Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 12.3.2026 vs Of on 8 April, 2026
2026:HHC:10810
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 417 of 2025
.
Reserved on: 12.3.2026
Date of Decision: 08.04.2026.
Kewal Ram ...Petitioner
Versus
of
Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Agriculture and Rural
Development Bank Ltd ...Respondent
Coram rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : Mr Atul Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr Narender Singh Thakur,
Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the judgment
dated 26.04.2025 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-1,
Shimla, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment
of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.09.2023, passed by
learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chopal, District Shimla,
HP (learned Trial Court) were upheld (Parties shall hereinafter be
referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the
learned Trial Court for convenience.)
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the
.
learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant is
a bank established under the Society Registration Act 1979,
of
having its head office at SDA Commercial Complex, Kasumpti,
Shimla and a branch office at Chopal. It is engaged in banking
rt
activities. The accused applied for a loan of ₹ 5 lakhs on
02/01/2016. The complaint disbursed the loan to the accused,
and the accused signed various documents to avail the loan. The
accused failed to return the amount, and he was liable to pay
₹1,77,920 till January 2021. The accused issued a postdated
cheque of ₹ 1,77,920/- dated 19/01/2020 drawn on Punjab
National Bank, Sarain (Ex. CW1/B). The complainant presented
the cheque for realisation on 03/02/2021, but it was dishonoured
with an endorsement ‘payment stopped by drawer’ vide memo
(Ex.CW1/C). The complainant issued a legal notice (Ex.CW1/D)
asking the accused to pay the amount within 15 days of the
receipt of the notice. The notice was served upon the accused,
but the accused failed to pay the amount; hence, the complaint
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was filed before the learned Trial Court for taking action as per
law.
.
3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of
accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence
of
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded
not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4.
rt
The complainant examined Narender Kumar (CW1)
to prove its complaint.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section
313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that the complainant had advanced a
loan of ₹ 5 lakh in his favour and he had executed the necessary
documents in the complainant’s favour. He admitted that he had
issued a postdated cheque of ₹ 1,77,920 drawn on Punjab
National Bank, Sarain, Shimla, in the complainant’s favour. He
admitted that the complainant presented the cheque for
encashment, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement
‘payment stopped by the drawer’. He admitted that the
complainant had issued a legal notice to him, which was duly
served upon him, and he had not paid any money to the
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complainant. He stated that he had paid ₹ 45,000 and ₹ 1,50,000
to the complainant. He stated that the complainant had filed a
.
false complaint against him, and he was innocent. He did not
produce any evidence in defence.
6. Learned Trial Court held that taking of the loan, the
of
issuance of the cheque, its dishonour and service of the notice
upon the accused were not disputed. A cheque carried with it a
rt
presumption that it was issued in discharge of the debt/legal
liability. The accused admitted taking the loan, and he did not
produce any evidence to rebut the presumption attached to the
cheque. The complainant denied the suggestions made to him
during his cross-examination and denied suggestions do not
amount to any proof. All the ingredients of the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly
satisfied. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of
the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of
the NI Act and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment
for three months, pay a fine of ₹2,50,000/- and in default of
payment of the fine to undergo simple imprisonment for one
month.
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7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by
the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was
.
decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (I), Shimla,
District Shimla, HP (learned Appellate Court). The learned
Appellate Court held that the accused had admitted the taking of
a loan, issuance of the cheque, its dishonour and the receipt of
of
the notice. A cheque carries with it a presumption that it was
issued in discharge of debt/legal liability. The accused claimed
rt
that he had made the part payment, but this plea was not
proved. All the ingredients of the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied.
The learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused. The
sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was adequate, and
no interference was required with it. Hence, the appeal was
dismissed.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed
by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present
revision, asserting that the learned Courts below failed to
properly appreciate the material placed before them. The
complainant failed to produce the loan document to establish
the advancement of the loan of ₹ 5 lakhs. Mr Narender (CW1)
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had not produced any authority letter to establish his capacity to
depose or file the complaint. The learned Courts below had
.
wrongly invoked the presumption under Section 139 of the NI
Act. The service of notice was not proved. An excessive sentence
was imposed. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision
be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned
of
Courts below be set aside.
9.
rt
I have heard Mr Atul Sharma, Ld. counsel for the
petitioner/accused and Mr Narinder Singh Thakur, Ld. counsel
for the respondent/complainant.
10. Mr Atul Sharma, Ld. counsel for the petitioner/
accused, submitted that Narender Kumar (CW1) did not produce
any authority letter to show that the bank had authorised him to
file the complaint or depose before the Court. This plea was
taken before the Ld. appellate Court but was not considered. The
complaint was not maintainable and Ld. Courts below erred in
convicting and sentencing the accused. Therefore, he prayed
that the present petition be allowed and the judgments and
order passed by the Ld Courts below be set aside.
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11. Mr Narender Singh Thakur, Ld. counsel for the
respondent/complainant, submitted that the competence of
.
