Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On : 24.3.2026 vs State Of H.P on 31 March, 2026
Author: Virender Singh
Bench: Virender Singh
1 2026:HHC:9700
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT
SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 80 of 2026
Reserved on : 24.3.2026
Decided on : 31.3.2026
Sant Prakash Sharma
...Applicant
Versus
State of H.P.
...Respondent
_______________________________________________________
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge
Whether approved for reporting?
________________________________________________
For the Applicant : Mr. Ajay Kochhar, Senior
Advocate with Ms. Swati
Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. Tejasvi Sharma, Mr.
Mohinder Zharaick, Additional
Advocates General with Mr.
Rohit Sharma, Dy. A.G.
Virender Singh, Judge
Applicant Sant Prakash Sharma has filed the
present application, under Section 483 of Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (hereinafter referred to as
‘the BNSS’) for releasing him, on bail, during the
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pendency of the trial, arising out of FIR No. 313 of
2023, dated 12.12.2023, registered under Sections
302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘the IPC‘) and Section
25 of the Arms Act, registered with Police Station,
Haroli, District Una, H.P.
2. According to the applicant, he is
innocent and has falsely been implicated, in
this case, as no legal evidence could be
collected by the prosecution to connect him,
with the alleged offence.
3. Apart from this, he has also put
forward his ill health, as, one of the grounds,
to release him on bail, by pleading that he is
suffering from spinal injury and the Doctor
has advised him to take home remedies,
painkillers and physio- therapy. The Doctor is
also stated to have advised that in case, the
proper precaution is not taken, the problem
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may aggravate. Due to said problem, he
allegedly could not follow daily pursuits.
4. According to the applicant, thereafter,
he was referred to PGI, Chandigarh, on
27.2.2024, and the Doctor gave a
comprehensive opinion. The applicant had
also remained hospitalized, in Regional
Hospital, Una, w.e.f. 20.9.2024 to 3.10.2024.
Thereafter, the Doctor has advised the
applicant the physio-therapy, for about 25
days, at PGI, Chandigarh. The applicant has
also given the chronology of his medical
treatment at various stages, in order to
support his case.
5. The applicant has relied upon the
advise of the Doctors at PGI, Chandigarh,
according to which, he should avoid travelling
and difficult postures.
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6. According to the further stand of the
applicant, investigation, in the present case, is
complete and the matter is now pending
before the learned trial Court. All these facts
have been highlighted to show that custodial
interrogation of the applicant, is no longer
required by the Police. Alongwith the
application,he has also annexed the medical
record.
7. The delay in the trial has also been
made a ground for seeking the relief of bail by
pleading that the chances of conclusion of the
trial against him, in near future, are not so
bright, as, there are as many as 47 witnesses
and till date only three PWs have been
examined.
8. The applicant, through his counsel,
has given certain undertakings, for which he
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is ready to abide by, in case, ordered to be
released on bail.
9. On all these submissions, Mr. Ajay
Kochhar, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms.
Swati Sharma, has prayed that the bail
application may kindly be allowed, as prayed
for.
10. When, put to notice, Police filed
status report, disclosing therein that on
12.12.2023, at about 1:20 a.m., a telephonic
message was received in Police Station,
Tahliwal that Sant Prakash (applicant) had
shot down labourer Ghoora, upon which,
Inspector Ashok Kumar, Incharge Police Post,
Tahliwal, alongwith other police officials,
reached at the spot, i.e. Sant Rice Mill, where
they noticed the blood stains near Sheller.
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10.1. In order to preserve the spot, HHC
Paramjeet was deputed there. When,
Inspector Ashok Kumar alongwith police
officials was present, in the factory, then, Raj
Kumar disclosed that the injured had been
taken for treatment at Naya Nangal, upon
which, the I.O. reached at RK Hospital, Naya
Nangal, where the Doctor had declared the
injured as ‘brought dead’. His dead body was
stated to be lying in vehicle No. HP-10B-
8896, on the side of the road. The dead body
was taken into possession and the same
was sent to RH, Una.
10.2 On the spot, Santosh Kumar, S/o
Lala Sahu has made statement under Section
154 Cr. P.C., disclosing therein that he is
working in the Sant Rice Mill J.K. Food, for
the last 7-8 years. As per him, at about 12:30
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a.m., in midnight, when, he was present in
the factory, then, he heard noise towards
Sheller and when, he reached at the spot, he
noticed that owner of the Sant Rice Mill and
the deceased were quarreling with each other
and Sant Prakash (applicant) was beating
Ghoora with the fist and kick blows, alleging
that he is not working properly. At that time,
Ritesh Kumar, Heera Ram and Munshi
Rakesh Kumar were also present. All the
aforesaid persons, alongwith the
complainant, were trying to save Ghoora from
Sant Prakash (applicant), and, in their
presence, Sant Prakash (applicant) had shot
down Ghoora. In the meanwhile, labourer Raj
Kumar allegedly reached at the spot.
Thereafter, Sant Prakash (applicant) had
gone to his room in the factory and came
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back alongwith keys of the vehicle. Thereafter,
this witness, Rakesh Kumar and Sant
Prakash (applicant) took Ghoora in the said
vehicle, for treatment to the hospital. The
Doctor had allegedly checked Ghoora in the
car and declared him ‘brought dead’.
10.3 According to the complainant, death
of Ghoora had occurred due to gun fire shot.
