Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Writ Appeal Under Clause 15 Of The … vs National Union Water Front Workers on 16 March, 2026
Date of reserved for Judgment :16.12.2025
Date of Pronouncement :16.03.2026
Date of uploading :16.03.2026
APHC010515212024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3545]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY,THE SIXTEENTH DAY OF MARCH
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
WRIT APPEAL NO: 974/2024
Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent to set aside the
impugned order of the Learned Hon'ble Single Judge made in
W.P.No.n862/2005, dt 06.09.2024, consequently direct the Respondents to
regularize the service of the Appellants herein as per the Award of
Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court made in I.D.No.37/2002,dt
14.12.2004, with all consequential benefits, and pass
Between:
1. THE AP POWER ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL WORKERS
UNION, REGD NO.H-9G, REP. BY ITS GENERAL SECRETARY,
SANAPU REDDY JAYACHANDRA REDDY, S/O LATE SANAPU
REDDY HARI NARYANA REDDY, AGED 55 YEARS, R/O
D.NO.36/208-40-5-3, REDDY COLONY, CHINNA CHOWK (POST),
KADAPA-516002.
...APPELLANT
AND
1. THE TRANSMISSION CORPORATION OF A P LIMITED, REP. BY
ITS CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, GUNADALA,
VIJAYAWADA.
2. THE CHIEF ENGINEER, TL AND SS ZONE KADAPA,
TRANSMISSION CORPORATION OF A.P LIMITED, KADAPA.
3. THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER, TL AND SS CIRCLE
KADAPA, TRANSMISSION CORPORATION OF A.P LIMITED.
2
4. THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER, TL AND SS CIRCLE
KURNOOL, TRANSMISSION CORPORATION OF A.P LIMITED,
KURNOOL.
5. THE DIVISIONAL ENGINEER, TL AND SS DIVISION KADAPA,
TRANSMISSION CORPORATION OF AP LIMITED, KADAPA.
6. THE DIVISIONAL ENGINEER, TL AND SS DIVISION
ERRAGUNTLA, TRANSMISSION CORPORATION OF A.P
LIMITED, KADAPA.
7. THE DIVISIONAL ENGINEER, TL AND SS DIVISION KURNOOL,
TRANSMISSION CORPORATION OF A.P LIMITED, KURNOOL.
8. THE DIVISIONAL ENGINEER, TL AND SS DIVISION ANANTAPUR,
TRANSMISSION CORPORATION OF A.P LIMITED, ANANTAPUR.
9. THE DIVISIONAL ENGINEER, TELECOM DIVISION KADAPA,
TRANSMISSION CORPORATION OF A.P LIMITED, KADAPA.
10. THE ADDITIONAL INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALCUM ADDLTLONAL
LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD, REP.BY PRESIDING OFFICER.
11. P NARSA REDDY, , S/O.P.KONDA REDDY, AGED ABOUT 58
YEARS, R/O.GANDHI NAGAR, BADWEL, KADAPA.
12. Y SAMBASIVA REDDY, S/O.Y.NARAYAN REDDY, AGED ABOUT
47 YEARS, R/O.D.NO.18-1-298, VENUGOPAL NAGAR,
ANANTHAPUR.
13. S V RAMANA REDDY, S/O.S.LINGA REDDY, GAED ABOUT 35
YEARS, R/O.87/515, SRINAGAR COLONY, KURNOOL.
14. K NAZEER BASHA, S/O.K.KASIM SAHEB, AGED ABOUT 53
YEARS, R/O 14/541, DASTAGIRIPET, PRADDATUR, KADAPA
DISTRICT.
15. N SRIHARI PRASAD, S/O.VISHVESWARA SASTRY, AGED
ABOUT 40 YEARS, R/O.N.P.KUNTA POST AND MANDAL,
ANANTAPUR DISTRICT.
16. M RAMA MURTHY, S/O.M.RAMA DASS, AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
R/O.4-71, M.R.D.STREET, CHENNURU, KADAPA DISTRICT.
17. M NAGA RAJU, , S/O.M.YOHAN, AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS,
R/O.LO-413/AL, SAI NAGAR, KOILAKUNTLA, KURNOOL
DISTRICT.
18. T ANAND MOHAN, S/O.T.RAGHUNATHA SATRY, AGED ABOUT
3
34 YEARS, R/O. PLOT NO.70, GURU RAGHAVENDRA NAGAR,
KURNOOL.
...RESPONDENT(S):
IA NO: 1 OF 2024
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances
stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be
pleased Pleased to set aside the order of the Learned Hon‟ble Single
Judge made in W.P.No.n862/2005, dt 06.09.2024, consequently direct the
Respondents to regularize the service of the Appellants herein as per the
Award of Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court made in I.D.No.37/2002,
dt:14.12.2004, with all consequential benefits, pending disposal of the
present Writ Appeal in the Interest of justice and pass
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. G V SHIVAJI
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. THE ADVOCATE GENERAL
2. V V SATISH
The Court made the following:
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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND
And
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
WRIT APPEAL No.974 of 2024
JUDGMENT:
(Per Hon‟ble Sri Justice A. Hari Haranadha Sarma)
Introductory:-
1. This Writ Appeal is directed against the Orders dated 06.09.2024
passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.11862 of 2005.
2. The appellant herein is the A.P. Power Engineering and Technical
Workers Union (for short “the Trade Union”). The cause of its workers
(members) for regularization was espoused by the Trade Union before the
Industrial Tribunal vide I.D.No.37 of 2002 before the Additional Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Additional Labour Court, Hyderabad (for short “the Tribunal”).
The writ petitioners are Respondent Nos.1 to 9 before the Tribunal. The
Tribunal passed the Award directing regularization of services of the
members of petitioners‟ Union from the date of respective services.
Aggrieved thereby, the respondents before the Industrial Tribunal filed the
Writ Petition No.11862 of 2005 invoking Article 226 of Constitution of India
seeking to issue a Writ of Certiorari declaring the orders passed in I.D.
