Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 26.02.2026 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 9 March, 2026
2026:HHC:6205
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 103 of 2026
Reserved on: 26.02.2026
Date of Decision: 09.03.2026.
Vijay Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : Mr Ankush Dass Sood,
Senior Advocate, with
Mr Yuyutsu Singh Thakur,
Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 51 of 2018, dated 01.05.2018,
registered at Police Station, Dharampur, District Solan, H.P., for
the commission of offences punishable under Sections 302, 307,
353, and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as
IPC) and Section 25 of the Arms Act.
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. It has been asserted that, according to the
prosecution, the petitioner had fired upon government officials
while they were discharging their official duties. The police
arrested the petitioner and investigated the matter. They filed
the main charge sheet before the Court on 26.07.2018, and
supplementary charge sheets on 23.10.2019 and 13.01.2020. The
matter was listed for final argument when the prosecution
moved an application under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (CrPC), read with Section 348 of Bhartiya Nagrik
Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 seeking the recall of Dr Sangeet
Dhillon (PW17) and Naseeb Singh Patiyal (PW41). The learned
Trial Court allowed the application and recalled the witnesses
for further examination. The matter was scheduled for the
examination of witnesses on 08.01.2026, but they failed to
appear, and the case was adjourned to 20.02.2026. The
prosecution is unable to complete the evidence despite the lapse
of seven years and eight months. The petitioner is innocent and
was falsely implicated. The undue delay in completing the trial
violates the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. The prosecution,
and not the petitioner, has caused the delay. The petitioner was
previously granted interim bail, and he did not violate the
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conditions imposed upon him. He would abide by the terms and
conditions that the Court may impose. Therefore, it is prayed
that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be
released on bail.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the National Green Tribunal (NGT) had directed
the demolition of all illegal constructions. Informant Shivender
Pal, Ranjan Gupta, Sanjay Negi, Rajeev Mishra, Smt. Shail Bala,
N.C. Mahajan, Rahul Sharma, police officials and PWD officials
were deputed to comply with the orders of the NGT. Petitioner
Vijay Singh is the owner of Narayani Guest House. He was
present at the reception. He shot at Smt. Shail Bala and Gulab
Singh, who sustained multiple injuries. Shail Bala and Gulab
Singh were taken to the hospital, however, Smt. Shail Bala
succumbed to her injuries. The police registered the FIR and
investigated the matter. The police seized the material objects
on the spot. As per the autopsy report, Smt. Shail Bala had died
as a result of hemorrhagic shock and injury to vital structures
caused by a rifled firearm. The police seized the empty cartridges
from the guest house. The police arrested the petitioner, and he
got a revolver and cartridges recovered. Subsequently, Gulab
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Singh also died because of septicemia secondary to gunshot
injury. As per the report of analysis, human blood was detected
on the blood recovered from the body of Shail Bala, the nose pin
of Shail Bala and the hair clip of Shail Bala, which was
insufficient for blood grouping. Human blood of blood group (A)
was detected in the blood sample of Shail Bala, her shirt,
pyjama, vest and a piece of mat. Human blood was also detected
on the underwear, brassiere, dupatta, blood-stained soil, stone
and artificial teeth of Shail Bala. Blood was detected on the vest,
pants, shirt and jacket of Gulab Singh, but it was inconclusive in
respect of the blood group. The police filed the charge sheet after
the completion of the investigation. The statements of two
witnesses are to be recorded, and the matter was listed on
20.02.2026 for recording their statements. Hence, the status
report.
4. I have heard Mr Ankush Dass Sood, learned Senior
Advocate, assisted by Mr Yuyutsu Singh Thakur, learned counsel
for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent/State.
5. Mr Ankush Dass Sood, learned Senior Advocate for
the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner was arrested in the
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year 2018. The prosecution has been unable to complete the
evidence despite the lapse of more than 7 years and 8 months
from the date of the petitioner’s arrest. The prosecution filed an
application for the recall of the witnesses at the stage of
arguments. The application was allowed, but the prosecution
failed to examine the witnesses. The petitioner’s right to a
speedy trial is being violated, and the petitioner is entitled to
bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and
the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the judgments
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indrani Pratim Mukerjea vs
Central Bureau of Investigation and another. Crl. No. 1627 of 2022
decided on 18.05.2022 Tapas Kumar Palit versus State of
Chhattisgarh, Criminal Appeal No. 738 of 2025 decided on
14.02.2025, Anoop Singh vs U.T. of J and K. Cr.l No. 1398 of 2026
decided on 03.02.2026 and this Court in Shariq Rehman vs. State
of H.P. Cr.MP(M) No. 2293 of 2023 decided on 05.01.2024 in
support of his submissions.
