would not be justified. In
the present case, the conclusions recorded by both the Divisional
Commissioner and the appellate authority are founded upon
official records maintained by the issuing authority and cannot be
characterised as either arbitrary or perverse. Consequently, this
67
Court finds no reason to substitute its own opinion for the
concurrent findings recorded by the authorities below.
118. The next contention urged on behalf of Mohammad Salman is that
the proceedings under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956 were
barred in view of the remedy of an election petition available
under Section 441 of the Act of 1956. This submission is equally
devoid of merit. The Coordinate Bench of this Court, while
deciding Writ Petition (C) No.1015 of 2024, has already examined
the very same objection and has categorically held that
proceedings under Section 19(1)(a-1) constitute an independent
statutory remedy intended to deal with cases where an elected
Councillor is alleged not to belong to the reserved category for
which the seat stood reserved. The distinction drawn by the
Coordinate Bench is both logical and legally sound.
119. An election petition ordinarily examines the legality of the election
process, improper acceptance or rejection of nomination, corrupt
practices or other grounds recognised by election law. On the
other hand, Section 19(1)(a-1) deals with a statutory
disqualification affecting the continuance of an elected Councillor
in office. The Legislature, being conscious of the importance of
preserving reservation in local bodies, has specifically empowered
the Divisional Commissioner to enquire into such questions
independently. If the argument of Mohammad Salman is
accepted, Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956 would become
68
redundant. Every case where a person occupies a reserved office
by producing false or invalid documents would necessarily be
relegated to the election tribunal, rendering the special statutory
mechanism enacted by the Legislature wholly otiose. Such an
interpretation cannot be accepted.
120. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that every
provision enacted by the Legislature must be given meaningful
effect and no provision should be interpreted in a manner that
renders it nugatory. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in
holding that proceedings under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of
1956 are independent of proceedings under Section 441 of the
Act of 1956 and both operate in separate spheres.
121. Viewed from another angle, acceptance of the petitioner’s
contention would have serious consequences upon the
constitutional scheme governing reservation in democratic
institutions. Reservation of seats in favour of Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes is intended to
secure meaningful political participation of the weaker sections of
society. Such constitutional protection cannot be permitted to be
diluted by allowing persons who fail to establish their eligibility to
continue occupying reserved offices merely on technical pleas
relating to jurisdiction.
122. The facts of the present case clearly reveal that Mohammad
Salman derived his eligibility to contest the election exclusively
69
from the social status certificate relied upon by him. Once the
competent authority itself reported that such certificate had never
been issued and the petitioner failed to establish otherwise
despite full opportunity, the inevitable consequence under Section
19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956 was that he could no longer continue
to occupy the reserved office of Councillor. This Court, therefore,
finds that both the Divisional Commissioner as well as the
appellate authority have correctly appreciated the statutory
provisions and the material placed on record. Their concurrent
finding that Mohammad Salman failed to establish his entitlement
to contest the election from the OBC reserved seat neither suffers
from perversity nor from any jurisdictional infirmity. Consequently,
the challenge laid to the orders dated 06.05.2024 and 04.09.2024
cannot be sustained.
123. Further, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
determination made by the High Level Caste Scrutiny Committee
with regard to the caste status of Mohammad Salman also cannot
be sustained in the present proceedings, as the issue involved
before this Court is not as to whether Mohammad Salman
belongs to any particular caste on the basis of any subsequent
enquiry conducted by the High Level Caste Scrutiny Committee,
but the real controversy revolves around the validity and
genuineness of the caste certificate submitted by Mohammad
Salman along with his nomination papers at the time of contesting
the election for the post of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda
70
Para, Bhilai.
124. The election of Mohammad Salman was based upon the caste
certificate produced by him claiming himself to be belonging to
Kunjda caste, which is included in the Other Backward Class
(OBC) category. Therefore, the relevant consideration before the
competent authority was whether the said caste certificate, on the
basis of which Mohammad Salman claimed reservation benefit
and contested the election from a reserved category seat, was
genuine, valid and issued in accordance with the prescribed
procedure or not.
