Punjab-Haryana High Court
Gopal Singh Rathi & Ors. vs State Of Haryana & Ors. on 23 July, 2026
Author: Vikas Bahl
Bench: Vikas Bahl
CWP-13333-2016 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP-13333-2016
Date of decision: 23.07.2026
Gopal Singh Rathi and others
.....Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana and others
.....Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS BAHL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBHAS MEHLA
Present:- Mr. Tushar Sharma, Advocate, and
Mr. Shourya Arora, Advocate,
for the petitioners.
Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana
for the respondents-State.
***
VIKAS BAHL, J. (ORAL)
INDEX
Paragraph(s) Page(s)
1. Challenge in the present petition 1-2 1-2
2. Brief background of the case 3-4 2-4
3. Arguments on behalf of the 5-11 4-9
petitioners
4. Arguments on behalf of the 12-18 10-15
respondents
5 Arguments in rebuttal 19-20 15-16
6 Analysis and findings 21-46 16-37
CHALLENGE IN THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION
1. Present writ petition has been filed under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction
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CWP-13333-2016 2
especially in the nature of Certiorari for setting aside/quashing the
notification dated 17.04.2002 (Annexure P-3) issued under Section 4,
notification dated 10.04.2003 (Annexure P-5) issued under Section 6 and the
award dated 25.06.2004 (Annexure P-6) passed under Section 11 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 qua the land of the petitioners measuring 1
Bigha 12 Biswa comprised in Khasra по. 3580/951 (11 Biswa), 3579/951
(12 Biswa) and 5127/3293/573 (9 Biswa) situated in the revenue estate of
Bahadurgarh, District Jhajjar, Haryana. A further prayer has also been made
for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction especially in the nature
of Mandamus directing the respondents to release the land of the petitioners.
2. Present petition has been filed in the year 2016 after a period of
12 years from the date of passing of the award.
BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:-
3. The petitioners are stated to be the owners of land measuring 1
bigha 12 biswas comprised in khasra No.3580/951 (11 biswa), 3579/951 (12
biswa) and 5127/3293/573 (9 biswa) situated in the revenue estate of
Bahadurgah, District Jhajjar, Haryana. It is the case of the petitioners that the
ownership of khasra No.3580/951 (11 biswa) devolved upon the petitioners
through succession from Dharam Singh, Ram Kishan and Jai Singh and that
Khasra No.3579/951 (12 biswa) devolved upon the petitioners through
natural succession and further that the land comprised in khasra
No.5127/3293/573 (9 biswa) was purchased by petitioner No.1 vide
registered sale deed dated 23.05.2000. The respondents-State had issued
Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘Act of 1894’) which was published in the Government
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CWP-13333-2016 3Gazette on 17.04.2002 and in the Newspapers in accordance with law. By
virtue of the same, total land measuring 1326.04 acres was sought to be
acquired, which included the land of the petitioners in the revenue estates of
Bahadurgarh, for the public purpose i.e. development and utilization of land
for residential, commercial and institutional for Sector 1 (Part), Sectors 10-
11 (Part), 12 and 13 Bahadurgarh. No objections under Section 5A of the
Act of 1894 qua the land in question was filed by the petitioners or their
predecessors-in-interest. Notification under Section 6 of the 1894 Act was
issued on 10.04.2003 with respect to the land measuring 1238.15 acres
which also included the land in question and the same was also duly
published.
4. Thereafter, award dated 25.06.2004 was passed by the Land
Acquisition Collector with respect to the said land. It is further the case of
the State that total amount of award with respect to the entire land was
Rs.72,57,04,098/- and the same was duly tendered at the time of
announcement of the award and out of the said amount as on 18.08.2025,
Rs.53,59,11,899/- has been disbursed to the landowners and rest of the
amount of compensation i.e. Rs.18,97,92,199/- also stands duly deposited
and is available for disbursement to the landowners including the petitioners.
It is further the case of the respondents-State that the possession of the land
in question has been taken vide rapat no.1318 dated 25.06.2004. Dharam
Singh, predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Nos.1 and 2 had challenged the
same Notifications by filing CWP-10904-2004. The land qua which the
Notifications were challenged was the other land owned by Dharam Singh
and although a part of the land in question was also owned by him but the
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CWP-13333-2016 4
same was not included in the said writ petition. The land in question was
admittedly lying vacant at the time of Notification under Section 4 of the
1894 Act. Dharam Singh had died during the pendency of the said writ
petition and petitioner Nos.1 and 2 were impleaded as legal representatives
vide order dated 03.02.2010 passed in CWP-10904-2004. The said writ
petition was dismissed on 07.05.2010 and it is the petitioner Nos.1 and 2
who had filed SLP against same in the year 2011. Petitioner Nos.3 and 4 are
the sisters of petitioner Nos.1 and 2. No challenge was made to the
Notifications or award with respect to the land in question for a period of 12
years and it is after the lapse of period of 12 years that the present writ
petition has been filed in the year 2016.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the
petitioners are the owners in possession of the land measuring 1 Bigha 12
Biswa which has been mentioned in the headnote of the petition and is
situated in the revenue estate of Bahadurgarh, District Jhajjar, Haryana. It is
further submitted that the ownership of khasra No.3580/951 (11 Biswa) and
3579/951 (12 Biswa) was devolved upon the petitioners through natural
succession and in support of the same has referred to the jamabandis which
have been annexed as Annexure P-1. It is stated that the petitioner No.1 had
purchased the land comprised in khasra No.5127/3293/573 measuring 9
Biswa, vide sale deed dated 23.05.2000.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that on
17.04.2002, the respondents-State had issued notification under Section 4 of
the Act of 1894 for acquiring about 1300 acres of land situated in the
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CWP-13333-2016 5
revenue estates of Tehsil Bahadurgarh, District Jhajjar for public purpose i.e.
residential, commercial and institutional for Sector 1 (Part), Sectors 10-11
(Part), 12 and 13 Bahadurgarh and the land belonging to the petitioners was
included in the said notification. It is submitted that the predecessor-in-
interest of the petitioners, namely, Dharam Singh had filed objections under
Section 5-A of the 1894 Act, however on account of lack of proper
knowledge, the objections were filed only with respect to the other land
owned by him and not qua the land involved in the present petition and thus,
no objections qua the land in question were filed either by him or by the
petitioners. It is argued that vide notification dated 10.04.2003, a declaration
under Section 6 of the 1894 Act was issued which also included the land of
the petitioners and that thereafter, on 25.06.2004 an award under Section 11
of the 1894 Act was passed. It is submitted that although a rapat was
recorded regarding taking of possession of the acquired land, however, the
same was only a paper transaction and no possession was actually taken in
accordance with law, and thus, the acquisition cannot be stated to have been
completed and it cannot be said that the land in question has vested with the
State Government as envisaged under Section 16 of the 1894 Act.
