Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 23.3.2026 vs Of on 22 May, 2026
2026:HHC:19292
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 236 of 2025
Reserved on: 23.3.2026
.
Date of Decision: 22.5.2026.
Rajesh Kumar Nayyar & ors. .... Petitioners
Versus
of
State of HP & anr. .... Respondents
Coram rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Janesh Gupta, Advocate.
For Respondent No.1/State : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy
Advocate General.
For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Divya Raj Singh, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petition for
quashing of FIR No.26, dated 28.2.2024, registered at Police
Station Gagret, District Una, H.P., for the commission of offences
punishable under Section 420 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code
(IPC) and the consequential proceedings arising out of it. (The
parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they
were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience).
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the informant filed an application before the
.
police, asserting that he was the owner in possession of Plot Nos.
376, 377, 415 and 416 at the site Manohar Infrastructure and
Construction Mulanpur, Chandigarh. He wanted to raise the
construction of the residential houses on the site. The accused
of
approached the informant and disclosed that they were running
the construction business under the name and style of Nayyar
rt
Builders and Contractors. They agreed to build the residential
houses for ₹ 1,88,30,700/-. The informant agreed to the proposal
of the accused. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 entered into an agreement
with the informant on 9.11.2019. This agreement was signed by
the informant and accused No.1, Gaurav Nayyar, in the capacity
of a partner of Nayyar Builders and Contractors. The construction
work had to be completed within 120 days from the date of the
agreement. It was also agreed that the accused would issue a bill
every 15 days. The informant paid a total amount of
₹2,71,84,984/- to the accused, but the accused failed to complete
the construction within the stipulated time. The informant told
the accused that he would take action against them, after which
the accused disclosed that accused No.1, Gaurav Nayyar, was
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neither the Director nor a partner of M/s Nayyar Builders and
Contractors. Accused No.1 had falsely signed the agreement as a
.
partner. The accused misappropriated the money advanced to
them. Hence, it was prayed that an action be taken against them.
3. The police registered the FIR and investigated the
matter. The police seized the documents and the details of the
of
money paid by the informant. It was found that the informant
and his family members had transferred ₹2,71,84,984/- in the
rt
accounts of the accused. Nayyar Builders and Construction was
not registered with the Registrar of Companies, Punjab. The
stamp paper for executing the agreement was purchased in the
name of Devender Singh, who was an employee of the accused,
and his services were subsequently terminated. Gaurav Nayyar
was not authorised to issue the invoice on behalf of the firm
before 25.5.2023. The documents were sent to the FSL, and the
signatures tallied with the admitted signatures of Gaurav Nayyar.
The charge sheet was filed before the Court, which is pending
scrutiny by the prosecution Department.
4. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the
accused have filed the present petition asserting that the
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informant Ajay Kumar approached Nayyar Builders and
Contractors through Rajesh Nayyar for raising construction on
.
four plots No. 376, 377, 415 and 416 situated at the Project Site of
Manohar Infrastructure and Construction, Village Mulanpur,
New Chandigarh, Mohali. A formal contract was drawn between
the parties, and the total cost of construction was fixed as
of
₹1,88,30,700/- for raising the structure. Nayyar Builder and
Contractor had Rajesh Kumar and Kavita Nayyar as partners. The
rt
agreement was signed by Gaurav Nayyar on behalf of Nayyar
Builders and Contractors after getting authorisation from the
partners. Gaurav Nayyar was looking after the affairs of the firm
and was duly authorised by the partners to do the various acts.
The structural work was completed in time, and a completion
certificate was issued by the Architect. The informant asked the
accused to carry out the interior work, and he agreed to pay the
additional cost to the accused. The construction of three units in
Plot Nos. 415, 416 and 376 were completed in the year 2022, and
the units were sold to the buyers. The accused demanded money
for completing the construction in Plot No. 377, but the
informant declined to do so. This led to the dispute. The firm
demanded the outstanding amount of ₹25.00 lakhs for the work
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done by it. The informant claimed that ₹90.00 lakhs was
recoverable from the firm. He lodged a false FIR to compel the
.
firm and the partners to meet his unlawful demand. The
informant had voluntarily executed various documents. The
accused had also filed a civil suit and obtained an interim order. A
dispute of a civil nature was being converted into a criminal case,
of
which is impermissible. The ingredients of the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 419, 420, 465 and 120-B of
rt
the IPC are not satisfied in the present case. Therefore, it was
prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and
consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed.
5. The petition is opposed by filing a status report by the
State reproducing the contents of the FIR and mentioning the
details of the investigation conducted by the police. A reply
taking preliminary objection regarding the lack of locus-standi
and maintainability was filed. It was asserted on merits that the
investigation was still in progress, and no conclusion can be
drawn without completing the investigation. Hence, it was
prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
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6. I have heard Mr Janesh Gupta, learned counsel for the
petitioner Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
.
respondent No.1-State and Mr Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel
for respondent No.2/informant.
7. Mr Janesh Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the allegations against the petitioners are false.
of
The contents of the FIR do not disclose the commission of any
cognizable offence. The continuation of the investigation
rt
amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. A civil dispute is
being given a colour of criminality, which is impermissible.
Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR
and the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be
quashed. He relied upon the following judgments in support of
his submission:-
(i) Anukul Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & anr. 2025
LiveLaw (SC) 948;
(ii) R. Nagender Yadav Vs. State of Telangana & anr., Cr.
Appeal No. 2290 of 2022 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.
