Orissa High Court
Bhagaban Majhi vs Mohandas Majhi on 27 July, 2026
Author: V. Narasingh
Bench: V. Narasingh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) NO.10541 of 2026
(An application under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India).
Bhagaban Majhi .... Petitioner
-versus-
1.
Mohandas Majhi …. Opposite Parties
2. Purnochandra Majhi
For Petitioner : Ms. S. Srivastava, Advocate
For Opposite Parties : Mr. M. K. Panda, Advocate
CORAM: JUSTICE V. NARASINGH
DATE OF FINAL HEARING : 20.07.2026
DATE OF JUDGEMENT : 27.07.2026
V. Narasingh, J. Heard Ms. Srivastava, learned
counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. M. K. Panda,
learned counsel for the Opposite Parties.
1. This writ petition has been filed assailing the
order dated 27.01.2026 by which the District Judge,
acting as the Appellate Authority in terms of Section
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W.P.(C) No.10541 of 2026
38(4)1 of the Orissa Gram Panchayats Act, 1964
(hereinafter referred to as “the OGP Act”) in
essence did not approve the office note of the office
of the District Judge stating that there has been
delay of “two days” in presentation of the appeal.
2. The brief facts germane for just adjudication
runs thus:-
The Opposite Party No.1, as the Election
Petitioner, had assailed the election of the present
Petitioner as Sarpanch of Naikatiguda Gram
Panchayat, Kashipur Block by filing Election Petition
No.6 of 2022, inter alia, on the ground that the
Petitioner had incurred the disqualification to
contest such election in terms of Section 25(1)(v)2
1
38. Decision of Civil Judge (Junior Division) :-
(1) to (3) xxx xxx xxx
(4) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Civil Judge (Junior
Division) may within thirty days from the date of the order, prefer
an appeal in such manner as may be prescribed before the
Disdtrict Judge having jurisdiction who shall after giving the
parties an opportunity of being heard, confirm, reverse, alter or
modify the order of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) and pending
disposal of such appeal may direct stay of operation of the said
order.
2
25. Disqualification for membership of Grama Panchayat
:- (1) A person shall be disqualified for being elected or
nominated as, a Sarpanch or any other member of the Grama
Panchayat constituted under this Act, if he- (a) to (u) xxx
xxx xxx
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W.P.(C) No.10541 of 2026
of the OGP Act, having more than two children after
the cut-off date. The Election Tribunal, that is, the
Civil Judge (Junior Division), Rayagada, by
judgment dated 14.07.2025, dismissed Election
Petition No.6 of 2022.
2-A. Assailing the same, the Opposite Party-
Election Petitioner filed Election Appeal No.2 of
2025 in terms of Section 38(4)1 of the Act, 1964.
2-B. A note was put up by the office of the District
Judge (Appellate Court) stating that there had been
delay of two days in presentation of the appeal.
Such office note, pointing out the delay of
two days, having been found to be without any
foundation, the Appellate Court having ignored such
delay by the impugned order dated 27.01.2026, the
present writ petition has been preferred, as already
noted.
(v) has more than two Children :
Provided that the disqualification under Clause (v) shall not
apply to any person who has more than two Children on the date
of commencement of the Orissa Grama Panchayats (Amendment)
Act, 1994 or, as the case may be, within a period of one year of
such commencement, unless he begets an additional child after
the said period of one year.
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W.P.(C) No.10541 of 2026
3. To fortify her submission, Ms. Srivastava,
learned counsel for the Petitioner, relies on the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Suman
Devi v. Manisha Devi3 as well as in the case of K.
Venkateswara Rao v. Bekkam Narasimha
Reddi4.
3-A. Referring to the said judgments, it is
submitted by the learned counsel for the Petitioner
that the OGP Act, being a self-contained Code and
there being no provision for condoning the delay or
extending the period of limitation as prescribed
under Section 38(4) of the Act, 1964, the
provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 ipso facto
does not apply.
3-B. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer
to the judgments cited by the learned counsel for
the Petitioner.
3.-B(i). It is trite that every decision turns on its
own facts. While relying on the aforementioned
3
Suman Devi v. Manisha Devi, (2018) 9 SCC 808,
4
K. Venkateswara Rao v. Bekkam Narasimha Reddi, 1968 SCC
OnLine SC 285
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W.P.(C) No.10541 of 2026
judgments, such salutary principle appears to have
escaped the attention of the learned counsel for the
Petitioner, in as much as in Suman Devi (supra)3
the Supreme Court was dealing with a case in
which an application had been filed under Sections
55 and 146 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking
exclusion of the period spent between the filing of
the earlier proceeding and the decision permitting
5
5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.–Any
appeal or any application, other than an application under any of
the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the
appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient
cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application
within such period.
