― Advertisement ―

Absence of Full Trial Makes Foreign Judgment Unenforceable in India: Supreme Court

In a significant ruling on the enforcement of foreign judgments, the Supreme Court of India in Messer Griesheim GmbH v. Goyal MG Gases...
Home23.04.2026 vs The State Of Meghalaya on 23 April, 2026

23.04.2026 vs The State Of Meghalaya on 23 April, 2026

ADVERTISEMENT

Meghalaya High Court

Date Of Order: 23.04.2026 vs The State Of Meghalaya on 23 April, 2026

                                                       2026:MLHC:397

Serial No.03
Supplementary List


                     HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
                            AT SHILLONG

   Crl.Petn.No.29/2026
                                            Date of Order: 23.04.2026
   Shri Sofior Rahman                                   ..... Petitioner

                                 Vs.

   1. The State of Meghalaya, represented by Commissioner and
      Secretary, Home Police Department, Meghalaya, Shillong.
   2. The Director General of Police, Government of Meghalaya,
      Shillong.                                   ..... Respondents
   Coram:
          Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Revati Mohite Dere, Chief Justice
   Appearance:
   For the Petitioner :      Mr. K. Paul, Sr.Adv with
                             Mr. S.K. Hassan, Adv
                             Mr. S. Thapa, Adv
                             Mr. S. Chanda, Adv
                             Ms. M. Rahman, Adv
                             Ms. S Khatun, Adv

   For the Respondents :     Mr. N.G. Shylla, Addl.PP with
                             Mr. J.N. Rynjah, GA
   i)    Whether approved for reporting in          Yes
         Law journals etc.:


   ii)   Whether approved for publication
         in press:                                  Yes




                                                              Page 1 of 13
                                                   2026:MLHC:397




JUDGMENT:

(Oral)

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

SPONSORED

2. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith with the consent

of the parties and the aforesaid petition is taken up for final

disposal.

3. Mrs. N.G. Shylla, learned Addl.PP waives notice on behalf

of respondent Nos.1 and 2.

4. By this petition, the petitioner seeks a direction to the

respondent authorities to disclose/furnish details of all pending

cases/FIRs filed against the petitioner at various police stations

in various districts in the State of Meghalaya; and a direction to

the respondent authorities to club all the cases registered

against the petitioner in different districts of the State of

Meghalaya.

5. According to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

petitioner, the petitioner a local leader and Ex-MDC of the area

had raised his voice for the non-tribal communities on several

occasions for participation of non-tribals communities in the

Page 2 of 13
2026:MLHC:397

GHADC election through social media platform i.e. ‘Facebook’ in

his name and also through newspaper. It appears that during

routine monitoring of social media platform that a Facebook

operating under the name of the petitioner was found to be

circulating, which according to the complainant was provocative,

inflammatory and capable of disturbing public peace and

communal harmony. Accordingly, a complaint came to be lodged

by one individual on 10th March, 2026 with Araimile Police

Station and on the same day, the police registered a case being

P.S. Case No.19/2026 with the said Police Station for the alleged

offences punishable under Sections 196(a)(b)/351(2) of the BNS,

2023. On 12th March, 2026, another case was registered with

the Songsak Police Station at the behest of the Organizing

Secretary of the A’chik State Peoples’ Front. The said complaint

was based on the same Facebook post put up by the petitioner.

Accordingly, the Songsak Police Station registered P.S. Case

No.07/2026, for the alleged offences punishable under Sections

196(1)/197(1)/352/353 (1)(b)(c)(2) of the BNS, 2023. It appears

that thereafter, on 15th March, 2026, a similar complaint was

lodged by one Police Officer based on the same Facebook post,

Page 3 of 13
2026:MLHC:397

with Tura Police Station and the police registered a case being

P.S. Case No.32/2026, for the alleged offences punishable under

Sections 192/196(1)/353(1)(2)/57 of the BNS, 2023, read with

Section 6A/8B of the MMPO Act and read with Sections 8A/11

of the MMPO (Autonomous District) Act, on the same day.

6. Mr. K. Paul, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner

submitted that three cases registered against the petitioner arise

out of the same Facebook post. He submitted that in this view of

the matter and having regard to the judgments of the Apex Court

in the case of T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala & ors reported in

(2001) SCC 181, which was followed in Amish Devgan v. Union

of India & ors reported in (2021) 1 SCC 1, all the three FIRs

will have to be clubbed together, as there cannot be multiple

criminal proceedings based on the same cause of action.