No.37 of 2002, dated 14.12.2004 on the file of the Additional Industrial
Tribunal, Hyderabad published vide G.O.Rt.No.499, dated 25.02.2005 as
illegal arbitrary and without jurisdiction and to quash the same by calling for
the record and the writ petition was allowed setting aside the award passed
5
by the Industrial Tribunal. Hence, the present appeal by the Trade Union /
respondent No.2 in the Writ Petition.
The case of the Trade Union:-
3. [i] There was engagement of the workers through contractors for
operation of various sub-stations and the same was commenced by the
APSEB from the year 1990 against the regular sanctioned posts of Helpers
(later re-designated as Lineman), Watchmen and Sweepers under the guise
of a stopgap arrangement till the vacant posts are filled up as per service
rules. But it was continued for 12 years and extended to all the newly
commissioned sub-stations. Several vacancies arose time-to-time on
account of promotion, retirement, demise of regular workers, but they are
not filled up. In respect of several substations as a combination of both
regular and contract labour the agreements between the contractors and
the authorities of the respondent organization were entered ranging from
one month to one year and they are all formal for the purpose of record.
The contractors are changed from time to time but the workers are same
irrespective of the contractors through whom they are engaged.
[ii] Provisions of Section 7 and 12 of Contract Labour (R&A) Act
[for short „CLRA‟] are not complied with.
[iii] Engaging workers from the contractors claimed by the
Petitioner- organisation, viz., the writ petitioner is a mere ruse, camouflage
and a veil intended to exploit the workers and to deny various benefits
6
available to them under Labour Welfare legislations. The contractors are
mere name lenders and the workers are working under direct control and
supervision of the APSEB officials and operations are carried out by them
during the duty hours.
[iv] Log of operation book, Line clear book, Message book, Log
sheet etc., are maintained on par with the regular workers.
[v] The Power Transmission Corporation/respondent No.1 is one
of the three main wings of APSEB, which was trifurcated into three
independent companies viz., 1) A.P. Power Generation Corporation 2) A.P.
Power Transmission Corporation and 3) A.P. Power Distribution Company.
The Government of A.P. issued G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 23.09.1996 prohibiting
engagement of contract labour in APSEB in (33) categories of works, which
include Helper, Watchmen, and Sweeper. The said GO was acted upon by
the erstwhile APSEB, while regularizing the services of workmen in
prohibited categories in Generation Wing. But regularization of the services
similarly placed persons in Transmission and Distribution wings was not
done.
[vi] In fact, BPMS No.260 dated 19.12.1997 provides for
regularization of services of those engaged against prohibited categories in
APSEB. Therefore, the transmission Corporation, being successor-in-
interest to APSEB vested with the all powers and bound by the assurance
provided under BPMS No.260 but remained silent, resulting to hostile
7
discrimination to the members of the Trade Union. Some Ex. casual labour,
who worked about 60 days as Helpers were regularised while ignoring the
services of the members of the Trade Union, who are put in one to 10 years
of service at the relevant time.
[vii] The respondent Corporation is an industry. The members of
the Union are in fact workers falling under the definition of Section 2(s) of
the Industrial Disputes Act [for short „ I.D. Act‟], and entitled to the benefits
under the provisions of Section 25-F, G and H of the I.D. Act.
[viii] Earlier, the Trade Union has filed W.P.No. 8219 of 2000
seeking Writ of Mandamus to declare the action of respondents in engaging
the members of petitioners union as contract labourers as arbitrary, illegal
and unconstitutional and to regularize them as Helpers (re-designated as
Junior Lineman), Watchmen, Sweepers as the case may be. The
Honourable High Court vide orders dated 8.2.2002 disposed of the said Writ
Petition directing the Trade Union to approach the Labour Court for
redressal of grievances since the matter involves evidence etc.,
[ix] The Trade Union filed Writ Appeal and the Division Bench of
this Court disposed of the said appeal vide orders dated 23.4.2002
confirming the decision passed in the Writ Petition. Thereafter, the Union
moved an application before the Labour Court or the Industrial Dispute
Tribunal for necessary reliefs and successful but the owner of the Labour
8
Court are set aside the orders in the Writ Petition, vide W.P.No.11862 of
2005, now impugned.
[x] The workers are entitled to all the reliefs prayed for and that the
Trade Union (petitioner before the Labour Court) is entitled to represent its
members, being a Registered Union.
Case of the respondents:-
4. [i] The Trade Union has no local standi, as the same is not a
recognized Union. Only recognized Trade Unions have got the right to
represent before the Labour Court and Tribunals. So the present Trade
Union cannot espouse the cause of workmen, nor act as a bargaining unit
on behalf of the workers.
[ii] There is no privity of contract between the members of the
Trade Union and the organization and there is no master and servant
relationship or command and obedience – relationship. Therefore, the
petition must be dismissed.
[iii] Jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal cannot be made
applicable as the dispute is not raised by the individual worker nor it is a
case of workmen seeking relief in a dismissal, discharge, termination as
referred under the provisions of law.
[iv] The application before the Tribunal is not maintainable under
section10 (1) of the I.D. Act without exhausting the remedy of conciliation
and Section 10 can be invoked by the appropriate government only. The
9
Union which has espoused to the cause failed to add the contractors or
parties, who are supposed to be possession of the records and competent
to clarify any applicant as a contract labour.
[v] Even if it is assumed that the provisions of the CLRA Act 1970
applies to the members of the petitioner union. The only forum open to the
petitioner Union is to approach appropriate Government under Section 10 of
the abolition of Contract Labour, therefore, the petition is not maintainable.
[vi] Merely because the contractors have no valid license under
the Act, the members of the petitioner-union (workers) cannot act as a direct
employees of the organization. Such situation is not contemplated under the
provisions of CLRA Act. The remedy available is only penal provision.
[vii] The members of the Trade Union, even if it put in a continuous
service of 240 days, they are entitled to get compensation and nothing. The
allegation that the workers are under the direct control and supervision of
the officials of the writ petitioner-organization is not correct.
[viii] APSEB prohibited engagement of contract labour in (33)
categories under BPMS No.37 and the same is applicable to transmission
and distribution wings and restricted to 33 categories alone in A.P.
Generation Corporation. The BPMS No.260 has no application to the claim
made by the present Trade Union. The workmen under the I.D. Act and
definition under CRLA are entirely different and the provisions of Section 25
F,G and H of the I.D .Act are not applicable.
