Bombay High Court
Vishwas Krishnarao Gangurde vs Bank Of India And Anr on 26 February, 2026
2026:BHC-AS:9857
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 6715 OF 2021
Vishwas Krishnarao Gangurde ...Petitioners
since deceased through his legal
representatives-
1 -Smt. Madhura Vishwas Gangurde
and Ors.
V/s.
Bank of India and Anr. ...Respondents
________________
Mr. Sagar Bhirange for the Petitioners.
Mr. Sunil M. Kadam for the Respondents.
________________
CORAM: SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.
RESERVED ON: 16 FEBRUARY 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON: 26 FEBRUARY 2026
JUDGMENT:
1) By this Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, the Petitioners assail the judgment and order dated 25 February
2021 passed by the learned District Judge 1, Pune in Public Premises
Eviction Appeal No.10 of 2019. By the impugned judgment and order,
the Appeal preferred by the Petitioner has been dismissed, thereby
confirming the eviction order dated 8 July 2019 passed by the Estate
Officer. By the eviction order, Petitioner has been directed to vacate the
premises in question by handing over possession thereof to the
Respondent-Bank.
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at City Survey No. 761(old city survey no.607) Sadashiv Peth, Pune
comprising of two rooms and admeasuring 120 Sq. ft are the suit
premises. The suit premises are located in the structure owned by the
Bank of Karad. Shri. Dattatray Baburao Doiphode was the tenant in
respect of the suit premises. The Bank of Karad filed Suit No. 2914 of
1969 in the court of Small Causes, Pune, seeking eviction of Shri.
Dattatray Baburao Doiphode interalia on the ground of bonafide
requirement and for reconstruction of the structure by demolishing the
old structure. Eviction was also sought on the ground of nonpayment of
rent. The Suit came to be dismissed by judgment and decree dated 25
August 1971. The Bank of Karad filed Civil Appeal No. 954 of 1971
challenging the decree of the Trial Court. The Appeal was allowed by
the District Court by judgment and order dated 12 September 1972
directing the tenant-Shri. Dattatray Baburao Doiphode to vacate the
tenanted premises on the ground enumerated in Section 13 (1)(hh) of
the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947.
(the Bombay Rent Act). The eviction was thus ordered for bonafide and
reasonable requirement of immediate demolition of the suit structure
and for construction of the new building. Bank of Karad filed Execution
Petition No. 221 of 1973 in the court of Small Causes, Pune. However,
the Execution Petition was dismissed for failure to take steps for
execution of the possession warrant by order dated 16 March 1989.
3) According to the Petitioner, he entered into Assignment
Agreement with the original tenant-Shri. Dattatray Baburao Doiphode
on 25 August 1992 for transfer of tenancy rights along with goodwill,
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stock-in-trade and right to occupy the premises. The Petitioner claims
to be put in possession of the premises in pursuance of Assignment
Agreement dated 25 August 1992, subject to the eviction proceedings.
4) Bank of Karad Ltd. was merged/ amalgamated with Bank of India
pursuant to the amalgamation dated 6 March 1994. According to the
Petitioner, though the premises were assigned, there was no attornment
of tenancy and Petitioner did not receive any notice of change of
landlord from the Bank of India. The Respondent Bank issued notice
dated 12 June 2019 under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (PP Act)
seeking possession of the premises on the grounds of occupation by the
Petitioner, nonpayment of rent for many years and requirement of the
Bank for its own use. Petitioner sent reply dated 16 July 2019 to the
notice refuting the allegations therein. The Estate Officer of the Bank
(Respondent No. 2) proceeded to pass order dated 8 July 2019 directing
eviction of the Petitioner.
5) Aggrieved by the eviction order dated 8 July 2019, the Petitioner
filed Appeal under Section 9 of the PP Act before District Judge, Pune,
which was numbered as Public Premises Eviction Appeal No.10 of 2019.
