Bombay High Court
Valentine Co Operative Housing Society … vs District Deputy Registrar Co Operative … on 6 March, 2026
Author: N. J. Jamadar
Bench: N. J. Jamadar
2026:BHC-AS:11137
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Santosh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 4648 OF 2025
Valentine Cooperative Housing Society Ltd
at Tank Road, Orlem, Malad West,
Mumbai - 400064. ...Petitioner
Versus
1. District Deputy Registrar, Cooperative
Societies, Mumbai City (4)
2. Stell Mary Disoza
3. Rufas John Disoza
4. Aanasli Antoni Disoza
SANTOSH
SUBHASH 5. Tradi Konsatrans Pereira
KULKARNI
Digitally signed by
6. Lorana Fedrik Disoza
SANTOSH SUBHASH
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.03.06
20:35:24 +0530
7. Din Loid Disoza
8. Jojef Anton
9. Sabina Imyanual Disoza
10. Osmonda Disoza
11. Myron Disoza
12. Goradon Disoza
13. Crowninu Disoza
14. IMA Disoza
15. M/s. Lubin Enterprises
16. Lubin Co-operative Housing Society Ltd.
at Domnic Colony, Tank Road, Orlem Malad
West, Mumbai - 400064
17. LA Charmaine Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd.
19. Additional Collector - Mumbai
Suburban (ULC) , Government Colony,
Bandra East, Mumbai 400051 ...Respondents
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Mr. Yogendra M Kanchan, i/b YMK Legal, for the Petitioner.
Mrs. Snehal S Jadhav, AGP, for the Respondent-State.
Mr. Amardev J Uniyal, with Jinal Neghani and B.L. Mangale, for
Respondent No.16
CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.
RESERVED ON: 16th JANUARY, 2026
PRONOUNCED ON: 6th MARCH, 2026
JUDGMENT:
–
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and, with the
consent of the learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.
2. By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, the petitioner assails the legality, validity and correctness
of an order dated 27th May, 2016 passed by the Competent
Authority (R1) thereby granting a certificate of Unilateral
Deemed Conveyance in favour of respondent No.16 and the Deed
of Deemed Conveyance dated 23rd January, 2020 executed and
registered pursuant to the said order, and another order dated
14th September, 2023 thereby granting a certificate of Unilateral
Deemed Conveyance, under Section 11 of the Maharashtra
Ownership Flats (Regulation of the promotion of Construction,
Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 (“the MOFA, 1963”)
in favour of the petitioner.
3. The background facts leading to this petition can be
summarized as under:
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3.1 Respondent Nos.2 to 14 and/or their predecessor-in-title
were the owners of a larger piece and parcel of land
admeasuring 4144.10 sq. yards equivalent to 3465 sq. mtrs.
bearing Survey No.43, Hissa No.5, corresponding CTS No.201 of
village Valnai, Malad (W), Mumbai, (“the larger property”).
Respondent Nos.2 to 14 executed a Development Agreement in
respect of the larger property in favour of Respondent No.15.
3.2 Respondent No.15 proposed to construct two buildings on
the larger property. Building No.1 “Lubin” was constructed by
respondent No.15, in two wings, comprising of 30 flats on
ground plus four floors. Building No.2 “Valentine” was
constructed by respondent No.15. Eventually, the owners of the
apartments in building No.1 formed Lubin Co-operative Housing
Society (R16) and the owners of the apartments in building No.2
formed Valentine Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., the
petitioner.
3.3 The petitioner asserts, the built up area of building No.1
“Lubin” is 1482.13 sq. mtrs. and build up area of building No.2
“Valentine” is 970.12 sq. mtrs. as per the sanctioned building
plan.
3.4 Respondent No.16 filed an application for grant of a
certificate of Unilateral Deemed Conveyance, being Application
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No.169/2014, before the Competent Authority (R1). The
petitioner was impleaded as a party opponent (No.10) to the said
application. By an order dated 27 th May, 2016, repelling the
objections of the petitioner – opponent No.10 therein, the
Competent Authority was persuaded to issue a certificate of
entitlement for Unilateral Conveyance of the land admeasuring
1500.14 sq. mtrs. out of new CTS No.201/A, admeasuring
2319.4 sq. mtrs. as per the physical survey conducted, and
certificate issued, by the Architect DARV.