6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner
had shot Shail Bala and Gulab Singh, who were discharging their
duties and were complying with the orders passed by the
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National Green Tribunal. They subsequently succumbed to their
injuries. The petitioner has committed heinous offences which
are punishable with capital punishment. The statements of only
two witnesses are to be recorded. Hence, he prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records
carefully.
8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page
380:-
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elabo-
rating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India in the context of personal liberty of a person under
trial, has laid down the key factors that should be consid-
ered while granting bail, which are extracted as under:
(SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is
the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of jus-
tice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
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jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Mod-
ern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the
Court considering the likelihood of the applicant inter-
fering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise
polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional
but rational, in this context, to enquire into the an-
tecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find
whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which
suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences
while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of crimi-
nological history that a thoughtless bail order has en-
abled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict fur-
ther crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion,
on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a
defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.”
(emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be ex-
tracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on
the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary
manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep
in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evi-
dence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment
which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour,
means and standing of the accused, circumstances
which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibil-
ity of securing the presence of the accused at the trial,
reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tam-
pered with, the larger interests of the public or State
and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept
in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the
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legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the
court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it
(sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against
the accused and that the prosecution will be able to
produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.”
(emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking
through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising
discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same ju-
diciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted
as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this
Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order,
but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion
in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course.
An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be
sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant
of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the
matter being dealt with by the court and facts do al-
ways vary from case to case. While placement of the
accused in the society, though it may be considered by
itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant
of bail, and the same should always be coupled with
other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The
nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations
for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime,
the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail,
though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of
the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004)
7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977 , this Court held that al-
though it is established that a court considering a bail ap-
plication cannot undertake a detailed examination of evi-
dence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the
case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie
reasons justifying the grant of bail.
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60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee,
(2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765 , this Court ob-
served that where a High Court has granted bail mechani-
cally, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-
application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held
as under with regard to the circumstances under which an
order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the fac-
tors which ought to have guided the Court’s decision to
grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499,
para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, in-
terfere with an order passed by the High Court grant-
ing or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is
equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its
discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in com-
pliance with the basic principles laid down in a
plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is
well settled that, among other circumstances, the fac-
tors to be borne in mind while considering an appli-
cation for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reason-
able ground to believe that the accused had
committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing,
if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and
standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses
being influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being
thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis sup-
plied)
xxxxxxx
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62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC
497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge
Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned
and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021
SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar,
2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting
bail to the accused, observed as follows: ( Brijmani
Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC
(Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of
an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time
while considering an application for bail courts can-
not lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations
against an accused and the facts that have a bearing
in the case, particularly, when the accusations may
not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are
supported by adequate material brought on record so
as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclu-
sion. While considering an application for the grant of
bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by
reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to
the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due con-
sideration must be given to facts suggestive of the na-
ture of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused,
if any, and the nature of punishment that would fol-
low a conviction vis-Ã -vis the offence(s) alleged
against an accused.” (emphasis supplied)
9. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
10. The status report mentions that the petitioner was
arrested on 03.05.2018 and the charge sheet was filed before the
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Court on 26.07.2018. Supplementary charge sheets were filed on
23.10.2019 and 13.01.2020. The copies of the order sheets show
that the charges were framed on 06.09.2018, and the matter was
listed for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses on
different dates; however, the prosecution did not produce the
witnesses summoned by the Court, and the Court had to adjourn
the matter repeatedly because of the absence of the summoned
witnesses. When the matter was listed for arguments on
13.08.2025, an application under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. was filed,
which was allowed on 07.11.2025. The witnesses were ordered to
be recalled for further examination, however, the witnesses
were not produced. Therefore, the petitioner’s plea that the
prosecution failed to complete the evidence within a reasonable
time has some merit. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in Dipak Shubhashchandra Mehta v. CBI, (2012) 4
SCC 134, that detaining under-trial prisoners in custody for an
indefinite period violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Kashmira Singh v. State of
Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 291: 1977 SCC (Cri) 559: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
254 that keeping a person inside the prison for 5-6 years for an
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offence which is alternatively found not to have been committed
by him is a travesty of justice. It was observed at page 292:
“2…. It would indeed be a travesty of justice to keep a per-
son in jail for a period of five or six years for an offence
which is ultimately found not to have been committed by
him. Can the Court ever compensate him for his incarcer-
ation, which is found to be unjustified?… Of what avail
would the acquittal be to such a person who has already
served out his term of imprisonment or, at any rate, a
major part of it?”
11. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that when the State or any prosecuting
agency including the Court concerned has no wherewithal to
provide the right to speedy trial of the accused, the bail should
not be opposed on the ground that crime committed is serious. It
was observed at page 820:
17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the
court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect
the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial
as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the
State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose
the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed
is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies
irrespective of the nature of the crime.
18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an
accused, not a convict. The overarching postulate of
criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be
innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside
lightly, however stringent the penal law may be.
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19. We are convinced that the manner in which the
prosecuting agency, as well as the Court, have proceeded,
the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be
said to have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of
the Constitution.
12. It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India,
(2015) 7 SCC 291: (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127
that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the
accused. It was observed at page 298:
“13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948, assures that:
“12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.”
14. More recently, the European Convention on Human
Rights in Article 6(1) promises that:
“6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time….”
And in its second sub-article, that:
“6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”
15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down
the use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and
omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal
prosecution in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386
US 213 (1967)].
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16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569:
1994 SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court
unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a
fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract
these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp.
638-39, paras 86-87)
“86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article
21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to
life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with
the actual restraint imposed by arrest and
consequent incarceration and continues at all
stages, namely, the stage of the investigation,
inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any
possible prejudice that may result from the
impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of
the commission of the offence till it consummates
into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it
may be noted that the constitutional guarantee of a
speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure.
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], while dealing
with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has
observed thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
‘5. … No procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as
“reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of
Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a
speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean
reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and
essential part of the fundamental right to life and
liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which
would, however, arise is as to what would be the
consequence if a person accused of an offence is
denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of
his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long-
delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right
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under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released
unconditionally, freed from the charge levelled
against him on the ground that trying him after an
unduly long period of time and convicting him after
such a trial would constitute a violation of his
fundamental right under Article 21?”
17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence
being present at every stage of a criminal trial and a
fortiori in departmental enquiries has been emphasised
by this Court on numerous occasions. The Constitution
Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1
SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] underscored that this right to
speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution
and is also reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973; that it encompasses all stages viz.
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial;
that the burden lies on the prosecution to justify and
explain the delay; that the Court must engage in a
balancing test to determine whether this right had been
denied in the particular case before it.”
13. It was held in the Shaheen Welfare Association. v.
Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person
cannot be kept behind bars when there is no prospect of trial
being concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 621:
“8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to
grant some relief to those persons who have been
deprived of their personal liberty for a considerable
length of time without any prospect of the trial being
concluded in the near future. Undoubtedly, the safety of
the community and the nation needs to be safeguarded,
looking to the nature of the offences these undertrials
have been charged with. But the ultimate justification for
such deprivation of liberty pending trial can only be their
being found guilty of the offences for which they have
16
2026:HHC:6205been charged. If such a finding is not likely to be arrived
at within a reasonable time, some relief becomes
necessary.”
14. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3
SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be
subjected to unending detention pending trial. It was observed at
page 335:
“40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has
been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that
cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed
as an indefinite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is
not necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law which,
regardless of the stringent provisions in a penal law or
the gravity of the offence, has time and again recognised
the legitimacy of seeking liberty from incarceration. To
put it differently, no accused can be subjected to
unending detention pending trial, especially when the law
presumes him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even
where statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail,
such as in cases under the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967, this Court has expressly ruled that
after a reasonably long period of incarceration, or for any
other valid reason, such stringent provisions will melt
down, and cannot be measured over and above the right
of liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
(see Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A.
Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, paras 15 and 17] ).”
15. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right
to a speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right
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of bail is curtailed on the premise that the trial would be
concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 174: –
13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused
to secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial discre-
tion (like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present case),
this Court has upheld them for conflating two competing
values i.e. the right of the accused to enjoy freedom, based
on the presumption of innocence, and societal interest —
as observed in Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Ra-
jasthan [Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2009)
2 SCC 281: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 745: (2008) 17 SCR 369] (“the
concept of bail emerges from the conflict between the police
power to restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have com-
mitted a crime, and presumption of innocence in favour of
the alleged criminal….”). They are, at the same time, up-
held on the condition that the trial is concluded expedi-
tiously. The Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of
Punjab [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569:
1994 SCC (Cri) 899: (1994) 2 SCR 375] made observations to
this effect. In the Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of
India [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2
SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123] again, this
Court expressed the same sentiment, namely, that when
stringent provisions are enacted, curtailing the provi-
sions of bail, and restricting judicial discretion, it is on
the basis that investigation and trials would be concluded
swiftly. The Court said that parliamentary intervention is
based on: (Shaheen Welfare case [Shaheen Welfare Assn.
v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366:
(1996) 2 SCR 1123], SCC p. 624, para 17)
“17. … a conscious decision has been taken by the leg-
islature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal lib-
erty of an undertrial accused for the sake of protecting
the community and the nation against terrorist and
disruptive activities or other activities harmful to soci-
ety, it is all the more necessary that investigation of
such crimes is done efficiently and an adequate num-
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ber of Designated Courts are set up to bring to book
persons accused of such serious crimes. This is the
only way in which society can be protected against
harmful activities. This would also ensure that persons
ultimately found innocent are not unnecessarily kept
in jail for long periods.”
16. The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial
detention and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page
178:
“23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that
laws which impose stringent conditions for the grant of
bail may be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials
are not concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the
individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and
their living conditions, more often than not, are ap-
palling. According to the Union Home Ministry’s response
to Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had
recorded that as on 31-12-2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners
were lodged in jails against a total capacity of 4,25,069
prisoners in the country [ National Crime Records Bureau,
Prison Statistics in India <https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/de-
fault/files/PSI-2021/Executive_ncrb_Summary-
2021.pdf>]. Of these, 1,22,852 were convicts; the rest,
4,27,165, were undertrials.
24. The danger of unjust imprisonment is that inmates
are at risk of “prisonisation”, a term described by the
Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A Convict
Prisoner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993 Cri LJ 3242]
as “a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner: (SCC
OnLine Ker para 13)
“13. … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He
loses personal possessions. He has no personal rela-
tionships. Psychological problems result from loss of
freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy of
personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to
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2026:HHC:6205be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary
standards. Self-perception changes.”
25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to
crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the more
professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal” [
Working Papers – Group on Prisons & Borstals – 1966
U.K.] (also see Donald Clemmer’s “The Prison Community”
published in 1940 [ Donald Clemmer, The Prison Commu-
nity (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is referred to
in Tomasz Sobecki, “Donald Clemmer’s Concept of Pris-
onisation”, available at:<https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wpcon-
tent/uploads/2020/12/Sobecki_sklad.pdf> (accessed on
23-3-2023).] ). Incarceration has further deleterious ef-
fects, where the accused belongs to the weakest economic
strata: immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases,
scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and
alienation from society. The courts, therefore, have to be
sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an ac-
quittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure
that trials–especially in cases where special laws enact
stringent provisions- are taken up and concluded speed-
ily.”
17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra) that the right to speedy trial of
the offenders facing criminal charges is an important facet of
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and inordinate delay in
the conclusion of the trial entitles the accused to the grant of
bail. It was observed at page 817: –
“10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1
SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the
right to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges
is “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as
20
2026:HHC:6205interpreted by this Court”. Remarking that a valid
procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a
procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just”, it was held
that: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
“5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law
for depriving a person of liberty cannot be
“reasonable, fair or just” unless that procedure
ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of
such person. No procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable,
fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There
can, therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by
speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is
an integral and essential part of the fundamental right
to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question
which would, however, arise is as to what would be the
consequence if a person accused of an offence is
denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of
his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long-
delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21.”
11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and
again, in several judgments, such as Kadra
Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of
Bihar, (1981) 3 SCC 671: 1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93].
In the latter, the court re-emphasised the right to a
speedy trial and further held that an accused, facing a
prolonged trial, has no option: (Abdul Rehman Antulay
case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC
225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269, para 84)
“84. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is,
thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as
the case may be, to proceed with the case with
reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country,
where the large majority of accused come from poorer
and weaker sections of society, not versed in the ways
21
2026:HHC:6205
of law, where they do not often get competent legal
advice, the application of the said rule is wholly
inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused
demands a speedy trial and yet he is not given one, it
may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot
disentitle an accused from complaining of
infringement of his right to a speedy trial on the
ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy
trial.”
