17926) on 28 April, 2026

Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur

Urn: Crlmp / 5877U / 2020Yashraj … vs State Of Rajasthan (2026:Rj-Jp:17926) on 28 April, 2026

[2026:RJ-JP:17926]

        HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
                    BENCH AT JAIPUR

        S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 6781/2021

Ishita Bhardwaj D/o Shri Ashwini Bharadwaj, Aged About 25
Years, Resident Of 677 A, Ganesh Vihar, Niwaroo Road,
Jhotwara, Jaipur.
                                                                     ----Petitioner
                                      Versus
1.       State of Rajasthan, Through P.P.
2.       Victim D/o Shri K.L. Gautam, R/o House No. D/46,
         Malviya Nagar, Jaipur.
                                                                   ----Respondents

Connected With
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 3581/2020
Yashraj Bhardwaj S/o Shri Ashiwini Bhardwaj, Aged About 26
Years, R/o 677A, Ganesh Vihar, Niwaroo Road Jhotwara, Jaipur.

—-Petitioner
Versus

1. State of Rajasthan, Through P.P.

2. Victim D/o Shri K.L. Gautam, R/o House No. D/46,
Malviya Nagar, Jaipur.

—-Respondents

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Swadeep Singh Hore with
Mr. Sahajveer Baweja
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Shree Ram Dhakar, PP
Mr. N.K. Meena

JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND

Order

28/04/2026
Reportable

1. The instant misc. petition is listed before this Court in

pursuance of the directions issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

the case of Vijay Kumar and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan

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(Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 773/2026, decided

on 15.01.2026), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that in

various matters, interim orders have been passed in criminal

revision petitions and petitions filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as

a result of which trial relating to serious offences such as murder,

rape, dacoity, dowry death, etc., could not proceed and remained

stalled/held up due to the passage of considerable time.

2. Directions have been issued to this Court and other High

Courts to take up such like matters which are pending since long,

on priority and decide the same expeditiously without deferring

the hearings to subsequent dates.

3. Since common question of law and facts are involved in both

the instant petitions and since these petitions have been

submitted against the very same impugned FIR No. 365/2020,

registered with the Police Station Jawahar Circle, District Jaipur

City (East) for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(n),

323, 341 & 384 IPC, therefore, with the consent of counsel for

both the sides, final arguments have been heard together and

these miscellaneous petitions are being decided by this common

order.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the

prosecutrix, i.e. respondent No.2 ‘AG’ is a major lady. She came in

touch with the petitioner Yashraj Bhardwaj in the year 2018 and

thereafter, they started residing together in a ‘live-in-relationship’

from 2018 to 2019. Counsel further submits that on account of

some dispute between the parties, the prosecutrix ‘AG’ filed a

complaint under Section 190 Cr.P.C. against the petitioner Yashraj

Bhardwaj, for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 384,

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323, 342 & 506 IPC before the Court of the Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur on 18.02.2020, wherein, it

has been alleged that the petitioner Yashraj Bhardwaj developed

physical relationship with the prosecutrix ‘AG’ on the pretext of

marriage. He further submits that during pendency of the

aforesaid complaint, the prosecutrix ‘AG’ again stayed with the

petitioner in Hotel Moti Mahal at Pushkar for two days i.e. on

27.02.2020 & 28.02.2020 and this fact is further fortified from the

statement of an employee, said to be posted in the said hotel,

recorded by the Police under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Counsel further

submits that the visitors’ register of the said hotel was also

handed over to the Investigating Officer which indicates that the

petitioner-Yashraj Bhardwaj and the prosecutrix ‘AG’ checked-in

the hotel on 27.02.2020 and checked-out on 28.02.2020. He

further submits that the petitioner-Yashraj Bhardwaj was not

aware about filing of the aforesaid complaint by the prosecutrix

against him. Thereafter, the impugned FIR was registered by the

prosecutrix ‘AG’ with the Police Station Jawahar Circle, District

Jaipur City (East) on 17.07.2020 with regard to the same

allegations, which have been levelled in the aforementioned

complaint filed by her against the petitioner-Yashraj Bhardwaj

under Section 190 Cr.P.C. before the Court of the Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur.

5. Learned counsel further submits that in the meantime, the

learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur,

while exercising the powers contained under Section 192 Cr.P.C.,

sent the complaint for its disposal to the Court of Additional Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate No.2, Jaipur Metropolitan, where the

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complaint remain pending for a considerable period of time and on

17.07.2021, the prosecutrix ‘AG’ appeared in-person and withdrew

the aforesaid complaint on the ground that she does not wish to

continue the proceedings in the said complaint. He further submits

that the order dated 17.07.2021 bears signatures of the

prosecutrix ‘AG’ and the same was duly identified by her counsel

Mr. Ravindra Kumar. He further submits that under these

circumstances, registration of second FIR with regard to the same

incident and the same offence, amounts to abuse the process of

law and the same is not permissible in the light of the judgment

passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of T.T. Antony Vs.

