Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
R.P. Meena vs Jodhpur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. on 23 July, 2026
Author: Nupur Bhati
Bench: Nupur Bhati
[2026:RJ-JP:34127]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
AT JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14652/2026
CNR: RJHC010673722026 | URN: CW / 26728U / 2026
R.P. Meena S/o Shri Kalyan Sahay Meena, Aged About 45 Years,
R/o Devenwada, Tehsil And District Dausa Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Jodhpur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd., New Power House
Road, Jodhpur Rajasthan, Through Its Managing Director.
2. Secretary (Administration), Jodhpur Discom, New Power
House Road, Jodhpur Rajasthan
3. Assistant Engineer-Ii (O And M), Jodhpur Vidhyut Vitaran
Nigam Ltd. Sri Dungargarh, District Bikaner Rajasthan.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. G.R. Punia, Sr. Advocate assisted
by Mr. Mahendra Godara
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Mehul Kothari.
Mr. Tabish Samdani, R-3.
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE NUPUR BHATI
Order
23/07/2026
1. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with the following
prayers:
“It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this
writ petition may kindly be allowed with cost and by an
appropriate order or directions:-
(i) That the order dated 10.07.2026 (Annex.-2) may be
declared illegal quo the petitioner; and
(ii) Any other appropriate relief which this Hon’ble Court
deems just and proper in the facts and circumstances of
the case, in favour of the petitioner, may kindly be
granted to him.”
2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was initially
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appointed as Junior Engineer on 12.05.2010 and was
subsequently promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer, during
which period he was transferred to various places. Vide order
dated 14.01.2025 (Sr.No.161), he was transferred from Bikaner
to Sri Dungargarh and, within a period of less than two years, he
has again been transferred from Sri Dungargarh to Bikaner vide
order dated 10.07.2026 (Sr.No.126). Being aggrieved by the
impugned transfer order dated 10.07.2026 (Annex.2), the
petitioner has preferred the present writ petition challenging the
same.
3. Learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner submits
that the respondents vide order dated 10.07.2026 (Annex.2),
have transferred the petitioner from the post of AEN (O&M), Sri
Dungargarh-II, District Bikaner to AEN (Protection) Bikaner. He
submits that the petitioner has been transferred, within a period
of less than two years as the petitioner, vide order dated
14.01.2025 (Annex.1), was transferred from AEN (RDSS)
Bikaner to AEN (O&M-II), Sri Dungargarh. He submits that the
impugned order dated 10.07.2026 (Annex.2) is in grave violation
to the Transfer Policy dated 28.11.2017, which has been
approved by the Board of Directors and is in force since
01.04.2018.
4. While drawing attention of this Court towards the policy,
learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner submits that
Clause No.2 of the policy stipulates the tenure of stay of an
employee on a post; wherein, ordinarily, an employee shall not
be transferred before completing two years and in case he is
required to be transferred before the completion of two years,
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the said can be given effect only in certain contingencies,
however, the petitioner’s case does not fall in any of the
contingencies laid down in the policy and despite that the
respondents have transferred the petitioner.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the
order dated 25.08.2022 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this
Court passed in the case of Brijnandan Kumar Gupta v.
JDVVNL & Anr. : SBCWP No.11111/2022, order dated
24.11.2025 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court at Jaipur
Bench in the case of Hargovind Meena v. Secretary, School
Education & Ors. : SBCWP No.17757/2025 decided on
24.11.2025 and the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Bhika Ram v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. : 2025 0
Supreme SC 2098.
6. Counsel representing the respondents submits that the
transfer policy, relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner, is not statutory in nature and the transfers have been
made on account of administrative exigency. He further submits
that the respondent No.3 has joined at the place of the petitioner
and thus no indulgence ought to be granted to the petitioner. He
further submits that the case of Brijnandan Kumar Gupta
(supra), relied upon by the petitioner, is not applicable in the
present case, as the transfer policy is not having statutory force
and is purely administrative in nature and the respondents are
not bound to follow the transfer policy. He also submits that a
huge number of employees have been transferred vide order
dated 10.07.2026 on account of administrative exigency.
7. In support of their contentions, counsel representing the
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respondents place reliance upon the following judgments
rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of: Sri Pubi
Lombi v. The State of Arunanchal Pradesh & Ors. reported
in 2024 Supreme(Online)SC 4481 and Union of India &
Ors. v. S.L. Abbas reported in 1993 SC 2444.
8. I have heard and considered the submissions advanced by
counsel representing the parties, perused the material available
on record and have also gone through the judgments cited at
Bar.