10
Findings of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal:
5. It is the contention of Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh
that erstwhile A.P. State Electricity Board (APSEB) has recognised certain
unions which have got a representative capacity. Those unions are 1) A.P.
Electricity Employees Union. 2) APSEB Employees Union 3) Telugunadu
Vidyuth Karmika Sangam. All the employees were members of these three
unions of the erstwhile APSEB and they are continuing in the respective
wings even after trifurcation into three entities. Therefore, the unrecognised
trade union cannot espouse the cause of the contract workers. The
certificate of registration of appellant‟s trade union in Form-C is filed along
with the claim petition. Recognition to the three trade unions referred to
above was granted without taking up any verification process. As there is
no law in force in the state of Andhra Pradesh to recognise trade unions and
since there is no specific law or procedure for recognition of a trade union,
there cannot be any distinction between the recognised and un-recognised
trade unions. Therefore, the objection as to locus standi of the appellant is
not tenable.
6. The objection that the conciliation process should to have been
exhausted and that the State Government should have referred the dispute
and without such reference to the appropriate tribunal or Court there cannot
be any jurisdiction is not tenable, for the reason that in the earlier writ
petition W.P.No.8219 of 2001, adjudication of the dispute by the labour court
was directed by the high court and the same was confirmed by the Common
11High Court in W.A.No.692 of 2002. Therefore, the objection as to the
maintainability of the proceedings before the Labour Court is not tenable.
7. The objection that there exists no Master and Servant relationship
between the workers and the Transmission Corporation, particularly when
they are engaged through the contractor for maintenance of operations of
various sub stations, does not merit consideration. The objection that W.W.1
has acted as a Labour Contractor cannot be regarded particularly in the
context of admission of M.W.4, who is a Divisional Engineer has
categorically admitted in the cross-examination that W.W.1 worked as a
Labourer in the contract works shown in Ex.M-16 to M-39 agreements.
Several documents disclosed, list of Contract Labourers shown in Annexure
I and II of the claim petition, vide Exs.W.1, W.3, W.4 and W.5, emanated
from the offices of the Transmission Corporation. Such lists are exhibited
by the writ petitioner in Exs.M-1 to M-5, M-7, M-8, M-9 and M-12. There are
official documents along with Log Sheets maintained by sub divisions.
There is abundant evidence both oral and documentary established the fact
that the workers of the Trade Union has been working as Contract Labour in
various divisions. In view of the evidence, the objection is not tenable
8. The objection that the contract workers are not posted in sanctioned
posts is not tenable. Ex.W3 is one of the letters where the Divisional
Engineer (operation) Rajampet wrote to the Superintendent Engineer,
Kadapa, to furnish the particulars of Contract Labourers working against
12
regular sanctioned, vacant posts pertaining to the operation division and a
list was submitted under a prescribed proforma.
9. The contractors with whom the agreements are stated to have been
entered for supply of contract workers were not holding licences as required
under Section 12 of the CRLA Act, not even a single copy of licence of any
contractor was produced by the department, on whom the burden lies to
prove that the contract labourers were secured by lawful agreements
through licensed contractors. The nature of work of the contract workers
and the regular workers union is similar and it is perennial in nature, who
control the work of the workers is demonstrated from the cross examination
of the witnesses from the department like M.W.1 etc.
10. The evidence of the other witnesses M.W.1, M.W.2, M.W.3 and
M.W.4 is also sufficient to believe the control the engagement of contract
workmen is a camouflage.
11. The objection as to maintainability of application for regularisation of
contract workers by the union is not tenable particularly in the light of
Ex.M40 a memo and that the work men are entitled for regularisation.
Findings of the learned Single Judge in the writ petition under the
impugned orders:
12. The Trade Union which espoused the cause of the workers is not a
recognised union but only a registered union. Therefore, it cannot espouse
the cause.
13
13. The writ petitioner corporation was engaging the services of
members of the union on need basis subject to availability of the work and
contractor was making the payments.
14. In W.P.No.25357 of 2013 while considering the claim of contract
labourers seeking extension of time scale on par with the regular employees
made a distinction was made between the contract labour and the casual
labour whereas the casual labour are not entitled for the same.
15. Respondent No.2 Trade union could not have approached the
tribunal for omnibus relief and tribunal also could not have passed the
orders without verifying the case of each member independently on its own
merits.
Arguments in the appeal:
For the appellant:
16. [i] Sri G.V. Shivaji, learned counsel for the appellant‟s Trade Union
would submit that the workers, members of the appellant trade union, have
been working as contract labour in the category of skilled, semi-skilled and
un-skilled basing on their qualification, with the writ petitioner corporation for
more than two and half decades. The writ petitioner is a successive entity.
As per Section 10(1) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act,
there is prohibition for engaging contract labour system in various
categories. In pursuance of the same, the scheme was introduced for
absorbing the contract labour. However, the workers engaged like helpers,
shift helpers, shift operators in the Sub Stations and Electric lines are of
14
perennial works. But, they have not been considered for regularisation,
while other contract labour are regularised.
[ii] In Writ Petition No.8219 of 2001, by considering the law laid
down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India vs.
National Union Water Front Workers1, direction was given to pursue
remedy before Labour and Industrial Tribunal. Thereupon, I.D.No.37 of
2002 was resorted to. In the said I.D., the Transmission Corporation (writ
petitioner Corporation), by I.A.No.289 of 2002, sought to decide the
maintainability of the dispute as a preliminary issue on the ground that the
appellant union is not a recognised union. The said petition was dismissed
by the Industrial Tribunal vide order dated 31.03.2003, against which
W.P.No.3880 of 2003 was filed by the writ petitioner. Vide orders dated
12.08.2003, the said writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge.
Thereupon W.A.No.1987 of 2003 was filed and the Division Bench of this
Court was pleased to allow the Writ Appeal vide order dated 19.11.2003,
setting aside the orders of the learned Single Judge passed in W.P.No.3880
of 2003 and also directing the Industrial Court to consider the objection as
to maintainability. Against which SLP (Civil) No.8736 of 2004 was preferred
by the writ petitioner and the same was dismissed by the Hon‟ble Apex
Court vide orders dated 15.07.2005 as infructuous. (It is relevant to note
that by the said date I.D.No.37 of 2002 was disposed of).
