Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 02.03.2026 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 16 March, 2026
2026:HHC:7151
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 2917 of 2025
Reserved on: 02.03.2026
Date of Decision: 16.03.2026.
Kishan Chand ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : Ms Rajni Gandhi, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 7 of 2024, dated 18.03.2024,
registered at Police Station, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P., for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 376(2) (n),
376 (3) and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (in short IPC) and
Section 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (in
short POCSO Act).
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
victim fell ill in October 2023. Her mother took her to the
hospital, where the Doctors informed her that the victim was
pregnant. The informant (victim’s mother) repeatedly asked her
about the name of the child’s father, but she did not disclose
anything. She stated that the child belonged to some unknown
Nepali. The victim subsequently revealed that Kishan Bhai (the
petitioner) had raped her 3-4 times and threatened to kill her if
the incident was narrated to anyone. She also named Chandu @
Chandermani as the person who had done a wrong act with her.
The matter was reported to the police, and the police registered
the FIR. The allegations against the petitioner are false. The
petitioner remained in custody for 1½ years. He is the sole
earner of the family. He is a resident of District Kullu, and there
is no likelihood of his jumping over the bail. The petitioner
would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may
impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be
allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the victim became ill in October 2023. The
informant took her to the hospital, where the doctor disclosed
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that the victim was pregnant. The informant asked the victim
repeatedly about the name of the child’s father, but she did not
disclose anything. The victim subsequently revealed that Kishan
Bhai (present petitioner) and Chandermani had raped her. They
had threatened to kill her in case the incident was revealed to
any person. The police registered the FIR and investigated the
matter. As per the medical examination of the victim, she was
found pregnant. The police arrested the petitioner and
Chandermani. The victim delivered a child subsequently. As per
the report of analysis, the DNA of Kishan Chand was
inconsistent with his being the biological father of the baby. The
DNA of Chandermani was consistent with his being the
biological father of the baby. The police filed the charge sheet
before the Court. The victim’s statement was recorded on
13.06.2025. The petitioner would intimidate the witnesses in
case of his release on bail. Hence, the status report.
4. The victim was informed about the pendency of the
bail petition, however, she did not appear before the Court to
contest it.
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5. I have heard Ms Rajni Gandhi, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent/State.
6. Ms Rajni Gandhi, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely
implicated. The victim had not named any person as the father
of the baby. She subsequently revealed the names of Kishan
Chand and Chandermani. The DNA analysis ruled out the
petitioner being the biological father of the baby. The petitioner
was arrested on 19.03.2024. About 2 years have lapsed, and the
trial has not concluded. The victim’s statement has been
recorded, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining
the petitioner in custody. Hence, she prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
7. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that the victim was
a minor. She had named the petitioner as her rapist. The mere
fact that the DNA analysis did not connect the petitioner to the
baby does not show that the statement of the victim was
incorrect. The offence is heinous and is punishable with life
imprisonment. The petitioner should not be released on bail
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because of the gravity of the offence and severity of the
punishment. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be
dismissed.
8. I have given considerable thought to the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records
carefully.
9. The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page
380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elabo-
rating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India in the context of personal liberty of a person under
trial, has laid down the key factors that should be consid-
ered while granting bail, which are extracted as under:
(SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is
the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of jus-
tice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Mod-
ern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
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9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the
Court considering the likelihood of the applicant inter-
fering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise
polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional
but rational, in this context, to enquire into the an-
tecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find
whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which
suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences
while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of crimi-
nological history that a thoughtless bail order has en-
abled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict fur-
ther crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion,
on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a
defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.”
(emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be ex-
tracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on
the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary
manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep
in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evi-
dence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment
which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour,
means and standing of the accused, circumstances
which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibil-
ity of securing the presence of the accused at the trial,
reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tam-
pered with, the larger interests of the public or State
and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept
in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the
legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the
court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it
(sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against
the accused and that the prosecution will be able to
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produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.”
(emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking
through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising
discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same ju-
diciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted
as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this
Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order,
but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion
in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course.
An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be
sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant
of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the
matter being dealt with by the court and facts do al-
ways vary from case to case. While placement of the
accused in the society, though it may be considered by
itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant
of bail, and the same should always be coupled with
other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The
nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations
for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime,
the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail,
though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of
the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004)
7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977 , this Court held that al-
though it is established that a court considering a bail ap-
plication cannot undertake a detailed examination of evi-
dence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the
case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie
reasons justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee,
(2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765 , this Court ob-
served that where a High Court has granted bail mechani-
cally, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-
application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held
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as under with regard to the circumstances under which an
order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the fac-
tors which ought to have guided the Court’s decision to
grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499,
para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, in-
terfere with an order passed by the High Court grant-
ing or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is
equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its
discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in com-
pliance with the basic principles laid down in a
plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is
well settled that, among other circumstances, the fac-
tors to be borne in mind while considering an appli-
cation for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reason-
able ground to believe that the accused had
committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing,
if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and
standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses
being influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being
thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis sup-
plied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC
497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge
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Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned
and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021
SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar,
2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting
bail to the accused, observed as follows: ( Brijmani
Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC
(Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of
an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time
while considering an application for bail courts can-
not lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations
against an accused and the facts that have a bearing
in the case, particularly, when the accusations may
not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are
supported by adequate material brought on record so
as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclu-
sion. While considering an application for the grant of
bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by
reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to
the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due con-
sideration must be given to facts suggestive of the na-
ture of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused,
if any, and the nature of punishment that would fol-
low a conviction vis-Ã -vis the offence(s) alleged
against an accused.” (emphasis supplied)
10. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11. The status report specifically mentions that the
victim had not named any person as the father of the baby. She
had initially claimed that some unknown Nepali was the father
of the baby. She subsequently named the petitioner and
Chandermani as the persons who had raped her. The report of
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the DNA analysis does not show that the petitioner is the father
of the baby. The fact that the victim had not named the
petitioner earlier, and the report of the analysis rules out the
petitioner being the father of the baby, will make the
petitioner’s involvement suspect.
12. The petitioner was arrested on 19.03.2024. About two
years have elapsed since his arrest. The status report mentions
that the statements of four witnesses, including the victim, have
been recorded, therefore, the petitioner is not likely to influence
the victim after his release.
13. It was submitted that the petitioner would intimidate
the witnesses if released on bail. This apprehension can be
removed by imposing conditions, and it is not sufficient to deny
bail to the petitioner.
14. The petitioner claimed that he is a resident of District
Kullu. This was not stated to be incorrect in the status report.
This means that the petitioner is not likely to abscond after his
release on bail.
15. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed,
and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, subject to his
furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety
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in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.
While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following
conditions: –
(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses,
nor will he influence any evidence in any manner
whatsoever.
(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and
every hearing and will not seek unnecessary
adjournments.
(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for
a continuous period of seven days without
furnishing the address of the intended visit to the
SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and
the Trial Court.
(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to
the Court; and
(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and
social media contact to the Police and the Court and
will abide by the summons/notices received from
the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social
Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile
number or social media accounts, the same will be
intimated to the Police/Court within five days from
the date of the change.
16. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to
file a petition for cancellation of the bail.
17. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy
of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Central Model
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Jail Kanda, District Shimla, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by
FASTER.
18. The observations made hereinabove are regarding
the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the case’s merits.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
16th March, 2026 Digitally signed
(Nikita) CHANDER by CHANDER
SHEKHAR
SHEKHAR Date: 2026.03.16
13:40:22 +0530
