Chattisgarh High Court
Yashwant Raj Singh vs Bhognath on 22 July, 2026
1
CGHC010305002018 2026:CGHC:31314
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
MCC No. 739 of 2018
Yashwant Raj Singh S/o Shri Muninddraraj Singh, Caste Rajgond, Occupation
Cultivation, R/o Village Tarapur, Tahsil And District Raigarh, Madhya Pradesh. (Now
Chhattisgarh).
...Applicant
versus
1 - Bhognath S/o Shri Gopi Ram Aged About 65 Years Caste Aghariya, Occupation
Cultivator , R/o Village Ranngda, Tahsil And District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh.
2 - Smt. Shakuntala Devi W/o Late Munindraraj Singh Aged About 62 Years R/o
Village Tarapur, Tahsil And District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh.
3 - Bhoopatraj Singh S/o Late Munindraraj Singh Aged About 35 Years R/o Village
Tarapur, Tahsil And District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh.
4 - Narharitraj Singh S/o Late Munindraraj Singh Aged About 35 Years Occupation
Cultivation, R/o Village Tarapur, Tahsil And District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh.
5 - Chandramani Singh S/o Shri Prithviraj Singh Aged About 60 Years Occupation
Cultivation, R/o Village Nayapara, Tahsil And District Raigarh Chhattisgarh.
6 - State Of Madhya Pradesh (Now Chhattisgarh) Through The Collector Raigarh,
Madhya Pradesh (Now Chhattisgarh)
... Respondents
For Applicant : Mr. Ashish Shrivastava, Sr. Adv. with Ms.
Shotabdi Baghi and Mr. Ashutosh Shrivastava,
Advocates
For Respondent No.6/State : Mr. Mayoor Khandelwal, Panel Lawyer
(Hon’ble Shri Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi)
Order on Board
22.07.2026
Digitally
signed by BINI
PRADEEP
BINI Date:
PRADEEP 2026.07.23
16:06:37
+0530
2
1. Heard on IA No.01/2018, application for condonation of delay in filing
restoration application.
2. Present MCC has been filed for restoration of Second Appeal
No.518/1993, which was dismissed for non-compliance of peremptory order
dated 21.02.2012.
3. Learned Sr. counsel appearing for the applicant submits that Second
Appeal No.518/1993 was listed for hearing on 21.02.2012, wherein PF was
directed to be paid for issuance of notice to LRs of respondent No.1. In
compliance with the Order dated 21.02.2012, PF was paid by ordinary mode,
but it could not be paid by registered mode. Therefore, the second appeal
was dismissed. It is further submitted that the applicant was unaware of the
dismissal of the admitted second appeal, therefore, delay of about 06 years
(2335 days) occurred in filing the MCC, which is bonafide, hence, the delay
may be condoned and the present MCC may be allowed. To substantiate his
contention, learned Sr. counsel has placed reliance on the order dated
01.11.2017 passed by this Court in MCC No.160/2015 (Tikaram (dead)
through Lrs. vs. Kehar Singh (Dead) through Lrs.) and on the judgment of
Supreme Court in Banwarilal (Dead) by Legal Representatives and
another v. Balbir singh reported in (2016) 1 SCC 607.
4. Learned counsel for the State submits that the State is formal party.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. The second appeal was listed on 21.02.2012, but it was dismissed in
compliance with the peremptory order dated 12.3.2012. The present
Miscellaneous Civil Case (MCC), however, was filed by the
applicant/appellant only on 20.09.2018. Thus, there is a delay of 2,335 days,
i.e., approximately six years, in filing the present MCC. The explanation
3offered by the applicant/appellant for the inordinate delay is that he was not
aware of the dismissal of the second appeal. Such a statement cannot be
accepted in the absence of any specific or satisfactory explanation as to the
actual circumstances that prevented the applicant/appellant from filing an
application for restoration within a reasonable time. No material has been
placed on record to explain the prolonged inaction extending over more than
six years. When the second appeal was listed for hearing, it was necessary
upon the applicant/appellant to remain vigilant and keep himself informed
about the progress of his case. However, he remained completely oblivious to
the proceedings and displayed gross negligence and lack of diligence for
more than six years. It is also pertinent to note that the original Civil Suit No.
167A/1989 was instituted in the year 1989. The record of the second appeal
shows that the civil suit filed by the appellant was dismissed by the trial Court,
and the said judgment and decree were affirmed by the first appellate Court.
In such circumstances, after the lapse of such a long period, it is quite
possible that third-party rights or other interests may have been created in
respect of the subject matter of the suit. Therefore, the parties were expected
to remain vigilant regarding the status of the litigation. The conduct of the
applicant/appellant, however, does not reflect the diligence expected of a
litigant who is genuinely pursuing his remedy.
7. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the applicant/appellant has failed to furnish any
sufficient or satisfactory cause for condonation of the inordinate delay of
2,335 days in filing the present MCC. The only explanation offered, that he
was unaware of the dismissal of the second appeal, is vague,
unsubstantiated and wholly insufficient to explain the prolonged inaction of
more than six years. The applicant/appellant has failed to disclose the
4
circumstances that prevented him from pursuing the matter with due diligence
or from ascertaining the status of the appeal during the intervening period.
8. In the case of Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi,
(2021) 18 SCC 384:AIR 2022 SC 332, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while
considering the alike issue has observed that the High Court erred in
condoning the huge delay of 1011 days in preferring the appeal and thereby
set-aside the order observing therein as under:-
7.1 In the case of Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. 1961 SCC
Online SC 39, it is observed and held as under:
In construing s. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important
considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of
the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives
rise to a right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree
as binding between the parties. In other words, when the
period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree holder
has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the
decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has
accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be
light- heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which
cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay
is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and
admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately
conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and
discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance
substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High
Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, ILR (1890) 13 Mad. 269, “s. 5
gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is
to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and
discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are
well understood; the words ‘sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice when no
negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to
the appellant.”