6
14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court
without jurisdiction.–(1) In computing the period of limitation
for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been
prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether
in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the
defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the
same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court
which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature,
is unable to entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the
time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due
diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first
instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the
same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is
prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of
jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain
it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order XXIII
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of
sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on
permission granted by the court under Rule 1 of that Order,
where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit
must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or
other cause of a like nature.
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W.P.(C) No.10541 of 2026
its withdrawal while computing limitation for
institution of a fresh election petition of a Ward
Councilor under the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act,
1994. In that context, the Apex Court held that,
considering the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994
to be a complete Code, the period of thirty days
prescribed for filing an election petition could not be
extended by application of Section 146 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. And, the Apex Court relied
upon its earlier judgment in Charan Lal Sahu v.
Nandkishore Bhatt7 and held that there is no
common law right to challenge an election since it
is strictly regulated by the terms of the statute. The
right being statutory, the terms of the statute must
be complied with strictly.
3-B(ii). The judgment relied upon in K.
Venkateswara Rao (supra)4 laid down the law
that the Limitation Act cannot apply for condonation
of delay in an Election Petition.
7
Charan Lal Sahu v. Nandkishore Bhatt, (1973) 2 SCC 530
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W.P.(C) No.10541 of 2026
In paragraphs 12 and in 18 thereof, it was
held as under:-
"xxx xxx xxx
12...............In our opinion however the
Limitation Act cannot apply to proceedings
like an election petition in as much as the
Representation of the People Act is a
complete and self-contained code which does
not admit of the introduction of the principles
or the provisions of law contained in the
Indian Limitation Act.
xxx xxx xxx
18. It is to be noted however that even
though the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 does
not apply to an election petition provisions
like Sections 98 and 109 of the General
8
9. Commencement and termination of time.–(1) In
any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of
this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first
in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word
“from”, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of
days or any other period of time, to use the word “to”.
(2) This section applies also to all Central Acts made after the
third day of January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or
after the fourteenth day of January, 1887
9
10. Computation of time.–(1) Where, by any Central Actor
Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any act or
proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any Court
or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if
the Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the
prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as
done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day
afterwards on which the Court or office is open:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or
proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, applies.
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W.P.(C) No.10541 of 2026
Clauses Act, 1897 providing for computation
of time which are in pari materia with
Sections 12(1)10 and 411 of the Limitation Act
would apply to such a petition.”
(Emphasized)
4. Reliance on the aforementioned judgments of
the Apex Court by the learned counsel for the
Petitioner is untenable in the factual matrix of the
case at hand, which would be evident from the
subsequent paragraphs of this judgment.
(2) This section applies also to all Central Acts and
Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January,
1887.
10
12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.–(1) In
computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or
application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned,
shall be excluded.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an
application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a
judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was
pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the
decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised
or reviewed shall be excluded.
(3) Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be
revised or reviewed, or where an application is made for leave to
appeal from a decree or order, the time requisite for obtaining a
copy of the judgment shall also be excluded.
(4) In computing the period of limitation for an application to set
aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the
award shall be excluded.
11
4. Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed.–
Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application
expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or
application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when
the court reopens.
Page 8 of 15
W.P.(C) No.10541 of 2026
5. The observations of the Apex Court in K.
Venkateswara Rao (supra)4 have a direct
bearing on the point in issue, in as much as the
Apex Court has succinctly observed that, in
considering an appeal, the High Court would
exercise the same powers as were available to it in
an appeal from a decree of a subordinate Court,
and to such an appeal the provisions of Section 1210
of the Limitation Act would necessarily “stand
attracted”.
6. In both the cases, the law has been settled
that where a specific period of limitation has been
prescribed, Section 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963
cannot be read into it. There cannot be any qualm
with such proposition of law that Section 55, as
such, has no application to proceedings under the
OGP Act, which is a self-contained Code.
7. Hence, the finding of the learned
Appellate Court in the impugned order that
“Section 55 of the Limitation Act can be safely
applied to the special statue of the Act, 1964
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W.P.(C) No.10541 of 2026
is” untenable. The stand of the learned
counsel for the petitioner on this count
succeeds.