Petitioner filed application for stay to the eviction order and the District
Court passed order of status quo on 1 March 2021, which was extended
from time to time. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed reply resisting the
application for stay. The District Court proceeded to dismiss the appeal
by judgment and order dated 25 February 2021, which is the subject
matter of challenge in the present Petition. By order dated 25 October
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2021, this court directed maintenance of status quo, which protection
has been continued from time to time and operates till date. During
pendency of the Petition, Petitioner has passed away and his legal heirs
have been brought on record. The Petition is taken up for final hearing
and disposal with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the
parties.
6) Mr. Bhirange, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners
submits that the learned District Judge has erred in dismissing the
appeal preferred by the Petitioner without appreciating the position
that the very notice issued to the Petitioner was itself in contravention
of provisions of Section 4 of the PP Act. That two out of the three
grounds for eviction enumerated therein were vague and lacked
material particulars. That ‘you are occupying the premises’ cannot be a
ground for eviction. That ‘non-payment of rent since many years’, is
again absolutely vague, lacking material particulars. That Petitioner’s
earlier tenant was unable to deposit rent on account of lack of certainty
about the exact entity to whom rent was required to be paid. He relies
upon sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the PP Act in support of his
contention that a specific notice is required to be given before
demanding the arrears of rent. That no notice was given under Section
7(3) of the PP Act before seeking eviction on the ground of non-
payment of rent. So far as the third ground of bonafide requirement is
concerned, Mr. Bhirange would submit that the issue is already settled
by decision of Suit No. 2914 of 1969. That the ground of bonafide
requirement is specifically rejected by the Small Causes Court. That
thereafter it is no longer open for the Respondent to again raise the
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ground of the bonafide requirement since the findings recorded by the
Small Causes Court would prevail over the proceedings under the PP Act
and in any case, would bind the Estate Officer.
7) Mr. Bhirange further submits that the Petitioner is a protected
tenant in respect of the suit premises and cannot be unceremoniously
thrown out by following the summary procedure under the PP Act. That
the issue of eviction of protected tenant under Section 13 of the
Bombay Rent Act has already been assailed and already adjudicated by
the rent court. That therefore the only ground for which possession can
be sought from the Petitioner is under Section 13 (1)(hh) of the Bombay
Rent Act i.e., for demolition of existing structure and for reconstruction
of any structure. That it is therefore not open to the Bank to seek
eviction contrary to the ruling given by the rent court. He relied on
judgment of the Apex court in Dr. Suhas H. Pophale V/s Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd.1 in support of his contention that protected tenant of
premises subsequently taken over by the Government cannot be evicted
under the PP Act. Mr. Bhirange however fairly invites attention of this
court to the latest judgment of the Apex court in Life Insurance
Corporation of India and Anr. V/s Vita2.
8) Mr. Bhirange further submits that the Petitioner has lawfully
purchased the entire business along with the goodwill from the original
tenant and that therefore, there is no element of subletting involved in
the present case. Mr. Bhirange further submits that the eviction order
clearly exceeds the grounds specified in notice issued under Section 4 of
1 AIR 2014 SC 1509
2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2772
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the PP Act. He submits that subletting is not the ground alleged in the
eviction notice and therefore could not have been relied on while
passing the final eviction order. In support, he has relied upon
judgment of Division Bench of Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Dr.
Yash Paul Gupta V/s Dr. S. S. Anand and Ors 3. On the above broad
submissions, Mr. Bhirange prays for setting aside the order passed by
the District Court and by the Estate Officer.