7. It is argued that the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners,
namely, Dharam Singh, had filed CWP-10904-2004 challenging the
acquisition proceedings, however, the challenge was only confined to the
other parcels of land and not the land which forms the subject matter of the
present petition. It is submitted that the said writ petition along with other
writ petitions were divided into two bunches i.e. one bunch being the writ
petitions in which the petitions had been filed prior to the passing of the
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CWP-13333-2016 6
award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act and the other bunch being the
petitions which were filed after the passing of the award, which bunch
included the writ petition filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the
petitioners i.e. Dharam Singh. It is further submitted that the Co-ordinate
Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 07.05.2010 had dismissed
the writ petitions which had been filed after the passing of the award only on
the ground that the same were not maintainable once the award had been
passed under Section 11 of the 1894 Act. It is stated that the lead case in the
said bunch was CWP No.10396 of 2004 titled as “Prahlad Singh and others
Vs. Union of India and others“, and the petition filed by Dharam Singh was
decided along with the said bunch. It is pointed out that Dharam Singh had
died issueless and petitioners No.1 and 2 were impleaded vide order dated
03.02.2010 as his LRs which order was passed in CM-1039-CWP-2010 and
which fact is reflected from the headnote of the judgment dated 07.05.2010.
8. It is submitted that another bunch of writ petitions which were
filed prior to the passing of the award were allowed vide judgment dated
21.06.2010 (Annexure P-8) and it was held that the acquisition proceedings
were violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is argued that one
set of petitioners from the bunch in which the lead case was Prahlad Singh
and others (supra) had filed SLP No.8626 of 2011 (Civil Appeal No.3779
of 2011) before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and other set of petitioners from
the same bunch had filed SLP No.24567 of 2010 (Civil Appeal No. 6202 of
2011) titled as “Vidya Devi and another Vs. State of Haryana and others“
and in both of the said SLP’s challenge was laid to the judgment dated
07.05.2010. It is stated that the present petitioners No.1 and 2 had filed SLP
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CWP-13333-2016 7No.7981 of 2011 (Civil Appeal No.6275 of 2011) also challenging the
judgment dated 07.05.2010 and that the respondent-authorities had
challenged the judgment dated 21.06.2010 passed in the second bunch of
writ petitions of which the lead case was CWP No.2308 of 2004 titled as
“Reshma Footwears (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana and others“, vide SLP
No.10857-10878/2011.
9. It is argued that the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide judgment
dated 29.04.2011 (Annexure P-9) had allowed the SLP in the case of
Prahlad Singh and others (supra) and had observed that the dismissal of
the writ petitions of the first bunch merely on the ground that the award had
been passed was not sustainable. While referring to the judgment which has
been annexed as Annexure P-9, learned counsel for the petitioners has
submitted that in the said judgment it was held that the possession cannot be
said to have been taken merely on the basis of the rapat entries made in the
roznamcha and that the acquisition proceedings could not have been stated
to have been completed as the land did not vest in the State as yet and
thereafter, the matter was remanded for consideration on merits. By relying
upon the observations made in the said judgment. Learned counsel for the
petitioners has submitted that since the rapat roznamcha which was in
question, was the same rapat roznamcha vide which the respondents
authorities have been stated to have taken taken possession of the land in
question in the present writ petition, thus, it cannot be said that the actual
and physical possession of the land in question had been taken and further it
is argued that the panchnama was not prepared in the presence of the
independent witnesses. It is submitted that the observations of the Hon’ble
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CWP-13333-2016 8Supreme Court with respect to the rapat would also apply to the case of the
present petitioners as the ‘rapat’ is common and there is no subsequent
‘rapat’ and no process of taking possession has been detailed in the written
statement filed by the respondent-authorities.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that in
the meanwhile, another bunch of writ petitions of which the lead case was
CWP-11412-2004 titled as Lehri Singh and others Vs. Union of India and
others which was also arising out of the same acquisition also came before
the Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court and while following the case
of Reshma Footwear (supra), the Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court
vide judgment dated 25.08.2011 (Annexure P-10) allowed the same. It is
submitted that observations with respect to ‘rapat roznamcha’ were made by
the Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court to the effect that the said
entries were not signed by any of the rights holders. It is reiterated that thus
the said common ‘rapat roznamcha’ was held to be not duly executed in
accordance with law. It is submitted that the SLP filed by the petitioners
No.1 and 2 with respect to the other land of Dharam Singh, which was also
inherited by the petitioners No.1 and 2 from Dharam Singh, along with the
case of Vidya Devi and others (supra), which was the lead matter, was also
allowed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 29.07.2013
(Annexure P-11) following the decision in the case of Prahlad Singh and
others (supra) and the matter was remanded to this Court for consideration
on merits. It is pointed out that a perusal of the order passed in the case of
Vidya Devi and others (supra) would show that the same was passed on the
basis of the statement made by the counsel for the respondent-authority, who
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CWP-13333-2016 9had given list of matters which may be disposed of in terms of the judgment
of Parhlad Singh and others (supra). It is submitted that after the remand of
the cases, including the case of the petitioners with respect to the other
property owned by Dharam Singh, the Division Bench of this Court vide
order dated 21.04.2014 passed in in CWP-17412-2004 titled as ‘Girdhari
Lal and others Vs. Union of India and others“, allowed the writ petition by
placing reliance upon the judgment of the Co-ordinate Division Bench of
this Court in the case of Reshma Footware (P) Ltd. (supra), but the same
was made subject to the decision in the SLP, which was pending against the
judgment in the case of Reshma Footwear (P) Ltd. (supra). It is further
submitted that in the case of Girdhari Lal (supra), the observations as were
earlier made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Prahlad Singh
and others (supra) with respect to possession were reiterated. It is pointed
out that vide order dated 11.05.2016 the SLP filed by the HUDA was
dismissed.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that after the
rights had been crystallized with respect to the other land of Dharam Singh,
which was inherited by the petitioners, the petitioners filed the present
petition in the year 2016 to challenge the acquisition with respect to the land
in question. It is submitted that the case of the petitioners is on similar
footing as that of the petitioners in the case of Prahlad Singh and others
(supra), Reshma Footwears (P) Ltd. (supra), Girdhari Lal (supra) and
Lehri Singh and others Vs. Union of India and others passed in CWP-
11412 of 2004, and thus, the notifications qua the land in question should
also be quashed or the land of the petitioners should also be released.