1
(2001) 7 SCC 1
15
[iii] The award passed by the Labour Court was suspended under
order in W.P.M.P.No.1551 of 2005, dated 08.06.2005. Then the wages are
not paid during the pendency of the writ petition. Hence, a miscellaneous
application was moved for payment of wages and directions was given to
pay minimum wages directly to the principals of the union bypassing the
contractors, if any. But, on review, orders are modified directing the principal
employer to ensure that contractors shall pay wages to the workmen every
month by way of crossed cheques.
[iv] The findings in the impugned orders that the Trade union is not
a recognised trade union and that the contract labour petitioners has to
raise the industrial dispute is not correct.
[v] The learned Single Judge ought to have considered that the
appellant union is a registered union. Therefore, the objection raised is not
correct.
[vi] The learned Single Judge ought to have considered that the
engagement through contractor is merely a camouflage and that the
contract labour will have to be considered as employees of the principal
employer and that they shall be directed to be regularised.
[vii] The learned Single Judge ought to have considered that the
Labour and Industrial Tribunal has properly appreciated all the aspects and
ought not to have set aside the award passed by the Labour and Industrial
Tribunal.
16
For the Respondents (Writ Petitioner’s-Transmission Corporation)
17. [i] The orders in I.D.No.37 of 2002, dated 14.12.2004 are not
sustainable in law and the maintainability of the proceedings at the instance
of an unrecognised trade union are not properly appreciated by the
Tribunal.
[ii] The learned Single Judge has properly appreciated the legal
aspects as to maintainability of the legal proceedings against the
unrecognised union and the entitlement of contract labour, particularly when
the engagement of services of the workers represented by the trade union
is need-based and not on regular basis.
[iii] The factual and legal position is properly appreciated by the
learned Single Judge. Regularisation will have a lot of effect on the service
condition and in respect of several other employees as well as the
exchequer of the department.
[iv] The Labour and Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to
interfere the regularisation issue with reference to contract labour abolition
provisions under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act.
[v] Admittedly, workers are engaged through contractors. They
can‟t claim direct engagement.
[vi] There are no grounds to interfere and the writ appeal is liable to
be dismissed.
17
18. Perused the material available on record. Thoughtful and anxious
consideration is given to the arguments advanced by both sides.
19. The points that arise for determination in this appeal are:
1) Whether the appellant trade union has locus standi to espouse
the cause of the workers, before the management, Tribunal and
Courts when it is an unrecognised trade union?
2) Whether the Labour and Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction?
3) Whether the workers listed under Annexure-I and II to the claim
statement filed by the union before the Labour Court are entitled for
regularisation?
4) Whether the impugned orders of the learned Single Judge allowing
the writ petition and setting aside the award passed by the Labour
and Industrial Tribunal in I.D.No.37 of 2002, dated 14.12.2004 are
sustainable or require any interference?
5) What is the result of the appeal?
Point No.1:
20. It is relevant to note that initially W.P.No.8219 of 2001 was filed and
orders were passed on 08.02.2002 following the judgment in Steel
Authority of India vs. National Union Water Front Workers (1 supra).
The learned Single Judge of erstwhile common High Court of Andhra
Pradesh in W.P.No.8219 of 2001 observed that the issue relating to
absorption of contract labour be adjudicated by the forum established. In
W.A.No.692 of 2002, under orders dated 23.04.2002, the Division Bench of
18
this erstwhile Common High Court of Andhra Pradesh has confirmed the
same. Then I.D.No.37 of 2002 was moved. Thereafter, an application was
moved to decide the maintainability vide I.A.No.289 of 2002 before the
Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. Orders were passed by the Tribunal
dismissing the application and upholding the maintainability, assigning
reasons that the union is a registered one. The said orders were
questioned in W.P.No.3880 of 2003 and the learned Single Judge of the
common High Court of Andhra Pradesh, vide orders dated 12.08.2003, held
that a non-recognised trade union cannot espouse the cause and that the
petition is not maintainable.
21. Questioning the same, W.A.No.1987 of 2003 was filed and the said
Writ Appeal was allowed, setting aside the orders of the learned Single
Judge. However, it was observed that the maintainability of the industrial
dispute can also be decided by the Industrial Tribunal. The same was
questioned before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) No.8736 of
2004, but the same was dismissed as infructuous. The Labour and
Industrial Tribunal has held that the proceedings are maintainable at the
instance of the claimant trade union for the following reasons:
1) There is no established process of recognition in the state of
Andhra Pradesh.
2) There is no material indicating debarring unregistered unions to
represent the cause of trade union workers, particularly when the
same are registered trade unions.
19
3) There is no material to show that whether recognition to the trade
union now litigating is denied, if so, on what basis.
22. Reliance is placed by the respondents herein viz. Transmission
Corporation for the proposition that, only a recognised trade union can
espouse the cause in Chairman, SBI and Another vs. All Orissa State
Bank Officers Association and others2. It is relevant to note that the
observations in para 14, 15 and 16 read as follows:
14. The High Court disposed of the review petition by passing the
judgment/order which has been quoted earlier.
15. With growth of industrialization in the country and progress made
in the field of trade union activities the necessity for having multiple
unions in an industry has been felt very often. Taking note of this
position power has been vested in the management to recognize one
of the trade unions for the purpose of having discussions and
negotiations in labour-related matters. This arrangement is in
recognition of the right of collective bargaining of workmen/employees
in an industry. To avoid arbitrariness, bias and favouritism in the
matter of recognition of a trade union, rules have been framed laying
down the procedure for ascertaining which of the trade unions
commands support of majority of workmen/employees. Such
procedure is for the benefit of the workmen/employees as well as the
management/employer since collective bargaining with a trade union
having the support of majority of workmen will help in maintaining
industrial peace and will help smooth functioning of the establishment.