3.5 Pursuant to the aforesaid certificate, a Deed of Unilateral
Deemed Conveyance came to be executed in favour of
respondent No.16 Society, on 23rd January, 2020.
3.6 In the intervening period, the petitioner preferred an
application for grant of a certificate of entitlement for Unilateral
Deemed Conveyance seeking conveyance of an area of land
admeasuring 917.56 sq. mtrs. out of CTS No.201/A and
undivided rights in 9.15 sq. mtrs. wide right of way area
admeasuring 141.59 sq. mtrs. out of Survey No.206/D, in terms
of the Architect’s Certificate.
3.7 By an order dated 14th September, 2023, the Competent
Authority (R1) rejected the claim of the petitioner in regard to
the land bearing Survey No.206/D, finding the same completely
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ill-founded. Noting that in respect of CTS No.201/A, out of total
area of 2319.4 sq. mtrs., a certificate of Unilateral Deemed
Conveyance had already been granted in favour of respondent
No.16 – opponent No.15 therein, for an area admeasuring
1500.14 sq. mtrs, the Competent Authority granted a certificate
of entitlement for Deemed Conveyance in respect of the land
admeasuring 819.26 sq. mtrs., only.
3.8 It appears that respondent No.16 initiated the process of
redevelopment. Taking umbrage, the petitioner invoked the writ
jurisdiction asserting, inter alia, that respondent No.16 is in the
process of appointing a developer for redevelopment of its
property in terms of the Deed of Conveyance dated 23rd January,
2020 and, in that event, the petitioner would suffer great
hardship, loss and damage as the petitioner would ultimately
get lesser area of land than its entitlement.
3.9 The core contention of the petitioner is that, despite the
built up area of building No.1 “Lubin” being 1482.13 sq. mtrs.,
as per the sanctioned building plan, the Competent Authority
(R1) has granted a certificate of Unilateral Deemed Conveyance
for land admeasuring 1500.14 sq. mtrs., to the prejudice of the
rights of the petitioner. Hence this petition challenging both the
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orders granting certificate of Unilateral Deemed Conveyance in
favour of respondent No.16 and the petitioner.
4. An affidavit-in-reply has been filed on behalf of respondent
No.16. At the outset, the tenability of the petition is questioned
on the ground of delay and laches as the order of grant of
certificate of Unilateral Deemed Conveyance in favour of
respondent No.16 was passed on 26th May, 2016 and the
petitioner, despite being a party to the said proceeding and
having contested the same, has assailed the said order after
nine years and there is no explanation whatsoever to account
for such an inordinate delay. Secondly, the petition was stated
to be malafide as the petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction
only after respondent No.16 initiated the process to appoint a
developer to redevelop its property. The petition is driven by a
devious design to derail the redevelopment of respondent No.16
Society.
5. On the merits of the matter, it was contended that, in the
instant petition, the petitioner has endeavoured to raise the
grounds which were not at all taken before the Competent
Authority. In any event, the reliance on the Government
Resolution dated 22nd June, 2018 is misconceived as the said
Government Resolution has no application to the case of
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respondent No.16 as the certificate of Unilateral Deemed
Conveyance was issued much prior to the issuance of the said
Government Resolution. Even otherwise, in terms of the said
Government Resolution, while granting Deemed Conveyance in
respect of a building in the layout where the TDR has been
utilized, the conveyance should be granted according to the
plinth and appurtenant area. In the case at hand, 350 sq. mtrs.
of TDR is loaded on the petitioner Society’s building. Thus,
there is no infirmity in any of the impugned orders. Respondent
No.16, thus, prayed for dismissal of the petition with exemplary
costs as the petition has been filed with malafide intent.
6. In the wake of the aforesaid pleadings and the material on
record, I have heard Mr. Yogendra Kanchan, the learned
Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Amardev Uniyal, the learned
Counsel for respondent No.16, and Smt. Sneahl Jadhav, the
learned AGP for the State, at some length.
7. Mr. Kanchan, the learned Counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the grant of Deemed Conveyance in favour of
respondent No.16 in respect of an area admeasuring 1500.14 sq.
mtrs. is against the weight of the material on record. Mr.