Narender Kumar (CW1) was not disputed in the cross-
examination and this plea could not have been taken for the first
time before the Ld. appellate Court. The accused admitted to the
taking of a loan, issuance of a cheque, its dishonour and the
of
receipt of the notice. Therefore, all the ingredients of the
commission of an offence punishable under section 138 of the NI
rt
Act were duly satisfied. Ld trial Court had imposed an adequate
sentence. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be
dismissed.
12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:
(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional
court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent
defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page
207-
“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at
the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent::: Downloaded on – 08/04/2026 20:35:25 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:10810findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a
detailed appreciation of the material and evidence
brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision.
against conviction is not supposed to exercise the
jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of
interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397
of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC“) vestsjurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence
or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity ofof
any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the
provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of
jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error
that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases.
rt
It is also well settled that while considering the same, the
Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the factsand evidence of the case to reverse those findings.
14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under
Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power tocall for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the
purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality andregularities of any proceeding or order made in a case.
The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect
or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which
has crept in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this
Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v.
Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687:
(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has
been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC
p. 475, paras 12-13)::: Downloaded on – 08/04/2026 20:35:25 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:10810“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the
power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as.
to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or
order made in a case. The object of this provision is
to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction
or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it
may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise
the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token
of careful consideration and appear to be in
of
accordance with law. If one looks into the various
judgments of this Court, it emerges that the
revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the
decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous,
rt
there is no compliance with the provisions of law,
the finding recorded is based on no evidence,
material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is
exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not
exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each
case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional
jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the
inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an
interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in
mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself
should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is
dealing with the question as to whether the charge has
been framed properly and in accordance with law in a
given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise
of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially
falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing
of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the
proceedings under CrPC.”
15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8
SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC
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OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the
.
absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:
“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of
Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the
revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala
v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCCof
452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of
the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court
has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)
5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can
rt
call for and examine the record of any proceedings
to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality orpropriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other
words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory
jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for
correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the saidrevisional power cannot be equated with the power
of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a
second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore,it would not be appropriate for the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence and come to itsconclusion on the same when the evidence has
already been appreciated by the Magistrate as wellas the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring
feature is brought to the notice of the High Court
which would otherwise amount to a gross
miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the
impugned judgment of the High Court from the
aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in
concluding that the High Court exceeded its
jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the
respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”
13. Another judgment which has also been referred
to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment
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of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v.
Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2
SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in
.
the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not
interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it
is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-
consideration of any relevant material, the order
cannot be set aside merely on the ground that
another view is possible. The following has been
laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)
of
“14. … Unless the order passed by the
Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the
court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-
consideration of any relevant material or there
rtis palpable misreading of records, the
Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside
the order, merely because another view is
possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to
act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of
the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the
power in the court to do justice in accordance
with the principles of criminal jurisprudence.
The revisional power of the court under
Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated
with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the
court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is
shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is
grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or
where the decision is based on no material or
where the material facts are wholly ignored or
where the judicial discretion is exercised
arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not
interfere with the decision in exercise of their
revisional jurisdiction.”
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16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh
Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ)
.
309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:
“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of
perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not forof
the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the
evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.
Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it
rt
is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional
Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed bya court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a
jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is,
therefore, in the negative.”
17. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.
Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:
“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional
jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of
perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir
Singh(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not forthe Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the
evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales
& Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008)
14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that
the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong
order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the
absence of a jurisdictional error.
28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the
absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in
the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the::: Downloaded on – 08/04/2026 20:35:25 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:10810concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions
Court.
18. The present revision has to be decided as per the
.
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
19. The accused admitted the issuance of the cheque in
his statement recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C. Thus, the
of
issuance of the cheque and the signatures on the cheque were
not disputed. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
rt
APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers
(2020) 12 SCC 724, that when the issuance of a cheque and
signature on the cheque are not disputed, a presumption would
arise that the cheque was issued in discharge of the legal
liability. It was observed: –
“9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and
considering the fact that the accused has admitted the
issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque
and that the cheque in question was issued for the secondtime after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that
even according to the accused some amount was due and
payable, there is a presumption under Section 139 of the
NI Act that there exists a legally enforceable debt or
liability. Of course, such a presumption is rebuttable.
However, to rebut the presumption, the accused was
required to lead evidence that the full amount due and
payable to the complainant had been paid. In the present
case, no such evidence has been led by the accused. The
story put forward by the accused that the cheques were
given by way of security is not believable in the absence of::: Downloaded on – 08/04/2026 20:35:25 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:10810further evidence to rebut the presumption, and more
particularly, the cheque in question was issued for the
second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured.
.
Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in
not properly appreciating and considering the
presumption in favour of the complainant that there
exists a legally enforceable debt or liability as per Section139 of the NI Act. It appears that both the learned trial
court as well as the High Court have committed an error
in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove theof
debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption
under Section 139 of the NI Act. As observed above,
Section 139 of the Act is an example of reverse onus clause
and therefore, once the issuance of the cheque has been
rt
admitted and even the signature on the cheque has been
admitted, there is always a presumption in favour of thecomplainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or
liability and thereafter, it is for the accused to rebut such
presumption by leading evidence.”