4629 of 2021, decided on 15.12.2022;
(iii) Sarabjit Kaur Vs. State of Punjab & Anr., Cr. Appeal No.
581 of 2023, decided on 1.3.2023;
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(iv) Sanjay Agarwal Vs. State of Odisha & anr., Cr. Appeal
Nos. 2593 and 2594 of 2024 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.)
No(s). 5303 and 5304 of 2021), decided on 16.4.2024;
.
(v) Naresh Kumar & Anr. Vs. State of Karnataa & Anr., Crl.
Appeal No. 1510 of 2024 (Arising of SLP (Crl.) No. 1570 of
2021), decided on 12.3.2024;
(vi) Commissioner of Police & ors. Vs. Devender Anand & ors.
of
Crl. Appeal No. 834 of 2017, decided on 8.8.2019;
8. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for
rt
respondent No.1-State, submitted that the police have completed
the investigation and filed the charge sheet before the Court. The
Learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should
not exercise its inherent jurisdiction at this stage. Hence, he
prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
9. Mr Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for respondent
No.2/informant adopted the submissions made by Mr Ajitt
Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.
1/State and prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
10. I have given a considerable thought to the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records
carefully.
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11. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of
.
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: –
“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it
is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to
be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal,of
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised
some of the principles under which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:
rt
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under ChapterXIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of
the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code whichwe have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either toprevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not bepossible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines orrigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers
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under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
of
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
rt Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable based on which no prudent person
can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted)
to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings, and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)
would be of relevance to us in this case.
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In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute
.
any offence or make out a case against the accused, then
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
of
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in
such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
rt
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising
its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,
may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processesor to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are
neither controlled nor limited by any other statutoryprovision. However, given the broad and profound nature
of this authority, the High Court must exercise it
sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are
embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing
the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of
process or where intervention is essential to uphold the
ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
several decades, has laid down the principles and
guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing
criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-
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empting the Prosecution from building its case before the
Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia,
contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal
complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR.
represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie
offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.)
the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations;
and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the
dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335).
of
13. A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State
of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed:
rt
“70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear
that where the High Court is satisfied that the process ofany court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the
ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only
empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its
inherent powers. The provision does not confer any newpower on the High Court but rather saves the power which
the High Court already possesses, from before the
enactment of the legislation, by reason of its veryexistence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate
for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the
High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it
may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of theproceedings would serve the ends of justice.”
14. The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
15. The ingredients of cheating were explained by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, (2002)
1 SCC 241, as under:
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“10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are: (i) there
should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person
by deceiving him, (ii)(a) the person so deceived should be
induced to deliver any property to any person or to.
consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b)
the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to
do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if
he were not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii)
(b), the act of omission should cause or is likely to cause
damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind,
of
reputation or property.
11. One of us (D.P. Mohapatra, J.), speaking for the Bench,
in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4
SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786] on facts of that case, has
rt
expressed thus: (SCC p. 177, para 15)
“15. In determining the question, it has to be kept in
mind that the distinction between mere breach of
contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It
depends upon the intention of the accused at the
time of inducement, which may be judged by his
subsequent conduct, but for this, subsequent
conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract
cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating
unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown
right at the beginning of the transaction, that is, the
time when the offence is said to have been
committed. Therefore, it is the intention that is the
gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating,
it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or
dishonest intention at the time of making the promise.
From his mere failure to keep up a promise,
subsequently, such a culpable intention right at the
beginning, that is, when he made the promise, cannot
be presumed.” (emphasis supplied)
12. Finding that the ingredients of the offence of cheating
and its allied offences had not been made out, this Court
interfered with the order of the High Court and quashed
the criminal proceedings.
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13. In G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [(2000) 3 SCC 693: 2000 SCC
(Cri) 733], this Court in para 7 has stated thus: (SCC pp.
696-97)
.
“7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts.
In the first part, the person must ‘dishonestly’ or
‘fraudulently’ induce the complainant to deliver any
property; in the second part, the person shouldintentionally induce the complainant to do or omit
to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part,
inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In theof
second part, the inducement should be intentional.
As observed by this Court in Jaswantrai Manilal
Akhaney v. State of Bombay [AIR 1956 SC 575: 1956 Cri
LJ 1116], a guilty intention is an essential ingredient
rt
of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to
secure the conviction of a person for the offence ofcheating, ‘mens rea’ on the part of that person must
be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo
Prasad v. State of W.B. [AIR 1954 SC 724: 1954 Cri LJ
1806] that in order to constitute the offence of cheating,the intention to deceive should be in existence at the
time when the inducement was offered.”(emphasis
supplied)
14. In Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal [(1999) 8
SCC 686: 2000 SCC (Cri) 47] dealing with the effect of
existence of arbitration clause in the agreement on
criminal prosecution on the ground that civil proceedings
are also maintainable, this Court has held that quashing of
FIR or a complaint exercising power under Section 482
CrPC should be limited to a very extreme exception;
merely because an act has a civil profile is not enough to
stop action on the criminal side. It is further held that a
provision made in the agreement for referring the disputes
to arbitration is not an effective substitute for a criminal
prosecution when the disputed act constitutes a criminal
offence.
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16. A similar view was taken in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad,
(2000) 3 SCC 693, wherein it was observed as under:
.