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CWP-13333-2016 10
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
12. Learned counsel for the respondents-State, on the other hand,
has submitted that in the present case, the notifications under Section 4 and 6
were duly published in accordance with law and the petitioners or their
predecessors-in-interest did not file any objection under Section 5A of the
1894 Act qua the land in question, and thus, accepted that they have no
objection to the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 qua the land
in question and cannot now challenge the same. In support of his arguments,
learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Delhi Administration Vs. Gurdeep
Singh Uban and others“, reported as (1999) 7 SCC 44. It is further
submitted that admittedly the award in the present case was passed on
25.06.2004 and the total amount of award was Rs.72,57,04,098/- and the
said amount was duly tendered at the time of announcement of the award
and out of the said amount as on 18.08.2025, an amount of
Rs.53,59,11,899/- has already been disbursed and the rest of the amount of
compensation of Rs.18,97,92,199/- stands deposited and is available for
disbursement to the landowners including the petitioners. It is further
submitted that after the announcement of the award, the possession of the
suit land was taken vide rapat No.1318 dated 25.06.2004.
13. It is submitted that Dharam Singh, who, even as per the case of
the petitioners, was their predecessor-in-interest had filed a writ petition
challenging the same impugned Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 as well
as the award with respect to the other land owned by him and even as per
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CWP-13333-2016 11
their own case, the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 were made legal representatives in
the said proceedings in the year 2010 and after the dismissal of the said writ
petition, the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 even filed SLP in the year 2011, yet the
petitioners never filed any petition with respect to the land in question and
thus, apparently, they had acquiescenced to the acquisition of the land in
question. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the respondents-
State has relied upon the judgment passed by the coordinate Division Bench
of this Court in the case titled as Desraj and others Vs. State of Haryana
and others reported as 2022(4) RCR (Civil) 298. It is further submitted that
the present petition has been filed after a period of 12 years from the date of
passing of the award and thus, the same deserves to be dismissed on the
ground of delay and laches alone. It is submitted that the petitioners have
been well aware of the proceedings inasmuch as it is the own case of the
petitioners that petitioner Nos.1 and 2 were even impleaded as LRs, in the
earlier petition filed by Dharam Singh, in the year 2010 and that petitioner
Nos.3 and 4 are the sisters of petitioner Nos.1 and 2. It is submitted that a
Coordinate Division Bench of this Court in case of Rajesh Malik Vs. State
of Haryana and others passed in CWP-19246-2017 and other connected
matters, decided on 30.07.2021, had dismissed the writ petitions, filed in the
year 2017 in which the challenge was to the same impugned Notifications
primarily on the ground of delay by observing that with respect to the award
passed in the year 2004, the petitioners therein had approached the Court in
the year 2017. It is submitted that on the basis of the same principle, the case
of the present petitioners also deserves to be dismissed outrightly.
14. Learned counsel for the respondents has further submitted that
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CWP-13333-2016 12
the present petition also deserves to be dismissed on the ground of
constructive res judicata as well as being barred by the provisions of Order II
Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter to be referred as “the CPC“).
In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the respondents has relied
upon judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Direct Recruit
Class II Engineering Officers’ Association Vs. State of Maharashtra and
others reported as (1990) 2 Supreme Court Cases 715, M. Nagabhushana
Vs. State of Karnataka & others reported as 2011(3) SCC 408, judgment of
the Coordinate Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mithan Lal
Gupta Vs. State of Haryana and others reported as 2021 SCC Online P&H
4546, and the SLP(C) bearing Nos. 12574-12575/2022 titled as Mithan Lal
Gupta Vs. State of Haryana against the said judgment has been dismissed on
08.08.2022.
15. Learned counsel for the respondents has further submitted that
in the present case, it is not in dispute that the land at the time of the
issuance of the Notification under Section 4 was lying vacant and thus, in
case, the present land is released then every person who is a fence sitter and
is owner of vacant land would seek release of his land on the ground of
parity. It is further submitted that the land of the petitioners is affecting the
planning of the site for Senior Secondary School, 12 meter wide road, two
pavements, parking and is also affecting the site for EWS Housing Scheme
as per the layout plan annexed as Annexure R-4 along with written
statement. It is submitted that a perusal of the plan would show that the
entire area has been duly planned and in case land of the petitioners is
released then the same would disrupt the integrated planning of the whole
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CWP-13333-2016 13
Sector. It is further submitted that in the present case, apparently after the
award had been passed in the year 2004, the petitioners had acquiescence to
the acquisition qua the land in question and it is only after coming into force
of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter to be referred as “the
2013 Act”) and in view of provisions of Section 24(2) of the said Act that
the petitioners filed the present petition and the said fact is apparent from
para 5(a) of the writ petition in which the first point of law which has been
raised is with respect to the proceedings having lapsed in view of Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act.
16. It is submitted that the said writ petition was earlier allowed by
the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 30.10.2017 solely on the
ground of the said provision of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act and thereafter,
appeal was filed by the State of Haryana and other respondents against the
said judgment and the same was set aside vide order dated 15.02.2024
passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP(C) No.6610 of 2019 in view
of the law laid down by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and
others reported as (2020) 8 SCC 129 and the Hon’ble Supreme Court had
observed that the matter is required to be remitted to the High Court for
fresh consideration in light of the said judgment. It is submitted that since
the law, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgment,
completely answered the plea of the petitioners on the aspect of Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act, thus, the present petition should be dismissed on the
said ground alone. It is further submitted that the petitioners have fairly not
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CWP-13333-2016 14
agitated the points on the aspect of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, but the
same would not permit the petitioners to raise pleas to which they had
acquiescence for a period of more than 12 years.