As such, he has prayed that action be taken
against applicant Sant Prakash, upon which,
the Police registered a case under Section
302 IPC and Section 25-54-59 of Arms Act.
10.4 Thereafter, investigation started.
During investigation, when, the I.O. reached
at the spot, he came to know about the fact
that accused had gone towards Naya Nangal.
Consequently, I.O. alongwith labourer Raj
Kumar had reached Naya Nangal. Thereafter,
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the Cyber Cell was requested to ascertain the
location of the mobile phone of Sant Prakash
(applicant) and Rakesh Kumar. Thereafter,
Medical Officer of RK Hospital handed over
slip OPD No. 7284, dated 12.12.2023 to the
Police, containing the following description:
“Pt. Brought by Mr. Sant Prakash alongwith two
persons at 01:25 am (Approx) c C/o Fall from ht 20
mins ago, Pt examined outside the hospital in the car.
O/E Pt. Is uncounscious Gcs-Fz-1, V-I, M-I pupils-
Dilated No reflection towards light HR-Nil, Perepheral
pulses-Nil, BP & PR-Nil Brought dead.”
10.5 When, the I.O, inquired from the
persons, who were present outside the
hospital, then, one of the persons, disclosed
his name as Sant Prakash (applicant) and
when, he was inquired about the said injured
person, he tried to evade the questions asked
by the Police and got perplexed. He has
disclosed that he had sent the injured
persons, for further treatment to PGI,
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Chandigarh. When, the other person was
inquired, about the said person, who has
disclosed his name as Rakesh Kumar, he also
tried to evade the questions asked by the
police. The third person disclosed his name
as Santosh Kumar and on inquiry, he
disclosed that injured Ghoora has already
expired and his dead body was taken
somewhere by Sant Prakash (applicant) and
Rakesh Kumar, upon which, Rakesh Kumar
disclosed that vehicle No. HP-10B-8896 was
parked, underneath the fly over, near railway
line. The vehicle was, thereafter, searched and
blood stains were found in the vehicle. In the
said vehicle, dead body was found, which was
taken into possession.
10.6 During investigation, spot map was
prepared, where dead body and the vehicle
were found. The vehicle in question was also
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taken into possession. During investigation,
record from RK Hospital was obtained and as
per the record, the cause of the injury on the
person of the deceased was stated to be “fall
from height” by the accused persons. As
such, accused persons, according to the
Police has misled the Medical Officer, as well
as, the Police, so that they could dispose off
the body.
10.7 The post-mortem examination of the
dead body was conducted at RPGMC, Tanda,
District Kangra, HP. Thereafter, blood was
preserved from the spot.
10.8 During search of the residential
house of the applicant Sant Prakash, a pistol
of 0.32 calibre, alongwith the live cartridges,
was found, which was also taken into
possession. During search of his residential
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house, another double barrel country made
pistol was found, alongwith live cartridges,
which was also taken into possession.
10.9. It is further case of the Police that in
the intervening night of 11-12/12/2023, a
quarrel had taken place and thereafter,
applicant Sant Prakash had called his
Clerk/Munshi at the spot. Thereafter, he got
his licensed pistol, from his residence and
shot him with two gunshots, which were also
found, during post-mortem examination of
the dead body.
10.10 Thereafter, on the request of other labourers, applicant Sant Prakash and Rakesh Kumar, took the injured to RK
Hospital, where he was declared “brought
dead”. Thereafter, they took the dead body, in
their vehicle, and parked the vehicle, at a
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distance of about 2 kms., at a secluded place.
They had also misled the Police by disclosing
that the injured was sent to PGI, Chandigarh,
for treatment. As per the post-mortem
examination, deceased was found to have
consumed liquor, prior to his death. The
cause of death has been mentioned as under:
“The cause of death in this case in our opinion is
the hemorrhagic shock due to injury to abdominal
and thoracic contents as a consequence of
ftrearm injury which is sufficient to cause death
in ordinary course of nature.”
10.11 Investigation is stated to be complete
and charge-sheet has been filed in the Court
of CJM, Una. Thereafter, the same has been
committed to the Court of Sessions and the
case is now stated to be pending before the
learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Una,
H.P., and fixed for consideration on charge,
on 8.1.2025.
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11. On the basis of above facts, a prayer
has been made to dismiss the application.
12. Bail application of the applicant has
earlier been dismissed by this Court on
10.1.2025. As per the status report, there are
total 47 witnesses, out of which, three have
been examined, till date.
13. The case is now fixed for recording
evidence of PWs 6 to 8 on 6.5.2026, PWs 9 to
11 on 7.5.2026, PWs 12 to 14 on 8.5.2026,
PWs 15, 17, 19 and 20 on 15.5.2026 and PWs
16, 18 and 21 on 16.5.2026.
14. The applicant is seeking the relief of bail
on the ground of undue delay in the trial by
highlighting the snail pace of trial, as discussed
above. Right to speedy trial has been held to be
fundamental right by the Constitutional Bench
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a case titled as
Abdul Rehman Antulay and others versus R.S.
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Nayak and another, reported in (1992) 1
Supreme Court Cases 225. In the said case, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the
accused has right to speedy trial, which flows
from Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Relevant paragraph 86 of the said judgment, is
reproduced, as under:
“86. In view of the above discussion, the following
propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We
must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive.