9) The Petition is opposed by Mr. Kadam, the learned counsel
appearing for the Respondent, who submits that the issue of non-
availability of protection of Rent Act in respect of premises purchased
by Government/PSU is no longer res-integra and is covered by the
judgment of the Apex Court in LIC V/s Vita (supra). He further submits
that Petitioner himself is a sublettee, who has come in possession of the
premises by means of unauthorized purchase of tenancy without the
consent of the landlord. That the Petitioner himself does not occupy the
premises and it has come in evidence that the premises are actually in
possession of one-Supriya Shreyash Kamble, who runs business under
name of M/s. Isha’s Collection. That the Respondent produced Shop Act
license of Ms. Kamble to prove her occupation at the premises. He
submits that the date of 24 June 2018 stated in the notice issued under
Section 4 of the PP Act is mere typographical error and the hearing was
actually fixed on 24 June 2019. That Petitioner himself raised this issue
while submitting its reply on 16 July 2019 and thereby participated in
the proceedings without any demur. That the hearing of the
proceedings was adjourned on two different dates and ultimately
3 AIR 1980 J&K 16
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eviction order was passed on 8 July 2019. He submits that full
opportunity was offered to the Petitioner by the Estate Officer. He
further submits that non-payment of rent in respect of the premises is
also an admitted position. That the learned District Judge has
appreciated the factual position and has accordingly dismissed the
appeal preferred by him. He submits that no interference is warranted
in the impugned order passed by the District Judge. He would pray for
dismissal of the Petition.
10) Rival contentions of the parties now fall for my
consideration.
11) Petitioner claims to be an assignee of the premises let out
by Karad Bank Ltd. to Shri. Dattatray Baburao Doiphode, who enjoyed
the status of statutory tenant. Petitioner relies upon Sale Deed dated 25
August 1992 in support of his contention that he has purchased
goodwill and stock in trade together with right to occupy the premises
from the tenant-Dattatray Baburao Doiphode. The sale deed describes
Shri. Dattatray Baburao Doiphode as tenant of Karad Bank Ltd., in
which he was running the business of Lonkar Shoe Mart. The Petitioner
claims to have purchased the goodwill in the said business -Lonkar
Shoe Mart alongwith stock-in-trade, furniture etc. The sale deed was
shown to have been executed subject to execution of the decree passed
in Suit no. 2914 of 1969. As observed earlier, the Suit was originally
dismissed by the Small Causes Court and the Appellate Court partly
decreed the same under Section 13 (1) (hh) of the Bombay Rent Act
directing the tenant to handover possession of the premises for the
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purpose of demolition of old structure and reconstruction of new
structure. Karad bank Ltd. had filed execution proceedings, which were
dismissed for failure to take steps for service of possession warrant.
This is how the tenant had continued in occupation of the premises
even after passing of the eviction decree. Petitioner claims that he has
purchased goodwill, stock-in-trade and tenancy rights in respect of the
premises from the tenant-Shri. Dattatray Baburao Doiphode. Karad
Bank Ltd. is not party to the said Sale Deed and the transaction is
apparently executed behind the back of the landlord.
12) The Respondent-Bank of India has purchased the assets and
liabilities of Bank of Karad which includes the premises of CTS No. 761
(old No. 607) Sadashiv Peth, Pune vide registered Deed dated 19
December 2006. After acquiring title in respect of structure in which the
premises are located, Respondent-Bank issued notice dated 12 June
2019 to the Petitioner, which reads thus:
NOTICE
To Vishwas Gangurde,
Shri Dhananjay Mahadeo Mule
CTS No. 761, Sadashiv Peth,
Kumthekar Road,
Pune-411030Whereas I, Rajesh Ingle, Zonal Manager and Estate Officer, Bank of India,
Pune Zone, am of opinion, on the ground specified below, that you are in
unauthorized occupation of the public premises mentioned in the Schedule
below and that you should be evicted from the said premises.
GROUNDS
1) You are occupying the premises, despite eviction decree passed against
you.
2) You have not paid rent of the premises since many years
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3) The landlord, Bank of India, requires the premises for its own use.
Now, therefore, in pursuance of sub-section (1) of section 4 of Public
Premises (Eviction of unauthorized occupants) Act 1971, I hereby call
upon you to show cause on or before 21.06.2019 why such an order of
eviction should not be made.
In pursuance of clause (b) (ii) of subsection (2) of Section 4, I also call
upon you to appear before me in person or through a duly authorized
representatives capable to answer material questions connected with the
matter along with the evidence which you intend to produce in support of
the cause shown on 24.06.2018 at 11.30 a.m. at Bank of India, Pune
Zonal Office, 1162/6, Shivajinagar, near Observatory, University Road,
Pune-411005 for personal hearing.