17. It is further submitted that as per the law laid down in the case
of Indore Development Authority (Supra), dead claims cannot be agitated
and the aspect of possession has also been authoritatively held in favour of
respondent-authorities and it has been observed that the execution of the
rapat roznamcha is sufficient to show that the respondents have taken
possession, more so, when land in question is vacant land as it is in the
present case. It is submitted that the petitioners cannot take benefit of the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Prahlad Singh and
others (Supra), inasmuch as those proceedings arose from writ petitions
filed in the year 2004 and in the said cases, as recorded in para 21 of the said
judgment, Khasra Girdawri and jamabandis as well as notice issued by the
Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd., had been produced on record therein
and the same showed that the petitioners therein were in actual and physical
possession of the acquired land. It is submitted that no such material has
been placed before this Court to show that the petitioners are in actual and
physical possession of the land in question after the passing of the award. It
is further submitted that even rapat roznamcha has not been produced on
record to show that there is any infirmity in the same. It is submitted that the
Hon’ble Supreme Court after passing of the judgment in Prahlad Singh and
others (Supra), had remanded the case and a Coordinate Division Bench of
this Court vide order dated 21.04.2014 have only quashed the Notifications
and the award qua the petitioners therein and thus, no benefit can be taken
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CWP-13333-2016 15
by the petitioners of the said judgment.
18. It is submitted that even the case of Reshma Footwear (P) Ltd.
(Supra) as well as that of Lehri Singh and others (Supra) apart from being
on completely different facts are dealing with the cases where the petitioners
had filed the writ petition prior to the award and were allowed only qua the
petitioners therein. It is submitted that a perusal of the judgment in case of
Reshma Footwear (P) Ltd. (Supra) would show that there was substantial
construction done by the petitioners therein prior to the Notification under
Section 4 whereas the land of the petitioners was and is vacant land.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR
THE PETITIONERS IN REBUTTAL:-
19. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in rebuttal, has submitted
that in the present case, the petitioners had inherited khasra no.3580/951 (0-
11) from Dharam Singh, Ram Kishan and Jai Kishan, each of whom had
1/5th share in the said khasra number. It is submitted that there would be no
applicability of provision of Order II Rule 2 CPC or constructive res judicata
or res judicata with respect to the land inherited by the petitioners of the
share of Ram Kishan and Jai Kishan in the abovesaid khasra number. It is
further submitted that in khasra no.3579/951 (0-12) only Jai Kishan was the
exclusive owner and since the petitioners have inherited the said estate, the
said three objections raised would not sustain with respect to the said land.
Similarly with respect to khasra no.5127/3293/573 (0-9) which is stated to
be purchased by petitioner no.1 by virtue of sale deed dated 23.05.2000, it
is stated that the said three objections would not sustain. It is further
submitted that since the land in question is different from the land which
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CWP-13333-2016 16
was the subject matter of the earlier litigation and there are different pleas
which the petitioners wish to raise, thus, neither the bar under Order II Rule
2 nor constructive res judicata nor res judicata would apply. In this regard,
learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Channappa (D) Thr. Lrs. vs.
Parvatewwa (D) Thr. Lrs. reported as 2026 SCC OnLine SC 552.
20. It is further submitted that the case of the petitioners should not
be rejected solely on the ground of delay as the petitioners filed the case
after the issue had been crystallized after the dismissal of the SLP in the case
of Reshma Footwear (supra). In support of his arguments, learned counsel
for the petitioners has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and another vs. G.
Jayarama Reddy and others reported as (2011) 10 Supreme Court Cases
608. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that a part of
khasra no.573 and 951 which was the subject matter of CWP-10904-2004
has already been released and the khasra numbers in the present case are the
same i.e., khasra nos. 951 and 573 and in the plan it has not been depicted as
to which part of khasra no.573 and 951 has been released.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
21. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners as well as
learned counsel appearing for the respondents and we are of the opinion that
the writ petition deserves to be dismissed for the reasons detailed
hereinafter.
22. It is the admitted case of the parties that the notification under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 was published in the
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CWP-13333-2016 17
Government gazette on 17.04.2002 with respect to land measuring 1326.04
acres in village Bahadurgarh, Balore, Sarai Aurangabad and Barkatabad,
Tehsil Bahadurgarh and District Jhajjar for the public purpose, namely for
the development and utilization of the land for residential, commercial and
institutional for Sector 1 (Part)-10, 11 (Part), 12 and 13 Bahadurgarh which
also included the land of the petitioners falling in khasra no.3580/951,
3579/951 (11 biswa) and 5127/3293/573 (9 biswa) total land measuring 1
bigha 12 biswa (9 biswa) which was situated in the revenue estate of
Bahadurgarh District Jhajjar. It is the case of the respondent-State that the
notification was published in two daily newspapers namely “The Hindu”
(English) on 23.04.2002 and “Hari Bhumi” (Hindi) dated 27.04.2002 which
aspect has not been disputed before this Court. No objection qua the land in
question was filed by the petitioners or their predecessor-in-interest under
Section 5A of the 1894 Act. The notification under Section 6 of the 1894
Act was issued on 10.04.2003 with respect to land measuring 1238.15 acres
which also included the land in question and it is the case of the respondent-
State that the same was published in two daily newspapers namely “The
Hindu” (English) dated 16.04.2003 and “Hari Bhumi” (Hindi) dated
16.04.2003, which aspect has also not been disputed before this Court.
Admittedly the award dated 25.06.2004 was passed with respect to the said
land by the Land Acquisition Collector. It is further the case of the State that
total amount of award with respect to the entire land was Rs.72,57,04,098/-,
which was duly tendered at the time of the announcement of the award and
out of the said amount as on 18.08.2025, Rs.53,59,11,899/- has also been
disbursed to the landowners and rest of the amount of compensation i.e.
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CWP-13333-2016 18Rs.18,97,92,199/- also stand duly deposited and is available for
disbursement for the landowners including the petitioners. It is further the
case of the respondent-State that the possession of the land in question,
which was vacant land, has been taken vide rapat no.1318 dated 25.06.2004.