Taking note of the possibility of multiple trade unions coming into
existence in the industry, provisions have been made in the Rules
conceding certain rights to non-recognized unions. Though such non-
2
(2002) 5 SCC 669
20
recognized unions may not have the right to participate in the process
of collective bargaining with the management/employer over issues
concerning the workmen in general, they have the right to meet and
discuss with the employer or any person appointed by him on issues
relating to grievances of any individual member regarding his service
conditions and to appear on behalf of their members in any domestic
or departmental enquiry held by the employer or before the
Conciliation Officer or Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. In essence,
the distinction between the two categories of trade unions is that while
the recognized union has the right to participate in the
discussions/negotiations regarding general issues affecting all
workmen/employees and settlement, if any, arrived at as a result of
such discussion/negotiations is binding on all workmen/employees,
whereas a non-recognized union cannot claim such a right, but it has
the right to meet and discuss with the management/employer about
the grievances of any individual member relating to his service
conditions and to represent an individual member in domestic inquiry
or departmental inquiry and proceedings before the Conciliation
Officer and adjudicator. The very fact that certain rights are vested in a
non-recognized union shows that the Trade Unions Act and the Rules
framed thereunder acknowledge the existence of a non-recognised
union. Such a union is not a superfluous entity and it has a relevance
in specific matters relating to administration of the establishment. It
follows, therefore, that the management/employer cannot outrightly
refuse to have any discussion with a non-recognized union in matters
relating to service conditions of individual members and other matters
incidental thereto. It is relevant to note here that the right of the
citizens of this country to form an association or union is recognized
under the Constitution in Article 19(1)(c). It is also to be kept in mind
that for the sake of industrial peace and proper administration of the
industry it is necessary for the management to seek cooperation of the
entire workforce. The management by its conduct should not give an
impression as if it favours a certain section of its employees to the
21
exclusion of others which, to say the least, will not be conducive to
industrial peace and smooth management. Whether negotiation
relating to a particular issue is necessary to be made with
representatives of the recognized union alone or relating to certain
matters concerning individual workmen it will be fruitful to have
discussion/negotiations with a non-recognized union of which those
individual workmen/employees are members is for the management or
its representative at the spot to decide. At the cost of repetition we
may state that it has to be kept in mind that the arrangement is
intended to help in resolving the issue raised on behalf of the workmen
and will assist the management in avoiding industrial unrest. The
management should act in a manner which helps in uniting its
workmen/employees and not give an impression of a divisive force out
to create differences and distrust amongst workmen and employees.
Judged in this light the contents of paragraph 2 of Staff Circular No. 91
of 1987 clearly give an impression that the management has decided
at the threshold before being aware of the nature of the dispute raised
that its representatives should have no discussion at all with office-
bearers of the non-recognized Association. Such a circular is not only
contrary to the express provision in Rule 24 but also runs counter to
the scheme of the Trade Unions Act and the Rules.
16. In the case of Balmer Lawrie Workers’ Union [1984 Supp SCC 663
: 1985 SCC (L&S) 331 : (1985) 2 SCR 492] this Court, reviewing the
scheme of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and
Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, traced the history of
development of trade unions on the advent of the Industrial Revolution
and the need for multiple trade unions in industries and consequential
necessity for selecting one of the trade unions as the recognised union
by the management, and also took note of the difference between the
rights and privileges of a recognized trade union and a non-recognised
trade union. In that connection, this Court made certain observations,
portions of which are extracted hereunder: (SCC pp. 670 & 672-74,
paras 12 & 15-17)
22
“12. A need was felt that where there are multiple unions
seeking to represent workmen in an undertaking or in an
industry, a concept of recognised union must be developed.
Standing Labour Committee of the Union of India at its
Twenty-ninth Session held in July 1970 addressed itself to
the question of recognition of trade union by the employer. In
fact even amongst trade union leaders there was near
unanimity that the concept of recognised union as the sole
bargaining agent must be developed in the larger interest of
industrial peace and harmony. National Commission on
Labour chaired by late Shri P.B. Gajendragadkar, former
Chief Justice of India, after unanimously and wholeheartedly
expressing itself in favour of the concept of recognised union
and it being clothed with powers of sole bargaining agent
with exclusive right to represent workmen, addressed itself
only to the question of the method of ascertaining which
amongst various rival unions must be accorded the status of
a recognised union. Planting itself firmly in favour of
democratic principle, it was agreed that the union which
represents the largest number of workmen working in the
undertaking must acquire the status as that would be in tune
with the concept of industrial democracy.
***
15. Before the introduction of Section 2-A in the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 the courts leaned in favour of the view
that individual dispute cannot be comprehended in the
expression „industrial dispute‟ as defined in the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. Any dispute not espoused by the union
for the general benefit of all workmen or a sizeable segment
of them would not be comprehended in the expression
„industrial dispute‟ was the courts’ view. Often an invidious
situation arose out of this legal conundrum. An individual
workman if punished by the employer and if he was not a
member of the recognised union, the latter was very reluctant
to espouse the cause of such stray workman and the
individual workman was without a remedy. Cases came to
light where the recognised union by devious means
compelled the workmen to be its members before it would
espouse their cause. The trade union tyranny was taken note
of by the legislature and Section 2-A was introduced in the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by which it was made distinctly
clear that the discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or
termination of service of the individual workman would be an
industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman or
any union of workman is a party to the dispute. Section 20
sub-section (2) while conferring exclusive right on the
recognised union to represent workmen in any proceeding
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 simultaneously
denying the right to be represented by any individual
workman has taken care to retain the exception as enacted
23
in Section 2-A. This legal position is reiterated in Section
20(2)(b). Therefore while interpreting Section 20(2)(b) it must
be kept in view that an individual workman, who has his
individual dispute with the employer arising out of his
dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or termination of service
will not suffer any disadvantage if any recognised union
would not espouse his case and he will be able to pursue his
remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Once this
protection is assured, let us see whether the status to
represent workmen conferred on a recognised union to the
exclusion of any individual workman or one or two workmen
and who are not members of the recognised union would
deny to such workmen the fundamental freedom guaranteed
under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c) of the Constitution.