It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to
lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are:
(1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article
21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused
to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of
the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in
public interest or that it serves the social interest
also, does not make it any the less the right of the
accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the
guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as
quickly as possible in the circumstances.
(2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21
encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-
trial. That is how, this Court has understood this
right and there is no reason to take a restricted view.
(3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from
the point of view of the accused are:
(a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention
should be as short as possible. In other words, the
accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or
unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction;
(b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his
vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly
prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be
minimal; and
(c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the
ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on
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account of death, disappearance or non-availability of
witnesses or otherwise.
(4) At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is
usually the accused who is interested in delaying the
proceedings. As is often pointed out, “delay is a
known defence tactic”. Since the burden of proving
the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution,
delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-
availability of witnesses, disappearance of evidence by
lapse of time really work against the interest of the
prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the
prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the
proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right
to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the
first question to be put and answered is — who is
responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either
party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and
interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as
delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing
such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes
without saying that frivolous proceedings or
proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of
reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in
good faith. The mere fact that an application/petition
is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior
court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not
frivolous. Very often these stays are obtained on ex
parte representation.
(5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred
(resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one
must have regard to all the attendant circumstances,
including nature of offence, number of accused and
witnesses, the workload of the court concerned,
prevailing local conditions and so on — what is called,
the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation
of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State
includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical
approach should be adopted in such matters instead
of a pedantic one.
(6) Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice
the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his
advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in
Barker [33 L Ed 2d 101] “it cannot be said how long a
delay is too long in a system where justice is
supposed to be swift but deliberate”. The same idea
has been stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell [15 L Ed
2d 627] in the following words:
‘… the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is
necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has
orderly expedition, rather than mere speed, as its
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essential ingredients; and whether delay in
completing a prosecution amounts to an
unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon
all the circumstances.’
However, inordinately long delay may be taken as
presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the
fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant
fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become
a persecution. But when does the prosecution become
persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given
case.
(7) We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called
the ‘demand’ rule. An accused cannot try himself; he
is tried by the court at the behest of the prosecution.
Hence, an accused’s plea of denial of speedy trial
cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at
no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he
did make such a demand and yet he was not tried
speedily, it would be a plus point in his favour, but
the mere non-asking for a speedy trial cannot be put
against the accused. Even in USA, the relevance of
demand rule has been substantially watered down in
Barker [33 L Ed 2d 101] and other succeeding cases.
(8) Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the
several relevant factors — ‘balancing test’ or
‘balancing process’ — and determine in each case
whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a
given case.
(9) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the
conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has
been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the
case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the
only course open. The nature of the offence and other
circumstances in a given case may be such that
quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of
justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make
such other appropriate order — including an order to
conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is
not concluded or reducing the sentence where the
trial has concluded — as may be deemed just and
equitable in the circumstances of the case.
(10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-
limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be
qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely
to shift the burden of proving justification on to the
shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of
complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is
primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the
delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to
weigh all the circumstances of a given case before
pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court
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of USA too has repeatedly refused to fix any such
outer time-limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor
do we think that not fixing any such outer limit
ineffectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial.
(11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial
and for relief on that account, should first be
addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court
entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay
the proceedings, except in a case of grave and
exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court
must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.”
(self emphasis supplied)
15. A three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, in another case, titled as Raj Deo Sharma
versus State of Bihar, reported in (1998) 7 Supreme
Court Cases 507, has supplemented the decision of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abdul Rehman
Antulay‘s case (supra), by issuing the additional
directions. Relevant paragraph 13 of the judgment in
Raj Deo Sharma‘s case (supra), is reproduced as
under:
“17. After deep consideration of the matter, we proceed
to supplement the propositions laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Antulay case [(1992) 1 SCC
225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] with the following directions:
(i) In cases where the trial is for an offence punishable
with imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven
years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the court
shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of a
period of two years from the date of recording the plea
of the accused on the charges framed whether the
prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not
within the said period and the court can proceed to the
next step provided by law for the trial of the case.
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(ii) In such cases as mentioned above, if the accused
has been in jail for a period of not less than one-half of
the maximum period of punishment prescribed for the
offence, the trial court shall release the accused on bail
forthwith on such conditions as it deems fit.
(iii) If the offence under trial is punishable with
imprisonment for a period exceeding 7 years, whether
the accused is in jail or not, the court shall close the
prosecution evidence on completion of three years from
the date of recording the plea of the accused on the
charge framed, whether the prosecution has examined
all the witnesses or not within the said period and the
court can proceed to the next step provided by law for
the trial of the case, unless for very exceptional reasons
to be recorded and in the interest of justice the court
considers it necessary to grant further time to the
prosecution to adduce evidence beyond the aforesaid
time-limit.
(iv) But if the inability for completing the prosecution
within the aforesaid period is attributable to the
conduct of the accused in protracting the trial, no court
is obliged to close the prosecution evidence within the
aforesaid period in any of the cases covered by clauses
(i) to (iii).
(v) Where the trial has been stayed by orders of the
court or by operation of law, such time during which
the stay was in force shall be excluded from the
aforesaid period for closing the prosecution evidence.
The above directions will be in addition to and without
prejudice to the directions issued by this Court in
“Common Cause” A Registered Society v. Union of India
[(1996) 4 SCC 33 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 589] as modified by
the same Bench through the order reported in
“Common Cause” A Registered Society v. Union of India
[(1996) 6 SCC 775 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 42] .”