“7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While
in the first part, the person must “dishonestly” or
“fraudulently” induce the complainant to deliver anyproperty; in the second part, the person should
intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a
thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must beof
dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the
inducement should be intentional. As observed by this
Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [AIR
rt
1956 SC 575: 1956 Cri LJ 1116: 1956 SCR 483], a guilty
intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of
cheating. In order, therefore, to secure the conviction of aperson for the offence of cheating, “mens rea” on the part
of that person must be established. It was also observed in
Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B. [AIR 1954 SC 724: 1954 Cri LJ1806] that in order to constitute the offence of cheating,
the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time
when the inducement was offered.
8. Thus, so far as the second part of Section 415 is
concerned, “property”, at no stage, is involved. Here, it isthe doing of an act or omission to do an act by the
complainant, as a result of intentional inducement by theaccused, which is material. Such inducement should result
in the doing of an act or omission to do an act as a result of
which the person concerned should have suffered or was
likely to suffer damage or harm in body, mind, reputation
or property. In an old decision of the Allahabad High Court
in Empress v. Sheoram [(1882) 2 AWN 237], it was held by
Mahmood, J.:
“That to palm off a young woman as belonging to a
caste different to the one to which she really
belongs, with the object of obtaining money,
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2026:HHC:19292as defined in Section 416 of the Penal Code, 1860,
which must be read in the light of the preceding
Section 415.”
.
17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Ram Jas v. State of U.P., (1970) 2 SCC 740 that there should be a
fraudulent or dishonest inducement before a person can be held
guilty of cheating. It was observed:
of
“3. In recording this finding and conviction, the High
Court lost sight of the fact that no such charge was framed
against the appellant in the trial court. As we have
rt
indicated above, the persons, who were cheated or
attempted to be cheated, referred to in the charges framedagainst the appellant, were Madan Lal, Chunni Lal, or the
office of the Relief and Rehabilitation-cum-Settlement
Officer, Saharanpur. There was no charge at all relating to
any cheating or attempting to cheat the OathCommissioner. In fact, the case was never brought to
Court with the intention of obtaining a conviction of the
appellant for any offence of cheating in respect of the OathCommissioner. Not only was there no charge in this
respect, but, in addition, the appellant, when questionedunder Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure after
the prosecution’s evidence had been recorded, was notasked to explain evidence relating to such a charge of
cheating the Oath Commissioner. No doubt, there was
mention of the commission of forgery of affidavits; but the
mention of the commission of that offence could not
possibly lead the appellant to infer that he was liable to be
convicted for abetting the offence of cheating the Oath
Commissioner. Further, in recording this conviction, the
High Court did not even cease to examine in detail whether
all the ingredients of the offence had been established by
the prosecution’s evidence. The only finding of fact was
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Govind Ram and got the affidavit attested by the Oath
Commissioner as if it was being sworn by Govind Ram.
This act of wrong identification committed by the
.
appellant cannot amount to the offence of cheating by
personation. Cheating is defined in Section 415 IPC, which
is as follows:
“Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or
dishonestly induces the person so deceived to
deliver any property to any person, or to consentof
that any person shall retain any property, or
intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or
omit to do anything which he would not do or omit
if he were not so deceived, and which act or
rt
omission causes or is likely to cause damage or
harm to that person in body, mind, reputation orproperty, is said to ‘cheat’.”
The ingredients required to constitute the offence of
cheating are–
(i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest
inducement of a person by deceiving him;
(ii)(a) the person so deceived should be induced to
deliver any property to any person, or to consent that
any person shall retain any property; or
(b) the person so deceived should be intentionally
induced to do or omit to do anything which he would
not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and
(iii) in cases covered by (ii)(b), the act or omission
should cause or is likely to cause damage or harm to
the person induced in body, mind, reputation or
property.
4. In the present case, the finding of fact recorded only
shows that the Oath Commissioner was induced to attest
the affidavit by the deception practised by the appellant in
wrongly identifying a person as Govind Ram when he was
in fact not Govind Ram. That act done by the Oath
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Commissioner of attesting the affidavit could not,
however, possibly cause any damage or harm to the Oath
Commissioner in body, mind, reputation or property. The
Oath Commissioner was obviously not induced to deliver
.
any property to anybody by this wrong identification, nor
was he induced to consent that any person should retain
any property. Thus, the facts found did not constitute the
offence of cheating at all. The conviction for an offence
under Section 419, substantively or with the aid of Section
109 IPC, could only have been justified if the facts proved
of
constituted all the ingredients of the offence of cheating.
In recording the conviction, the High Court neglected to
see whether all those ingredients were proved. On the face
of it, though the Oath Commissioner was induced to attest
rt
the affidavit by wrong identification made by the
appellant, there was no likelihood of any damage or harm
to him in body, mind, reputation or property, so that the
Oath Commissioner was never cheated. Clearly, therefore,
the High Court fell into an error in recording the
conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section
419, read with Section 109 IPC and substituting that
conviction in place of the conviction for offences for which
he had been punished by the trial court.
18. Similar is the judgment in V.Y. Jose v. State of Gujarat,
(2009) 3 SCC 78, wherein it was observed: –
“14. An offence of cheating cannot be said to have been
made out unless the following ingredients are satisfied:
(i) deception of a person either by making a false or
misleading representation or by other action or
omission;
(ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person
to deliver any property, or to consent that any person
shall retain any property and finally intentionally
inducing that person to do or omit to do anything
which he would not do or omit.
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For the purpose of constituting an offence of cheating, the
complainant is required to show that the accused had
fraudulent or dishonest intentions at the time of making a
promise or representation. Even in a case where
.
allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the
accused to keep his promise, in the absence of a culpable
intention at the time of making the initial promise being
absent, no offence under Section 420 of the Penal Code can
be said to have been made out.”