***
16. … Conferring the status of recognised union on the union
satisfying certain prerequisites which the other union is not in
a position to satisfy does not deny the right to form
association. In fact the appellant Union has been registered
under the Trade Unions Act and the members, have formed
their association without let or hindrance by anyone. Not only
that the appellant Union can communicate with the employer,
it is not correct to say that the disinclination of the workmen
to join the recognised union violates the fundamental
freedom to form association. It is equally not correct to say
that recognition by an employer is implicit in the fundamental
freedom to form an association. Forming an association is
entirely independent and different from its recognition.
Recognition of a union confers rights, duties and obligations.
Non-conferring of such rights, duties and obligations on a
union other than the recognised union does not put it in an
inferior position nor the charge of discrimination can be
entertained. The members of a non-recognised association
can fully enjoy their fundamental freedom of speech and
expression as also to form the association.
17. The legislature has in fact taken note of the existing
phenomenon in trade unions where there would be unions
claiming to represent workmen in an undertaking or industry
other than recognised union. Section 22 of 1971 Act confers
some specific rights on such non-recognised unions, one
such being the right to meet and discuss with the employer
the grievances of individual workman. The legislature has
made a clear distinction between individual grievance of a
workman and an individual dispute affecting all or a large
number of workmen. In the case of even an Unrecognized
union, it enjoys the statutory right to meet and discuss the
grievance of individual workman with employer. It also enjoys
the statutory right to appear and participate in a domestic or
departmental enquiry in which its member is involved. This is
statutory recognition of an Unrecognized union. The
24
exclusion is partial and the embargo on such Unrecognized
union or individual workman to represent workmen is in the
large interest of industry, public interest and national interest.
Such a provision could not be said to be violative of
fundamental freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) or
19(1)(c) of the Constitution.”
23. A clear reading of entire judgment is not leading to the conclusion that
an unrecognised trade union cannot have locus standi to espouse the
cause of workers who are its members. Even otherwise, which is the
recognised trade union is not stated anywhere by the writ petitioner
corporation. What is the test for recognition and whether the appellant trade
union was put to such test of recognition and for what reasons it was
recognised are not spelt out. Therefore, the objection as to locus standi of
the appellant trade union found not convincing and the findings of the
Labour Industrial Tribunal in that regard are found convincing. The findings
of the learned Single Judge are found not sustainable. Point No.1 is
answered accordingly in favour of the appellant and against the
respondents (Writ petitioners).
Point No.2:
24. Maintainability of the proceedings before the Labour and Industrial
Tribunal for regularisation can be answered taking aid of observation in
Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. Union of India and others3. The
observations in para Nos.20 to 24 of the judgment are relevant to answer
the objection and they are as follows:
3
(2006) 12 SCC 233
25
20. The 1970 Act is a complete code by itself. It not only provides for
regulation of contract labour but also abolition thereof. Relationship
of employer and employee is essentially a question of fact.
Determination of the said question would depend upon a large
number of factors. Ordinarily, a writ court would not go into such a
question.
21. In State of Karnataka v. KGSD Canteen Employees’ Welfare
Assn. [(2006) 1 SCC 567 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 158] this Court held:
(SCC p. 584, para 43)
“43. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case as
also the principle of law enunciated in the above-referred
decisions of this Court, we are, thus, of the opinion that
recourse to writ remedy was not apposite in this case.”
22. We may reiterate that neither the Labour Court nor the writ court
could determine the question as to whether the contract labour
should be abolished or not, the same being within the exclusive
domain of the appropriate Government.
23. A decision in that behalf undoubtedly is required to be taken upon
following the procedure laid down in sub-section (1) of Section 10 of
the 1947 (sic) Act. A notification can be issued by an appropriate
Government prohibiting employment of contract labour if the factors
enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the 1970 Act are
satisfied.
24. When, however, a contention is raised that the contract entered
into by and between the management and the contractor is a sham
one, in view of the decision of this Court in Steel Authority of India
Ltd. [Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. National Union Waterfront
Workers, (2001) 7 SCC 1 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1121] an industrial
adjudicator would be entitled to determine the said issue. The
industrial adjudicator would have jurisdiction to determine the said
issue as in the event if it be held that the contract purportedly
awarded by the management in favour of the contractor was really a
26
camouflage or a sham one, the employees appointed by the
contractor would, in effect and substance, be held to be direct
employees of the management.
(emphasis added)
25. In the present case also there is vehement submission that the
engagement of the workmen through a contractor is only camouflage and
that the workmen are engaged to work under the writ petitioner institution
directly and were under direct control of the writ petitioner institution.
Hence, the proceedings in terms of the Industrial Tribunal Act before the
Labour and Industrial Tribunal are maintainable. In view of the disputed
facts as to whether the engagement through contractor is true or it is only a
fiction to avoid the application of some beneficial legislation to workers, the
jurisdiction of the Labour and Industrial Tribunal to examine the issue need
not be doubted and the objections in that regard are found untenable.
Therefore, to the extent of maintainability of Industrial Dispute, the objection
of the writ petitioner corporation is found not tenable. The point is answered
accordingly against the writ petitioner(s) and in favour of the appellant
herein. However, it is to be seen whether engaging of workmen through
contractor is a sham and for name sake and that the contractors are only
name lenders, which will be addressed infra.
Point Nos.3 and 4:
Contention of the Trade Union (Appellant):
26. [i] The contractors are mere name lenders and agents of the
department appointed for successful exploitation of the workers. There is
27
no valid contract between the contractor and the department. Therefore, the
members of the union who are the workers are deemed to be the direct
employees. The members on behalf of whom the Industrial Dispute is raised
is listed in Annexure-I and there are about „70‟. Annexure-II to the claim
petition refers to the basis on which the dispute is raised. Wages being paid
to the members of the union are mentioned in Annexure-III. As per
Annexure-II to the claim statement, as against the regular sanctioned posts
of helper (re-designated as Junior Lineman), watchman and sweeper, on
account of stop gap arrangement until the sanctioned vacant posts are filled
up, the workers are engaged through contractors. But, the same continued
for 12 years uninterruptedly. Several vacancies arise on account of
promotions, retirement and demise of the existing regular employees.