16. In a case, titled as Dharmendra Kirthal
versus State of Uttar Pradesh and another, reported in
(2013) 8 Supreme Court Cases 368, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held the right to speedy and fair
trial to be an integral part of very soul of Article 21 of
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the Constitution of India. Relevant paragraphs 30 to 33
of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:
“30. Keeping the aforesaid enunciation in view, we shall
presently proceed to deal with the stand and stance of
both the sides. The first submission which pertains to
the denial of speedy trial has been interpreted to be a
facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. In Kartar Singh
[Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 :
1994 SCC (Cri) 899] , the majority, speaking through
Pandian, J., has expressed thus: (SCC p. 638, paras
85-86)
“85. The right to a speedy trial is not only an important
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive
incarceration, to minimise anxiety and concern
accompanying the accusation and to limit the
possibility of impairing the ability of an accused to
defend himself but also there is a societal interest in
providing a speedy trial. This right has been actuated
in the recent past and the courts have laid down a
series of decisions opening up new vistas of
fundamental rights. In fact, lot of cases are coming
before the courts for quashing of proceedings on the
ground of inordinate and undue delay stating that the
invocation of this right even need not await formal
indictment or charge.
86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as
an essential part of the fundamental right to life and
liberty guaranteed and preserved under our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the
actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent
incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the
stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision
so that any possible prejudice that may result from
impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the
commission of the offence till it consummates into a
finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted
that the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is
properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.”
31. Be it noted, the Court also referred to the
pronouncements in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] , Sunil
Batra v. Delhi Admn. [(1978) 4 SCC 494 : 1979 SCC
(Cri) 155] , Hussainara Khatoon (4) v. State of Bihar
[(1980) 1 SCC 98 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 40] , Hussainara
Khatoon (6) v. State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 115 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 57] , Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [(1983)
2 SCC 104 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 361] , T.V. Vatheeswaran
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v. State of T.N. [(1983) 2 SCC 68 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 342]
and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1
SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] .
32. The present provision is to be tested on the
touchstone of the aforesaid constitutional principle.
The provision clearly mandates that the trial under this
Act of any offence by the Special Court shall have
precedence and shall be concluded in preference to the
trial in such other courts to achieve the said purpose.
The legislature thought it appropriate to provide that
the trial of such other case shall remain in abeyance. It
is apt to note here that “any other case” against the
accused in “any other court” does not include the
Special Court. The emphasis is on speedy trial and not
denial of it. The legislature has incorporated such a
provision so that an accused does not face trial in two
cases simultaneously and a case before the Special
Court does not linger owing to clash of dates in trial. It
is also worthy to note that the Special Court has been
conferred jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section
8 of the Act to try any other offences with which the
accused may, under any other law for the time being in
force, have been charged and proceeded at the same
trial.
33. As far as fair trial is concerned, needless to
emphasise, it is an integral part of the very soul of
Article 21 of the Constitution. Fair trial is the
quintessentiality of apposite dispensation of criminal
justice. In Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of
Gujarat [(2004) 4 SCC 158 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 999] , it
has been held as follows: (SCC p. 183, para 33)
“33. The principle of fair trial now informs and
energises many areas of the law. It is reflected in
numerous rules and practices. It is a constant,
ongoing development process continually adapted to
new and changing circumstances, and exigencies of
the situation–peculiar at times and related to the
nature of crime, persons involved– directly or
operating behind, social impact and societal needs
and even so many powerful balancing factors which
may come in the way of administration of criminal
justice system.”
(self emphasis supplied)
17. Similar view has been taken by a two Judges’
Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case, titled as
Hussain and another versus Union of India, reported in
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(2017) 5 Supreme Court Cases 702. Relevant
paragraphs 9 to 12 of the judgment, are reproduced, as
under:
“9. As already noticed, speedy trial is a part of
reasonable, fair and just procedure guaranteed under
Article 21. This constitutional right cannot be denied
even on the plea of non-availability of financial
resources. The court is entitled to issue directions to
augment and strengthen the investigating machinery,
setting up of new courts, building new court houses,
providing more staff and equipment to the courts,
appointment of additional Judges and other measures
as are necessary for speedy trial [Hussainara Khatoon
(4) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 98, para 10 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 40].
10. Directions given by this Court in Hussainara
Khatoon (7) v. State of Bihar, (1995) 5 SCC 326 : 1995
SCC (Cri) 913, to this effect which were left to be
implemented by the High Courts are as follows: (SCC p.
328, para 2)
“2. Since this Court has already laid down the
guidelines by orders passed from time to time in this
writ petition and in subsequent orders passed in
different cases since then, we do not consider it
necessary to restate the guidelines periodically
because the enforcement of the guidelines by the
subordinate courts functioning in different States
should now be the responsibility of the different High
Courts to which they are subordinate. General
orders for release of undertrials without reference to
specific fact situations in different cases may prove
to be hazardous. While there can be no doubt that
undertrial prisoners should not languish in jails on
account of refusal to enlarge them on bail for want of
their capacity to furnish bail with monetary
obligations, these are matters which have to be dealt
with on case-to-case basis keeping in mind the
guidelines laid down by this Court in the orders
passed in this writ petition and in subsequent cases
from time to time. Sympathy for the undertrials who
are in jail for long terms on account of the pendency
of cases has to be balanced having regard to the
impact of crime, more particularly, serious crime, on
society and these considerations have to be weighed
having regard to the fact situations in pending cases.