In case, you fail to appear on the said date and time, the case will be
decided exparte.
SCHEDULE
Shop premises situated on ground Floor at CTS No.761, Sadashiv Peth,
Kumthekar Road, Pune-411030.
Date: 12th June 2019
13) The notice issued under section 4(1) of the PP Act specified
three grounds for seeking eviction of the petitioner (i) occupation of
premises by the petitioner (ii) non-payment of rent for many years (iii)
requirement of Bank of India of the premises for its own use. Under
Section 4 of the PP Act, the Estate Officer needs to issue a notice upon
receipt of information regarding unauthorized occupation of public
premises to show cause as to why an order of eviction should not be
made. The notice must specify the ground(s) of eviction, which is
proposed to be made and must provide the opportunity to the noticee
to appear before the Estate Officer and show cause. Section 4 of the PP
Act provides thus:
4. Issue of notice to show cause against order of eviction.–
(1) If the estate officer has information that any person is in
unauthorised occupation of any public premises and that he should
be evicted, the estate officer shall issue in the manner hereinafter
provided a notice in writing within seven working days from the
date of receipt of the information regarding the unauthorised
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an order of eviction should not be made.
(1A) If the estate officer knows or has reasons to believe that any
person is in unauthorised occupation of the public premises, then,
without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), he shall
forthwith issue a notice in writing calling upon the person
concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be
made.
(1B) Any delay in issuing a notice referred to in sub-sections (1) and
(1A) shall not vitiate the proceedings under this Act.]
(2) The notice shall–
(a) specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed
to be made; and
(b) require all persons concerned, that is to say, all persons who are,
or may be, in occupation of, or claim interest in, the public
premises,–
(i) to show cause, if any, against the proposed order on or before
such date as is specified in the notice, being a date not 5[later than]
seven days from the date of issue thereof, and
(ii) to appear before the estate officer on the date specified in the
notice along with the evidence which they intend to produce in
support of the cause shown, and also for personal hearing, if such
hearing is desired.
(3) The estate officer shall cause the notice to be served by having it
affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the
public premises, and in such other manner as may be prescribed,
whereupon the notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to
all persons concerned.
14) The Notice under Section 4 was issued on 12 June 2019 and the
date of hearing was fixed as ’24 June 2018′. It is therefore contended on
behalf of the Petitioner that the Notice itself was faulty and that the
Petitioner was denied an opportunity of hearing which is mandatory
under Section 4 of the PP Act. Mr. Kadam has however clarified the
position by contending that the year ‘2018’ is indicated in the date fixed
for hearing in the notice by way of an inadvertent error and the hearing
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was actually fixed on 24 June ‘ 2019’. I am inclined to accept the
justification for variety of reasons. Firstly, Petitioner replied the notice
on 16 July 2019. He failed to raise any grievance with regard to fixation
of hearing on ‘24.06.2018’. Petitioner thus rightly understood that the
hearing was actually fixed on 24 June 2019. Far from raising any issue
relating to the date, Petitioner actually dealt with the grounds of
eviction on merits. Even in Appeal Memo filed before the District Court,
Petitioner did not raise the issue of fixation of date of hearing on 24
June 2018. It was not the case of the Petitioner either before the Estate
Officer or before the District Judge that no hearing was ever conducted
or that hearing was already conducted before the issuance of the notice.
On the contrary, the eviction order indicates that the notices were
issued to 8 different occupants in respect of 8 different premises. Except
the Petitioner, all other noticees appeared before the Estate Officer. As
observed above, Petitioner submitted his response to the show cause
notice. It appears that other occupants requested for adjournment of
hearing and accordingly two dates of hearing were fixed by the Estate
Officer. Therefore, mere inadvertent error in the year of hearing
reflected in show cause notice does not enure to the benefit of the
Petitioner.