20. It was laid down in N. Vijay Kumar v. Vishwanath Rao
N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 873, wherein it was held as under:
“6. Section 118 (a) assumes that every negotiable
instrument is made or drawn for consideration, while
Section 139 creates a presumption that the holder of a
cheque has received the cheque in discharge of a debt orliability. Presumptions under both are rebuttable,
meaning they can be rebutted by the accused by raising a
probable defence.”
21. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.
Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:
“ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED,
PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI
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15. In the present case, the cheque in question has
admittedly been signed by the Respondent No. 1-Accused.
This Court is of the view that once the execution of the.
cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of
the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for
consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of
the NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the saidcheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or
liability arises against the accused. It is pertinent to
mention that observations to the contrary by a two-Judgeof
Bench in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde,
(2008) 4 SCC 54, have been set aside by a three-Judge
Bench in Rangappa (supra).
16. This Court is further of the view that by creating this
rt
presumption, the law reinforces the reliability of cheques
as a mode of payment in commercial transactions.
17. Needless to mention that the presumption
contemplated under Section 139 of the NI Act is
rebuttable. However, the initial onus of proving that thecheque is not in discharge of any debt or other liability is
on the accused/drawer of the cheque [See: Bir Singh v.
Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197].
22. Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly held that
the cheque was issued in discharge of the liability for
consideration, and the burden is upon the accused to rebut this
presumption.
23. The accused admitted to taking the loan in his
statement recorded under section 313 of the Cr.P.C. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v.
Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705: 1992 SCC
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OnLine SC 421 that the Courts can rely upon the statement of the
accused recorded under section 313 of the Cr.P.C. It was observed
.
at page 742:
“51. That brings us to the question of whether such a
statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code can
constitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is
administered to the accused, the statements made by theof
accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is why
sub-section (3) says that the accused shall not render
himself liable to punishment if he gives false answers.
Then comes sub-section (4), which reads:
rt
“313. (4) The answers given by the accused may be
taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, andput in evidence for or against him in any other
inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which
such answers may tend to show he has committed.”
Thus, the answers given by the accused in response to his
examination under Section 313 can be taken into
consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This much is
clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section.
Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4)
permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said
inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R.B. Chowdhari
(1967) 3 SCR 708: AIR 1968 SC 110: 1968 Cri LJ 95. This
Court, in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of
M.B. 1951 SCC 1060: 1953 Cri LJ 1933: AIR 1953 SC 468, held
that an answer given by an accused under Section 313
examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as
the evidence given by a prosecution witness. In Narain
Singh v. State of Punjab (1963) 3 SCR 678: (1964) 1 Cri LJ
730, this Court held that if the accused confesses to the
commission of the offence with which he is charged, the
Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to
convict him. To state the exact language in which the
three-Judge bench answered the question, it would be
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advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations at
pages 684-685:
“Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal
.
Procedure by the first sub-section, insofar as it is
material, the Court may at any stage of the enquiry
or trial and after the witnesses for the prosecution
have been examined and before the accused iscalled upon for his defence shall put questions to
the accused person for the purpose of enabling him
to explain any circumstance appearing in theof
evidence against him. Examination under Section
342 is primarily to be directed to those matters on
which evidence has been led for the prosecution to
ascertain from the accused his version or
rt
explanation, if any, of the incident which forms the
subject-matter of the charge and his defence. Bysub-section (3), the answers given by the accused
may ‘be taken into consideration’ at the enquiry or
the trial. If the accused person in his examination
under Section 342 confesses to the commission of theoffence charged against him the court may, relying
upon that confession, proceed to convict him, but if he
does not confess and in explaining circumstanceappearing in the evidence against him sets up his
own version and seeks to explain his conductpleading that he has committed no offence, the
statement of the accused can only be taken intoconsideration in its entirety.” (emphasis supplied)
Sub-section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to sub-section
(1) of Section 342 of the old Code, except that it now
stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso added
thereto clarifying that in summons cases where the
presence of the accused is dispensed with, his
examination under clause (b) may also be dispensed with.
Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old sub-
section (4), asd the present sub-section (3) corresponds
to the old sub-section (2) except for the change
necessitated on account of the abolition of the jury
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system. The present sub-section (4) with which we are
concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old sub-
section (3). Therefore, the aforestated observations apply
.
with equal force.”
24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri)
1514: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 933, that the statement made by the
of
accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used to lend credence to
the evidence led by the prosecution, but such statement cannot
rt
form the sole basis for conviction. It was observed at page 244:
27. The statement made in defence by the accused under
Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend
credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only
a part of such statement under Section 313 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure cannot be made the sole basis of his
conviction. The law on the subject is almost settled that
the statement under Section 313 CrPC of the accused caneither be relied on in whole or in part. It may also be
possible to rely on the inculpatory part of his statement ifthe exculpatory part is found to be false on the basis of
the evidence led by the prosecution. See Nishi Kant Jha v.