While there can be no doubt that trials of those
23 2026:HHC:9700
accused of crimes should be disposed of as early as
possible, general orders in regard to Judge-strength
of subordinate judiciary in each State must be
attended to, and its functioning overseen, by the
High Court of the State concerned. We share the
sympathetic concern of the learned counsel for the
petitioners that undertrials should not languish in
jails for long spells merely on account of their
inability to meet monetary obligations. We are,
however, of the view that such monitoring can be
done more effectively by the High Courts since it
would be easy for those Courts to collect and collate
the statistical information in that behalf, apply the
broad guidelines already issued and deal with the
situation as it emerges from the status reports
presented to it. The role of the High Court is to
ensure that the guidelines issued by this Court are
implemented in letter and spirit. We think it would
suffice if we request the Chief Justices of the High
Courts to undertake a review of such cases in their
States and give appropriate directions where needed
to ensure proper and effective implementation of the
guidelines. Instead of repeating the general
directions already issued, it would be sufficient to
remind the High Courts to ensure expeditious
disposal of cases.”
11. Deprivation of personal liberty without ensuring
speedy trial is not consistent with Article 21. While
deprivation of personal liberty for some period may not
be avoidable, period of deprivation pending trial/appeal
cannot be unduly long. This Court has held that while
a person in custody for a grave offence may not be
released if trial is delayed, trial has to be expedited or
bail has to be granted in such cases [Supreme Court
Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial
Prisoners) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 731, para 15
: 1995 SCC (Cri) 39].
12. Timely delivery of justice is a part of human rights.
Denial of speedy justice is a threat to public confidence
in the administration of justice. Directions of this Court
in Noor Mohammed v. Jethanand, (2013) 5 SCC 202,
are as follows: (SCC p. 217, para 34)
“34. … Therefore, we request the learned Chief
Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan as well as the
other learned Chief Justices to conceive and adopt a
mechanism, regard being had to the priority of cases,
to avoid such inordinate delays in matters which can
really be dealt with in an expeditious manner.
Putting a step forward is a step towards the
destination. A sensible individual inspiration and a
24 2026:HHC:9700
committed collective endeavour would indubitably
help in this regard. Neither less, nor more.”
(self emphasis supplied)
18. A three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, in case, titled as Union of India versus K.A.
Najeeb, reported in (2021) 3 Supreme Court Cases
713, has held that when a timely trial would not be
possible and the accused has suffered incarceration
for a significant period of time, the Courts would
ordinarily be obligated to enlarge accused on bail.
Relevant paragraphs 11 and 15 of the judgment, are
reproduced, as under:
“11. The High Court’s view draws support from a batch
of decisions of this Court, including in Shaheen Welfare
Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC
(Cri) 366 , laying down that gross delay in disposal of
such cases would justify the invocation of Article 21 of
the Constitution and consequential necessity to release
the undertrial on bail. It would be useful to quote the
following observations from the cited case: (SCC p. 622,
para 10)
“10. Bearing in mind the nature of the crime and the
need to protect the society and the nation, TADA has
prescribed in Section 20(8) stringent provisions for
granting bail. Such stringent provisions can be
justified looking to the nature of the crime, as was
held in Kartar Singh case [Kartar Singh v. State of
Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] , on
the presumption that the trial of the accused will
take place without undue delay. No one can justify
gross delay in disposal of cases when undertrials
perforce remain in jail, giving rise to possible
situations that may justify invocation of Article 21.”
*** *** ***
25 2026:HHC:9700
15. This Court has clarified in numerous judgments that
the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution
would cover within its protective ambit not only due
procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a
speedy trial. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee
(Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India
[Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing
Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC
731, para 15 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 39] , it was held that
undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained pending trial.
Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences
of his acts unless the same is established before a
neutral arbiter. However, owing to the practicalities of
real life where to secure an effective trial and to
ameliorate the risk to society in case a potential criminal
is left at large pending trial, the courts are tasked with
deciding whether an individual ought to be released
pending trial or not. Once it is obvious that a timely trial
would not be possible and the accused has suffered
incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts
would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail.”
(self emphasis supplied)
19. In the recent decision of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar @ Banu
versus State of Punjab, in Cr. Appeal No.
1341/2026 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.
18775/2025, the similar view has again been
reiterated. Relevant paragraphs 5 and 6 of the
judgment are reproduced as under:
“5. Prosecution proposes to examine 23
witnesses to drive home that charges against the
appellant, but none has been examined. Thus,
the trial is likely to take some time to conclude.
6. Almost two years have passed since the
appellant was arrested without trial having
commenced and conclusion thereof nowhere
26 2026:HHC:9700being in sight. Incarceration without trial
amounts to punishment.”
20. In view of decision of Hon’ble
Supreme Court, as referred to above, now,
this Court would proceed to determine the
fact whether there is any undue delay in trial,
as mentioned above, as out of 47 witnesses,
only 3 witnesses have been examined till date
and the case is now listed for remaining PWs,
in the month of May, 2026 and on all these
dates, all the PWs, as per provisions of
Section 309 Cr. P.C. (BNSS) have not been
summoned. The trial is moving in snail pace,
as witnesses have been summoned in peace
meal manner.