19. This position was reiterated in Raju Krishna
of
Shedbalkar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 200, wherein
it was observed:rt
“7. A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that the
offence of cheating is in two parts. The first is where a
person fraudulently or dishonestly deceives another in
inducing that person to deliver any property to any
person, etc. The second part of the offence would be made
out if somebody is deceived to do an act which causes
damage or harm to that person, “in body, mind, or
reputation or property, ” and is said to have cheated. Time
and again, this Court has reiterated that in order to make
out an offence under cheating, the intention to cheat or
deceive should be right from the beginning. By no stretch
of the imagination, this is even reflected in the complaint
made by the informant.
8. In the case of Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of
Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 168, this Court held as under:
“15. In determining the question, it has to be kept in
mind that the distinction between mere breach of
contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It
depends upon the intention of the accused at the time
of inducement, which may be judged by his subsequent
conduct, but for this, subsequent conduct is not the
sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to
criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or::: Downloaded on – 23/05/2026 12:44:45 :::CIS
19
2026:HHC:19292dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of
the transaction, that is, the time when the offence is
said to have been committed. Therefore, it is the
intention that is the gist of the offence. To hold a person.
guilty of cheating, it is necessary to show that he had a
fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the
promise. From his mere failure to keep up a promise,subsequently, such a culpable intention right at the
beginning, that is, when he made the promise, cannot
be presumed.”(Emphasis supplied)of
9. Further, in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC
India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC 736, this position was reiterated in
the following manner:
rt
33. The High Court has held that a mere breach of
contractual terms would not amount to cheating unless
the fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right atthe beginning of the transaction, and in the absence of
an allegation that the accused had a fraudulent or
dishonest intention while making a promise, there isno “cheating”. The High Court has relied on several
decisions of this Court wherein this Court has held that
dishonest intent at the time of making thepromise/inducement is necessary, in addition to the
subsequent failure to fulfil the promise. Illustrations (f) and
(g) to Section 415 make this position clear:
“(f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A
means to repay any money that Z may lend to himand thereby dishonestly induces Z to lend him
money, A not intending to repay it. A cheats.
(g) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A
means to deliver to Z a certain quantity of indigo
plant which he does not intend to deliver, and
thereby dishonestly induces Z to advance money
upon the faith of such delivery, A cheats; but if A, at
the time of obtaining the money, intends to deliver
the indigo plant, and afterwards breaks his contract
and does not deliver it, he does not cheat, but is::: Downloaded on – 23/05/2026 12:44:45 :::CIS
20
2026:HHC:19292liable only to a civil action for breach of
contract.”(emphasis supplied).
.
20. There is no whisper in the FIR that the petitioners had
a dishonest intention to begin with. The dishonest intention
cannot be inferred from failure to keep the promise or fulfil the
contract. The FIR only mentions that the accused Gaurav Nayyar
of
represented himself to be a partner, but he was not a partner. It is
not disputed that Nayyar Builder and Contractor had executed
rt
the work. The money was paid to them. The dispute is regarding
the extent of the work to be done by the contractors and the
money payable to them. Therefore, it was not a case where any
false representation was made. The accused has specifically
stated that Gaurav Nayyar was acting on behalf of the firm and he
was authorised to do so. The money was credited to the account
of the firm and not to the personal account of Gaurav Nayyar.
Therefore, it cannot be said that any false representation was
made regarding the identity of Gaurav Nayyar. The dispute
between the parties appears to be a civil dispute regarding the
payment of the money, which is being given a colour of criminal
proceedings by filing an FIR for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 420 of the IPC. It was laid down by the
::: Downloaded on – 23/05/2026 12:44:45 :::CIS
21
2026:HHC:19292
Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam,
(2019) 16 SCC 739: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 454: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 208
.
that powers under Section 482 of CrPC are to be exercised
sparingly, but where the dispute of Civil nature was being given a
cloak of criminal proceedings, the High Court should not hesitate
to exercise the power. It was observed at page 749:
of
28. The jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure has to be exercised with care. In the
rt
exercise of its jurisdiction, a High Court can examine
whether a matter which is essentially of a civil nature has
been given the cloak of a criminal offence. Where theingredients required to constitute a criminal offence are
not made out from a bare reading of the complaint, the
continuation of the criminal proceeding will constitute anabuse of the process of the court.
21. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarabjit
Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2023) 5 SCC 360: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 210
that a breach of contract does not give rise to a criminal liability.
It was observed at page 363: –
13. A breach of contract does not give rise to criminal
prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest
intention is shown right at the beginning of the
transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to keep up
promise will not be enough to initiate criminal
proceedings….The entire idea seems to be to convert a civil
dispute into criminal and put pressure on the appellant for
return of the amount allegedly paid. The criminal courts
are not meant to be used for settling scores or pressurise
parties to settle civil disputes. Wherever ingredients of::: Downloaded on – 23/05/2026 12:44:45 :::CIS
22
2026:HHC:19292criminal offences are made out, criminal courts have to
take cognizance.
.
22. Section 465 has been added because Gaurav Nayyar
was neither authorised nor a partner of the firm. It was held in
Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 , that execution of
of
the sale deed by a person by describing himself as an owner does
not amount to forgery. It was observed: –
rt
9. Let us first consider whether the complaint averments,
even assuming to be true, make out the ingredients of theoffences punishable either under Section 467 or Section
471 of the Penal Code.