State of Bihar (1969) 1 SCC 347: AIR 1969 SC 422: (SCC pp.
357-58, para 23)
“23. In this case, the exculpatory part of the
statement in Exhibit 6 is not only inherently
improbable but is contradicted by the other
evidence. According to this statement, the injury
that the appellant received was caused by the
appellant’s attempt to catch hold of the hand of Lal
Mohan Sharma to prevent the attack on the victim.
This was contradicted by the statement of the
accused himself under Section 342 CrPC to the effect
that he had received the injury in a scuffle with a
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herdsman. The injury found on his body when he
was examined by the doctor on 13-10-1961,
negatives of both these versions. Neither of these
.
versions accounts for the profuse bleeding which led
to his washing his clothes and having a bath in River
Patro, the amount of bleeding and the washing of
the bloodstains being so considerable as to attract
the attention of Ram Kishore Pandey, PW 17 and
asking him about the cause thereof. The bleeding
was not a simple one as his clothes all got stained
of
with blood, as also his books, his exercise book, his
belt and his shoes. More than that, the knife which
was discovered on his person was found to have
been stained with blood according to the report of
rt
the Chemical Examiner. According to the post-
mortem report, this knife could have been the cause
of the injuries on the victim. In circumstances like
these, there being enough evidence to reject the
exculpatory part of the statement of the appellant in
Exhibit 6, the High Court had acted rightly in accepting
the inculpatory part and piercing the same with the
other evidence to come to the conclusion that the
appellant was the person responsible for the crime.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. It was laid down in Ramnaresh v. State of
Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 382: 2012 SCC
OnLine SC 213, that the statement of the accused under Section
313 Cr.P.C., in so far as it supports the prosecution’s case, can be
used against him for recording a conviction. It was observed at
page 275: –
“52. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to
put material evidence to the accused under Section 313
CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of::: Downloaded on – 08/04/2026 20:35:25 :::CIS
20
2026:HHC:10810recording a statement under this provision of the CrPC is
to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the
circumstances appearing against him as well as to put.
forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once he
does not avail this opportunity, then consequences in law
must follow. Where the accused takes benefit of this
opportunity, then his statement made under Section 313CrPC, insofar as it supports the case of the prosecution,
can be used against him for rendering a conviction. Even
under the latter, he faces the consequences in law.”
of
26. This position was reiterated in Ashok Debbarma v.
State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 417: 2014 SCC
rt
OnLine SC 199, and it was held that the statement of the accused
recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can be used to lend
corroboration to the statements of prosecution witnesses. It
was held at page 761: –
24. We are of the view that, under Section 313 statement,
if the accused admits that, from the evidence of various
witnesses, four persons sustained severe bullet injuriesby the firing by the accused and his associates, that
admission of guilt in Section 313 statement cannot be
brushed aside. This Court in State of Maharashtra v.
Sukhdev Singh [(1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705 held
that since no oath is administered to the accused, the
statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC
will not be evidence stricto sensu and the accused, of
course, shall not render himself liable to punishment
merely on the basis of answers given while he was being
examined under Section 313 CrPC. But, sub-section (4)
says that the answers given by the accused in response to
his examination under Section 313 CrPC can be taken
into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This Court
in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1951
::: Downloaded on – 08/04/2026 20:35:25 :::CIS
21
2026:HHC:10810
SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468: 1953 Cri LJ 1933 held that the
answers given by the accused under Section 313
examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as
.
the evidence given by the prosecution witness. In Narain
Singh v. State of Punjab (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730: (1963) 3 SCR
678, this Court held that when the accused confesses to
the commission of the offence with which he is charged,
the court may rely upon the confession and proceed to
convict him.
25. This Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh (2002) 10
of
SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514 held that: (SCC p. 244, para
27)
“27. The statement made in defence by the
rt accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be
taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led
by the prosecution, but only a part of such
statement under Section 313 CrPC cannot be
made the sole basis of his conviction.”
In this connection, reference may also be made to the
judgments of this Court in Devender Kumar Singla v.
Baldev Krishan Singla (2005) 9 SCC 15: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1185
and Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam (2007) 11 SCC
467: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766. The abovementioned decisions
would indicate that the statement of the accused under
Section 313 CrPC for the admission of his guilt or
confession as such cannot be made the sole basis for
finding the accused guilty, the reason being he is not
making the statement on oath, but all the same the
confession or admission of guilt can be taken as a piece of
evidence since the same lends credence to the evidence
led by the prosecution.
26. We may, however, indicate that the answers given by
the accused while examining him under Section 313, fully
corroborate the evidence of PW 10 and PW 13 and hence
the offences levelled against the appellant stand proved
and the trial court and the High Court have rightly found
him guilty for the offences under Sections 326, 436 and
302 read with Section 34 IPC.”
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22
2026:HHC:10810
27. It was submitted in the memorandum of revision
that no document was produced to show that the complainant
.
had advanced ₹5 lakhs to the accused, and Narender Kumar
(CW1) admitted in his cross-examination that the loan was not
advanced in his presence. Therefore, there was no proof of
advancing the loan. This submission will not help the accused
of
because he admitted to taking a loan in his statement recorded
under Section 313 CrPC. Therefore, the taking of the loan was
rt
never disputed and Ld. Courts below had rightly held that the
accused had failed to rebut the presumption attached to the
cheque.