Kanchan would urge in the initial plan sanctioned in the year
1987 the built up area of building No.1 was shown 1500.14 sq.
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mtrs. However, the said plan came to be subsequently revised
in the year 2000 and the built up area of building No.1 was
shown 1482.13 sq. mtrs. only. Yet, the Competent Authority
proceeded to grant a certificate of Unilateral Deemed
Conveyance in favour of respondent No.16 on the basis of the
Architect’s Certificate which is patently incorrect. Secondly, in
view of the Government Resolution dated 22 nd June, 2018, the
Competent Authority was enjoined to grant a certificate of
Unilateral Deemed Conveyance in favour of the petitioner in
respect of 970.12 sq. mtrs. on the basis of the built up area
consumed by the Valentine. Despite the patent error having
been pointed out to the Competent Authority, the latter
proceeded to grant a certificate of Unilateral Deemed
Conveyance in respect of an area admeasuring 819.26 sq. mtrs.
only.
8. Mr. Kanchan submitted that the adherence to the
guidelines in the Government Resolution dated 27 th June, 2018,
is peremptory. Reliance was placed on a judgment of this Court
in the case of Rai Residency Pvt. Ltd. vs. Competent Authority
and District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies and ors1.
1 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 3591.
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9. Per contra, Mr. Uniyal, the learned Counsel for respondent
No.16, stoutly submitted that the petition does not deserve to be
entertained on the count of laches and malafide. Taking the
Court through the averments in the petition, especially
paragraphs 9(m) and (n) and paragraph 15, Mr. Uniyal would
urge that the petitioner has been filed with an express assertion
that after respondent No.16 commenced the process of
redevelopment and appointment of a developer, the petitioner
professed to assail the order granting the certificate of Unilateral
Deemed Conveyance in favour of respondent No.16 passed prior
to nine years. The contention in the petition that the petitioner
did not challenge the order dated 27 th May, 2016 on account of
the legal advice then tendered is a subterfuge. There is no
explanation for the huge and inordinate delay. Thus, the petition
deserves to be dismissed in limine. Reliance was placed by Mr.
Uniyal on an order passed by this Court in Jaydeep Developers
vs. Competent Authority and District Deputy Registrar, Co-
operative Societies and ors.2, wherein this Court had declined to
entertain the challenge to an order of Deemed Conveyance,
which was passed on 21st March, 2017.
2 WP/723/2025 dtd.20/3/2025.
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10. Inviting the attention of the Court to the grounds on which
the petitioner had resisted the grant certificate of Unilateral
Deemed Conveyance in Application No.169 of 2014, Mr. Uniyal
would urge that the grounds now sought to be urged were never
taken before the Competent Authority.
11. At the outset, it is necessary to note that the petitioner
was a party to Application No.169/2014 and did contest the
same. The order of Deemed Conveyance dated 27th May, 2016
passed therein was admittedly not assailed by the petitioner
either by instituting the petition before this Court or by filing a
suit, till the petitioner preferred an application for Deemed
Conveyance in the year 2023. A period of more than seven
years elapsed between the date of the granting certificate of
entitlement for Unilateral Deemed Conveyance and the filing of
the application before the Competent Authority by the petitioner.
The said Application No.66/2023 filed by the petitioner was
allowed by the Competent Authority on 14th September, 2023.
Yet, the instant petition came to be filed before this Court in the
month of February, 2025, assailing both the orders. There is
indeed delay in assailing the order granting a certificate of
Unilateral Deemed Conveyance in favour of respondent No.16.
By any standard, the delay of nine years is inordinate.
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12. It is trite the exercise of writ jurisdiction is discretionary.
Though there is no prescribed period of limitation for filing a
writ petition, if the petition suffers from delay and laches and no
explanation is forthcoming, the Writ Court would be justified in
declining to entertain the petition. A party who seeks relief from
the Writ Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction is
expected to approach the Court with reasonable dispatch.
Undoubtedly, the reasonableness of time is a relative concept
and hinges upon the facts and circumstances of the given case
and the explanation offered for not approaching the Court at an
earlier point in time.