State of Kerala & Ors. reported in (2001) 6 SCC 181.

6. Learned counsel further submits that so far as, the

petitioner-Ishita Bhardwaj is concerned, her name was not

mentioned in the first complaint and even in the second FIR

registered by the prosecutrix ‘AG’, no allegations whatsoever were

levelled against her. He further submits that the petitioner-Ishita

Bhardwaj is married to one-Harish Sharma and on account of

matrimonial dispute between the husband and the wife i.e. Ishita

Bhardwaj and Harish Sharma, the petitioner-Ishita Bhardwaj

lodged an FIR against him under Section 498 IPC. In counter-blast

to the aforesaid, her husband-Harish Sharma deposed against the

petitioner-Ishita Bhardwaj in the impugned FIR and levelled

allegations against the petitioner-Ishita Bhardwaj alleging therein

that she sent certain abortion pills to the prosecutrix ‘AG’ from

Jaipur to Kota via courier.

7. Learned counsel further submits that no such allegations

were levelled against the petitioner-Ishita Bhardwaj initially, and

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the entire story relating to abortion pills was concocted at a later

stage to falsely implicate the petitioner-Ishita Bhardwaj in the

impugned FIR. He further submits that from the facts narrated as

above, registration of the impugned FIR and continuation of the

proceedings arising out of the same against both the petitioners

amounts to abuse of process of law. Hence, the same is liable to

be quashed and set aside.

8. Per contra learned Public Prosecutor as well as counsel

appearing on behalf of the complainant opposed the prayer made

by counsel for the petitioners and submitted that after thorough

investigation made by the Investigating Agency, a prima facie case

was found to be proved against both the petitioners for the

abovestated offences, hence, under these circumstances,

interference of this Court is not warranted and both the instant

miscellaneous petitions are liable to be rejected.

9. Heard and considered the submissions made at the Bar and

perused the material available on record.

10. Perusal of the record indicates that on 18.02.2020, the

prosecutrix ‘AG’ filed a complaint against the petitioner Yashraj

Bhardwaj under Section 190 Cr.P.C., before the Court of the

learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur.

In the aforesaid complaint bearing No. 61/2020, for the offences

under Sections 376, 384, 323, 342 & 506 IPC, the prosecutrix ‘AG’

has alleged that she came in touch with the petitioner on

28.02.2018 and thereafter, they both became friends and a

consensual relationship was developed between both of them. She

further alleged that on the pretext of marriage, she was subjected

to sexual intercourse on multiple occasions between the year 2018

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to 2019. It is pertinent to note here that the aforesaid complaint

was submitted by the prosecutrix on 18.02.2020. It is utterly

shocking that the prosecutrix ‘AG’, after filing of the aforesaid

complaint, again stayed with the petitioner-Yashraj Bhardwaj in

Hotel Moti Mahal at Pushkar for two days i.e. on 27.02.2020 &

28.02.2020, especially considering the fact that she has already

lodged a complaint against the petitioner-Yashraj Bhardwaj with

the allegation that she was subjected to rape by him.

11. In spite of the above, she once again lodged the impugned

FIR against the petitioner-Yashraj Bhardwaj with the self same

allegations for the same incident and same offences, on

17.07.2020 with the Police Station Jawahar Circle, Jaipur City

(East). If the allegations mentioned in the impugned FIR and the

complaint filed by the prosecutrix are seen from the bare naked

eye, they are almost similar and identical.

12. It is worthy to note here that during pendency of the

impugned FIR, the matter was transferred to the Court of the

Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate No.2, Jaipur Metropolitan

No.2, Jaipur by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Jaipur

Metropolitan, Jaipur, while exercising power contained under

Section 192 Cr.P.C. and the matter remained pending before the

Court of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,

Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur till 17.07.2021, when the prosecutrix

‘AG’ appeared in person and submitted that she does not wish to

peruse any proceedings against the petitioner-Yashraj Bhardwaj

and she has also put her signatures on the ordersheet dated

17.07.2021 to this effect. She has been duly identified by her

counsel Mr. Ravindra Kumar and therefore, it is clear that the

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aforesaid complaint was “dismissed as not pressed” on

17.07.2021 at the instance of the prosecutrix ‘AG’ herself.