28. It was submitted that the authority of Narender
Kumar (CW1) to file the complaint or make a statement before
the Court was not proved, and the complaint was not
maintainable. This submission is not acceptable. The
complainant had specifically asserted in para-1 of the complaint
that Narender Ghunta, the Branch manager, is authorised to file
the complaint on behalf of the bank. The accused filed an
application under section 145 (2) of the NI Act seeking
permission to cross-examine the complainant’s witnesses. He
mentioned in para-2 of the application that he had issued a
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23
2026:HHC:10810
blank cheque as security and paid the entire cheque amount to
the complainant. He never claimed that Narender (CW1) was not
.
authorised to file a complaint or depose on behalf of the
complainant. Narender Kumar (CW1) filed his proof affidavit
(CW 1/A) mentioning that he was authorised to file the
complaint. He was not cross-examined regarding this part of his
of
statement. Therefore, this part of the statement was accepted as
correct. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State
rt
of Uttar Pradesh Versus Nahar Singh 1998 (3) SCC 561 that where
the testimony of a witness is not challenged in the cross-
examination, the same cannot be challenged during the
arguments. This position was reiterated in Arvind Singh v. State
of Maharashtra, (2021) 11 SCC 1: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 208: 2020 SCC
OnLine SC 4, and it was held at page 34:
“58. A witness is required to be cross-examined in a
criminal trial to test his veracity; to discover who he is
and what his position in life is, or to shake his credit, by
injuring his character, although the answer to such
questions may directly or indirectly incriminate him or
may directly or indirectly expose him to a penalty or
forfeiture (Section 146 of the Evidence Act). A witness is
required to be cross-examined to bring forth
inconsistencies and discrepancies, and to prove the
untruthfulness of the witness. A-1 set up a case of his
arrest on 1-9-2014 from 18:50 hrs; therefore, it was
required for him to cross-examine the truthfulness of the::: Downloaded on – 08/04/2026 20:35:25 :::CIS
24
2026:HHC:10810prosecution witnesses with regard to that particular
aspect. The argument that the accused was shown to be
arrested around 19:00 hrs is an incorrect reading of the.
arrest form (Ex. 17). In Column 8, it has been specifically
mentioned that the accused was taken into custody on 2-
9-2014 at 14:30 hrs at Wanjri Layout, Police Station,
Kalamna. The time, i.e. 17, 10 hrs mentioned in Column 2,appears to be when A-1 was brought to the Police Station,
Lakadganj. As per the IO, A-1 was called for interrogation
as the suspicion was on an employee of Dr Chandak sinceof
the kidnapper was wearing a red colour t-shirt which was
given by Dr Chandak to his employees. A-1 travelled from
the stage of suspect to an accused only on 2-9-2014.
Since no cross-examination was conducted on any of the
rt
prosecution witnesses about the place and manner of the
arrest, the argument that the accused was arrested on 1-9-2014 at 18:50 hrs is not tenable.
59. The House of Lords, in a judgment reported as Browne
v. Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL), considered the principles of
appreciation of evidence. Lord Chancellor Herschell, heldthat it is absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a
cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness if not
speaking the truth on a particular point, direct hisattention to the fact by some questions put in cross-
examination showing that imputation is intended to bemade, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a
matter altogether unchallenged. It was held as under:
“Now, my Lords, I cannot help saying that it seems
to me to be absolutely essential to the proper
conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest
that a witness is not speaking the truth on a
particular point, to direct his attention to the fact
by some questions put in cross-examination
showing that that imputation is intended to be
made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as
a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when
it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he
might have been able to do if such questions had::: Downloaded on – 08/04/2026 20:35:25 :::CIS
25
2026:HHC:10810been put to him, the circumstances which it is
suggested indicate that the story he tells ought not
to be believed, to argue that he is a witness.
unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always
understood that if you intend to impeach a witness
you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him
an opportunity of making any explanation which isopen to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only
a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a
case, but is essential to fair play and fair dealingof
with witnesses. Sometimes reflections have been
made upon excessive cross-examination of
witnesses, and it has been complained of as undue,
but it seems to me that cross-examination of a
rt
witness which errs in the direction of excess may be
far more fair to him than to leave him withoutcross-examination, and afterwards, to suggest that
he is not a witness of truth, I mean upon a point on
which it is not otherwise perfectly clear that he has
had full notice beforehand that there is an intentionto impeach the credibility of the story which he is
telling.”
60. Lord Halsbury, in a separate but concurring opinion,
held as under:
“My Lords, with regard to the manner in which the
evidence was given in this case, I cannot too
heartily express my concurrence with the LordChancellor as to the mode in which a trial should be
conducted. To my mind, nothing would be more
absolutely unjust than not to cross-examine
witnesses upon evidence which they have given, so
as to give them notice, and to give them an
opportunity of explanation, and an opportunity
very often to defend their own character, and, not
having given them such an opportunity, to ask the
jury afterwards to disbelieve what they have said,
although not one question has been directed either::: Downloaded on – 08/04/2026 20:35:25 :::CIS
26
2026:HHC:10810to their credit or to the accuracy of the facts they
have deposed to.”