23. The present writ petition has been filed in the year 2016 after a
period of more than 12 years from the date of passing of the award dated
25.06.2004. It is not the case of the petitioners that they were not aware of
the proceedings or passing of the award. Rather the facts in the present case
clearly show that petitioners no.1 and 2 even participated in the proceedings
in which challenge to the same notifications was laid. It would be relevant to
note that it is the case of the petitioners that with respect to khasra
no.3580/951 (11 biswa), which is one of the khasra numbers which is
subject matter of the present writ petition, the petitioners inherited the same
from Dharam Singh to the extent of 1/5th share. The said Dharam Singh had
challenged the same notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6, which are
the subject matter of the present writ petition, by filing CWP-10904-2004. It
is further the case of the petitioners that the said Dharam Singh had died
during the pendency of the said writ petition and petitioners no.1 and 2 were
impleaded as legal representatives of the said Dharam Singh vide order
dated 03.02.2010 passed in CM-1039-2010 in CWP-10904-2004 which fact
is further apparent from a bare perusal of the judgment dated 07.05.2010
(Annexure P-7) passed in the case of Dharam Singh. Since the case filed by
Dharam Singh was dismissed by the Co-ordinate Division Bench of this
Court on 07.05.2010 along with other connected matters, it is the present
petitioners no.1 and 2 who had filed civil appeal no.6275 of 2011 against the
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said judgment before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Petitioners no.3 and 4 are
the sisters of petitioners no.1 and 2.
24. It is not disputed that the land in question, at the time of
issuance of notification under Section 4, was vacant land. Apparently for the
said reason the petitioners/Dharam Singh in spite of the notification under
Sections 4 and 6 having been issued in the year 2002 and 2003 and also the
award having been passed in 2004 and having filed and pursued the
litigation with respect to the challenge to the same notifications with respect
to the other parcel of land, which was owned by Dharam Singh and is stated
to have been inherited by the petitioners, did not choose to include the
present suit land for the apparent reason that the petitioners/Dharam Singh
had acquiescenced to the fact that since the land in question was vacant land,
thus, no useful purpose would be served in laying challenge to the
notification and the award qua the said land.
25. The first issue that arises for consideration before this Court is,
as to whether the petitioners can be permitted to lay challenge to the
notification issued in the year 2002 and 2003 and the award dated
25.06.2004 after a period of 12 years in the year 2016, moreso, with respect
to the land which was admittedly vacant land at the time of notification
under Section 4. The answer is in the negative, for the following reasons.
26. The Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court in the case of
Rajesh Malik (supra) was examining the challenge made in the year 2017 to
the same notifications as are the subject matter of the present petition. In the
said case, reliance was placed by the petitioners therein upon various
judgments, including the judgment passed in the case of Reshma Footwears
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(P) Ltd. (supra) as well as the case of Lehri Singh and others (supra) as is
sought to be relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the
present case also. The Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court after
considering all the issues had observed that the writ petitions in the case of
Reshma Footwears (P) Ltd. (supra) as well as Lehri Singh and others
(supra) were filed in the year 2004, whereas the petitioners therein had
approached the Court in the year 2017 and thus, the delay in filing of writ
petitions by the petitioners therein was taken into consideration along with
other factors to dismiss the said writ petition. In the said case, the Co-
ordinate Division Bench had taken note of the grievance of the petitioners
therein to the effect that they had not received the compensation awarded to
them and that they were in possession of the land, but however did not grant
any relief to the said petitioners therein. Reference was made to various
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dismissing the said writ
petition. It has not been disputed before us that the said judgment has
attained finality and thus, the landowners who had filed writ petitions in the
year 2017 challenging the impugned notifications by relying upon the same
judgments which the petitioners also wish to rely upon, did not meet any
success.
27. Further the Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court in the case
of Desraj and others (supra) had observed that in the cases in which
challenge is made to the notifications vide which land is sought to be
acquired, the concept of negating the challenge on account of the doctrine of
delay and laches is well recognized. It was observed that even in case there
were procedural irregularities or the status of the land at the time of initiation
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of the acquisition proceedings had not been taken into consideration in a
proper manner, at the time of rejecting the objections filed under Section 5A
of the 1894 Act, the landowner was not entitled to raise such pleas after
much delay, as such pleas have to be raised at the first instance and
immediately when the cause of action arises to the landowner. It was further
observed that in case the landowner chooses to remain silent and allows the
State to proceed, then, apart from the fact that the case is to be rejected on
the ground of delay and laches, even the doctrine of acquiescence would
come into play, which is sufficient to take away that right and any such plea
is required to be rejected at the threshold. It was also observed that such
silence would be conclusive evidence of the waiver of interest on the part of
the litigant and that the doctrine of acquiescence acts as an estoppel which
bars the litigant from complaining about the violation of his right. It was
further observed that dead and stale claims cannot be revived at a belated
stage.
28. The Co-ordinate Division Bench in the abovesaid judgment had
made the said observations after taking into consideration the well known
facet of law that whensoever there was conflict between public interest and
private interest, the private interest has to make way for the public interest.
The challenge thus made by the petitioners therein to the acquisition
proceedings was rejected by taking into consideration the delay in
challenging the same. Although in the said case it was the case of the
petitioners therein that there was construction on the land in question and the
said petitioners had even filed objections under Section 5A of the 1894 Act,
which two aspects are not there in the present case and yet the Co-ordinate
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Division Bench dismissed the case by observing that the cause of action for
seeking release of the constructed portion had arisen at the time of the
notification under Section 6 and not after a period of several years and thus,
in spite of the said two aspects being in favour of the petitioners therein, they
were not granted any relief. The Division Bench in the abovesaid case also
took into consideration the judgment of the Constitutional Bench of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority
(supra) in which it had been observed that the dead and stale claims cannot
be revived.