10. Section 467 (insofar as it is relevant to this case)
provides that whoever forges a document which purports
to be a valuable security shall be punished with
imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of eitherdescription for a term which may extend to ten years and
shall also be liable to fine. Section 471, relevant to ourpurpose, provides that whoever fraudulently or
dishonestly uses as genuine any document which he
knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document,shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged
such document.
11. Section 470 defines a forged document as a false
document made by forgery. The term “forgery” used in
these two sections is defined in Section 463. Whoever
makes any false documents with the intent to cause damage
or injury to the public or any person, or to support any
claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property,
or to enter into an express or implied contract, or with the
intent to commit fraud or that the fraud may be
committed, commits forgery.
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23
2026:HHC:19292
12. Section 464 defining “making a false document” is
extracted below:
“464. Making a false document.–A person is said to
.
make a false document or false electronic record–
First.–Who dishonestly or fraudulently–
(a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or
part of a document;
(b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part
of any electronic record;
of
(c) affixes any digital signature on any electronic
record;
(d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a
rt
document or the authenticity of the digital signature,
with the intention of causing it to be believed thatsuch document or a part of document, electronic
record or digital signature was made, signed, sealed,
executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the
authority of a person by whom or by whoseauthority he knows that it was not made, signed,
sealed, executed or affixed; orSecondly,–Who, without lawful authority,
dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation orotherwise, alters a document or an electronic record
in any material part thereof, after it has been made,
executed or affixed with a digital signature either byhimself or by any other person, whether such
person be living or dead at the time of such
alteration; or
Thirdly.–Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes
any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document
or an electronic record or to affix his digital
signature on any electronic record knowing that
such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or
intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception
practised upon him, he does not know the contents::: Downloaded on – 23/05/2026 12:44:45 :::CIS
24
2026:HHC:19292of the document or electronic record or the nature of
the alteration.
Explanation 1.–A man’s signature of his own name
.
may amount to forgery.
Explanation 2.–The making of a false document in
the name of a fictitious person, intending it to be
believed that the document was made by a real
person, or in the name of a deceased person,
intending it to be believed that the document was
made by the person in his lifetime, may amount to
of
forgery.
[Note.– The words ‘digital signature’ wherever they
occur were substituted by the words ‘electronic
rt
signature’ by the Amendment Act 10 of 2009.
(emphasis supplied)
13. The condition precedent for an offence under Sections
467 and 471 is a forgery. The condition precedent for
forgery is making a false document (or false electronic
record or part thereof). This case does not relate to any
false electronic record. Therefore, the question is
whether the first accused, in executing and registering
the two sale deeds purporting to sell a property (even if it
is assumed that it did not belong to him), can be said to
have made and executed false documents, in collusion
with the other accused.
14. An analysis of Section 464 of the Penal Code shows
that it divides false documents into three categories:
1. The first is where a person dishonestly or
fraudulently makes or executes a document with the
intention of causing it to be believed that such a
document was made or executed by some other
person, or by the authority of some other person, by
whom or by whose authority he knows it was not
made or executed.
2. The second is where a person dishonestly or
fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a::: Downloaded on – 23/05/2026 12:44:45 :::CIS
25
2026:HHC:19292document in any material part, without lawful
authority, after it has been made or executed by
either himself or any other person.
.
3. The third is where a person dishonestly or
fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or
alter a document knowing that such person could
not, by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b)intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him,
know the contents of the document or the nature of
the alteration.
of
In short, a person is said to have made a “false
document” if (i) he made or executed a document
claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone
rt
else; or (ii) he altered or tampered with a document; or
(iii) he obtained a document by practising deception, or
from a person not in control of his senses.
15. The sale deeds executed by the first appellant clearly
and obviously do not fall under the second and third
categories of “false documents”. It, therefore, remains to
be seen whether the claim of the complainant that the
execution of sale deeds by the first accused, who was in
no way connected with the land, amounted to
committing forgery of the documents with the intention
of taking possession of the complainant’s land (and that
Accused 2 to 5 as the purchaser, witness, scribe and
stamp vendor, colluded with the first accused in
execution and registration of the said sale deeds) would
bring the case under the first category.
16. There is a fundamental difference between a person
executing a sale deed claiming that the property
conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale
deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to
be authorised or empowered by the owner to execute the
deed on the owner’s behalf. When a person executes a
document conveying a property, describing it as his,
there are two possibilities. The first is that he bona fide
believes that the property actually belongs to him. The
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26
2026:HHC:19292
second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently
claiming it to be his, even though he knows that it is not
his property. But to fall under the first category of “false
documents”, it is not sufficient that a document has been
.
made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a
further requirement that it should have been made with
the intention of causing it to be believed that such a
document was made or executed by, or by the authority of
a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it
was not made or executed.
of
17. When a document is executed by a person claiming a
property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is
someone else, nor is he claiming that he is authorised by
someone else. Therefore, execution of such a document
rt
(purporting to convey some property of which he is not
the owner) is not execution of a false document as
defined under Section 464 of the Code. If what is executed
is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no
forgery, then neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the
Code is attracted.
23. It was further held in Mohd. Ibrahim‘s case (supra), that a
Sale Deed executed conveying a property not owned by the seller may
amount to cheating to the purchaser but not to any other person. It
was observed:-
18. Let us now examine whether the ingredients of an offence of
cheating are made out. The essential ingredients of the offence
of “cheating” are as follows:
(i) deception of a person either by making a false or
misleading representation or by dishonest concealment or
by any other act or omission;
(ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that person to
either deliver any property or to consent to the retention
thereof by any person or to intentionally induce that::: Downloaded on – 23/05/2026 12:44:45 :::CIS
27
2026:HHC:19292person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he
would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and
(iii) such act or omission causing or is likely to cause
.
damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation
or property.