125. The subsequent exercise undertaken by the High Level Caste
Scrutiny Committee for determination of caste status of
Mohammad Salman cannot substitute or cure the illegality
attached to the caste certificate which was produced at the time of
filing nomination papers. The eligibility of a candidate to contest
an election from a reserved category seat has to be examined on
the basis of the statutory requirements and documents submitted
by such candidate at the relevant point of time. If the very
foundation, i.e. the caste certificate relied upon by the candidate,
is found to be invalid or forged, the consequences prescribed
under the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 would
automatically follow.
126. The High Level Caste Scrutiny Committee is empowered to verify
the caste status of an individual; however, such determination has
71
to be made strictly in accordance with the statutory procedure and
by considering the relevant material placed before it. In the
present case, since the controversy before this Court pertains to
the legality of the caste certificate produced along with nomination
papers and the consequential disqualification arising therefrom,
the determination made by the High Level Caste Scrutiny
Committee does not have any bearing on the issue which is
required to be adjudicated in the present writ petition. The
question before this Court is confined to examining whether
Mohammad Salman had validly claimed the benefit of reservation
on the basis of a genuine caste certificate at the time of election
and whether the subsequent action taken by the competent
authority under the Act of 1956 suffers from any illegality or not.
127. The second issue which falls for consideration before this Court is
regarding the validity of the subsequent election process initiated
for filling up the vacancy caused due to removal of Mohammad
Salman from the office of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para,
Bhilai.
128. From the material available on record, it is evident that after
passing of the order of removal of Mohammad Salman under
Section 23(3) of the Act of 1956, the Election Commissioner
initiated proceedings for conducting a fresh election for filling up
the vacant seat of Councillor. However, the fact regarding initiation
of such election proceedings was not brought to the notice of this
72
Court when the order dated 28.01.2025 was passed.
129. It is an admitted position that the order dated 28.01.2025 passed
by this Court was limited in its scope, whereby the effect and
operation of the orders dated 06.05.2024 and 04.09.2024 passed
by the Commissioner were stayed. The said interim order was
passed in relation to the challenge made to the removal
proceedings initiated against Mohammad Salman and did not
prohibit or restrain the statutory authorities from taking steps for
conducting an election to fill up a vacancy which had already
occurred on account of removal of an elected Councillor.
130. Once the office of Councillor became vacant, the Election
Commissioner, being the authority empowered under the relevant
provisions of law, was required to initiate the election process for
filling up the said vacancy. The initiation of election proceedings
and conduct of election thereafter fall within the exclusive domain
of the election authorities.
131. It is a settled principle of law that once the election process has
commenced, the constitutional bar contained under Article 329 of
the Constitution of India comes into operation and the Courts
ordinarily cannot interfere with the electoral process. Article 329(b)
of the Constitution of India specifically provides that no election to
Parliament or State Legislature shall be called in question except
by an election petition, and the said principle has consistently
been extended to ensure that the election process, once set in
73
motion, reaches its logical conclusion without judicial interference.
132. The object behind such constitutional restriction is to prevent
disruption of the election process and to ensure that the
democratic exercise is completed in accordance with law.
Therefore, once the election proceedings for Ward No.35, Sharda
Para, Bhilai were initiated by the competent authority, this Court
cannot examine the legality of such proceedings in the present
writ jurisdiction.
133. In view of the aforesaid legal position, the election conducted for
filling up the vacant post of Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda
Para, Bhilai and the consequential declaration of Chandan Yadav
as elected Councillor without contest cannot be said to be illegal
or contrary to law. The order dated 28.01.2025 did not operate as
a bar against conducting a fresh election, as the vacancy had
arisen due to the statutory consequence of removal of
Mohammad Salman and the election process was initiated by the
competent election authority in accordance with law. Accordingly,
this Court is of the considered opinion that the election process
initiated for filling up the vacant seat of Councillor of Ward No.35,
Sharda Para, Bhilai could not have been interdicted by this Court
in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, particularly in view of the constitutional mandate contained
under Article 329 of the Constitution of India.