61. This Court, in a judgment reported as State of U.P. v.
.
Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561: 1998 SCC (Cri) 850, quoted
from Browne v. Dunn, (1893) 6 R 67 (HL) to hold that in the
absence of cross-examination on the explanation of
delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and
ought to have been believed by the High Court. Section
146 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-
examining the witness tendered in evidence by the
of
opposite party. This Court held as under: (State of U.P. v.
Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561: 1998 SCC (Cri) 850], SCC pp.
566-67, para 13)
rt
“13. It may be noted here that part of the statement
of PW 1 was not cross-examined by the accused. In
the absence of cross-examination on the
explanation of the delay, the evidence of PW 1
remained unchallenged and ought to have been
believed by the High Court. Section 138 of the
Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-
examining the witness tendered in evidence by the
opposite party. The scope of that provision is
enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act by
allowing a witness to be questioned:
(1) to test his veracity,
(2) to discover who he is and what his position inlife is, or
(3) to shake his credit by injuring his character,
although the answer to such questions might tend
directly or indirectly to incriminate him or might
expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose him
to a penalty or forfeiture.”
62. This Court, in a judgment reported Muddasani
Venkata Narsaiah v. Muddasani Sarojana, (2016) 12 SCC
288: (2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 268, laid down that the party is
obliged to put his case in cross-examination of witnesses
of the opposite party. The rule of putting one’s version in
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27
2026:HHC:10810
cross-examination is one of essential justice and not
merely a technical one. It was held as under: (SCC pp.
294-95, paras 15-16)
.
“15. Moreover, there was no effective cross-
examination made on the plaintiff’s witnesses with
respect to the factum of execution of the sale deed.
PW 1 and PW 2 have not been cross-examined as tothe factum of execution of the sale deed. The cross-
examination is a matter of substance, not of
procedure. One is required to put one’s own versionof
in the cross-examination of the opponent. The
effect of non-cross-examination is that the
statement of the witness has not been disputed. The
effect of not cross-examining the witnesses has
rt
been considered by this Court in Bhoju
Mandalv.Debnath Bhagat, AIR 1963 SC 1906. ThisCourt repelled a submission on the ground that the
same was not put either to the witnesses or
suggested before the courts below. A party is
required to put his version to the witness. If no suchquestions are put, the Court would presume that
the witness account has been accepted as held in
Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.
Ltd., 1957 SCC OnLine P&H 177: AIR 1958 P&H 440.
16. In Maroti Bansi Teli v. Radhabai, 1943 SCC OnLine
MP 128: AIR 1945 Nag 60, it has been laid down that the
matters sworn to by one party in the pleadings notchallenged either in pleadings or cross-examination
by another party must be accepted as fully established.
The High Court of Calcutta in A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y.
Derderian, 1960 SCC OnLine Cal 44: AIR 1961 Cal 359 has
laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in
the cross-examination of witnesses of the opposite
party. The rule of putting one’s version in cross-
examination is one of essential justice and not merely
a technical one. A Division Bench of the Nagpur High
Court, Kuwarlal Amritlal v. Rekhlal Koduram, 1949 SCC
OnLine MP 35: AIR 1950 Nag 83 has laid down that when::: Downloaded on – 08/04/2026 20:35:25 :::CIS
28
2026:HHC:10810attestation is not specifically challenged, and the
witness is not cross-examined regarding details of
attestation, it is sufficient for him to say that the.
document was attested. If the other side wants to
challenge that statement, it is their duty, quite apart
from raising it in the pleadings, to cross-examine the
witness along those lines. A Division Bench of thePatna High Court in Karnidan Sardav.Sailaja Kanta
Mitra, 1940 SCC OnLine Pat 288: AIR 1940 Pat 683 has
laid down that it cannot be too strongly emphasisedof
that the system of administration of justice allows of
cross-examination of opposite party’s witnesses for
the purpose of testing their evidence, and it must be
assumed that when the witnesses were not tested in
rt
that way, their evidence is to be ordinarily accepted. In
the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court hasgravely erred in law in reversing the findings of the
first appellate court as to the factum of execution of
the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.”
29. Therefore, it was rightly submitted on behalf of the
complainant that this plea could not have been raised before the
Ld. Appellate Court, and it is impermissible to raise this plea
before this Court as well.
30. The accused claimed in his statement recorded under
section 313 Cr.P.C. that he had paid ₹ 45,000/- and 1,50,000 to
the bank. However, no evidence was presented to prove this fact.
It was held in Sumeti Vij v. Paramount Tech Fab Industries, (2022)
15 SCC 689: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 201 that the accused has to lead
defence evidence to rebut the presumption and mere denial in
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29
2026:HHC:10810
his statement under section 313 is not sufficient to rebut the
presumption. It was observed at page 700:
.