18. This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v.
State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was
observed:
7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a hurried
trial is frowned upon as it may not give sufficient time to
prepare for the defence, an inordinate delay in the
conclusion of the trial would infringe the right of an
accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde, in
“The Ballad of Reading Gaol”, wrote the following
poignant lines while being incarcerated:
“I know not whether Laws be right,
Or whether Laws be wrong;
All that we know who be in jail
Is that the wall is strong;
And that each day is like a year,
A year whose days are long.”
19. It was held in Athar Parwez v. Union of India, (2024)
20 SCC 57: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3762 that long incarceration and
the delay in the conclusion of the trial will entitle the accused to
bail. It was observed at page 63:
22
2026:HHC:6205
19. Long incarceration and the unlikely likelihood of the
trial being completed in the near future have also been
taken as a ground for exercising its constitutional role by
the constitutional courts to grant bail on violation of Ar-
ticle 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees
trial be concluded within a reasonable time. Gross delay
in conclusion of the trial would justify such invocation,
leading to a conclusion of violation of Part III of the Con-
stitution of India, which may be taken as a ground to re-
lease an undertrial on bail.
*****
21. At the initial stage, the legislative policy needs to be
appreciated and followed by the courts. Keeping the
statutory provisions in mind, but with the passage of
time, the effect of that statutory provision would, in fact,
have to be diluted, giving way to the mandate of Part III of
the Constitution, where the accused, as of now, is not a
convict and is facing the charges. Constitutional right of
speedy trial in such circumstances will have precedence
over the bar/strict provisions of the statute and cannot be
made the sole reason for denial of bail. Therefore, the pe-
riod of incarceration of an accused could also be a rele-
vant factor to be considered by the constitutional courts,
not to be merely governed by the statutory provisions.
20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC
322 that the accused has a right to an expeditious trial. It was
observed:
10. However, many times we have made ourselves very
clear that howsoever serious a crime may be, the accused
has a fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined in
Article 21 of the Constitution.
23
2026:HHC:6205
21. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to bail because of
the inability to conclude the trial expeditiously.
22. It was submitted on behalf of the State that the
offence alleged against the petitioner is heinous. He had shot at
two officials who were obeying the orders of the NGT. There is
no dispute that the petitioner is prima facie involved in the
commission of a heinous offence, but this cannot be a reason to
detain the petitioner indefinitely. The State has an obligation to
ensure the conviction of the guilty by expeditious trial, and it
cannot keep a person behind bars for an indefinite period
without proving his guilt simply because the allegations against
him are heinous. In Tapas Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that a person cannot be detained indefinitely
awaiting the outcome of the trial. In Indrani Pratim Mukerjea
(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where a person
was kept behind bars for 6½ years, and there was no prospect of
the early conclusion of the trial, his further detention was not
justified. Similarly, in Anoop Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that when the prosecution was unable to complete
24
2026:HHC:6205
the evidence within 7 years, the petitioner cannot be detained in
custody. In Shariq Rehman (supra), a Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court enlarged the accused on bail when the prosecution was
unable to complete the evidence for about 6 years and one
month. Therefore, the delay in the trial would override the
gravity of the offence.
23. Keeping in view the delay in the trial, the present
petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released
on bail, subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of
₹1,00,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the
satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the
petitioner will abide by the following conditions: –
(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses,
nor will he influence any evidence in any manner
whatsoever.
(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and
every hearing and will not seek unnecessary
adjournments.
(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for
a continuous period of seven days without
furnishing the address of the intended visit to the
SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and
the Trial Court.
(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to
the Court; and
25
2026:HHC:6205(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and
social media contact to the Police and the Court and
will abide by the summons/notices received from
the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social
Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile
number or social media accounts, the same will be
intimated to the Police/Court within five days from
the date of the change.
24. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to
file a petition for cancellation of the bail.
25. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy
of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent of Sub Jail Solan,
District Solan, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.
26. The observations made hereinabove are regarding
the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the case’s merits.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
9th March, 2026
(Nikita)
Digitally signed by RAVINDER KUMAR
DN: C=IN, O=HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA,
Phone=35ecb6f93c6891a7dae90f163e34d7ecaa420b13af1363204ab0e0f5c87077dc,
RAVINDER KUMAR
PostalCode=171001, S=Himachal Pradesh,
SERIALNUMBER=f6cc63c55495d14ce1f8623eacdb6cb9ef2c553803537a2f53c4ee637cbebaff,
CN=RAVINDER KUMAR
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
Date: 2026-03-09 14:24:01