7.2 In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala and
Anr. (1997) 7 SCC 556, while refusing to condone the delay
of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of
5reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for
seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be
condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to
be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes
and the courts have no power to extend the period of
limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that
while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the
court has to exercise discretion judiciously.
7.3 In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil vs. Executive Engineer,
Jalgaon Medium Project (2008) 17 SCC 448, it is observed as
under:
“The laws of limitation are founded on public policy.
Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of
peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates
insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential
for public order. The principle is based on the maxim “interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State
requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same
time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice
suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and
preventing oppression. The object for fixing time limit for
litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal
remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to
see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail
their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence
states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and
not of the sleepy.”
7.4 In the case of Basawaraj and Anr. Vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, it is observed and held by
this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be
exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of
each case. It is further observed that the expression
“sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the
party. It is further observed that even though limitation may
harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with
all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further
6
observed that in case a party has acted with negligence,
lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be
any justified ground for condoning the delay even by
imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for
condonation of delay has to be decided within the
framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed
that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient
cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would
amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter
disregard to legislature.
7.5 In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra), it is observed by
this Court that the court cannot enquire into belated and
stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity.
The Courts help those who are vigilant and “do not slumber
over their rights.”
9. In the matter of Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar
Municipal Corporation, 2022 SCC Online 64, their Lordship of the Supreme
Court held as under :-
“9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter
statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose
and statutes of peace, though some contrary opinions have
been expressed (in Nav Rattanmal Vs. State of Rajasthan,
AIR 1961 SC 1704). The courts have expressed the view that
the law of limitation rests on the foundations of greater public
interest for three reasons, namely, (a) that long dormant
claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (b) that a
defendant might have lost the evidence to disapprove a stale
claim; and (iii) that persons with good causes of action (who
are able to enforce them) should pursue them with
reasonable diligence (State of Kerala Vs. V.R. Kalliyanikutty,
(1999) 3 SCC 657 relying on Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4 th
Edn., Vol. 28, para 605; Halsbury’s lawas of England, Vol. 68
(2021) para 1005. Equally, change in de facto position or
character, creation of third party rights over a period of time,
waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in dealings,
are equitable public policy considerations why period of
7limitation is prescribed by law. Law of limitation does not
apply to writ petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a
constitutional court is exercised with caution as delay and
laches principle is applied with the aim to secure the quiet of
the community, suppress fraud and perjury, quicken diligence,
and prevent oppression. See Popat and Kotecha Property v.
State Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510.
Therefore, some decisions and judgments do not look upon
pleas of delay and laches with favour, especially and rightly in
cases where the persons suffer from adeptness, or incapacity
to approach the courts for relief. However, other decisions,
while accepting the rules of limitation as well as delay and
laches, have observed that such rules are not meant to
destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger public
interest and are founded on public policy. There must be a
lifespan during which a person must approach the court for
their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty
as to the rights and obligations of the parties. (See N.
Blarkrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurty, (1998) 7 SCC 123.
Referring to the principle of delay and laches, this Court, way
back in Moons Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial
Court, Bombay AIR 1967 SC 1450, had referred to the view
expressed by Sir Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum
Company and Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and
John Kemp, (L.R.) 5 P.C. 21 in the following words:
” Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of
Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust
to give a remedy, either because the party
has, by his conduct, done that which might
fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of
it, or where by his conduct and neglect he
has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy,
yet put the other party in a situation in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the
remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay
are most material. But in every case, if an
argument against relief, which otherwise
would be just, is founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar by
any statute of limitations, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles
8substantially equitable. Two circumstances,
always important in such cases, are, the
length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval, which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other,
so far as relates to the remedy.”
10. Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba
Reddy (Died) By L.Rs. and Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA)
reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 513 has held in paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 20
& 21, as under:-
“17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing
‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the
Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for
filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder
accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The
decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of
time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights.
18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramla, Motilal
And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd reported in AIR 1962 SC
361 has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been
shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party
is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is
the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court,
despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons,
may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides
of the party.
19. In Maqbul Ahmad vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors.
reported in AIR 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot
grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or
on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again
repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and
delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it
ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.
9
20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar
vs. State of Haryana reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351 wherein while
observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some
person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or
immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons
cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a
belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and
compassion.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported
in (2011) 4 SCC 363 where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory
explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the
applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the
High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and
objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion
in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in
considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to
override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the
concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’
and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the
substantial law of limitation.
11. It is also settled proposition of law that, the doctrine of delay and laches
or for that matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of
repose and statutes of peace, there must be a lifespan during which a person
must approach the Court for his remedy. Otherwise there would be unending
uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties.
12. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this
Court finds that the applicant/appellant has failed to establish any sufficient
cause warranting condonation of the extraordinary delay of 2,335 days. On
the contrary, the record reflects complete indifference and lack of diligence in
prosecuting the matter. Entertaining such a highly belated application would
defeat the very object of the law of limitation and unsettle rights that may
10
have accrued to the opposite parties over the passage of time.
13. Accordingly, IA No.01/2018, application for condonation of delay, is
rejected. Consequently, the present Miscellaneous Civil Case (MCC), being
barred by limitation, is dismissed. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi)
Judge
Bini