19. To constitute an offence under Section 420, there should not
only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the
accused should have dishonestly induced the person deceived
(i) to deliver any property to any person, or
of
(ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable
security (or anything signed or sealed and which is capable
of being converted into a valuable security).
rt
20. When a sale deed is executed conveying a property claiming
ownership thereto, it may be possible for the purchaser under
such a sale deed to allege that the vendor has cheated him by
making a false representation of ownership and fraudulently
induced him to part with the sale consideration. But in this case,
the complaint is not by the purchaser. On the other hand, the
purchaser is made a co-accused.
21. It is not the case of the complainant that any of the
accused tried to deceive him either by making a false or
misleading representation or by any other action or omission,
nor is it his case that they offered him any fraudulent or
dishonest inducement to deliver any property or to consent to
the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce
him to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit
if he were not so deceived. Nor did the complainant allege that
the first appellant pretended to be the complainant while
executing the sale deeds. Therefore, it cannot be said that the
first accused, by the act of executing sale deeds in favour of the
second accused, the second accused, by reason of being the
purchaser, or the third, fourth and fifth accused, by reason of
being the witness, scribe and stamp vendor in regard to the sale
deeds, deceived the complainant in any manner.
::: Downloaded on – 23/05/2026 12:44:45 :::CIS
28
2026:HHC:19292
22. As the ingredients of cheating as stated in Section 415 are not
found, it cannot be said that there was an offence punishable
under Sections 417, 418, 419 or 420 of the Code.
.
23. When we say that the execution of a sale deed by a person,
purporting to convey a property which is not his, as his property,
is not making a false document and therefore not forgery, we
should not be understood as holding that such an act can never
be a criminal offence. If a person sells a property knowing that it
does not belong to him and thereby defrauds the person who
purchased the property, the person defrauded, that is, the
of
purchaser, may complain that the vendor committed the
fraudulent act of cheating. But a third party who is not the
purchaser under the deed may not be able to make such a
complaint.
rt
24. The term “fraud” is not defined in the Code. The dictionary
definition of “fraud” is “deliberate deception, treachery or
cheating intended to gain advantage”. Section 17 of the Contract
Act, 1872, defines “fraud” with reference to a party to a contract.
25. In Vimla (Dr.) v. Delhi Admn. [AIR 1963 SC 1572] This Court
explained the meaning of the expression “defraud” thus: (AIR
pp. 1576-77, para 14)
“14. … the expression ‘defraud’ involves two elements,
namely, deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is
something other than economic loss, that is, deprivation
of property, whether movable or immovable, or of money,
and it will include any harm whatever caused to any
person in body, mind, reputation or such others. In short,
it is a non-economic or non-pecuniary loss. A benefit or
advantage to the deceiver will almost always cause loss or
detriment to the deceived. Even in those rare cases where
there is a benefit or advantage to the deceiver, but no
corresponding loss to the deceived, the second condition is
satisfied.”
The above definition was, in essence, reiterated in State of
U.P. v. Ranjit Singh [(1999) 2 SCC 617: 1999 SCC (Cri) 293].
26. The Penal Code, however, defines “fraudulently”, an
adjective form of the word “fraud” in Section 25, as follows:
::: Downloaded on – 23/05/2026 12:44:45 :::CIS
29
2026:HHC:19292
“25. ‘Fraudulently.–A person is said to do a thing
fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud
but not otherwise.”
.
27. The term “fraudulently” is mostly used with the term
“dishonestly”, which is defined in Section 24 as follows:
“24. ‘Dishonestly’.–Whoever does anything with the
intention of causing wrongful gain to one person orwrongful loss to another person is said to do that thing
‘dishonestly’.”
of
28 [Ed.: Para 28 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No.
F.3/Ed.B.J./149/2009 dated 6-10-2009. To “defraud” or do
something fraudulently is not, by itself, made an offence under
the Penal Code, but various acts when done fraudulently (or
rt
fraudulently and dishonestly) are made offences. These include:
(i) Fraudulent removal or concealment of property
(Sections 206, 421 and 424).
(ii) Fraudulent claim to property to prevent seizure
(Section 207).
(iii) Fraudulent suffering or obtaining a decree (Sections
208 and 210).
(iv) Fraudulent possession/delivery of counterfeit coin
(Sections 239, 240, 242 and 243).
(v) Fraudulent alteration/diminishing weight of the coin
(Sections 246 to 253).
(vi) Fraudulent acts relating to stamps (Sections 255 to
261).
(vii) Fraudulent use of false instrument/weight/measure
(Sections 264 to 266).
(viii) Cheating (Sections 415 to 420).
(ix) Fraudulent prevention of debt being available to
creditors (Section 422).
(x) Fraudulent execution of a deed of transfer containing a
false statement of consideration (Section 423).
::: Downloaded on – 23/05/2026 12:44:45 :::CIS
30
2026:HHC:19292
(xi) Forgery, making or executing a false document
(Sections 463 to 471 and 474).
(xii) Fraudulent cancellation/destruction of valuable
.
security, etc. (Section 477).
(xiii) Fraudulently going through the marriage ceremony
(Section 496).
It follows, therefore, that by merely alleging or showing that a
person acted fraudulently, it cannot be assumed that he
committed an offence punishable under the Code or any other
of
law unless that fraudulent act is specified to be an offence under
the Code or other law.”