“20. That apart, when the complainant exhibited all these
documents in support of his complaints and recorded the
statement of three witnesses in support thereof, theappellant recorded her statement under Section 313 of the
Code but failed to record evidence to disprove or rebut the
presumption in support of her defence available underof
Section 139 of the Act. The statement of the accused
recorded under Section 313 of the Code is not substantive
evidence of defence, but only an opportunity for the accused
to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the
rt
prosecution’s case against the accused. Therefore, there is no
evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheques wereissued for consideration.” (Emphasis supplied)”
31. Ld. counsel for the accused had also not suggested to
Narender Kumar (CW1) that any payment was made by the
accused to the complainant. Therefore, this plea was not
acceptable.
32. Even if the plea of the accused is accepted to be
correct, the accused had taken the loan of ₹ 5 lakh, and after
deducting the amount of ₹1,95,000, an amount of ₹ 3,05,000
remains payable and the cheque of ₹ 1,77,920, was issued in
discharge of the legal liability.
33. The accused admitted in his statement recorded
under section 313 of Cr.P.C. that the cheque was dishonoured
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30
2026:HHC:10810
with an endorsement ‘payment stopped by the drawer’. It was
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laxmi Dyechem v.
.
State of Gujarat, (2012) 13 SCC 375: (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 283: 2012
SCC OnLine SC 970 that the dishonour of a cheque on the ground
that the drawer stopped the payment will attract the provisions
of Section 138 of the NI Act. It was observed at page 388:
of
12. In Modi Cements Ltd. [(1998) 3 SCC 249: 1999 SCC (Cri)
252], a similar question had arisen for the consideration
rt
of this Court. The question was whether dishonour of a
cheque on the ground that the drawer had stopped
payment was a dishonour punishable under Section 138 ofthe Act. Relying upon two earlier decisions of this Court in
Electronics Trade & Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. v.
Indian Technologists and Engineers (Electronics) (P) Ltd.
[(1996) 2 SCC 739: 1996 SCC (Cri) 454] and K.K. Sidharthan
v. T.P. Praveena Chandran [(1996) 6 SCC 369: 1996 SCC (Cri)
1340], it was contended by the drawer of the cheque that if
the payment was stopped by the drawer, the dishonour of
the cheque could not constitute an offence under Section
138 of the Act. That contention was specifically rejected
by this Court. Not only that, the decision in Electronics
Trade & Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. [(1996) 2 SCC
739: 1996 SCC (Cri) 454] to the extent that the same held
that dishonour of the cheque by the bank after the drawer
had issued a notice to the holder not to present the same
would not constitute an offence, was overruled. This
Court observed: (Modi Cements Ltd. case [(1998) 3 SCC 249:
1999 SCC (Cri) 252], SCC pp. 257-58, paras 18 & 20)
“18. The aforesaid propositions in both these reported
judgments, in our considered view, with great respect,
are contrary to the spirit and object of Sections 138 and
139 of the Act. If we are to accept this proposition, it
will make Section 138 a dead letter, for, by giving
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31
2026:HHC:10810
instructions to the bank to stop payment immediately
after issuing a cheque against a debt or liability, the
drawer can easily get rid of the penal consequences,
.
notwithstanding the fact that a deemed offence was
committed. Further, the following observations in
para 6 in Electronics Trade & Technology Development
Corpn. Ltd. [(1996) 2 SCC 739: 1996 SCC (Cri) 454] (SCC
p. 742)
Section 138 is intended to prevent dishonesty on the
part of the drawer of a negotiable instrument to
of
draw a cheque without sufficient funds in his
account maintained by him in a bank and induce
the payee or holder in due course to act upon it.
Section 138 draws the presumption that one commits
rt
the offence if one issues the cheque dishonestly.
In our opinion, do not also lay down the law correctly.
***
20. On a careful reading of Section 138 of the Act, we
are unable to subscribe to the view that Section 138 of
the Act draws a presumption of dishonesty against the
drawer of the cheque if he without sufficient funds to
his credit in his bank account to honour the cheque
issues the same and, therefore, this amounts to an
offence under Section 138 of the Act. For the reasons
stated hereinabove, we are unable to share the views
expressed by this Court in the above two cases, and we
respectfully differ with the same regarding the
interpretation of Section 138 of the Act to the limited
extent as indicated above.” (emphasis in original)
13. We may also, at this stage, refer to the decisions of this
Court in M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P)
Ltd. [(2002) 1 SCC 234: 2002 SCC (Cri) 121], where to this
Court considering an analogous question held that even
in cases where the dishonour was on account of “stop-
payment” instructions of the drawer, a presumption
regarding the cheque being for consideration would arise
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32
2026:HHC:10810
under Section 139 of the Act. The Court observed: (SCC p.
240, para 19)
“19. Just such a contention has been negatived by this
.