21. Considering the fact, so discussed
above, this Court is of the view that the
applicant was arrested on 13.12.2023 and
after the lapse of two years and three months,
27 2026:HHC:9700
the prosecution could examine only three
witnesses and the case is now listed in the
month of May, 2026, that too, for recording
only 23 PWs. Meaning thereby, the chances of
conclusion of the trial, against the applicant,
in near future, are not so bright. From the
above fact, the undue delay in the the trial is
writ at large. Hence, the applicant is entitled
for the relief of bail.
22. Considering all these facts this Court is of
the view that the bail application of the
applicant is liable to be allowed.
23. Consequently, the bail application is allowed
and the applicant is ordered to be released on bail, in
case FIR No. 313 of 2023, dated 12.12.2023,
registered under Sections 302 and 201 read with
Section 34 of the IPC and Section 25 of the Arms
Act, registered with Police Station, Haroli, District
Una, H.P. on his furnishing personal bond in the
28 2026:HHC:9700
sum of Rs. 50,000/-, with one surety, in the like
amount, to the satisfaction of learned trial Court.
24. This order, however, shall be subject to the
following conditions:-
a) Applicant shall regularly attend the trial Court on each
and every date of hearing and if prevented by any reason
to do so, seek exemption from appearance by filing the
appropriate application;
b) Applicant shall not tamper with the prosecution
evidence nor hamper the investigation of the case in any
manner whatsoever;
c) Applicant shall not make any inducement, threat or
promises to any person acquainted with the facts of the
case so as to dissuade them from disclosing such facts to
the Court or the Police Officer, and
d) Applicant shall not leave the territory of India without
the prior permission of the Court.
25. Any of the observations, made herein
above, shall not be taken, as an expression of
opinion, on the merits of the case, as these
observations are confined, only to the disposal of
the present bail application.
26. It is made clear that the respondent-State
is at liberty to move an appropriate application,
in case, any of the bail conditions is found to be
violated by the applicant.
29 2026:HHC:9700
27. The Registry is directed to forward a soft
copy of the bail order to the Superintendent of
District Jail, Una, through e-mail, with a
direction to enter the date of grant of bail in the
e-prison software.
28. In case, the applicant is not released
within a period of seven days from the date of
grant of bail, the Superintendent of District Jail,
Una is directed to inform this fact to the
Secretary, DLSA, Una. The Superintendent of
the District Jail, Una is further directed that if
the applicant fails to furnish the bail bonds, as
per the order passed by this Court within a
period of one month from today, then, the said
fact be submitted to this Court.
29. The applicant has also given the
details of his ailment in para-9 of the
application, which is re-produced as under:
“i. 27.02.2024: The petitioner was examined at PGI
Chandigarh and was advised continuous physiotherapy
30 2026:HHC:9700
for 10 days from 04.03.2024 to12.03.2024, with MWD
7/10 till 16.04.2024 and review on 16.04.2024.
ii. 06.03.2024: PGI Chandigarh advised the petitioner
to avoid travelling, lifting heavy weights, and forward
bending.
iii. 03.04.2024: PGI Chandigarh advised continuation
of physiotherapy for another six weeks and to avoid
Indian-style toilets and travelling.
iv. 26.06.2024: Regional Hospital (RH), Una advised
regular physiotherapy.
v. 02.07.2024: RH Una again advised regular
physiotherapy.
vi. 12.07.2024: PGI Chandigarh reiterated advice to
avoid Indian-style toilets and travelling and prescribed
physiotherapy for six weeks.
vii. 19.07.2024: PGI Chandigarh physiotherapy for 10
days. Advised RH Una advised viii. 07.09.2024: regular
physiotherapy sessions as recommended by PGI
Chandigarh.
viii. 7.9.2024: RH Una advised regular physiotherapy
sessions as recommended by PGI Chandigarh.
ix. 17.09.2024: RH Una reiterated advice for regular
physiotherapy as per PGI Chandigarh.
x. 03.10.2024: advised Una RH regular physiotherapy
sessions for 25 days as per PGI Chandigarh.
xi 17.10.2024: CT scan revealed depression of the
superior end plates of L3 and L5 vertebral bodies.
xii. 07.11.2024: PGI Chandigarh advised the petitioner
to avoid travelling, lifting, forward bending, and
climbing stairs, and recommended continued treatment
at a local hospital with regular physiotherapy.
xiii. 11.11.2024: RH Una advised avoidance of forward
bending and climbing.
31 2026:HHC:9700
xiv. 10.01.2025: The Hon’ble High Court, while
dismissing the bail application, directed the jail
authorities to provide proper medical treatment to the
petitioner.
XV. 14.01.2025: RH Una referred the petitioner to a
spine surgeon/neurosurgeon.
xvi. 30.01.2025: PGI Chandigarh advised that the
petitioner required admission at a local hospital for
continued and regular physiotherapy and lumbar
traction.
xvii. 10.02.2025: A Medical Board at Dr. Rajendra
Prasad Government Medical College, Tanda, opined
that the petitioner was suffering from chronic low
backache with intermittent left radicular pain and
advised continuation of treatment as prescribed by PGI
Chandigarh.
xviii. 22.04.2025: RH Una noted lapse in follow-up in
the medical case file.
xix. 21.06.2025: The petitioner filed Application No.