13. It is settled preposition of law, as propounded by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in the case of T.T. Antony(Supra), that one cannot

be allowed to lodge subsequent FIR with regard to the same

allegations, same offences and same incident. The Hon’ble Apex

Court has held that registration of a subsequent FIR/complaint

with regard to the self same allegations is nothing but an abuse of

process of law.

14. Their Lordships in the case of T.T. Antony (Supra) have

held that registration of second F.I.R. in respect of same offence is

not only impermissible but it is also violative of Article 21 of the

Constitution of India. It has been held in para 19, 20 and 27, as

under:-

“19. The scheme of CrPC is that an officer in charge
of a police station has to commence investigation as
provided in Section 156 or 157 CrPC on the basis of
entry of the first information report, on coming to
know of the commission of a cognizable offence. On
completion of investigation and on the basis of the
evidence collected, he has to form an opinion under
Section 169 or 170 CrPC, as the case may be, and
forward his report to the Magistrate concerned under
Section 173(2) CrPC. However, even after filing such
a report, if he comes into possession of further
information or material, he need not register a fresh
FIR; he is empowered to make further investigation,
normally with the leave of the court, and where
during further investigation he collects further
evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to
forward the same with one or more further reports;
this is the import of subsection (8) of Section 173
CrPC.

20. From the above discussion it follows that under
the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155,
156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 CrPC only the
earliest or the first information in regard to the

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commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the
requirements of Section 154 CrPC. Thus there can be
no second FIR and consequently there can be no
fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent
information in respect of the same cognizable offence
or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one
or more cognizable offences. On receipt of
information about a cognizable offence or an incident
giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on
entering the FIR in the station house diary, the officer
in charge of a police station has to investigate not
merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but
also other connected offences found to have been
committed in the course of the same transaction or
the same occurrence and file one or more reports as
provided in Section 173 CrPC.

21. xxx

22. xxx

23. xxx

24. xxx

25. xxx

26. xxx

27. A just balance between the fundamental rights of
the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Constitution and the expansive power of the police to
investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by
the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-
section (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the police
to make further investigation, obtain further evidence
(both oral and documentary) and forward a further
report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang case it
was, however, observed that it would be appropriate
to conduct further investigation with the permission
of the court. However, the sweeping power of
investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen
each time to fresh investigation by the police in
respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or
more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of
successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final
report under Section 173(2) CrPC. It would clearly be
beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 CrPC,
nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of
investigation in a given case. In our view a case of
fresh investigation based on the second or successive
FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in connection
with the same or connected cognizable offence

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alleged to have been committed in the course of the
same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to
the first FIR either investigation is under way or final
report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to
the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of
power under Section 482 CrPC or under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution.”

15. Similarly, in the case of Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah Vs.

Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2013) 6 SCC

348, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held in para 58.5, as under:-

“58.5. The first information report is a report which
gives first information with regard to any offence.
There cannot be second FIR in respect of the same
offence/event because whenever any further
information is received by the investigating agency, it
is always in furtherance of the first FIR.”

16. Likewise in the case of Anju Chaudhary Vs. State of Uttar

Pradesh and Anr. reported in (2013) 6 SCC 384, the Hon’ble

Apex Court has held that there cannot be two FIRs for the same

incident and the same offence. The Hon’ble Court has held in

paras 14 and 15, as under:-

“14. On the plain construction of the language and
scheme of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the Code, it
cannot be construed or suggested that there can be
more than one FIR about an occurrence. However,
the opening words of Section 154 suggest that every
information relating to commission of a cognizable
offence shall be reduced into writing by the officer-in-
charge of a police station. This implies that there has
to be the first information report about an incident
which constitutes a cognizable offence. The purpose
of registering an FIR is to set the machinery of
criminal investigation into motion, which culminates
with filing of the police report in terms of Section
173(2) of the Code. It will, thus, be appropriate to
follow the settled principle that there cannot be two
FIRs registered for the same offence. However, where
the incident is separate; offences are similar or
different, or even where the subsequent crime is of
such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit

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and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second
FIR could be registered. The most important aspect is
to examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the
legislature in the very language of Section 154 of the
Code. These safeguards can be safely deduced from
the principle akin to double jeopardy, rule of fair
investigation and further to prevent abuse of power
by the investigating authority of the police.
Therefore, second FIR for the same incident cannot
be registered. Of course, the investigating agency
has no determinative right. It is only a right to
investigate in accordance with the provisions of the
Code. The filing of report upon completion of
investigation, either for cancellation or alleging
commission of an offence, is a matter which once
filed before the court of competent jurisdiction attains
a kind of finality as far as police is concerned, may be
in a given case, subject to the right of further
investigation but wherever the investigation has been
completed and a person is found to be prima facie
guilty of committing an offence or otherwise, re-
examination by the investigating agency on its own
should not be permitted merely by registering
another FIR with regard to the same offence. If such
protection is not given to a suspect, then possibility
of abuse of investigating powers by the police cannot
be ruled out. It is with this intention in mind that
such interpretation should be given to Section 154 of
the Code, as it would not only further the object of
law but even that of just and fair investigation. More
so, in the backdrop of the settled canons of criminal
jurisprudence, reinvestigation or de novo
investigation is beyond the competence of not only
the investigating agency but even that of the learned
Magistrate. The courts have taken this view primarily
for the reason that it would be opposed to the
scheme of the Code and more particularly Section
167(2) of the Code.

