Uttarakhand High Court
30 April vs State Of Uttarakhand & Others on 30 April, 2026
Bench: Manoj Kumar Tiwari, Pankaj Purohit
2026:UHC:3309-DB
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Writ Petition Service Bench No. 272 of 2022
30 April, 2026
Sachin Kumar ... Petitioner
Versus
State Of Uttarakhand & others ... Respondents
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Presence:-
Mr. Bhupesh Kandpal, learned counsel for the petitioner
Mr. G.S. Negi, learned Additional C.S.C. for the State of
Uttarakhand
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Dated: 30th April, 2026
Coram : Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.
Hon'ble Pankaj Purohit, J.
Per: Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.
JUDGMENT
1. Petitioner has challenged judgment dated
16.02.2017 rendered by learned Public Service Tribunal
in Claim Petition No. 33/DB/2016. He has also
challenged the order dated 04.05.2017 whereby his
review application was rejected by learned Tribunal.
2. It is not in dispute that petitioner was
appointed as Constable in Civil Police on 01.06.2009
and he was dismissed from service vide order dated
23.03.2025 passed by Senior Superintendent of Police,
Haridwar. He filed appeal against the punishment
order, which was dismissed by Inspector General of
Police, Garhwal Range vide order dated 23.08.2025.
The order passed by disciplinary authority and
appellate authority were challenged by petitioner
before Public Services Tribunal; however, his claim
petition was dismissed by learned Tribunal.
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3. The charge against the petitioner was that his
date of birth is 24.06.1983, but he managed to secure
appointment as Constable based on an incorrect date of
birth, i.e., 07.07.1988.
4. It is not in dispute that petitioner passed
High School (10th Standard) from U.P. Board of
Secondary Education in the year 1999 and in the High
School Certificate, his date of birth is recorded as
24.06.1983. Petitioner thereafter again passed High
School (10th Standard) from National Institute of Open
Schooling (in short “NIOS”) in the year 2007, but in the
certificate issued by NIOS his date of birth was
mentioned as 07.07.1988.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that in his application for the post of Constable (Civil
Police), petitioner, due to mistake mentioned his date
of birth as 07.07.1988, as was mentioned in the
certificate issued by NIOS. He submits that petitioner
had no intention to submit false information and due to
mistake, petitioner had mentioned an incorrect date of
birth. He submits that petitioner was not going to get
any benefit by mentioning incorrect date of birth, as he
was eligible even otherwise also. He further submits
that petitioner had submitted application to Director,
NIOS, New Delhi on 28.11.2007 to correct his date of
birth as “24.06.1983”, which indicates his bonafide in
the matter. Thus, it is contended that punishment,
imposed upon the petitioner, not only unsustainable,
but harsh also.
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6. It is contended on behalf of petitioner that an
FIR was registered against him regarding the same
incident and he was tried for offences punishable under
Sections 420 & 471 of IPC, which resulted in conviction
by trial court, however, in appeal, trial court’s
judgment was set aside and petitioner was acquitted.
7. Learned State Counsel, per contra submits
that defence of innocent mistake, taken by petitioner,
is unbelievable. He submits that no one forgets his
name and date of birth and even if petitioner’s date of
birth was wrongly recorded in the school certificate
issued by NIOS, it cannot be a valid explanation for
mentioning wrong date of birth in his application for
appointment. He submits that petitioner obtained yet
another High School Certificate from NIOS with
different date of birth with evil design, as the age limit,
mentioned in the advertisement dated 15.12.2008 for
the post of Constable Civil Police, was between 18 to 22
years and petitioner had crossed the upper age limit of
22 years before the deadline indicated in the
advertisement.
8. Learned State Counsel further submits that
since age for recruitment as Constable is to be seen
with reference to 1st of July, therefore, petitioner
managed to get his age mentioned as 07.07.1988 in
the certificate procured from NIOS to ensure that he
gets maximum number of attempts to participate in the
selection process. He further submits that petitioner
relied upon a mark-sheet, in which he was shown as
five years younger than his actual age ,
therefore, he would have continued in service for five
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more years after attaining age of superannuation. He
thus submits that the contention raised by petitioner’s
counsel that petitioner did not get any benefit by
mentioning incorrect date of birth is not correct and
petitioner would have secured lifelong benefits, if the
fraud played by him upon the employer was not
exposed in time.
9. Learned State Counsel further submits that
petitioner dishonestly mentioned incorrect date of birth,
is evidenced from the fact that he also submitted an
affidavit in which he again mentioned his date of birth
as 07.07.1988. Thus, he submits that the story
developed by petitioner, that he had made application
to NIOS for correcting date of birth, also falls to the
ground.