Court in Modi Cements Ltd. v. Kuchil Kumar Nandi
[(1998) 3 SCC 249: 1999 SCC (Cri) 252]. It has been held
that even though the cheque is dishonoured by reason
of a ‘stop-payment’ instruction, an offence under
Section 138 could still be made out. It is held that the
presumption under Section 139 is also attracted in
such a case. The authority shows that even when the
of
cheque is dishonoured by reason of ‘stop-payment’
instructions by virtue of Section 139, the court has to
presume that the cheque was received by the holder
for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or
rt
liability. Of course, this is a rebuttable presumption.
The accused can thus show that the ‘stop-payment’
instructions were not issued because of insufficiency
or paucity of funds. If the accused shows that in his
account there were sufficient funds to clear the
amount of the cheque at the time of presentation of
the cheque for encashment at the drawer bank and
that the stop-payment notice had been issued because
of other valid reasons, including that there was no
existing debt or liability at the time of presentation of
a cheque for encashment, then offence under Section
138 would not be made out. The important thing is that
the burden of so proving would be on the accused.
Thus, a court cannot quash a complaint on this
ground.”
14. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in
Goaplast (P) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula D’Souza [(2003) 3 SCC 232:
2003 SCC (Cri) 603: 2003 Cri LJ 1723] where this Court held
that “stop-payment instructions” and consequent
dishonour of a post-dated cheque attract the provision of
Section 138. This Court observed: (SCC pp. 232g-233c)
“Chapter XVII, containing Sections 138 to 142, was
introduced in the Act by Act 66 of 1988 with the object
of inculcating faith in the efficacy of banking::: Downloaded on – 08/04/2026 20:35:25 :::CIS
33
2026:HHC:10810operations and giving credibility to negotiable
instruments in business transactions. The said
provisions were intended to discourage people from.
not honouring their commitments by way of payment
through cheques. The court should lean in favour of an
interpretation which serves the object of the statute. A
post-dated cheque will lose its credibility andacceptability if its payment can be stopped routinely. The
purpose of a post-dated cheque is to provide some
accommodation to the drawer of the cheque. Therefore, itof
is all the more necessary that the drawer of the cheque
should not be allowed to abuse the accommodation given
to him by a creditor by way of acceptance of a post-dated
cheque.
rt
In view of Section 139, it has to be presumed that a
cheque is issued in the discharge of any debt or otherliability. The presumption can be rebutted by adducing
evidence, and the burden of proof is on the person who
wants to rebut the presumption. This presumption,
coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act, leads tothe conclusion that by countermanding payment of a
post-dated cheque, a party should not be allowed to get
away from the penal provision of Section 138 of the Act. Acontrary view would render Section 138 a dead letter and
will provide a handle to persons trying to avoid paymentunder legal obligations undertaken by them through
their own acts, which, in other words, can be said to betaking advantage of one’s own wrong.” (emphasis
supplied)
34. The accused admitted in his statement recorded
under section 313 of Cr.P.C. that the notice was served upon him.
Therefore, the plea taken by him in the memorandum of
revision that no notice was served upon him is not acceptable.
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34
2026:HHC:10810
35. The accused did not claim that he had paid the
money to the complainant after the receipt of notice. Therefore,
.
the Ld. Courts below had rightly held that all the ingredients of
the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of
the NI Act were duly satisfied.
of
36. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to
undergo simple imprisonment for two months. It was laid down
rt
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar,
(2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309:
2019 SCC OnLine SC 138 that the penal provision of section 138 is
a deterrent in nature. It was observed at page 203:
“6. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiableinstruments, including cheques, and to encourage and
promote the use of negotiable instruments, including
cheques, in financial transactions. The penal provision of
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intendedto be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable
instruments such as cheques without serious intention to
honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same.”
37. Keeping in view the deterrent sentence to be
awarded, the sentence of two months cannot be said to be
excessive, and no interference is required with it.
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38. Learned Trial Court had awarded a compensation of
₹2,50,000/-. The cheque was issued on 19.01.2021. The
.
compensation was awarded on 29.09.2023 after the lapse of two
years and six months. The complainant lost money that it would
have gained by lending the money to someone. It had to engage
a counsel to prosecute the complaint filed by him. Therefore, it
of
was entitled to be compensated for its loss. It was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme
rt Court in Kalamani Tex v. P.
Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021)
2 SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 75 that the Courts should
uniformly levy a fine up to twice the cheque amount along with
simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum. It was observed at
page 291: –
19. As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf
of the respondent, we are conscious of the settled
principles that the object of Chapter XVII of NIA is notonly punitive but also compensatory and restitutive. The
provisions of NIA envision a single window for criminal
liability for the dishonour of a cheque as well as civil
liability for the realisation of the cheque amount. It is also
well settled that there needs to be a consistent approach
towards awarding compensation, and unless there exist
special circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy
fines up to twice the cheque amount along with simple
interest @ 9% p.a. [R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260,
para 20: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 79: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 520]”
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36
2026:HHC:10810
39. Therefore, the compensation of ₹2,50,000/- cannot
be said to be excessive.
.
40. No other point was urged.
41. In view of the above, the present revision fails, and it
is dismissed, and so are the pending miscellaneous applications,
of
if any.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
rt Judge
8th April, 2026
(Nikita)
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