Therefore, the members of the petitioner union, the contract labour are
asked to work on par with regular employees. Contractors are changed
time to time. But, the registration process contemplated under Section „7‟ of
the CRLA Act was not done nor were licences obtained from the competent
authority as contemplated under Section 12 of the Act. There is no contract,
much less valid one, between the contractor and the department. This
contract system allegedly followed by the writ petitioner institution is a mere
ruse, camouflage, smoke screen and a veil intended to exploit the workers
from the benefit of welfare status such as Employees Provident Fund and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, Minimum Wages Act, Payment of Wages Act,
Payment of Bonus Act, Payment of Gratuity Act etc.
28
[ii] The petitioners are working under the direct control and
supervision of the respondents. Thirty-three categories of workers,
including the category of helper, watchmen and sweeper were designated
as prohibited categories vide G.O.Ms.No.41, dated 23.09.1996 and
B.P.Ms.No.260 dated 19.12.1997 for regularisation of services of those
engaged against prohibited categories in A.P.S.E.B., but the principle
remained only as a principle.
[iii] The power corporation is an Industrial establishment. The
workers squarely cover the definition of “workman” under Section 2(s) of the
Industrial Disputes Act and they are entitled to the benefit of Section 25-F,
25-G & 25-H of the I.D. Act, 1947. Therefore, the claim.
Contention of the Writ Petitioners’-Corporation:
27. [i] As per the counter of the Transmission Corporation, the
contention relevant for the present point is that the industrial Disputes Act
deals only with dismissal, discharge and termination but not absorption.
The petitioners before the Labour Court, if entitled for any relief and to raise
an industrial dispute, must exhaust the remedy of conciliation process and
only if the appropriate Government feels that there is necessity of
adjudication, then only a reference can be made under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act. The contractors to whom the workers are engaged
are not made parties, who are supposed to be in possession of the records.
The petitioner Trade Union should have approached the Conciliation Officer
for having a reference.
29
[ii] Even if the contractor has no valid licence under CRLA, the
members of the petitioner‟s Trade Union can‟t be declared as direct
employees of the corporation. The contention that after abolition of contract
labour system in the categories of helpers, watchmen and sweeper, the
workers become direct employees is not acceptable. The members of the
union working for 240 days are entitled for absorption is not supported by
any statutory provisions. Continuation of service for 240 days will enable
one to get compensation in terms of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act on
discontinuation etc. and nothing more. Allegation that, some persons are
regularised is baseless. The details in Annexure-I are self serving
statements. There is no direct control of contract labour by the officers of
the power Corporation.
[iii] B.P.Ms.No.37 and prohibition of contract labour in 33
categories is correct, but, the same is not applicable to the transmission and
distribution wings.
Discussion:
28. When the definition of “Industrial Dispute” as provided under Section
2(k) and “workman” as defined under 2(s) and “trade union” as defined
under Section 2 that a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act
vide Section 2(qq), combinedly read with the facts and circumstances of the
present case, the findings of the tribunal that the dispute is maintainable
before the tribunal are found reasonable.
30
29. For appreciating the contention as to engaging workers directly by
the Transmission Corporation or whether engaging through contractor is
whether a camouflage intended to exploit the working class, the following
aspects are relevant:
[i] There is no dispute about the persons listed in the Annexure-IV
of the claim petition working as the Contract works in the writ petitioner
Corporation, except one or two workers. Documents marked as Exs.M-1,
M-2, M-3, M-4, M-5, M-7, M-8 and M-12 testify that contract workers are
working in the various divisions.
[ii] The evidence of the workers of the appellant union, particularly
the workmen witness W.W.1 shows that he is working as Junior Lineman at
substation Maidukur joined in 1992 and there are 5,220 sub stations under
the control of divisional engineer, transmission lines sub stations at Kadapa.
He is working along with two contract workers in the sub stations, who are
also Junior Linemen. Certain memos were issued vide Ex.W1, W3, W4 and
W5 consisting of the list of Contract Labour as on 31.08.1997 of TL & SS
Division Kurnool(Ex.W1), list of contract labour working against sanctioned
posts pertaining to operation division, Rajampet(Ex.W3) particulars of
contract workers engaged in TL&SS division, Kadapa against regular
sanctioned posts(Ex.W4) and also relating to list of Contract Labour working
at various sub divisions of Telecom Division, Kadapa(Ex.W5).
[iii] Ex.W4 is another letter from Divisional Engineer, TL&SS,
Kadapa. Then, Ex.W-5 letter addressed by the Divisional Engineer,
31Telecom, APSEB, Kadapa, where it is stated that contract labours were
being engaged for cleaning works in the sub divisions.
30. There is no other material indicating that the workers whose cause is
now espoused are directly engaged by the Transmission Corporation or by
its predecessor. There may be regular posts. Whether the recruitment
process was properly taken place, how many recruitments have taken
place, whether tenders are floated for engaging the workers through
contractors are all the matters of evidence. Mere working for good length of
time by itself whether justify the claim for regularisation and all
consequential benefits like promotions and where they are to be fixed with
the other persons are all serious questions. Evidence relating to those
matters are neither placed nor taken note of by the Labour and Industrial
Tribunal. The want of licence to the contractor through whom the workers
are engaged is examined and concluded without there being any evidence
and without at least notice to the said contractors.
31. It is relevant to note that chapter „VI‟ of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 provides certain penalties for the
contravention of the provisions. Section 12 and 13 provide for licence to the
contractors and suspension/grant of licence etc. The contravention of the
provisions and penalties are contemplated under Sections 24 and 25 also.
The findings of the Labour and Industrial Tribunal without reference to these
provisions particularly in the absence of contractors that it is a mask,
camouflage etc. are found not convincing.
32
32. [i] In a similar context of engaging of workers through contractor
and when they sought benefits like annual grade increments, time scale etc.
which were refused by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal,
Hyderabad and granted by the Hon‟ble High Court, when the matter was
taken up to the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in The Municipal Council, Rep. by
its Commissioner, Nandyal Municipality, Kurnool District, A.P vs.
K. Jayaram and others etc.4 the Hon‟ble Apex Court did not consider the
same. The orders of the Tribunal are restored by setting aside the orders of
the High Court and the observation in para „10‟ of the judgment is as
follows:
10. In view of the discussions made hereinabove and for the
reasons aforesaid, the appeals are allowed. The impugned order
dated 23.08.2018 passed by the High Court is set aside and the
orders of the Tribunal stand restored.