15) The next ground urged by the Petitioner is that the show cause
notice was vague and lacked material particulars. It is contended that
the first ground for eviction of ‘occupation of premises by the
Petitioner’ cannot be ground of eviction. I am unable to agree. What is
meant in ground no. 1 is that though the tenant in respect of the
premises was Shri. Doiphode, Petitioner was found to be in occupation
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of the premises. Thus, the reason of subletting is actually reflected in
the first ground. Petitioner was required to show in authority in which
he entered into the premises and was occupying the same. The
Petitioner fully understood this ground and accordingly submitted his
response relying on Sale Deed dated 25 August 992. Petitioner thus
attempted to show the authorized nature of his possession of the
premises and it therefore cannot be contended that the first ground of
eviction reflected in the show cause notice is vague as sought to be
alleged.
16) The second ground of eviction in the show cause notice was about
non-payment of rent for many years. Mr. Bhirange fairly accepts the
position that the Petitioner or the tenant-Doiphode had not paid any
rent in respect of premises for quite some time. He however submits
that “non-payment” of rent was clearly attributable to the actions of
the earlier landlord-Karad Bank Ltd., which had gone in liquidation and
there was no certainty about the exact person/entity to whom the rent
was to be paid. He submits that “non-payment” of rent is not a
deliberate overt act on the part of the Petitioner. In my view, “non-
payment” of rent in respect of the premises is clearly fatal to the case of
the Petitioner. The eviction order records that ” they also admitted that
rent has not been paid by them after passing of eviction decree against
them”. As observed above, the eviction decree was passed by the
Appellate Court on 12 September 1972. Thus, from 1972 till passing of
Eviction Order on 8 July 2019. the rent in respect of the premises was
not paid for 47 long years. Even after alleged purchase of goodwill and
stock-in-trade by the Petitioner in 1992, no attempt was even made by
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him to pay the rent. Once the act of non-payment of rent is admitted,
Petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the ground of vagueness. The
case does not involve any dispute in respect of period of non-payment
of rent. There is therefore sufficient clarity in the ground of non-
payment of rent in the show cause notice, which cannot be termed as
vague by any stretch of imagination.
17) So far as the last ground of bonafide requirement of Bank of
India is concerned, I am unable to accept the contention raised on
behalf of the Petitioner that the finding recorded by the Small Causes
Court on the issue of bonafide requirement of Bank of Karad would
operate as res-judicata for the Estate Officer while deciding the
requirement of Bank of India. No doubt, the Small Causes Court
rejected the ground of bonafide requirement of Bank of Karad. However,
bonafide requirement is a continuous phenomenon and even if
requirement at a particular point of time is rejected, the same does not
mean that bonafide requirement can never arise again in future.
Therefore, the principle of res-judicata would not apply to a case
involving continuous injury within the meaning of Section 22 of the
Limitation Act.
18) So far as permissibility to evict a protected tenant under the
provisions of PP Act after purchase of the premises by Government /
Government organization is concerned, the issue was earlier Governed
by the judgment of the Apex Court in Dr. Suhas H. Pophale (supra).
However, the reference was made to the Larger Bench about correctness
of the ratio in Dr. Suhas H. Pophale and the reference has been
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answered by three Judge Bench decision in LIC V/s Vita (supra). The
issue before the larger bench is captured in paragraphs 1.1 to 2 and 2.1
of the judgment, which read thus:-
1.1 The referral order dated 17.03.2015, aforementioned, reads as
under,
“In these petitions, in fact, the ratio decided by the two-
Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Suhas H. Pophale vs.
Oriental Insurance Company Limited and its Estate Officer2, is
contrary to the decision of the Constitution Bench rendered in the
case of Ashoka Marketing Ltd. And Another vs. Punjab National
Bank and Ors.3. Therefore, these matters need to be heard by a
three-Judge Bench.”
Issue Under Reference :-
2. The principal question that arises for determination in this batch
of matters is whether the provisions of the PP Act 1971 would
prevail over the respective State Rent Control legislations, in
relation to premises let out prior to the commencement of the said
Act, as against the premises let out after its enforcement but before
their acquisition or transfer to the Government or any statutory
corporation, by which the character of such premises stood
transformed into “public premises” within the meaning of the Act.