29. This Court has seen that in a large number of cases of
acquisition of land under the Act of 1894, which had been initiated decades
earlier and in which, the award had also been passed and where the
landowners either had filed a petition and had lost their case or had not filed
any petition, suddenly sprung up after the coming into force of the new Act
i.e. The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 in order to take benefit of Section
24(2) of the said Act which provides for lapsing of the acquisition
proceedings in certain circumstances. In the said belated writ petitions, an
endeavour has also been made to raise issues which had become stale and
dead and which the landowners had acquiescence to or were barred from
raising the same on the ground of delay and laches. Further, after the plea
under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act had been finally answered by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of
Indore Development Authority (supra) against the landowners, the
landowners instead of resting their case have now sought to raise pleas
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CWP-13333-2016 23
which were barred in view of the abovesaid principles and thus, endlessly
engaged the Court with respect to settled acquisitions, bringing no finality to
the acquisition proceedings and inordinately delaying the development of the
area concerned. The present case is also one such case. The present petition
is admittedly filed in the year 2016 challenging the award of the year 2004
and suffers from delay and laches and in view of the law laid down in the
abovesaid judgment, the petitioners cannot be permitted to raise stale pleas.
30. The argument raised on behalf of the petitioners to the effect
that the case on which reliance is being placed by the petitioners was
although instituted in the year 2004 but had attained finality in the year 2016
and it is after the said case had attained finality, the petitioners have chosen
to file the present petition and the said ground is a reasonable ground to
overlook the ground of delay, laches and acquiescence, deserves to be
rejected. In case such a plea is accepted and notification qua the land of the
petitioners which, admittedly is vacant land is quashed on the said plea,
then, the same would have a cascading effect. Another set of landowners
who may also be having vacant land and are fence-sitters like the petitioners
would then possibly raise the plea of parity on the basis of the present case
and would rely on there new borne cause of action to challenge the
acquisition. Thus, acceptance of the said plea would lead to a situation
where there would be no finality to acquisition proceedings and would
endlessly delay the development of the area concerned.
31. The judgment referred to by the learned counsel for the
petitioners in the case of Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and another (supra)
on the aspect of delay and laches would, in the facts and circumstances of
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CWP-13333-2016 24
the present case, not further the case of the petitioners. In the said judgment,
it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the person, who is
not vigilant and does not seek intervention of the Court within a reasonable
time from the date of accrual of cause of action or the alleged violation of
the constitutional, legal or other rights, is not entitled to relief under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. In the said judgment, although it was
observed that no hard and fast rule could be laid down with regard to the
exercise of discretion of rejecting the case on the ground of delay and laches
but it was further observed by relying upon various judgment that every case
has to be decided on its own facts. This Court is of the view that in view of
the facts and circumstances of the present case, the petitioners cannot be
permitted to raise the dead claims after a lapse of 12 years.
32. Additionally, it would be relevant to note that as far as the
challenge to the notification qua land comprised in Khasra No.3580/951 (0-
11) is concerned, wherein it is the case of the petitioners themselves that
they have inherited 1/5th share from Dharam Singh, the challenge is also
barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC as well as the principles of constructive
res judicata. It is not in dispute that Dharam Singh, apart from having share
in Khasra No.3580/951, was also owner of other land and the abovesaid
khasra number as well as the other land were sought to be acquired by virtue
of the same notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, which are the subject matter of challenge in the present
petition. It is also not in dispute that the said Dharam Singh had challenged
the notifications in question by filing CWP-10904-2004 and did not include
the said khasra number, although the same was also sought to be
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CWP-13333-2016 25
acquired. The cause of action to the said Dharam Singh to include the
abovesaid khasra number had arisen on the date the notification dated
10.04.2003 issued under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 but the said Dharam
Singh did not choose to include the abovesaid khasra number in the writ
petition filed in the year 2004. The provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC
specifically provide that every suit shall include the whole of the claim
which the litigant is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action within
the jurisdiction of the Court and further specifically provides that omissions
to claim any relief would then bar the said litigant from filing fresh
proceedings to claim the said relief. The coordinate Division Bench of this
Court in the case of Mithan Lal Gupta (supra) by relying upon Rule 32 of
the Writ Jurisdiction (Punjab and Haryana) Rules, 1976 has held that said
principle would also apply to writ proceedings. The relevant portion of said
judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“11. Thirdly, any cause of action available to the appellant prior to
institution of CWP-21603-2016 but not urged in the said writ
petition, was also barred by the principle enshrined in Order 2 Rule
2, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as applicable mutatis mutandis to
writ proceedings vide Rule 32, Writ Jurisdiction (Punjab &
Haryana) Rules, 1976. Said Rule reads as under:
“32. In all matters for which no provision is made by these
rules, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908,
shall apply mutatis mutandis, in so far as they are not
inconsistent with these rules.”
33. The SLP No.12574-12757 of 2020 filed against the said
judgment has been dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order
dated 08.08.2022. The abovesaid provision as well as the law laid down in
the abovesaid judgment would apply on all fours in the present case.
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34. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Direct
Recruit Class II Engineering Association Limited (supra) by relying upon
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Forward
Construction Company and others Versus Prabhat Mandal (Regd.)
Andheri and others reported as 1986 (1) SCC 100 had observed that an
adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter
determined but also as to every other matter which the parties might and
ought to have litigated and every matter coming into the legitimate purview
of the original action. It was further observed that the principle of
constructive res judicata is also applicable to writ petitions. In view of the
abovesaid principles also, the writ petition filed by the petitioners, more so
qua the share inherited by the petitioners from Dharam Singh deserves to be
rejected.
35. The argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioners to
the effect that with respect to every khasra number, the petitioners would
have a separate cause of action, cannot be accepted. It would be relevant to
note that even in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
M/s Channappa (D) Thr. Lrs. (supra) which has been relied upon by the
counsel for the petitioners, it has been specifically observed that the object
of Order II Rule 2 CPC was to prevent multiplicity of suits/litigation and the
provision is founded on the principle that a person shall not be vexed twice
for one and the same cause and that a correct and a reliable test to see the
applicability of Order II Rule 2 CPC is to determine whether the claim in the
subsequent suit is founded upon a cause of action which is distinct from the
cause of action in the earlier case. The law laid down in the abovesaid case
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by the Hon’ble Supreme Court would in fact go against the proposition
propounded on behalf of the petitioners. Once several khasra numbers are
sought to be acquired by virtue of notifications issued under the Land
Acquisition Act, then the cause of action to challenge the acquisition would
be the issuance of the notifications and in case while laying a challenge to
the said notifications, the landowner does not include certain khasra
numbers, then, the said landowner/litigant is barred from filing a subsequent
petition again challenging the same notification qua other khasra numbers.