9. As per the transfer policy relied upon by the petitioner,
ordinarily an employee shall not be transferred before
completion of two years’ period, however, there are certain
contingencies based on which, the employee can be transferred
even before completion of period of two years. It is an admitted
position that the case of the petition does not fall in the
contingencies laid down in the transfer policy. It is important to
note that the use of the expression ‘ordinarily’ manifests that the
transfer policy is directory and not mandatory. Being an
executive instruction, lacking statutory force, it serves as an
administrative guideline and does not confer an enforceable legal
right upon an employee or impose a statutory obligation upon
the employer. Further, it is also seen that the petitioner was
transferred vide order dated 14.01.2025 (Annex.1) from Bikaner
to Sri Dungargarh, District Bikaner; whereafter, vide impugned
order dated 10.07.2026 (Annex.2), the petitioner has been
transferred from Sri Dungargarh-II to AEN (Protection) Bikaner.
Thus, apparently, the petitioner has not been posted out of
Bikaner vide both the transfer orders.
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10. This Court finds that the case of Bhika Ram (supra), relied
upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, cannot be
said to be applicable in the instant case, as the same pertained
to the directions issued by the Rural Development and
Panchayati Raj Department, Government of Rajasthan for
redemarcation and creation of the new panchayats and
panchayat samitis under Section 9, 10 and 101 of the Rajasthan
Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. The decision rendered in the case of
Brijnandan Kumar Gupta (supra), relied upon by the petitioner,
is distinguishable as the transfer policy in question is merely an
executive/administrative guideline and does not have any
statutory force.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner while placing reliance
upon order dated 24.11.2025 passed in Hargovind Meena v.
Secretary, School Education Department, Rajasthan,
Bikaner & Ors. (SBCWP No.17757/2025) submitted that the
Coordinate Bench of this Court allowed the writ petition taking
into consideration that the State has made mass transfers of the
teachers in the month of September 2025. However, from the
perusal of the order passed in Hargovind Meena (supra), it
transpires that the sole consideration of the Court while allowing
the writ petition was that such mass transfer of the teachers
carried out in the month of September 2025 would gravelly
impact/affect the future of the students and also the aspiration
of the parents, who cannot afford private public school for their
children in the mid of education session. It is also important to
note that said writ petition was filed against the order dated
04.11.2025 passed in Appeal No.4387/2025, wherein the stay
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application filed by the petitioner therein, was dismissed by the
learned Rajasthan Administrative Tribunal and the appeal was
still pending before the Tribunal. The Coordinate Bench while
staying transfer orders directed the learned Tribunal to dispose
of the appeal in an expeditious manner. However, upon a query
being made to the counsel for the petitioner about the outcome
of Appeal No.4387/2025; he submitted that he is not in a
position to apprise the Court of the same.
12. This Court also takes into consideration the judgment
passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.L. Abbas
(supra), wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the
guideline does not confer upon a government employee, a legal
enforceable right and executive instructions issued by the
government are in the nature of guidelines and do not have
statutory force. Relevant para(s) of the judgment passed in the
case of S.L. Abbas (supra), is reproduced hereunder:
“6. An order of transfer is an incident of Government
service. Fundamental Rule 11 says that “the whole time
of a Government servant is at the disposal of the
Government which pays him and he may be employed in
any manner required by proper authority”. Fundamental
Rule 15 says that “the President may transfer a
Government servant from one post to another. That the
respondent is liable to transfer anywhere in India is not
in dispute. It is not the case of the respondent that the
order of his transfer is vitiated by mala fides on the part
of the authority making the order, though the Tribunal
does say so merely because certain guidelines issued by
the Central Government are not followed, with which
finding we shall deal later. The respondent attributed
“mischief” to his immediate superior who had nothing to
do with his transfer. All he says is that he should not be
transferred because his wife is working at Shillong, his
children are studying there and also because his health
had suffered a setback some time ago. He relies upon
certain executive instructions – issued by the Government
in that behalf. Those instructions are in the nature of(Uploaded on 26/07/2026 at 06:51:48 PM)
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13. This Court also take into consideration the judgment dated
16.06.2026 passed in DBSAW No.483/2026 : Union of India
& Ors. v. Sqn. Ldr. Deepak Sindhu; wherein Union of India
had laid a challenge to order passed by learned Single Judge
quashing the transfer order on the ground that the Transfer
Policy was not statutory in nature, and the respondent/writ-
petitioner, serving as Sqn. Leader in Indian Air Force, could be
posted anywhere beyond the Transfer Policy and taking into
consideration the said fact, the intra-court appeal was allowed.
The relevant paragraphs of the judgment passed by Division
Bench of this Court reads as under:
“24. The policy in question cannot be construed as
possessing binding statutory force or creating an
enforceable legal mandate, but is merely in the nature of
administrative guidelines intended to regulate internal
governance and operational management. The Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others v. S.L.