2.1 In other words, the issue that falls for determination is whether,
for the purposes of application of the PP Act 1971, a valid
distinction can be made between tenants who were in occupation of
the premises prior to the enforcement of the said Act and those who
entered into occupation subsequent thereto but before such
premises were taken over by the Government or a Government
Corporation, as the case may be; and whether in such cases, the
operation of the PP Act 1971 is intended to be only prospective in
nature.
19) The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the judgment in Dr.Suhas H.
Pophale (supra) is in direct conflict with the ratio of the judgment of the
Constitution Bench in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. V/s Punjab National Bank4
and three Judge Bench decision in Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v.
Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr 5. The three Judge Bench in
4 (1990) 4 SCC 406
5 AIR 1956 SC 614
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LIC V/s Vita (supra) held that the PP Act on one hand and the Bombay
Rent Control Act, 1947, Maharashtra Rent Control Act 1999, Delhi Rent
Control Act 1958 and other similar Rent Control Legislations, on the
other hand, are special laws. It is further held that having regard to the
purpose, policy and legislative intent of the PP Act, the same would
prevail over State Rent Control Acts in respect of eviction of
unauthorized occupants of ‘Public Premises’. It is further held that the
person in unauthorized occupation of public premises cannot invoke
protection of the Rent Control Act. The conclusions drawn and answer
to the issue in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the judgment are as under:-
Conclusions
12. In view of the foregoing discussion, reasons and analysis, the
following positions of law emerges,
(a) In view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in
Ashoka Marketing and the three-Judge Bench decision in M/s. Jain
Ink, the view taken in Suhas H. Pophale which is a two-Judge Bench
decision, is palpably incorrect and unjustified. Suhas H. Pophale
cannot and does not hold the field.
(b) Since, the propositions laid down in Suhas H. Pophale runs
contrary to the decisions laid down by the Benches of larger
strength in Ashoka Marketing and M/s. Jain Ink, the same is bad in
law.
(c) The ratio decidendi by the Bench of larger strength is binding on
the Bench of the smaller strength, irrespective of the fact whether
the judgment by the Bench of the larger strength is apriori or
posterior, in point of time.
(d) A Bench of the smaller strength cannot mark a departure from
the decision of the Bench of larger strength, so as to vary the ratio
of the Bench of larger strength, in guise of explaining the decision
of the larger Bench.
(e) It was not permissible for the two- Judge Bench in Suhas H.
Pophale to interpret the statutes and lay down propositions in
conflict with what was laid down by the Constitution Bench in
Ashoka Marketing and by a three-Judge Bench in M/s. Jain Ink,
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when the set of material facts in the background of the controversy
dealt with, were similar.
(f) In laying down the propositions incongruent to and contrary to
the law laid down in Ashoka Marketing, the Bench in Suhas H.
Pophale disregarded the principle of stare decisis and violated the
well settled law of precedent.
Answers
13. As a sequitur, this Court reiterates the propositions of law laid in
Ashoka Marketing
(i) Both categories of statutes namely, the PP Act 1971 on one hand,
and the Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947, Maharashtra Rent Control
Act, 1999, Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and similar Rent Control
Legislations, on the other hand, are special laws. Therefore, in order
to determine as to which Act will apply in case of conflict, reference
has to be made to the purpose and policy underlying the two
enactments and the clear intendment conveyed by the language of
the relevant provisions therein. Keeping in view the object and
purpose underlying both the enactments, that is, the PP Act 1971
and the Rent Control Acts, the provisions of the PP Act 1971 shall
override the provisions in the Rent Control Legislations.
(ii) The PP Act 1971 and the State Rent Control Acts are special
enactments in themselves. Rule generalia specialibus non derogant
will not apply. Having regard to the purpose, policy and legislative
intent of the PP Act 1971, the same would prevail over the State
Rent Control Acts in respect of eviction of ‘unauthorised occupants’
of ‘public premises’ as defined in Section 2(g) of the Act.
(iii) The provisions of PP Act 1971, to the extent they cover the
premises falling within the ambit of Rent Control Act, override the
provisions of the Rent Control Act.