Cr.M.A/464/2025 for medical treatment before the
learned Additional Sessions Judge. Vide order dated
04.07.2025, jail authorities were directed to take
necessary steps; however, no regular treatment was
ensured.
xx. 07.07.2025: PGI Orthopaedics Department XX.
advised rheumatology consultation and physiotherapy
for 10 consecutive days. The petitioner was referred to
the Rheumatology Department on 22.08.2025.
Physiotherapy, though advised from 07.07.2025,
commenced belatedly on 17.07.2025.
xxi. 29.07.2025: It was recorded that over a span of 26
days, physiotherapy was conducted only 8 times and
remained incomplete. Jail authorities, vide Letter No.
2639-40 dated 29.07.2025, stated that treatment could
32 2026:HHC:9700
not be provided regularly due to non-availability of
police escort and further disclosed that no Medical
Officer was posted at District Jail Una, Bangarh,
compelling inmates to rely on old prescriptions or
generic painkillers available in the jail pharmacy.
xxii 11.08.2025: The petitioner was admitted at RH
Una but was discharged on the same day due to non-
availability of police guard, with advice to get Registrar
admitted again once escort was available: however,
thereafter. re-admission no was arranged thereafter.
xxiii. 22.08.2025: PGI Chandigarh advised blood tests,
for which fees were deposited the same day, but the
petitioner was asked to report again on 24.10.2025.
Reports have not been collected till date.
xxiv. 15.10.2025: PGI Chandigarh advised certain
blood tests; the petitioner was taken to RH Una, but
the tests were unavailable there and hence not
conducted.
xxv. 24.10.2025: PGI Chandigarh advised ECG and
TFT tests at PGI laboratory; however, the same have
not been conducted till date.”
30. Although, it is the duty of the jail
authorities to take the applicant to the
hospital, as advised by the Doctor, however,
alongwith the bail application, copy of
information, under Right to Information Act,
has also been annexed, as Annexure P-3.
This Court deems it appropriate to reproduce
33 2026:HHC:9700
paras-3 and 4 of the said information to
demonstrate the sorry state of affairs, as
prevailing in the jail, in which, the applicant
has been confined. Accordingly, paras-3 and
4 of Annexure P-3, are reproduced, as under:
“3) As far as possible, the treatment recommended by
the PGI and TMC Kangra was provided but sometimes
due to non-availability of Police escort inspite of
repeated requests for guard deployment, the
unavoidable delay occurred as vide letter No. 3168-
3267 dated 21.01.2025 the non-availability of Police
escort as large Police Personnel were deployed to
impart the rehearsal and other multifarious duties
from 21.01.2025 to 26.01.2025, vide letter No. 5702-
5801 dated 07.02.2025 the non-availability of Police
escort as large Police Personnel were engaged in
constable recruitment process duty from 10.02.2025
to 18.02.2025, vidÄ™ letter No. 9485-88 dated
03.03.202.5 the non-availability of Police escort as
large Police Personnel were deployed for the cremation
ceremony of Sant Dera baba Rudra Nand Ji Maharaj at
Basal from 02.03.2025 το 03.03.2025, vide letter No.
10111 dated 05.03.2025 the non-availability of Police
escort as large Police Personnel were deployed in Baba
Badbhag Singh Ji at Mari Tehsil Amb from 07.03.2025
to 17.03.2025 and vide letter No. 17156-256 dated
26.04.2025 the non-availability of Police escort as
large Police Personnel were deployed in Haroli
Mahotsav from 27.04.2025 to 29.04.2025 (Annexure-
B.).
34 2026:HHC:9700
4) Currently, no permanent Medical Officer has been
posted in this jail. However, deputed Medical officers
from R.H, Una on weekly visit Jail for checking up of
ailing inmates while one whole time jail dispenser,
Sh.Raj Kumar has been posted for looking after the
ailing inmates.”
31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case
reported in Dr. Upendra Baxi (I) versus State of Uttar
Pradesh, (1983) 2 SCC 308, has stressed upon the
rights of inmates to live in human and good
conditions. Relevant para-1 of the judgment is
reproduced as under:
“1. When this writ petition came up for hearing before us on
May 8, 1981 we made an order giving various directions in
order to ensure that the inmates of the Protective Home at
Agra do not continue to live inhuman and degrading
conditions and that the right to live with dignity enshrined in
Article 21 of the Constitution is made real and meaningful
for them. We gave to the State Government which is running
the Home, the entire period of vacation for carrying out these
directions. Miss Srivastava, Superintendent of the Home, has
filed an affidavit before us setting out the action taken by the
State Government with a view to complying with these
directions.”
32. The similar view has also been taken by
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parmanand Katara versus
35 2026:HHC:9700
Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 286. Relevant
paragraph of the judgment is reproduced as under:
“7. There can be no second opinion that preservation of
human life is of paramount importance. That is so on
account of the fact that once life is lost, the status quo
ante cannot be restored as resurrection is beyond the
capacity of man. The patient whether he be an innocent
person or be a criminal liable to punishment under the
laws of the society, it is the obligation of those who are
in-charge of the health of the community to preserve life
so that the innocent may be protected and the guilty may
be punished. Social laws do not contemplate death by
negligence to tantamount to legal punishment.”