In case the argument raised on behalf of the petitioners is accepted, then, in a
case where a landowner is owner of several khasra numbers regarding which
notification regarding acquisition has been issued under Sections 4 and 6 of
the Land Acquisition Act, the petitioner would keep filing successive
petitions with respect to every khasra number at different stages which
would be against the mandate of the provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC.
36. It is not disputed before us that the petitioners or their
predecessor-in-interest had not filed any objection under Section 5-A of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 with respect to the land in question. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Administration (supra) has
observed that in case the person interested has not filed objections under
Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, then, in principle, it should
be accepted that they have no objection to the notification issued under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act operating in respect of their property
and then, logically Section 6 declaration must be deemed to be enforced as
far as they are concerned. It was also observed that quashing a notification in
the case of an individual writ petition could not be treated as quashing the
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whole of the notification. It is thus incumbent upon the litigant to be vigilant
and to act immediately when the cause of action arises and the fence-sitters
cannot be given any benefit in the proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
37. As has been stated hereinabove, the present writ petition was
filed in the year 2016 in which the first question of law which was raised in
paragraph 5A was as to whether the present acquisition proceedings have
lapsed in view of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The writ petition was
allowed by the coordinate Division Bench of this Court vide order dated
30.10.2017 solely in view of the provisions of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act,
as it was observed that the acquisition of land owned by the present
petitioners had lapsed. It is not in dispute that the respondents had
challenged the said judgment dated 30.10.2017 by filing SLP (C) No.6610
of 2019 titled as The State of Haryana and others Versus Gopal Singh
Rathi and others and the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated
15.02.2024 had set aside the judgment and had made the following
observations:
“3. Having heard the learned A.A.G. for the appellants
and the learned counsel for the respondents and carefully
perusing the material placed on record, it appears that
the High Court had declared the acquisition
proceedings in question as lapsed in view of Section
24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013. However, it is not disputed by
the learned counsels for the parties that in view of the
later decision in the case of “Indore Development
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CWP-13333-2016 29Authority vs. Manoharlal And Ors. Etc.” Reported in
(2020) 8 SCC 129, the matter is required to be remitted
to the High Court for fresh consideration.
4. In that view of the matter, the impugned order
passed by the High Court is set aside and the matter is
remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration in
the light of the Judgment in the case of Indore
Development Authority (supra).
5. It is clarified that all legal contentions are kept
open to be raised by both the parties, as may be
permissible.
6. The appeal stands allowed in above-terms.
7. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed
of.”
A perusal of the above observations would show that the
High Court was directed to consider the matter afresh in the light of the
judgment passed in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra).
38. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development
Authority (supra) had observed that word ‘or’ used in Section 24(2) between
possession and compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’ and the
deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under the said provision could
only be in a situation where the possession of land has not been taken nor
compensation has been paid and in other words, in case the possession has
been taken but the compensation has not been paid there would be no lapse
and similarly if compensation has been paid and possession has not been
taken then also there would be no lapse. It was further observed that in case
the obligation under Section 31 of the 1894 Act had not been fulfilled, then,
interest under Section 34 of the said Act is to be granted and non-deposit of
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compensation in court does not result in the lapse of land acquisition
proceedings and in case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of
holdings for five years or more, then, compensation under the Act of 2013 is
required to be paid to the “landowners”. It was further observed that the
landowners who had refused to accept compensation or sought reference for
higher compensation, then, they cannot claim that the acquisition
proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court had further specifically observed that the provision of
Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to a new cause of action
to question the legality of concluded proceedings and applies only to a
proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e.,
1.1.2014 and does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not
allow the landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession
to reopen proceedings. With respect to mode of taking possession under the
1894 Act, it was observed that drawing of panchnama i.e. inquest
report/rapat roznamcha was valid proof of taking possession in land
acquisition cases and subsequent to the same, the land would vest in the
State and any re-entry or retaining the possession thereafter was unlawful
and the person who continued in possession would be a trespasser. Para 363
of the said judgment is reproduced as under: –
“363. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the
questions as under:
1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not
made as on 1.1.2014 the date of commencement of Act of 2013, there is
no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the
provisions of Act of 2013.
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2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of
five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court,
then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of
the Act of 2013 under the Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed.
3. The word ‘or’ used in Section 24(2) between possession and
compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’. The deemed lapse of
land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013
takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more
prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not
been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case
possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there
is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has
not been taken then there is no lapse.
4. The expression ‘paid’ in the main part of Section 24(2) of the Act
of 2013 does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The
consequence of non-deposit is provided in proviso to Section 24(2) in
case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings
then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for
land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall be entitled to
compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. In
case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act of
1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act
can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not
result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-
deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more,
compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the
“landowners” as on the date of notification for land acquisition under
Section 4 of the Act of 1894.
5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as
provided under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him
to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-
payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to
pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). Land
owners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought
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proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.
6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is to be treated as
part of Section 24(2) not part of Section 24(1)(b).
7. The mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894 and as
contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/
memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession
under Section 16 of the Act of 1894, the land vests in State there is no
divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, as once
possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).
8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of
proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their
inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more
before the Act of 2013 came into force, in a proceeding for land
acquisition pending with concerned authority as on 1.1.2014. The
period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be
excluded in the computation of five years.
9. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause
of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land
acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of
enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e., 1.1.2014. It does not revive stale
and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings
nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking
possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation
in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition.
Let the matters be placed before appropriate Bench for
consideration on merits.”
39. It was also observed that when the State Government acquires
land and draws up a memorandum of taking possession, that amounts to
taking physical possession of the land and that on the property which is
acquired, the Government is not supposed to put some other person or the
police force in possession to retain it and start cultivating it till the land is
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is supposed to start residing or to physically occupy it once possession has
been taken by drawing the inquest proceedings/rapat roznamcha.