13. A Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme court in the case of
Chairman/Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation
Limited and others vs. Ram Gopal3 enunciated the principle as
under:
“11. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to
proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of
India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an
unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained
delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ
actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in
exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who
have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence-
sitters cannot be allowed to barge into courts and cry for their
rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be
treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it
has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time
within which writ remedies can be enforced. In SS Balu v. State
of Kerala (2009) 2 SCC 479, this Court observed thus:
3 (2021) 13 Supreme Court Cases 225.
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“17. It is also well-settled principle of law that “delay
defeats equity”. …. It is now a trite law that where the
writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long
delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the
ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that
they are similarly situated to the other candidates who
obtain the benefit of the judgment.”
(emphasis supplied)”
14. In the case of Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and
others4, the Supreme Court delineated the approach to be
adopted by the Writ Court when its jurisdiction is invoked
belatedly. The observations in paragraphs 9 to 11 read as
under:
“9. ……. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or
in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of
time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted
the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and
again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one
of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court
while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may
refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of
the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action
to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle
the lapsed cause of action.
10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and
caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the
writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of
the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the
contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be
condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise
to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all
depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot
be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical
precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ
court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain
in which the facts have travelled.
11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed
period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to4 (2024) 15 SCC 215.
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be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been
invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the
dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has
had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of
delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the
applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ
petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to
dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as
the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent
litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there
cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will
have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and
latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court.
This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v.
State of W.B and others., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the
following effect:
“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no
doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental
right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction
under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution,
this Court takes into account certain factors and one of
such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the
applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled
that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the
grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the
Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and
laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a
writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest
reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in
making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground
for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction.
The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage
agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have
already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of
third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of
M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR
261] , Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [AIR 1967 SC
1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC
136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969] ). This
principle applies even in case of an infringement of
fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B.
Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110] , Durga Prashad v. Chief
Controller of Imports & Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and
Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84] ).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as
to when a person can approach a court. The question is
one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of
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case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of
fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when
and how the delay arose.”
15. In the case of Rikhab Chand Jain vs. Union of India and
others5, the Supreme Court exposited as to what would
constitute reasonable period, especially when there is an
alternate remedy which is required to be exhausted within a
prescribed period of limitation. The observations in paragraph
13 read as under:
“13. Although there is no period of limitation for invoking the
writ jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226, all that the
courts insist is invocation of its jurisdiction with utmost
expedition and, at any rate, within a “reasonable period”. What
would constitute “reasonable period” cannot be put in a
straight-jacket, and it must invariably depend on the facts and
circumstances of each particular case. Nonetheless, the period
of limitation prescribed by an enactment for availing the
alternative remedy provided thereunder in certain cases does
provide indication as to what should be the “reasonable period”
within which the writ jurisdiction has to be invoked.”
16. The decision in the case of Rikhab Chand Jain (supra)
assumes importance in the facts of the case as pursuant to the
grant of a certificate of Unilateral Deemed Conveyance, the Deed
of Conveyance came to be executed and registered in favour of
respondent No.16, on 23rd January, 2020. If the petitioner was
to assail the legality and validity of the order granting certificate
of Unilateral Deemed Conveyance dated 27 th May, 2016 and
5 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2510.
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Deed of Conveyance dated 23rd January, 2020, before the Civil
Court, the period of limitation would be three years from the
date the right to sue first accrued.
17. In the light of the aforesaid enunciation of law reverting to
the facts of the case, I find substance in the submission of Mr.
Uniyal that no reasonable explanation has been furnished for
the inordinate delay. A bald assertion that, due to legal advice
that the petitioner should apply for grant of Deemed Conveyance
separately, the petitioner did not challenge the impugned order
dated 27th May, 2016 passed in Application No.169/2014, is
unworthy of countenance. It is imperative to note that, even the
application for grant of certificate of Deemed Conveyance was
filed by the petitioner after a period of seven years from the said
order dated 27th May, 2016.
18. The situation which, thus, obtains is that there has been
huge and inordinate delay in assailing the order dated 27 th May,
2016 and the explanation sought to be offered for the delay is
plainly unworthy of credence. Writ Court is required to weigh
the explanation offered to account for the acceptability of the
same. In exercise of extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction,
such inordinate and unexplained delay cannot be lightly
brushed aside to the prejudice of the parties, who have altered
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their position on the premise of the finality of the order passed
by the Competent Court/Tribunal.