134. Once the caste certificate relied upon by Mohammad Salman for
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claiming reservation benefit as a candidate belonging to Kunjda
caste (OBC category) was found to be forged and invalid, the
consequential action taken by the competent authority cannot be
faulted. The submission of an invalid caste certificate for obtaining
benefit of reservation strikes at the very root of the eligibility of a
candidate to contest from a reserved category seat.
135. The principal contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is
that once the petitioner had produced a Social Status Certificate
claiming that he belonged to the Kunjda caste (OBC), neither the
learned Divisional Commissioner nor the Sub-Divisional Officer
(Revenue), Durg, could have recorded any adverse finding
regarding the validity of the said certificate. According to the
petitioner, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra), the question relating to
the correctness or validity of a caste certificate can be adjudicated
only by the competent Caste Scrutiny Committee constituted
under the Chhattisgarh Social Status Certification Act, 2013. It is,
therefore, contended that the report dated 07.03.2024 submitted
by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Durg, stating that the
caste certificate relied upon by the petitioner was not traceable in
the official records and stood recorded in the name of another
person, was wholly without jurisdiction and could not have formed
the sole basis for passing the order dated 06.05.2024 removing
the petitioner from office of Councillor under Section 19(1)(a-1) of
the Act of 1956.
75
136. The aforesaid submission, though attractive at first blush, cannot
be accepted in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
The procedure contemplated in Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra)
comes into operation where a caste certificate has in fact been
issued by the competent authority and the dispute pertains to
verification of the social status of the holder of such certificate.
However, the present case stands on an entirely different footing.
The report submitted by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue),
Durg, categorically records that the alleged caste certificate
bearing Case No.363/B-121/2015-16 dated 15.06.2016, relied
upon by the petitioner, was not found entered in the relevant
Daaira Register in the name of Mohammad Salman; rather, the
corresponding entry related to one Nomita Deshmukh, daughter
of Yuvraj Deshmukh.
137. Thus, the issue was not merely one of verification of caste status,
but of the very existence and genuineness of the document relied
upon by the petitioner. Once the issuing authority itself certified
that no such certificate had ever been issued in favour of the
petitioner, the matter ceased to be one requiring adjudication by
the Caste Scrutiny Committee under the principles laid down in
Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra). In such circumstances, the
competent authority was fully justified in reporting that the
document relied upon by the petitioner was not a genuine caste
certificate, and the learned Divisional Commissioner was
competent to consider such material while exercising jurisdiction
76
under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956 for determining
whether the petitioner possessed the essential eligibility to contest
the election from a ward reserved for the Other Backward Class
category.
138. It is well settled that there exists a clear distinction between a
false social status certificate and a non-genuine or fabricated
social status certificate. A false certificate is one which has in fact
been issued by the competent authority, but its issuance has been
procured by the applicant by suppressing material facts or by
furnishing incorrect or misleading information regarding his caste
or social status. In such cases, the document is a genuine official
certificate, though its procurement is alleged to be fraudulent,
thereby requiring verification by the competent Caste Scrutiny
Committee. On the other hand, where the competent authority
itself certifies that the alleged caste certificate was never issued
from its office or that the particulars contained therein do not
correspond with the official records maintained by it, the dispute is
not merely one of verification of social status but relates to the
very authenticity and existence of the document relied upon by
the claimant.
139. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case,
it is evident that the report dated 07.03.2024 submitted by the
Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Durg, categorically records that
the Social Status Certificate bearing Case No.363/B-121/2015-16
77
dated 15.06.2016, relied upon by the petitioner Mohammad
Salman, was not entered in the relevant Daaira Register in his
name. On verification of the official records, the corresponding
entry was found recorded in the name of Nomita Deshmukh,
daughter of Yuvraj Deshmukh. Thus, the competent authority itself
reported that no such caste certificate had ever been issued in
favour of the petitioner. In such circumstances, the controversy
did not relate to verification of the petitioner’s caste status on the
basis of a validly issued certificate, but to the genuineness of the
very document relied upon by him for contesting the election from
a ward reserved for the Other Backward Class category.