15. It has to be examined on the merits of each case
whether a subsequently registered FIR is a second
FIR about the same incident or offence or is based
upon distinct and different facts and whether its
scope of inquiry is entirely different or not. It will not
be appropriate for the court to lay down one
straitjacket formula uniformly applicable to all cases.

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This will always be a mixed question of law and facts
depending upon the merits of a given case.”

17. Perusal of the allegations levelled in the criminal complaint

and the FIR, lodged by the victim against the petitioner, reveals

that the allegations in both of the FIRs are verbatim same and

identical. There is hardly any difference of comma or full stop

between both of them. Once the criminal complaint with regard to

the same incident and the same offence is not pressed and

withdrawn by the victim, then the successive impugned FIR with

regard to the same incident and the same offence is legally not

sustainable in the eyes of law and the same is liable to be

quashed.

18. Now, this Court refers back to the S.B. Criminal

Miscellaneous Petition No.3581/2020, filed by the petitioner-Ishita

Bhardwaj. Perusal of both the complaint as well as the impugned

FIR, registered by the prosecutrix ‘AG’ against the co-petitioner

Yashraj Bhardwaj, reveals that not a single allegation has been

levelled against the petitioner-Ishita Bhardwaj alleging therein

that she sent any abortion pills to the prosecutrix ‘AG’ and after

taking the aforesaid pills, the prosecutrix ‘AG’ has aborted her

pregnancy. With no stretch of imagination it can be believed prima

facie that the petitioner-Ishita Bhardwaj has committed any

offence punishable under Section 313 IPC.

19. It is worthy to note here that this allegation was introduced

against the petitioner-Ishita Bhardwaj, not by the prosecutrix ‘AG’,

but by the husband of the petitioner-Ishita Bhardwaj, against

whom the petitioner-Ishita Bhardwaj has filed an FIR under

Section 498A IPC and in counter-blast to the aforesaid, these

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allegations have been levelled by her husband-Harish Sharma

against the petitioner-Ishita Bhardwaj.

20. Even if the allegations are taken on their face value, in the

light of Section 312 and 313 IPC, these offences deal with causing

miscarriage and its punishment. For ready reference Section 313

and 313 IPC are reproduced as under:-

“312. Causing miscarraige.–Whoever voluntarily
causes a woman with child to miscarry, shall, if such
miscarriage be not caused in good faith for the
purpose of saving the life of the woman, be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to three years, or with fine, or
with both; and, if the woman be quick with child,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven
years, and shall also be liable to fine.

313. Causing miscarriage without woman’s
consent.–Whoever commits the offence defined in
the last preceding section without the consent of the
woman, whether the woman is quick with child or
not, shall be punished with [imprisonment for life], or
with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine.”

Bare perusal of the provisions of above two Sections i.e.

Section 312 and Section 313 IPC indicates that a person can be

held responsible and punished for this offence, if he voluntarily

causes a women with child to miscarry and such miscarriage is not

caused in good faith for saving the life of such women.

In the instant case, no such allegations are there against the

petitioner-Ishita Bhardwaj that she caused miscarriage of the

victim. The only allegation levelled against her is that she sent

abortion pills to the victim through courier. Though, no such

evidence is available on the record and even if these allegations

are taken as they exist, then also sending abortion pills to anyone

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does not constitute any offence unless such pills are forcefully

given to the victim with the intent to miscarry her pregnancy. No

such primary evidence is available in the record which is said to be

against the petitioner-Ishita Bhardwaj. Hence, the basic

ingredients of the offence under Section 312 and 313 IPC are

missing in the instant case.

21. In the considered opinion of this Court, continuation of the

proceedings arising out of the impugned FIR against both the

petitioners amounts to gross abuse of the process of law. Hence,

the proceedings arising out of the impugned FIR are liable to be

and are hereby ordered to be quashed and set aside.

22. With the aforesaid observations, both the miscellaneous

petitions stand allowed. Stay application and all pending

application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

(ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J

Shivam/4-5

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