(iv) A person in unauthorised occupation of ‘Public Premises’ under
Section 2(e) of the Act cannot invoke the protection of the Rent
Control Act.
(v) In cases where the tenanted premises are claimed to be governed
by the State Rent Control Act and the same have also become ‘Public
Premises’ within the meaning in Section 2(e) of the PP Act 1971, for
their unauthorised occupation, the PP Act 1971 will have the
application.
(vi) The statutory machinery envisaged under the PP Act 1971,
could be activated for recovery of possession of public premises by
any Government or public entity mentioned in the definition.
(vii) The PP Act 1971 will apply to the tenancies which may have
been created and in existence either before coming into force of the
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Act or which may have been created subsequent to coming into the
force of the Act.
(viii) Two conditions must be satisfied for the applicability as above.
Firstly, the tenanted premises must fall within the purview of
definition under Section 2(e) of the PP Act 1971. Secondly, the
premises should have been in unauthorised occupation.
(ix) Termination of tenancy of ‘Pubic Premises’ by issuing notice
under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is one of the
modes which would render the occupation of the tenant
unauthorised, post the date specified in such notice. This would
hold true in respect of tenancies created before or after coming into
force of the PP Act 1971.
(x) Invocation and applicability of the provisions of the PP Act 1971
is not dependent upon the aspect of possession. What is material is
the occupation of the premises which has become unauthorised
occupation. The occupation is a continuous concept.
(xi) The propositions enunciated in Suhas H. Pophale, as noticed in
paragraph 3.3.6 of this judgment, do not, in our considered view,
state the correct position of law. The observations made therein,
with great respect, are not in consonance with the settled legal
principles and runs contrary to the principle of stare decisis and
stand overruled to that extent.
20) Thus, it is no more res-integra that a person in unauthorized
occupation of public premises under Section 2(e) of the PP Act cannot
invoke protection of either Bombay Rent Act or Maharashtra Rent
Control Act. Therefore, reliance by the Petitioner on the decree passed
by the Small Causes Court, as modified by the District Court, rejecting
all other grounds for eviction except Section 14(1)(hh) of the Bombay
Act is clearly misplaced.
21) The District Court has also taken note of the fact that the
Petitioner himself is no longer in occupation of the premises. Petitioner
is not the original tenant and claims to have acquired tenancy rights
along with goodwill and stock-in-trade from the original tenant. This is
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a sort of indirect subletting which this court has dealt with in Smt. Julia
Rodrigues (since deceased by her heirs and legal representatives-1(A)
Dr. Uma Pradeep Divate V/s Smt. Chandra Gulab Advani and Ors.6 In
that case, the tenant had purchased the tenancy rights alongwith
goodwill and stock-in-trade in similar fashion for running of a laundry,
whereas business of selling optical products was noticed in the suit
premises by an altogether different entity. The present case involves
similar circumstances though the issue is not about eviction of tenant
either under Bombay rent Act or under Maharashtra Rent Control Act.
In paragraph 13 of its judgment, the District Court has taken note of the
fact that one Smt. Supriya Shreyas Kamble is found to be occupying the
premises, who runs the business in the name of M/s Isha’s Collection.
As observed above, the original tenant was running the business of
selling footwear whereas an altogether different business (possibly of
ladies readymade garments) is found to be conducted in the premises
that too by a distinct person Smt. Supriya Shreyas Kamble. In paragraph
13 of the Judgment, learned District Judge has held as under:
13. The appellant in para no. 5 of his appeal mentioned that the
Estate Officer had issued a notice dated 12.06.2019 but it was
served on Mr. P. D. Kamble who is in fact not at all concerned with
suit premises as tenant. It is surprising to note that appellant
himself produced shop Act license of his snack center obtained on
23.10.1993. Thus the business which the appellant was carrying in
the suit premises was totally different than the business which Mr.