140. Once the issuing authority itself reports that the alleged caste
certificate was never issued from its office and that the official
records do not support the petitioner’s claim, the question of
referring such a document to the District Level or High Power
Caste Scrutiny Committee does not arise. The mechanism
contemplated in Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra) is attracted only
where a caste certificate has been issued by the competent
authority and the dispute concerns verification of the social status
of its holder. The said procedure cannot be invoked where the
very issuance of the certificate is denied by the issuing authority
itself. Therefore, the learned Divisional Commissioner committed
no jurisdictional error in acting upon the report of the Sub-
Divisional Officer (Revenue), Durg, while exercising powers under
Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956, for determining whether the
78
petitioner possessed the statutory eligibility to contest the election
from an OBC reserved constituency.
141. The petitioner has also sought to contend that the issue relating to
his social status ought to have been referred to the competent
Caste Scrutiny Committee under the provisions of the Act of 2013.
However, except making such a contention, no material has been
placed on record to demonstrate that the petitioner’s Social Status
Certificate was ever pending for verification before the competent
Scrutiny Committee or that any proceedings in that regard had
been initiated. In the absence of any documentary material
substantiating such a plea, the contention remains a mere
assertion and cannot dislodge the findings recorded by the
competent authorities on the basis of the official records.
Consequently, this Court finds no merit in the submission that the
impugned orders are vitiated for want of reference to the Caste
Scrutiny Committee.
142. The provisions of Section 19(1)(a-1) of the Act of 1956 provide for
disqualification in case a person is found to have been elected on
the basis of false or invalid caste claim, whereas Section 23(3) of
the Act of 1956 empowers the competent authority to remove
such Councillor from office in accordance with law. Therefore,
once the foundational document, i.e. the caste certificate, is found
to be forged, the statutory consequences prescribed under the Act
are bound to follow.
79
143. The subsequent election conducted for filling up the vacancy
created due to removal of Mohammad Salman was not only
permissible but was a statutory requirement to ensure continuity
of representation of the Ward. The election of Chandan Yadav as
Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Bhilai was conducted in
accordance with the procedure prescribed under law and there is
no illegality warranting interference by this Court.
144. Accordingly, having considered the entire factual and legal
position, this Court finds no merit in the challenge raised by
Mohammad Salman. Consequently, Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of
2024 is hereby dismissed.
145. As a consequence of dismissal of Writ Petition (C) No.5555 of
2024, the challenge made to the subsequent election conducted
for Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Bhilai does not survive. The
election conducted by the competent authority pursuant to the
vacancy caused due to removal of Mohammad Salman was valid
and in accordance with the provisions of law. Therefore, the claim
raised by Chandan Yadav in Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025
deserves acceptance.
146. The subsequent election having been conducted in accordance
with the statutory provisions and there being no legal impediment
in declaration of the result, Chandan Yadav has rightly been
declared elected as Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para,
Bhilai.
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147. Accordingly, Writ Petition (C) No.1808 of 2025 filed by Chandan
Yadav is hereby allowed and it is held that the election of
Chandan Yadav as Councillor of Ward No.35, Sharda Para, Bhilai
is valid and in accordance with law.
148. There shall be no order as to costs.
Sd/–
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Yogesh
The date when the The date when the The date when the judgment is
judgment is judgment is uploaded on the website
reserved pronounced
Operative Full
07.07.2026 03.08.2026 ------ 03.08.2026
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Head-Note
Removal of an elected Councillor from a reserved seat on the
basis of a Social Status Certificate found to have never been issued by
the competent authority and where the issuing authority itself disowns
the certificate, reference to the Caste Scrutiny Committee under the Act
of 2013 is not required. The Divisional Commissioner is competent to
determine the statutory disqualification under Section 19(1)(a-1) of the
Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, and the consequential
election cannot be interfered with once the election process has
commenced.