7. It is pertinent to note that the Apex Court in Arnab

Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India reported in (2020) 14 SCC

12, has in paragraphs 30 to 36 observed as under:

“30. The fundamental basis on which the jurisdiction of this
Court has been invoked under Article 32 is the filing of
multiple FIRs and complaints in various States arising from

Page 4 of 13
2026:MLHC:397

the same cause of action. The cause of action was founded
on a programme which was telecast on R. Bharat on 21-4-
2020. FIRs and criminal complaints were lodged against the
petitioner in the States of Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Madhya
Pradesh, Telangana and Jharkhand besides the Union
Territories of Jammu and Kashmir. The law concerning
multiple criminal proceedings on the same cause of action
has been analysed in a judgment of this Court in T.T.
Antony v. State of Kerala (“T.T. Antony
“). Speaking for a two-
Judge Bench, Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J. interpreted
the provisions of Section 154 and cognate provisions of the
CrPC including Section 173 and observed: (SCC pp. 196-97,
para 20)
“20. … under the scheme of the provisions of Sections
154
, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 CrPC, only
the earliest or the first information in regard to the
commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the
requirements of Section 154 CrPC. Thus, there can be
no second FIR and consequently there can be no fresh
investigation on receipt of every subsequent information
in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same
occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more
cognizable offences. On receipt of information about a
cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a
cognizable offence or offences and on entering the FIR
in the station house diary, the officer in charge of a
police station has to investigate not merely the
cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other
connected offences found to have been committed in the
course of the same transaction or the same occurrence
and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173
CrPC.”

Page 5 of 13

2026:MLHC:397

31. The Court held that “there can be no second FIR” where
the information concerns the same cognizable offence alleged
in the first FIR or the same occurrence or incident which
gives rise to one or more cognizable offences. This is due to
the fact that the investigation covers within its ambit not just
the alleged cognizable offence, but also any other connected
offences that may be found to have been committed. This
Court held that once an FIR postulated by the provisions of
Section 154 has been recorded, any information received
after the commencement of investigation cannot form the
basis of a second FIR as doing so would fail to comport with
the scheme of the CrPC. The Court observed: (T.T. Antony
case, SCC p. 196, para 18)

“18. … All other information made orally or in
writing after the commencement of the investigation
into the cognizable offence disclosed from the facts
mentioned in the first information report and entered in
the station house diary by the police officer or such
other cognizable offences as may come to his notice
during the investigation, will be statements falling
under Section 162 CrPC. No such
information/statement can properly be treated as an
FIR and entered in the station house diary again, as it
would in effect be a second FIR and the same cannot
be in conformity with the scheme of CrPC.”

32. This Court adverted to the need to strike a just balance
between the fundamental rights of citizens under Articles 19
and 21 and the expansive power of the police to investigate
a cognizable offence. Adverting to precedent, this Court held:

(T.T. Antony case, SCC p. 200, para 27)

Page 6 of 13
2026:MLHC:397

“27. … the sweeping power of investigation does not
warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh
investigation by the police in respect of the same
incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences,
consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether
before or after filing the final report under Section
173(2)
CrPC. It would clearly be beyond the purview of
Sections 154 and 156 CrPC, nay, a case of abuse of the
statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our
view a case of fresh investigation based on the second
or successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in
connection with the same or connected cognizable
offence alleged to have been committed in the course of
the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant
to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final
report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the
Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power
under Section 482 CrPC or under Articles 226/227 of
the Constitution.”

(emphasis supplied)

33. The Court held that barring situations in which a
counter-case is filed, a fresh investigation or a second FIR on
the basis of the same or connected cognizable offence would
constitute an “abuse of the statutory power of investigation”

and may be a fit case for the exercise of power either under
Section 482 CrPC or Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.

34. The decision in T.T. Antony came up for consideration
before a three-Judge Bench in Upkar Singh v. Ved
Prakash (“Upkar Singh
“).
N. Santosh Hegde, J. speaking for
this Court adverted to the earlier decisions of this Court
in Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.)
(“Ram Lal

Page 7 of 13
2026:MLHC:397

Narang”), Kari Choudhary v. Sita Devi (“Kari Choudhary”)
and State of Bihar v. J.A.C. (“Saldanha“). The Court noted
that in Kari Choudhary, this Court held that: (Kari
Choudhary case, SCC p. 717, para 11)

“11. …Of course, the legal position is that there cannot
be two FIRs against the same accused in respect of the
same case. But when there are rival versions in respect
of the same episode, they would normally take the
shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be
carried on under both of them by the same
investigating agency.”

35. In Saldanha, this Court had held that the power
conferred upon the Magistrate under Section 156(3) does not
affect the power of the investigating officer to further
investigate the case even after submission of the report
under Section 173(8). In Upkar Singh, this Court noted that
the decision in Ram Lal Narang is “in the same line” as the
judgments in Kari Choudhary and Saldanha and held that
the decision in T.T. Antony does not preclude the filing of a
second complaint in regard to the same incident as a
counter-complaint nor is this course of action prohibited by
the CrPC. In that context, this Court held: (Upkar Singh case,
SCC p. 299, para 23)

“23. Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this
Court in T.T. Antony case is to be accepted as holding
that a second complaint in regard to the same incident
filed as a counter-complaint is prohibited under the
Code then, in our opinion, such conclusion would lead
to serious consequences. This will be clear from the
hypothetical example given hereinbelow i.e. if in regard
to a crime committed by the real accused he takes the

Page 8 of 13
2026:MLHC:397

first opportunity to lodge a false complaint and the
same is registered by the jurisdictional police then the
aggrieved victim of such crime will be precluded from
lodging a complaint giving his version of the incident in
question, consequently he will be deprived of his
legitimate right to bring the real accused to book. This
cannot be the purport of the Code.”