(self-emphasis supplied)
33. Failure of the authorities to provide timely
medical treatment is also held to be violative of right
to life, guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, as held by Hon’ble Supreme
Court in a case titled as Paschim Banga Khet
Mazdoor Samity versus State of W.B., reported in
(1996) 4 SCC 37. Relevant paragraph-9, of the
judgment, is reproduced, as under:
“9. The Constitution envisages the establishment of a welfare
State at the federal level as well as at the State Level. In a
36 2026:HHC:9700welfare State the primary duty of the Government is to
secure the welfare of the people. Providing adequate medical
facilities for the people is an essential part of the obligations
undertaken by the Government in a welfare State. The
Government discharges this obligation by running hospitals
and health centres which provide medical care to the person
seeking to avail of those facilities. Article 21 imposes an
obligation on the State to safeguard the right to life of every
person. Preservation of human life is thus of paramount
importance. The government hospitals run by the State and
the medical officers employed therein are duty-bound to
extend medical assistance foi preserving human life. Failure
on the part of a government hospital to provide timely
medical treatment to a person in need of such treatment
results in violation of his right to life guaranteed under
Article 21. In the present case there was breach of the said
right of Hakim Seikh guaranteed under Article 21 when he
was denied treatment at the various government hospitals
which were approached even though his condition was very
serious at that time and he was in need of immediate
medical attention. Since the said denial of the right of Hakim
Seikh guaranteed under Article 21 was by officers of the
State, in hospitals run by the State, the State cannot avoid
its responsibility for such denial of the constitutional right of
Hakim Seikh. In respect of deprivation of the constitutional
rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution the
position is well settled that adequate compensation can be
awarded by the court for such violation by way of redress in
proceedings under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution.
Hakim Seikh should, therefore, be suitably compensated for
the breach of his right guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution. Having regard to the facts and circumstances
of the case, we fix the amount of such compensation at Rs
25,000. A sum of Rs 15,000 was directed to be paid to
37 2026:HHC:9700Hakim Seikh as interim compensation under the orders of
this Court dated 22-4-1994. The balance amount should be
paid by Respondent 1 to Hakim Seikh within one month.”
34. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case titled as
State of A.P. versus Challa Ramkrishna Reddy,
reported in (2000) 5 SCC 712 has held that even the
prisoners do have fundamental rights, human rights
and human dignity, which cannot be permitted to be
shrinked or taken away. Relevant paragraphs 22, 24
and 28, of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:
“22. Right to life is one of the basic human rights. It is
guaranteed to every person by Article 21 of the Constitution
and not even the State has the authority to violate that right.
A prisoner, be be a convict or undertrial or a detenu, does
not cease to be a human being. Even when lodged in the jail,
he continues to enjoy all his fundamental rights including
the right to life quaranteed to him under the Constitution.
On being convicted of crime and deprived of their liberty in
accordance with the procedure established by law, prisoners
still retain the residue of constitutional rights.
24. Thus, according to the definition under the Prisoners
Act, there is a convict, there is an undertrial and there is a
civil prisoner who may be a detenu under preventive
detention law. None of the three categories of prisoners lose
their fundamental rights on being placed inside a prison. The
restriction placed on their right to movement is the result of
their conviction or involvement in crime. Thus, a person
(prisoner) is deprived of his personal liberty in accordance
38 2026:HHC:9700with the procedure established by law which, as pointed out
in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India must be reasonable, fair
and just.
28. Thus, fundamental rights, which also include basic
human rights, continue to be available to a prisoner and
those rights cannot be defeated by pleading the old and
archaic defence of immunity in respect of sovereign acts
which has been rejected several times by this Court.”
35. If the grievances, so put forth by the
applicant, in the present case, as highlighted above,
are seen in the light of the decisions of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, as referred to above, then the
violation of fundamental right, under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, is writ at large.
36. The poor prisoner has been denied proper
medical aid, on various occasions, only on account of
the fact that no permanent Medical Officer has been
posted in the jail, and on many occasions, he has not
been taken to hospital, on account of non-availability
of the police escort. In such situation, it is high time
for this Court to direct the Chief Secretary to the
Govt. of Himachal Pradesh to look into the matter
39 2026:HHC:9700
and submit the detailed report, on or before the next
date of hearing.
37. In addition to this, the Director General of
Prisons & Correctional Services, Himachal Pradesh is
directed to submit the details of the jails, including
availability of the police escort to take the inmates to
hospital, in case, need so arises.
38. The Director General of Prisons &
Correctional Services, Himachal Pradesh is also
directed to submit the detailed report, with regard to
posts of Medical Officers/para-medical staff, in the
jails, and alternate arrangements, if any, made in the
absence of Medical Officer, on account of any
unforeseen circumstances.
39. The Director General of Prisons &
Correctional Services, Himachal Pradesh is also
directed to submit the detailed report regarding the
availability of the medical facilities, including
specialized treatment to the inmates, in the vicinity of
40 2026:HHC:9700
the jail(s), including distance of the nearby
hospital(s), including super-specialty hospital(s). This
also includes the mode of transport, adopted by the
jail authorities to take the inmates, in case of medical
emergency, as well as, availability of the police escort.
This information be submitted to this Court, on or
before the next date of hearing.
40. List on 27.4.2026.
(Virender Singh)
Judge
March 31, 2026
Kalpana
Digitally signed
by KALPANA
KALPANA Date:
2026.04.01
15:08:34 +0000