Doiphode was carrying in it. Therefore, there is no meaning in
saying that he had purchased tenancy right along with stock in
trade and goodwill of business of Mr. Doiphode. It is further
material to note that appellant himself produced zerox copy of
shop act license of firm M/s Isha’s collection issued in the name of
Supriya Shreyas Kamble. He failed to explain what concern she has
got with the suit premises. These facts and circumstances and
documents clearly show that deed of assignment of tenancy right6 Writ Petition No. 6679 of 2003 decided on 7 October 2024
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Renuka 56_wp_6715_2021 fc.odtgot executed from original tenant Mr. Doiphode is merely an eye
wash. Actually, Supriya Kamble is running business of Isha’s
collection in the suit premises. The appellant in his appeal nowhere
explained in what capacity Supriya Kamble is running her business
in that shop. Therefore there is no merit in the contention of
appellant that tenancy rights of Mr. Doiphode in respect of suit
premises was lawfully acquired by him.
22) Mr. Bhirange has sought to contend that the eviction has been
ordered on the ground which is not reflected in the show cause notice
and reliance is placed on judgment of Division Bench of Jammu and
Kashmir High Court in Dr. Yash Paul Gupta (Supra). However, perusal of
the eviction order would indicate that the same does not travel outside
the grounds specified in the show cause notice. The Estate Officer has
taken into consideration the factum of non-payment of rent and need
of the Bank for additional space. Both the grounds were reflected in
notice under Section 4 of the PP act. Therefore, it cannot be contended
that eviction is ordered on the grounds not specified in the show cause
notice.
23) Considering the overall conspectus of the case, I am of the view
that no serious error can be traced in the order passed by the District
Court dismissing the Appeal. It must also be noted that the Petitioner
has invoked jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. The jurisdiction under Article 227 is supervisory
and corrective in nature, in exercise of which, this Court need not
correct every error of law or fact. So long as this Court is satisfied with
the ultimate outcome of a case, power under Article 227 need not be
exercised merely because any error of fact or law is demonstrated in the
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order under challenge. The Apex Court in judgment of Garment Craft
V/s. Prakash Chand Goel7 has held in paragraph 15 as under:-
15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view
that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be
sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the
limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227
of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising
supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to
reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the
determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction
is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the
final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is
not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for
that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is
in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave
dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental
principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is
exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no
evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no
reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that
the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such
discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no
miscarriage of justice.
24) In the present case, this Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact
that the Petitioner has gained entry into the premises, which were
never let out to him by the erstwhile landlord-Bank of Karad. He has
secured possession under the guise of purchase of goodwill and stock-
in-trade. No rent is paid in respect of the premises since 1972, i.e., for
the last 54 long years. Petitioner/his legal heirs themselves do not run
the originally purchased business of selling footwear. The things did not
end here. Petitioners have further let out the premises to a third
person-Smt. Supriya Suresh Kamble, who runs an altogether different
business under the trade name- M/s Isha’s Collection. The case thus
involves unauthorised subletting twice. This conduct on behalf of
7 (2022) 4 SCC 181
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Petitioner otherwise does not entitle him to any relief in exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The owner of
the premises must receive the possession thereof at some point of time
and cannot haplessly watch the premises being freely passing hands
from one person to another and from one business to another. This
court is otherwise satisfied with the ultimate outcome of the
proceedings before the District Judge, which has not committed any
serious jurisdictional error while deciding the Appeal nor has recorded
any perverse findings while upholding the Eviction Order. Therefore,
order of the District Judge appears, to my mind, to be unexceptional and
the Petition is devoid of any merits. The Petition therefore must fail.
25) Resultantly, Petition fails and is dismissed without any order as
to costs.
[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]
26) After the judgment is pronounced, Mr. Bhirange, the learned
counsel appearing for the Petitioner seeks stay to the judgment for a
period of eight weeks. The request is opposed by Mr. Kadam, the
learned counsel appearing for the Respondent. Considering the
nature of findings recorded in the judgment, the request for stay to
the judgment is rejected.
[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]
Digitally
signed by
MEGHA
MEGHA SHREEDHAR
SHREEDHAR PARAB Page No.21 of 21
PARAB Date:
2026.02.26
26 February 2026
15:22:14
+0530
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