In the case at hand, admittedly the judgment
passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division)
dismissing Election Petition No.6 of 2022 was
pronounced on 14.07.2025 and, in terms of Section
38(4)1 of the Act, 1964, the appeal was required to
be filed within thirty days from the date of the
order.
It is borne out from the record, and it is also
not disputed, that the certified copy of the
judgment was applied for on 31.07.2025 and was
delivered on 02.08.2025.
As such, the Opposite Party-Election
Petitioner was entitled to exclusion of four days for
computing the period of limitation. If such four days
are excluded in the light of Section 38(4)1 of the
Act, 1964, the appeal was required to be presented
on 15.08.2025. Since the said day was a holiday,
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W.P.(C) No.10541 of 2026
being Independence Day, the appeal was instituted
on 16.08.2025.
Therefore, the learned Appellate Court,
relying on Section 411 of the Limitation Act, came to
the conclusion that the appeal, having been
preferred on 16.08.2025, was not barred by
limitation and that the office note was
misconceived.
8. The learned counsel for the Petitioner urged
with vehemence that no explanation has been given
as to why the Opposite Party-Election Petitioner did
not apply for the certified copy with promptitude, in
as much as, though the order was passed on
14.07.2025, the copy thereof was not applied for
till 31.07.2025. Hence, it is submitted that the
exclusion of the period taken for grant of the
certified copy for computation of period of limitation
ought not to inure to the benefit of the Opposite
Party-Election Petitioner.
The exclusion of the period taken for
obtaining the copy of the judgment has its
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W.P.(C) No.10541 of 2026
moorings in Section 12(2)10 of the Limitation Act,
1963.
9. On a conspectus of the material on record in
the light of Section 12(2)10 of the Limitation Act,
this Court does not find any infirmity in the learned
Appellate Court excluding the period taken for grant
of the certified copy from the prescribed period of
limitation in terms of Section 38(4)1 of the Act,
1964.
10. It is trite that such period could not have
been excluded for the benefit of the Opposite Party-
Election Petitioner had he not applied for the
certified copy within the period of thirty days
prescribed under Section 38(4)1 of the Act, 1964 for
preferring the appeal.
Hence, this Court does not find any infirmity
in the order passed by the learned Appellate Court
in coming to the conclusion that, in the facts of the
Page 12 of 15
W.P.(C) No.10541 of 2026
present case, Sections 312 and 55 of the Limitation
Act have no application.
11. Taking into account the period to be excluded
from the period of limitation as prescribed under
Section 38(4)1 of the OGP Act, in the backdrop of
the operation of Sections 411 and 12(2)10 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 there is no infirmity in the
impugned order passed by the learned District
Judge that Sections 312 and 55 of the Limitation Act,
12
3. Bar of limitation.–(1) Subject to the provisions contained
in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal
preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall
be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a
defence.
(2) For the purposes of this Act,–
(a) a suit is instituted,–
(i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the
proper officer;
(ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue
as a pauper is made; and
(iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is being
wound up by the court, when the claimant first sends in his
claim to the official liquidator;
(b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter-claim, shall be
treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been
instituted–
(i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in which
the set-off is pleaded;
(ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which the
counter claim is made in court;
(c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made
when the application is presented to the proper officer of that
court.
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W.P.(C) No.10541 of 2026
1963 , as such, need not come into play in the case
at hand.
Merely because the Petitioner has filed an
application seeking condonation of delay of 2 days
as per the office note that does not ipso facto lend
legitimacy to the office note pointing out the delay,
which, on the face of it is not tenable in the light of
the discussion made above.
The writ petition, being devoid of merit,
stands dismissed.
12. Interim order stands vacated.
13. The learned Appellate Court is called upon to
expedite the hearing of the appeal. To cut short any
further delay, both sides are called upon to appear
before the learned District Judge within a period of
one week from the date of uploading of this order
and upon such appearance, the Appellate Court in
seisin of the matter shall make an endeavour to
dispose of the appeal within a period of one month
from the date of such appearance.
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W.P.(C) No.10541 of 2026
14. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of
subject to the aforementioned direction relating to
disposal of the appeal. Costs made easy.
(V. Narasingh)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
Dated the 27th July, 2026/Jina
28.07.2026/ Uploaded
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: JINA DIGAL Page 15 of 15
Reason: Authentication
W.P.(C) No.10541 of 2026
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 28-Jul-2026 19:55:31