24. In Mir Nagvi Askari Vs CBI 2009 (15) SCC 643, the accused
rt
was charged with making false entries in the record of the bank. It was
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that making wrong entries by
itself will not attract criminal liability unless it is proved that the
document was false within the meaning of Section 464 of IPC. It was
observed:-
“[229] A person is said to make a false document or record if he
satisfies one of the three conditions as noticed hereinbefore
and provided for under the said section. The first condition
being that the document has been falsified with the intention ofcausing it to be believed that such a document has been made
by a person, by whom the person falsifying the document
knows that it was not made. Clearly, the documents in question
in the present case, even if it be assumed to have been made
dishonestly or fraudulently, had not been made with the
intention of causing it to be believed that they were made by or
under the authority of someone else.
[230] The second criterion of the section deals with a case
where a person without lawful authority alters a document
after it has been made. There has been no allegation of::: Downloaded on – 23/05/2026 12:44:45 :::CIS
31
2026:HHC:19292alteration of the voucher in question after they have been made.
Therefore, in our opinion, the second criterion of the said
section is also not applicable to the present case.
.
[231] The third and final condition of Section 464 deals with a
document, signed by a person who, due to his mental capacity,
does not know the contents of the documents which were
made, i.e. because of intoxication or unsoundness of mind, etc.Such is also not the case before us. Indisputably, therefore, the
accused before us could not have been convicted for the making
of a false document.
of
[232] The learned Special Judge, therefore, in our opinion,
erred in holding that the accused had prepared a false
document, which clearly, having regard to the provisions of the
rt
law, could not have been done.
[233] Further, the offence of forgery deals with the making of a
false document with the specific intentions enumerated
therein. The said section has been reproduced below.
“463. Forgery.–Whoever makes any false documents or
electronic record part of a document or electronic recordwith, intent to cause damage or injury], to the public or
any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any
person to part with property, or to enter into any expressor implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that
fraud may be committed, commits forgery.”
[234] However, since we have already held that the commission
of the said offence has not been convincingly established, the
accused could not have been convicted for the offence of
forgery. The definition of “false document” is a part of the
definition of “forgery”. Both must be read together. [Dr. Vimla
v. Delhi Administration, 1963 Supp2 SCR 585].
25. This question was also considered in Sheila Sebastian versus
R. Jawaharaj & Anr ETC. 2018 (7) SCC 581, and it was held that unless
the ingredients of Section 464 of IPC are satisfied, a person cannot be
convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section
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32
2026:HHC:19292
465 of IPC. It was observed:-
“[26] The definition of “false document” is a part of the
.
definition of “forgery”. Both must be read together. ‘Forgery’
and ‘Fraud’ are essentially matters of evidence which could be
proved as a fact by direct evidence or by inferences drawn from
proved facts. In the case at hand, there is no finding recorded bythe trial Court that the respondents have made any false
document or part of the document/record to execute the
mortgage deed under the guise of that ‘false document’. Hence,of
neither respondent no.1 nor respondent no.2 can be held as
makers of the forged documents. It is the imposter who can be
said to have made the false document by committing forgery. In
such an event, the trial court, as well as the appellate court,
rt
misguided themselves by convicting the accused. Therefore, the
High Court has rightly acquitted the accused based on the settledlegal position, and we find no reason to interfere with the same”.
26. It was laid down in Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev
Keni, (2020) 20 SCC 1 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 626: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 707,
that making false debit notes to claim the amount mentioned in them
will not amount to forgery as is understood in law. It was observed:
“50. Section 463 IPC speaks of “forgery” as being the making of a
“false document” or “false electronic record”, or a part thereof, todo the various things that are stated in that section. Unless a person
is said to make a false document or electronic record, Section 463
does not apply at all. The making of a “false document” is then
dealt with in Section 464 IPC. On the facts of the present case, we
are not concerned with the categories of false documents identified
under the heads “Secondly” and “Thirdly” of Section 464. Shri
Mishra states that the making of the debit notes by the respondents
in order to falsely claim amounts owing to them would fall within
the “First” category under Section 464.
51. The “First” category of Section 464 makes it clear that anyone
who dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document
with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document::: Downloaded on – 23/05/2026 12:44:45 :::CIS
33
2026:HHC:19292was made or executed by or by the authority of a person by whom or
by whose authority he knows that it was not made, can be said to
make a false document. Several judgments of this Court have held
that, assuming dishonesty or fraud, the second ingredient of the.
“First” category of Section 464 is that the document itself must be
made by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose
authority the person who creates the forgery knows that it was not
made. If the second ingredient is found missing, the offence offorgery is not made out at all. Thus, in Devendra v. State of
U.P. [Devendra v. State of U.P., (2009) 7 SCC 495 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ)
190 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 461], this Court set out the following facts :
of
(SCC p. 499, paras 5-6)
“5. On or about 22-8-1997, a sale deed was executed by
Appellants 1 and 2 in favour of Appellants 3 and 4. On 24-8-
rt
2005, a suit was filed by Respondent 2 and others for
cancelling the aforesaid deed of sale dated 22-8-1997, which
was registered as Civil Suit No. 382 of 2005. The said suit is
still pending in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Junior
Division), Ghaziabad. In the said suit, however, it was
averred that Solhu had four sons, whereas in Suit No. 135 of
1982, it was stated that Solhu had five sons. The appellants
filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section
151 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the Court of the
Deputy District Magistrate (First Class), Ghaziabad, praying
for dismissal of Suit No. 135 of 1982. An application for
impleadment was also filed by the appellants in Civil
Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 17667 of 1985.