40. With respect to interpretation of the word ‘paid’ used in Section
24(2) and ‘deposited’ used in the proviso to Section 24(2) detailed
observations were made and it was observed that the deposit in treasury in
place of deposit in court causes no prejudice to the landowner or any other
stakeholder as their interest is adequately safeguarded by the provisions
contained in Section 34 of the 1894 Act, which ensures higher rate of
interest than any other Government securities and the said money is safe and
can be made available for disbursement to the landowners. In para 228, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court had even taken into consideration the standing Order
No.28 which was issued in 1909 by the State of Punjab, which provided five
modes of payment and it was further observed that the said rules and the
standing orders are binding on the concerned Authorities. Paras 228 and 230
of the said judgment is reproduced herein below: –
“228. Standing Order No.28 was issued in 1909 by the State of
Punjab and was applicable to Delhi also, which provided five modes of
payment in para 74 and 75 thus:
“74. Methods of making payments.–There are five methods of
making payments:
(1) By direct payments, see Para 75(I) infra
(2) By order on treasury, see Para 75(II) infra
(3) By money order, see Para 75(III) infra
(4) By cheque, see Para 75(IV) infra
(5) By deposit in a treasury, see Para 75(V) infra ……….
xxx xxx xxx xxx
PAWAN KUMAR 230. Deposit in treasury in place of deposit in court causes no
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CWP-13333-2016 34prejudice to the landowner or any other stakeholder as their interest is
adequately safeguarded by the provisions contained in Section 34 of the
Act of 1894, as it ensures higher rate of interest than any other
Government securities. Their money is safe and credited in the earmarked
quantified amount and can be made available for disbursement to
him/them. There is no prejudice caused and every infraction of law would
not vitiate the act.”
41. It is thus apparent that the entire law with respect to possession,
payment of compensation, vesting and non-revival of stale and time barred
claims had been crystallized in the above-said judgment. Since in the present
case, as has been detailed hereinabove, the respondents have met the said
parameters, thus, the counsel for the petitioners has fairly not agitated his
challenge on the aspect of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
42. Further it is the stand of the respondents that the land in
question which is vacant piece of land is also affecting the site for Senior
Secondary School, 12 mtr. Wide Road, two pavements, parking and site for
EWS Housing Scheme as per the layout plan which has been annexed as
Annexure R-4 along with the written statement. A perusal of the said plan
would fortify the said plea. The plea of the petitioner to the effect that some
part of the khasra numbers which are now the property in question are no
longer under acquisition, even if taken on face value, then also would not
call for releasing the land in question, inasmuch as, any further decrease of
the said land at the instance of the petitioner who had come after 12 years of
the passing of the award would reduce the area for the above said purposes
and would severely prejudice the integrated planning and development of
the area in question.
PAWAN KUMAR
43. This Court would now consider the judgments of which reliance
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CWP-13333-2016 35
is sought to be placed upon by the petitioners in the present writ petition
filed in the year 2016. Reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench of
this Court in the case of Reshma Footwear (P) Ltd. (supra) is completely
misconceived. The said writ petition was filed in the year 2004, whereas the
present petition has been filed in the year 2016. In the said case, the
challenge to the acquisition was prior to the passing of the award, whereas,
in the present case, the challenge has been made after 12 years of the passing
of the award. From the perusal of the judgment in the case of Reshma
Footwears (P) Ltd., it is apparent that there were constructions including
industrial construction which had been raised and there were also residential
houses of the petitioners therein and which constructions had been raised
after obtaining due sanction of the plans. Reference in the said case was also
made to a policy of the Chief Administrator HUDA vide which it was stated
that existing factory should not be acquired and it should be released. On the
other hand, land in the present case is vacant piece of land.
44. Even the case of Lehri Singh and others (Supra) which is also
sought to be relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners and which
was decided vide judgment dated 25.08.2011 pertained to writ petitions
which were filed in the year 2004 and were prior to the passing of the award
in contrast to the present petition which was filed after 12 years of passing of
the award. The said case was found to be similar to the case of Reshma
Footwear (P) Ltd. (Supra), which case, cannot be stated to be similar to the
present case. Even reliance placed upon the case of Prahlad Singh and
others (Supra) would not further the case of the petitioners, inasmuch as, the
said bunch of writ petitions were also filed in the year 2004 and thus,
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CWP-13333-2016 36
challenge was made immediately after the cause of action had arisen
whereas the petitioners in the present case had slept over the matter for 12
years. Further, a perusal of the judgment in the case of Prahlad Singh and
others (Supra) would show that the landowners therein had filed objections
under Section 5-A(1) whereas no such objections had been filed by the
present petitioners or their predecessor with respect to land in question.
Further reading of para 21 of the said judgment would show that the
landowners therein had placed on record khasra girdawris, jamabandis
which reflected their actual and physical possession of the land and even
copy of the notices issued in the year 2011 by the Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran
Nigam Ltd. were also produced to show that physical possession of the
petitioners therein was continuing. On the other hand, there is no khasra
girdawri, annexed alongwith the present petition and even no jamabandi or
any other documents subsequent to passing of the award has been annexed
to show that the petitioners are in actual and physical possession of the
property. At any rate, the petitioners who are fence-sitters cannot now raise
challenge to the Notifications on the basis of said pleas, as has been detailed
hereinabove. Further in the case of Girdhari Lal and others (Supra), the writ
petitions were filed in the year 2004 and it was also observed that the case of
the petitioners therein was in no way distinguishable from the case of the
petitioners in Reshma Footwear (P) Ltd. (Supra) and Lehri Singh and
others (Supra) cases, whereas the said cases are not similar to the present
case as has been discussed hereinabove. Further, in the said case as well as
in the case of Girdhari Lal and others (Supra) which judgment was passed
after remand order in the case of Prahlad Singh and others (Supra) (which
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was the lead case), Notifications were quashed qua the petitioners therein
and it is not that the whole of the Notifications were quashed. Even the case
of Vidya Devi and others (supra) which was decided along with the SLP
filed by the petitioners No.1 and 2 with respect to the estate of Dharam
Singh was instituted in the year 2004 and thus the petitioners cannot claim
any benefit of the same.
45. Keeping in view the abovesaid facts and circumstances, the
present writ petition is meritless, deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly
dismissed.
46. Before parting, we wish to place on record our appreciation for
learned counsel for the petitioners Mr. Tushar Sharma, Advocate, as well as
Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana, learned counsel for the respondents-
State who have both fairly and ably argued the matter.
(VIKAS BAHL)
JUDGE
(SUBHAS MEHLA)
JUDGE
July 23, 2026
naresh.k/puneet/pawan/davinder
Whether reasoned/speaking? Yes/No
Whether reportable? Yes/No
PAWAN KUMAR
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