Abbas, (1993) 4 SCC 357 deliberated upon the issue as
to legal significance of the policy in question. The relevant
para is reproduced hereinafter as :
“6. An order of transfer is an incident of
Government service. Fundamental Rule 11 says
that “the whole time of a Government servant is at
the disposal of the Government which pays him
and he may be employed in any manner required
by proper authority”. Fundamental Rule 15 says
that “the President may transfer a Government
servant from one post to another. That the
respondent is liable to transfer anywhere in India
is not in dispute. It is not the case of the
respondent that the order of his transfer is vitiated
by mala fides on the part of the authority making
the order, though the Tribunal does say so merely
because certain guidelines issued by the Central
Government are not followed, with which finding
we shall deal later. The respondent attributed
“mischief” to his immediate superior who had
nothing to do with his transfer. All he says is that
he should not be transferred because his wife is
working at Shillong, his children are studying
there and also because his health had suffered a
setback some time ago. He relies upon certain
executive instructions – issued by the Government
in that behalf. Those instructions are in the nature
of guidelines. They do not have statutory force.”
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25. In the case of Public Services Tribunal Bar vs State
Of U.P. & Another : reported in 2003 Supreme (SC) 107,
the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that transfer is an
incidence of service, and the said principle squarely
applies to the facts of the present case. The relevant
paragraph is reproduced hereinafter:
“38. Transfer is an incident of service and
is made in administrative exigencies. Normally it
is not to be interfered with by the courts. This
Court consistently has been taken a view that
orders of transfer should not be interfered with
except in rare cases where the transfer has been
made in a vindictive manner.”
26. In view of the foregoing discussion and having
bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival
submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, this Court
is of the considered opinion that no case for interference
with the transfer order is made out. The scope of judicial
review in matters relating to transfer and posting of
members of the Armed Forces is extremely limited and
the policy governing postings, being merely
administrative in nature, cannot be construed as
conferring an enforceable right upon an officer to insist
upon continuation at a particular station. The transfer of
the respondent/writ petitioner appears to have been
effected in administrative and operational exigencies and
no material has been placed on record to establish mala
fides, arbitrariness or violation of any statutory provision
warranting interference by this Court. Though the
compassionate circumstances projected by the
respondent/writ petitioner evoke sympathy and deserve
humane consideration, the same, by themselves, cannot
override the paramount considerations of organizational
discipline, operational preparedness and service
requirements of the Armed Forces. Acceptance of such
claims as a ground for judicial interference in transfer
matters may seriously impair the flexibility and efficiency
essential for effective functioning of the Forces.
27. Consequently, finding no infirmity or illegality in
the action of the appellants-authorities, the present
appeal deserves to succeed and is accordingly allowed.
The judgment dated 30.03.2026 passed by the learned
Single Judge is set aside and the writ petition is
dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand
disposed of.”
14. The transfer policy in question is admittedly an executive
instructions, which does not have statutory force. They neither
create any enforceable right in favour of an employee, nor can
be construed as conferring the Court, the power to issue a
positive mandamus, directing the employer to enforce such
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guidelines in each and every place.
15. Thus, the respondents cannot be said to be bound by the
policy while transferring an employee particularly when clause
2.1 begins with the expression ‘ordinarily’. Thus, in the present
case, the petitioner is unable to demonstrate that the impugned
order of transfer has been passed in violation of any statutory
provision, either by an authority lacking competence nor any
material has been placed on record to establish the mala fides
exercise of power, which would justify interference under the
limited scope of judicial review. The challenge to the impugned
order rests essentially upon the alleged non-compliance with the
transfer policy (Annex.3). Since, the said guidelines are non-
statutory in character, their alleged violation in absence of any
other legally sustainable ground does not, by itself, constitute a
valid basis for quashing the transfer order.
16. After a careful and cumulative consideration of the record
and hearing learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court is
satisfied that the transfer impugned in this petition was not
arbitrary or actuated by mala fide intent. The material on record
establishes that the transfers were undertaken to meet bona fide
administrative exigencies and were applied uniformly to a
substantial cohort of employees. In these circumstances, the
petitioner has not demonstrated any exceptional or compelling
circumstances that would warrant judicial intervention.
Accordingly, no relief can be granted on the ground of
arbitrariness or mala fides in the exercise of judicial power to
transfer.
17. Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands dismissed. The
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impugned order dated 10.07.2026 (Annex.2) passed by the
JdVVNL, does not suffers from any illegality whatsoever, so as to
warrant any interference therein.
18. Stay application as well as all other pending applications, if
any, also stands dismissed.
(DR.NUPUR BHATI),J
75/Devesh Thanvi/609
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