[ii] In para No.9, the Hon‟ble Apex Court considered the aspects
relating to engagement of workers / employees through contractor, etc. The
observations in para No.9 are as follows:
9. The Court would pause here to indicate that it is not
anybody‟s case that the mode of employment through a contractor
itself was illegal or there was any illegality in the terms and
conditions of the contract so as to make it ultra vires any
constitutional provision or to make it discriminatory, and further there
has been no challenge to such contract or any of the terms
stipulated in the contract. Another issue on facts, which has been
addressed by learned counsel for the respondents is that the
respondents could not have been exploited by the parties and the4
2026 LiveLaw (SC) 38 ; Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.17711 – 17713 of 2019
33fact that they were the same persons being sent, though through
different contractors itself shows that the relationship was direct and
only a sham camouflage was created; that of a contractor being the
intermediary. To this, in our considered view, the answer may not be
in clear black and white terms and is still a grey area for the reason
that even if the respondents were the same persons who actually
worked for the appellant, there can be instances where the new
contractor, to maintain continuity and to ensure that there is no
complaint from the employer, the appellant in the present case,
continues with the same persons who were already employed and
were working with the appellant. Thus, there is argument for and
against such stand, which we will not dwell on any further. Another
issue which has been flagged by learned senior counsel for the
respondents is that the respondents being in the position they are,
and the relief given being the minimum of the time scale of the pay
attached to the regular post cannot be termed as giving them
something which was not due or something excessive, for ultimately
they also have a family to support and they are also performing the
job which is performed by people on the regular establishment. We
have absolutely no doubt in our mind that such issue raised by
learned senior counsel is of relevance, but the Court feels that the
mode of contractual employment, that too, by a contractor and not
directly by the employer will have to be seen in a different light in the
eyes of law. If all such distinctions between a regular employee and
such contractual employees is not made, then the basic concept of
hiring through various modes and in different capacity would lose its
purpose and sanctity and ultimately everybody would be getting
exactly the same benefit. This cannot be permitted in law for the
reason that employment under a State entity is a public asset and
every citizen of the country has a right to apply for it. In a regular
employment, directly made by the said State entity, there are
safeguards to ensure that the system of employment/engagement is
transparent and fulfills a minimum criteria and is open to all eligible
34persons and a mode/procedure is adopted for ultimately choosing
the right person. When employees/workmen are taken through a
contractor, it is the absolute discretion of the contractor as to whom
and through which mode he would choose such persons to be sent
to the principal. This is where the difference lies, which is a very
valid distinction in law. The reason why there are safeguards in
regular appointment is that there should not be any favoritism or
other extraneous consideration where persons, only on merit, are
recruited through a fully transparent procedure known in law. If the
persons who are employed through a contractor, and have come to
work, are given equal benefit and status as a regular employee, it
would amount to giving premium and sanction to a process which is
totally arbitrary as there is no mode prescribed in any contract as to
how the contractor would employ or choose the persons who are to
be sent, except for the basic qualification, i.e., knowledge in the field
for which they are required. The judgment/ order relied upon by
learned counsel for the appellant aptly covers the field in the present
case. The judgment cited by learned senior counsel for the
respondents is basically different on facts for the reason that there
the contractual employment was directly by the principal and in that
background contractual workers have been regularized.
[iii] The Hon‟ble Apex Court observed, in the background of the
case, that the workers have not been disengaged or returned to the
contractor and having uninterrupted service, they can be regularised.
However, it is specifically observed in the judgment that the orders are
passed in the special facts and circumstances of the case and shall not be
treated as precedent. The observations in para No.11 are as follows:
11. Having passed the order, we feel that sometimes justice is
required to be tempered with mercy as human factors cannot be
totally lost sight of. In such view of the matter, we would require the
35appellant to look into whether the jobs which were being done by
the respondents, in the background that they have not been
disengaged or returned to the contractor on the ground of being
unsatisfactory, having uninterrupted service under the appellant for
decades can be regularized on posts, which prima facie appears to
be perpetual in nature. We make it clear that this direction is limited
for the purposes of the present case only as it has been passed in
the special facts and circumstances of the present case and shall
not be treated as a precedent in any other case. We expect the
appellant to take a compassionate and sympathetic view in the
matter.
33. It is relevant to note that, in the present case, there is no material
placed indicating the direct engagement of workers by the Transmission
Corporation and it is the specific case of the trade union that the contractors
are changed from time to time, the workers are continuing, and payments
are also being paid by the contractors. Even at the writ petition stage,
interim arrangement was also made at one point of time for payment directly
through the Transmission Corporation viz. the writ petitioner. However, the
same was modified and reviewed, making it obligatory for the contractors to
pay. But, it is not out of place for us to mention that the entitlement of the
workmen for the other remedies like minimum wages, subscription to EPF
etc. guaranteed under different labour welfare legislations, shall be open
and they are entitled to pursue the same through proper legal proceedings.
34. In light of the discussion made above and in view of the observations
of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in The Municipal Council, Rep. by its
Commissioner, Nandyal Municipality, Kurnool District, A.P vs.
36
K. Jayaram and others etc. (4 supra), the claim of workers for
regularisation found not tenable and the orders of the learned Single Judge
allowing the writ petition by setting aside the award passed by the Labour
and Industrial Tribunal vide I.D.No.37 of 2002 are found sustainable and
require no interference. Consequently, the Writ Appeal is liable to be
dismissed. Point Nos.3 and 4 are answered accordingly.
Point No.5:
35. In the result the writ appal is dismissed. However, it is clarified that
the remedies for the contract workers under Minimum Wages Act,
compliance of the provisions of Minimum Wages Act, contribution to EPF,
ESI etc. shall be open and they are at liberty to prosecute the same. There
shall be no order as to costs.
36. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand
closed.
_________________________
JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND
__________________________________
JUSTICE A.HARI HARANADHA SARMA
Dated:16.03.2026
Knr
37
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND
&
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
WRIT APPEAL No.974 of 2024
Date:16.03.2026
Knr