10. Learned State Counsel submits that degree of
proof required in a criminal trial is different from
standard of proof required in disciplinary proceedings.
He submits that in disciplinary enquiry, a Government
Servant can be punished based on preponderance of
probabilities, while in criminal trial before punishing a
person, his guilt has to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, he submits that petitioner’s acquittal of
the criminal charge by appellate court alone cannot be
sufficient to interfere with the punishment imposed in
disciplinary proceedings. Thus, he submits that learned
Tribunal was justified in dismissing the claim petition
filed by petitioner and no interference with the
impugned judgment is called for.
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11. We have gone through the impugned
judgment. Learned Tribunal has considered and
discussed all relevant aspects, including findings
returned by Enquiry Officer against the petitioner.
Enquiry Officer referred to the undertaking given by
petitioner in para 10 & 11 of his affidavit, where he
stated that information furnished by him, regarding his
educational qualification, age, etc. is correct and any
information supplied by him if found to be incorrect,
will make him liable to be removed from service.
Learned Tribunal has opined that Disciplinary Enquiry
was held as per applicable Rules.
12. It is not the case of the petitioner before us
that the Discipline and Appeal Rules applicable to him
were violated or reasonable opportunity of defending
himself was not given to him. Learned counsel for the
petitioner contends that since petitioner was acquitted
of the criminal charge, therefore, punishment of
dismissal from service cannot be sustained.
13. Learned State Counsel, however, points out
that this ground is being raised for the first time and
such contention was not raised before learned Tribunal.
He further submits that petitioner secured appointment
as Police Officer by relying on false certificate. He
submits that higher standard of probity is demanded
from Police Officers and securing appointment in Police
Force by playing fraud upon the Authorities is
unpardonable. He submits that Police Officers play
sensitive role in maintaining order in the society,
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therefore, they must possess unimpeachable character
and integrity to maintain the community confidence.
14. This Court finds substance in the submissions
made by learned State Counsel. Petitioner has not
challenged the punishment on the ground of violation
of the norms laid down in the applicable Discipline and
Appeal Rules or for violation of Principles of Natural
Justice. He has also not questioned the findings
returned by Enquiry Officer. Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Ram Saran vs. I.G. of Police CRPF & others,
reported as (2006) 2 SCC 541, while dealing with
similar fact situation, has held as under:-
“8. The Courts should not interfere with the administrator’s
decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural
impropriety or was shocking to the
conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of
logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn.,
(1948) 1 KB 223: [1947] 2 All ER 680(CA) commonly known as
Wednesbury’s case the Court would not go into the correctness
of the choice made by the administrator open to
him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of
the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the
deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.
(See: V. Ramana v. A.P. SRTC and Ors., [2005] 7 SCC 338).”
15. In the present case, petitioner was held guilty
of playing fraud upon the Authorities while securing
appointment as Police Constable. Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Ram Chandra Singh vs Savitri Devi,
Appeal (Civil) No. 8216 of 2003 has enunciated the law
on fraud and held as follows:-
“16. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which
induces the other person or authority to take a definite
determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former
either by word or letter.
17. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself
amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also
give reason to claim relief against fraud.
18. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and
consists in leading a man into damage by wilfully or recklessly
causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law
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if a party makes representations which he knows to be false,
and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the
representations proceeded may not have been bad.
24. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A
collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of
others in relation to a property would render the transaction
void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous.
26. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to
fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any
affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the
application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata.
27. In Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Bros., it has been held that:
’20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most
solemn proceedings in any civilized system of
jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human
conduct.’
31. In Chittaranjan Das v. Durgapore Project Ltd. & others,
99 CWN 897, it has been held:
‘ Suppression of a material document which affects
the condition of service of the petitioner, would
amount to fraud in such matters. Even the
principles of natural justice are not required to be
complied with in such a situation.
It is now well known that a fraud vitiates all solemn
acts. Thus, even if the date of birth of the petitioner
had been recorded in the service returns on the
basis of the certificate produced by the petitioner,
the same is not sacrosanct nor the respondent
company would be bound thereby.'”
16. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon
the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & others,
reported as (2006) 5 SCC 446 for contending that since
petitioner was acquitted by criminal court, therefore,
punishment of dismissal, imposed upon him for similar
charge, is unsustainable.
