The statement means that a notification issued by the government cannot create a new legal power unless the Act itself has already granted that power in clear terms. In other words, if the parent statute does not authorize direct cognizance, an executive notification cannot manufacture that authority by itself because delegated legislation must remain within the limits of the statute from which it derives force.
Core idea
A parent statute is the main law enacted by the legislature, while a notification is a form of subordinate or delegated legislation issued under that law to carry it out. Since the delegate has no independent legislative power, any notification must conform to the statute and cannot travel beyond it.
So when someone says “the notification could not create a power of direct cognizance where the parent statute itself did not expressly confer one,” they mean that direct cognizance is a substantive judicial power and must come from the Act itself, not from an executive instrument made under it. A rule or notification may regulate procedure or implementation, but it cannot enlarge the court’s jurisdiction or add a power the legislature never gave.
Why this matters
“Taking cognizance” is the court’s act of first taking judicial notice of an offence, and the Code/BNSS specifies who may take cognizance and in what manner. For Magistrates, the statute itself states the recognized sources of cognizance, which shows that cognizance is statute-based and not something to be expanded merely by notification.
If the statute says a court can act only on complaint, police report, commitment, sanction, or another specified trigger, then a notification cannot add one more route called “direct cognizance” unless the statute authorizes that addition. If such a notification attempts to do so, it becomes ultra vires because delegated legislation cannot override or supplement the parent Act in a way that changes substantive legal power.
Legality of statute
The legality of the parent statute is tested at a higher level because it is primary legislation enacted by the competent legislature. It can be challenged mainly on grounds such as lack of legislative competence, violation of constitutional provisions, excessive delegation, or manifest arbitrariness where applicable.
So, if the Act itself expressly grants direct cognizance to a particular court, that power exists unless the statutory provision is struck down as unconstitutional or otherwise invalid. In that situation, a notification issued under the Act may simply operationalize the already existing power, for example by appointing the court, the date, the territorial area, or the class of cases.
Legality of notification
The legality of a notification is narrower and derivative because it depends entirely on the authority conferred by the parent statute. A notification can be invalid not only for constitutional reasons, but also because it exceeds the Act, conflicts with the Act, or fails to follow procedural requirements prescribed by the Act, such as publication in the Official Gazette.
That is the key distinction: even where the parent statute is perfectly valid, a notification under it may still be invalid if it creates something the Act never permitted. Courts treat this as substantive ultra vires because the executive cannot, under the guise of implementation, alter jurisdiction, curtail rights, or create new substantive powers.
Difference table
Applied example
Suppose an Act says: “A Special Court shall try offences committed under this Act,” but it does not say that the Special Court may take direct cognizance without committal or without a complaint. In that case, a later notification saying “the Special Court may take direct cognizance” would likely be invalid because the notification is not implementing the Act; it is adding a new jurisdictional power the legislature never enacted.
By contrast, if the Act itself says “the Special Court may take direct cognizance,” then a notification appointing which court will function as that Special Court is ordinarily valid because it is merely giving effect to an authority already created by the parent statute.
In one line, the principle is this: the statute creates the power; the notification only activates or administers it. A notification cannot be used as a shortcut to confer direct cognizance when the legislature has not said so in the parent law.