36. These principles were reiterated by a two-Judge Bench
of this Court in Babubhai v. State of Gujarat. Dr B.S.
Chauhan, J. observed: (SCC p. 265, para 21)

“21. In such a case the court has to examine the facts
and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the
test of sameness is to be applied to find out whether
both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of
the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents
which are two or more parts of the same transaction. If
the answer is in the affirmative, the second FIR is liable
to be quashed. However, in case the contrary is proved,
where the version in the second FIR is different and
they are in respect of the two different
incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. In case
in respect of the same incident the accused in the first
FIR comes forward with a different version or
counterclaim, investigation on both the FIRs has to be
conducted.”

This Court held that the relevant enquiry is whether two or
more FIRs relate to the same incident or relate to incidents
which form part of the same transactions. If the Court were
to conclude in the affirmative, the subsequent FIRs are
liable to be quashed. However, where the subsequent FIR
relates to different incidents or crimes or is in the form of a

Page 9 of 13
2026:MLHC:397

counter-claim, investigation may proceed. [See also in this
context Chirra Shivraj v. State of A.P. and Chirag M.
Pathak v. Dollyben Kantilal Patel
]”

8. In Amish Devgan‘s case, the Apex has observed in

paragraph 123, as under:

“123. In Arnab Ranjan Goswami case, the proceedings in the
subsequent FIRs were quashed as the counsel for the
complainants in the said case had joined the petitioner in
making the said prayer. However, in the present case, we
would like to follow the ratio in T.T. Antony which is to the
effect that the subsequent FIRs would be treated as
statements under Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure
Code. This is clear from the following dictum in T.T. Antony:
(SCC pp. 195-96, para 18)
“18. An information given under sub-section (1) of
Section 154 CrPC is commonly known as first
information report (FIR) though this term is not used in
the Code. It is a very important document. And as its
nickname suggests it is the earliest and the first
information of a cognizable offence recorded by an
officer in charge of a police station. It sets the criminal
law in motion and marks the commencement of the
investigation which ends up with the formation of
opinion under Section 169 or 170 CrPC, as the case
may be, and forwarding of a police report under Section
173
CrPC. It is quite possible and it happens not
infrequently that more informations than one are given
to a police officer in charge of a police station in respect
of the same incident involving one or more than one
cognizable offences. In such a case he need not enter
Page 10 of 13
2026:MLHC:397

every one of them in the station house diary and this is
implied in Section 154 CrPC. Apart from a vague
information by a phone call or a cryptic telegram, the
information first entered in the station house diary,
kept for this purpose, by a police officer in charge of a
police station is the first information report — FIR
postulated by Section 154 CrPC. All other informations
made orally or in writing after the commencement of
the investigation into the cognizable offence disclosed
from the facts mentioned in the first information report
and entered in the station house diary by the police
officer or such other cognizable offences as may come
to his notice during the investigation, will be statements
falling under Section 162 CrPC. No such
information/statement can properly be treated as an
FIR and entered in the station house diary again, as it
would in effect be a second FIR and the same cannot
be in conformity with the scheme of CrPC. Take a case
where an FIR mentions cognizable offence under
Section 307 or 326 IPC and the investigating agency
learns during the investigation or receives fresh
information that the victim died, no fresh FIR under
Section 302 IPC need be registered which will be
irregular; in such a case alteration of the provision of
law in the first FIR is the proper course to adopt. Let us
consider a different situation in which H having
killed W, his wife, informs the police that she is killed
by an unknown person or knowing that W is killed by
his mother or sister, H owns up the responsibility and
during investigation the truth is detected; it does not
require filing of fresh FIR against H — the real offender

— who can be arraigned in the report under Section
173(2)
or 173(8) CrPC, as the case may be. It is of
course permissible for the investigating officer to send

Page 11 of 13
2026:MLHC:397

up a report to the Magistrate concerned even earlier
that investigation is being directed against the person
suspected to be the accused.” (emphasis in original)

9. Learned prosecutor on instructions states that till date,

three cases have been registered as against the petitioner. She

does not dispute that all the three cases are based on one

Facebook post, put up by the petitioner on his Facebook

account. Learned prosecutor also does not dispute the legal

proposition laid down in Amish Devgan‘s case (supra) and other

cases.

10. In view of the aforesaid, learned prosecutor states that all

the three cases which have been registered against the

petitioner, will be clubbed together and that the cases registered

with Tura Police Station and Songsak Police Station (transferred

to the Crime Branch Police Station (CBPS) Western Range,

Tura), will be transferred to Araimile Police Station, where the

first FIR was registered against the petitioner i.e., P.S. Case

No.19/2026. Statement accepted.

Page 12 of 13

2026:MLHC:397

11. In view of the aforesaid, nothing survives for further

consideration in the petition.

12. Rule is made absolute on the aforesaid terms and the

petition stands disposed of.

(Revati Mohite Dere)
Chief Justice

Meghalaya
23.04.2026
“Lam DR-PS”

Page 13 of 13
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
LAMPHRANG KHARCHANDY
Date: 2026.04.24 17:32:23 IST



Source link