17. Learned State Counsel by referring to
judgment dated 06.02.2019 (Annexure 10 to the writ
petition) rendered by learned Sessions Judge in
Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 2018 (Sachin Kumar S/o Sri
Bhudev Sharma vs. State of Uttarakhand) submits that
petitioner’s conviction from the charge of Sections 420
& 471 IPC was reversed by appellate court on the7
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ground that he neither fabricated nor interpolated the
High School mark-sheet and the two mark-sheets,
possessed by petitioner, were issued by recognised
Boards, as such the offence under Sections 420 IPC is
not made out against him. He points out that learned
Sessions Judge further held that as a person, belonging
to Other Backward Classes, petitioner was entitled to
relaxation in upper age to the extent of five years,
therefore, he did not derive any wrongful benefit by
using incorrect date of birth and he was eligible even as
per his actual date of birth.
18. Learned State Counsel submits that the
reason assigned by learned Sessions Judge for
acquitting the petitioner reveals that the scope of
enquiry against petitioner in criminal trial was entirely
different from that in Disciplinary Proceedings. He
further submits that in the case of G.M. Tank (supra),
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that charge in
departmental proceedings and criminal case must be
identical only then acquittal in criminal case can be a
ground for setting aside the punishment order.
19. He submits that in the present case, charge
against petitioner in criminal trial was different from
the charge in Disciplinary Enquiry. He submits that in
disciplinary proceedings, charge was that he played
fraud upon the authorities by mentioning incorrect date
of birth which he knew was false, while in criminal trial,
scope of enquiry was different. He relies upon para 28
to 30 of the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme8
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Court in the case of G.M. Tank (supra), which are
extracted below:-
“28. This Court in Depot Manager, A.P. SRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf
Miya [(1997) 2 SCC 699 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 548] in para 8 held as
under: (SCC pp. 704-05)
“The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are
two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is
launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender
owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that
the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an
act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public
duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the
service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be
expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and
completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore,
desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which
the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed
pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each
case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts
and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed
simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal
case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature
involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence
generally implies infringement of public (sic duty), as
distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal
law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in
accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined
under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is the case of
departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental
proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the
delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined
under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict
standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands
excluded is a settled legal position. … Under these
circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the
departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent
in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a
question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its
own facts and circumstances. In this case, … the charge is
failure to anticipate the accident and prevention thereof. It has
nothing to do with the culpability of the offence under Sections
304-A and 338 IPC. Under these circumstances, the High Court
was not right in staying the proceedings.”
29. The judgment in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama
Rao [(1964) 3 SCR 25 : AIR 1963 SC 1723] was cited for the
purpose that the High Court is not constituted in a proceeding
under Article 226 of the Constitution as a court of appeal over
the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry
against a public servant, it is concerned to determine whether
the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and
according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf and
whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.
30. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing
for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. In
this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case
are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in
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a departmental case against the appellant and the charge before
the criminal court are one and the same. It is true that the
nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the
criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against
the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected
against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in
the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In
other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances
are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and
departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on
the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the appellant’s
residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating
Officer Mr V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were
the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by
relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the
charges were established against the appellant. The same
witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal
court on the examination came to the conclusion that the
prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the
appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the
appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the
charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed that the
judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on
hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and
unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in
the departmental proceedings to stand.”
20. We find substance in the submission made by
learned State Counsel. Since petitioner’s conviction was
reversed in appeal by learned Sessions Judge by
holding that the two High School Certificates possessed
by him were issued by different recognised Boards and
there is no prohibition in law against passing High
School examination from two different Boards and he
has not made any interpolation in those certificates,
therefore, reversal of his conviction in criminal trial in
itself will not be sufficient for disturbing the punishment
of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner, especially
when he admits that he passed High School (10th
Standard) from two different Boards and his date of
birth is different in the certificates issued by the two
Boards and further he relied upon a date of birth for
securing appointment which he knew was not correct.
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21. Thus, we do not find any reason to interfere
with the judgment rendered by learned Tribunal.
Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.
(Pankaj Purohit, J.) (Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.)
30.04.2026
Aswal
NITI RAJ SINGH Digitally signed by NITI RAJ SINGH ASWAL
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, 2.5.4.20=eacc6757ee7881e933ff8934f07477005aa85f9802a3a08b08d1369512ea30f3,
ASWAL
postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND, serialNumber=44EB54CBF00B7698CB6F10C2CE3D26F5C22DACF4F4610C1FE58A58531726FBB0, cn=NITI RAJ SINGH ASWAL
Date: 2026.05.16 02:26:11 -07’00’
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