19. I am, thus, inclined to hold that, on the ground of delay
and laches itself, the petition does not deserve to be entertained.
20. Even on the merits of the matter, this Court does not find
any justifiable reason to entertain the petition. A useful
reference, in this context, can be made to the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Arunkumar H. Shah HUF Vs Avon
Arcade Premises Co-op. Society Ltd6, wherein the nature of the
jurisdiction exercised by the Competent Authority and the
approach expected of the High Court while testing the legality,
validity and correctness of such order was enunciated as under:
“37. Our conclusions on the interpretation of sub-sections
(4) and (5) of Section 11 of the MOFA are as under:
…..
ii. The competent authority, while following the
summary procedure, cannot conclusively and finally decide
the question of title. Therefore, notwithstanding the order
under sub-section (4) of Section 11, the aggrieved parties can
always maintain a civil suit for establishing their rights;
iii. The provisions of Section 11 are for the benefit of the
flat purchasers. In writ jurisdiction, the Court should not
interfere with the order granting deemed conveyance unless
the same is manifestly illegal. The writ court should generally
be show in interfering with such orders. The reason is that,
notwithstanding the order under Section 11(4), the remedy of
aggrieved parties to file a civil suit remains open; and …….”
6 2025 SCC OnLine SC 828
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21. The High Court is, thus, expected to interfere only when
the order passed by the Competent Authority suffers from
manifest illegality. Since the aggrieved party has the remedy of
instituting a substantive suit based on title, the Writ Court
should be slow in interfering with the order passed by the
Competent Authority, where the challenge is predominantly
premised on the title or the entitlement to a particular/larger
area.
22. In the case at hand, at best, the case of the petitioner is
that, the built up area of respondent No.16 Society’s building is
1482.13 sq. mtrs. and not 1500.14 sq. mtrs. It is imperative to
note that in the reply filed by the petitioner in Application
No.169/2014 before the Competent Authority the only objection
that was taken by the petitioner was that the Architect’s
certificates produced by the petitioner showed that the built up
consumed by Lubin (R16) was 1482.13 sq. mtrs. and the
Architect’s certificate produced by respondent No.16 showed the
built up consumed by Lubin as 1500.14 sq. mtrs. and, hence, it
was left to the Competent Authority to decide on that anomaly.
23. The aforesaid discrepancy, even if taken at par, could
hardly furnish a justification for the Writ Court to interfere with
the order passed by the Competent Authority granting a
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certificate of Unilateral Deemed Conveyance in favour of
respondent No.16 as by no stretch of imagination can it be said
that the said order suffers from manifest illegality or
jurisdictional error or stares in the face on account of its
perversity.
24. So far as the challenge to the order granting a certificate of
Unilateral Deemed Conveyance in favour of the petitioner
purportedly for a lesser area (819.26 sq. mtrs.) against the
prayer for a larger area (917.56 sq. mtrs.), suffice to note that the
Competent Authority has ascribed justifiable reasons, including
that the claim of the petitioner for grant of certificate of Deemed
Conveyance in respect of the area, out of CTS No.206/D, was
completely ill-founded. The factor of TDR having been loaded on
the building No.2 “Valentine” also weighs in as in the
Government Resolution dated 22nd June, 2018, which certainly
governs the application of the petitioner, it is, inter alia,
provided that, while making Deemed Conveyance in respect of
the buildings in the layout where TDR is utilized, the
conveyance should be made according to the plinth and
appurtenant area. Thus, the claim premised on total built up
area cannot be readily countenanced.
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25. In any event, if the petitioner is dissatisfied with the grant
of lesser area by the impugned order dated 14 th September,
2023, the petitioner can institute a suit before the competent
civil court.
26. For the foregoing reasons, the petition deserves to be
dismissed.
27. Hence, the following order:
:ORDER:
(i) The petition stands dismissed with costs.
(ii) Rule discharged.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
At this stage, Mr. Kachan, the learned Counsel for the
petitioner, seeks continuation of ad-interim relief.
In the light of the view, which this Court is persuaded to
take, especially on the aspect of delay and laches, the oral
application for continuation of ad-interim relief stands rejected.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
19/19
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