6. On or about 21-9-2005, Respondent 2 filed an application
in Police Station Kavinagar, Ghaziabad, wherein the City
Magistrate, by an order dated 17-9-2005, passed an order to
hear the complainant and register a first information report.
Thereafter, Respondent 2 filed a first information report at
Police Station Sahni Gate on 21-9-2005. The appellants filed
an application for quashing the said first information report
before the High Court. It was marked as Criminal
Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 10568 of 2005.”
52. This Court held that the sale deed executed did not constitute a
“false document” under Section 464 IPC as follows : (Devendra
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34
2026:HHC:19292
case [Devendra v. State of U.P., (2009) 7 SCC 495 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ)
190 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 461], SCC pp. 502-503, paras 18-20)
“18. Section 463 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
.
‘463. Forgery.–Whoever makes any false documents
or false electronic record or part of a document or
electronic record, with intent to cause damage or
injury, to the public or any person, or to support anyclaim or title, or to cause any person to part with
property, or to enter into any express or implied
contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraudof
may be committed, commits forgery.’
According to Mr Das, making a false document to support any
claim over title would constitute forgery within the meaning
of the said provision and as a document was created for the
rt
purpose of showing one-third share in the joint property by
the appellants, although they were not entitled to do so, theymust be held to have committed an offence.
19. Making of any false document, in view of the definition of
“forgery”, is the sine qua non thereof. What would amount to
the making of a false document is specified in Section 464
thereof. What is, therefore, necessary is to execute a
document with the intention of causing it to be believed that
such a document inter alia was made by the authority of a
person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was
not made.
20. The appellants are the owners of the property. They have
executed a sale deed. Execution of the deed of sale is not
denied. If somebody is aggrieved by the false assertions made
in the said sale deed, it would be the vendees and not the co-
sharers. The appellants have not been alleged to be guilty of
creating any false document.”
53. In Mohd. Ibrahim v State of Bihar [Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of
Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929], it was held that
the execution of a sale deed by somebody in his own name qua
property which is not his does not constitute making a “false
document” under Section 464 IPC, because he does not
impersonate the owner or falsely claim to be authorised or
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empowered by the owner to execute the deed on the owner’s
behalf. The Court held : (SCC pp. 756-57, paras 13-17)
“13. The condition precedent for an offence under Sections
.
467 and 471 is a forgery. The condition precedent for forgery
is making a false document (or false electronic record or part
thereof). This case does not relate to any false electronic
record. Therefore, the question is whether the first accused,
in executing and registering the two sale deeds purporting to
sell a property (even if it is assumed that it did not belong to
him), can be said to have made and executed false
of
documents, in collusion with the other accused.
14. An analysis of Section 464 of the Penal Code shows that it
divides false documents into three categories:
1. The first is where a person dishonestly or
rt
fraudulently makes or executes a document with the
intention of causing it to be believed that such adocument was made or executed by some other person,
or by the authority of some other person, by whom or
by whose authority he knows it was not made or
executed.
2. The second is where a person dishonestly or
fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a
document in any material part, without lawfulauthority, after it has been made or executed by either
himself or any other person.
3. The third is where a person dishonestly or
fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or altera document knowing that such person could not, by
reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; (b) intoxication; or
(c) deception practised upon him, know the contents of
the document or the nature of the alteration.
In short, a person is said to have made a “false document” if
(i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone
else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or
tampered with a document; or (iii) he obtained a document
by practising deception, or from a person not in control of his
senses.
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15. The sale deeds executed by the first appellant clearly and
obviously do not fall under the second and third categories of
“false documents”. It, therefore, remains to be seen whether
the claim of the complainant that the execution of sale deeds
.
by the first accused, who was in no way connected with the
land, amounted to committing forgery of the documents with
the intention of taking possession of the complainant’s land
(and that Accused 2 to 5 as the purchaser, witness, scribe and
stamp vendor, colluded with the first accused in execution
and registration of the said sale deeds) would bring the case
under the first category.
of
16. There is a fundamental difference between a person
executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is
his property, and a person executing a sale deed by
rt
impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorised
or empowered by the owner to execute the deed on the
owner’s behalf. When a person executes a document
conveying a property, describing it as his, there are two
possibilities. The first is that he bona fide believes that the
property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may
be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his, even
though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under
the first category of “false documents”, it is not sufficient
that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or
fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should
have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed
that such a document was made or executed by, or by the
authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he
knows that it was not made or executed.
17. When a document is executed by a person claiming a
property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is
someone else, nor is he claiming that he is authorised by
someone else. Therefore, execution of such a document
(purporting to convey some property of which he is not the
owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under
Section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false
document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then
neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code is attracted.”
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27. Therefore, when the document was signed by a
person describing himself as a partner who was authorised by
.
other partners, it would not constitute an offence of forgery.
28. Therefore, the FIR does not disclose the commission
of any cognizable offence, and the continuation of the criminal
proceedings cannot be permitted. Hence, the present petition is
of
allowed, and the FIR No. 26, dated 28.2.2024, registered at Police
Station Gagret, District Una, H.P., for the commission of offences
rt
punishable under Section 420 and 120-B of IPC and
consequential proceedings arising out of it are ordered to be
quashed qua the petitioners.
29. The observations made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing
whatsoever on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
22nd May, 2026
(Chander)
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