Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
V (Vishal) vs State Of Rajasthan on 17 February, 2026
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
[2026:RJ-JD:8194]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 13/2026
V S/o Shri Dalla Ram, Aged About 18 Years, Resident Of rohicha
Khurd, Police Station Luni, Jodhpur Raj. Through Natural
Guardian Dalla Ram (Father). (Lodged In Child Welfare Home
Jodhpur)
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
2. P D/o Sh. Bhaka Ram, R/o Village Rohicha Khurd,police
Station Luni, Jodhpur Raj.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ravinder Kumar Singh
Mr. Rajpal Singh Rathore
For Respondent(s) : Ms. Manju Choudhary
Mr. N.S. Chandawat, Dy.G.A.
Mr. SriRam Choudhary, AGA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Order
DATE OF CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENTS : 11/02/2026
DATE ON WHICH ORDER IS RESERVED : 11/02/2026
FULL ORDER OR OPERATIVE PART : Full Order
DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 17/02/2026
REPORTABLE
BY THE COURT:-
GRIEVANCE
1. The instant criminal revision petition has been instituted
under Section 102 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015 (hereinafter to be referred as “JJ Act“),
assailing the judgment dated 17.12.2025 passed in Criminal
Appeal No. 16/2025 by the learned Special Judge, POCSO Cases
No. 1, Jodhpur Metropolitan. By way of the impugned judgment,
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the learned appellate Court has affirmed the orders of learned
Juvenile Justice Board, Jodhpur whereby it dismissed the default
bail plea raised by the deliquent in a matter arising out of offences
punishable under Sections 64(2)(m) and 308(2) of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita (hereinafter to be referred as “BNS”), as also
Sections 5(j)(ii)/6 and 5(l)/6 of The Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 (hereinafter to be referred as
“POCSO Act“). The impugned orders dated 29.11.2025 and
08.12.2025 passed by the learned Juveline Justice Board, Jodhpur
were affirmed.
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE
2. The brief facts of the case, shorn of unnecessary details, are
that an FIR No. 193/2025 came to be registered at Police Station
Luni, Jodhpur, at the instance of respondent No. 2, alleging that
about three months prior to the lodging of the report, the present
petitioner “V”, a child in conflict with law, along with co-accused
Rakesh, committed gang rape upon her and extended threats of
dire consequences.
2.1 It is further stated that upon medical examination conducted
on 19.08.2025, the prosecutrix was found to be pregnant of about
two months, whereafter the report was lodged. The petitioner was
apprehended on 28.08.2025 and has since been confined in the
Child Welfare Centre, Jodhpur. His first application under Section
12 of the JJ Act was rejected on 03.09.2025. Upon completion of
90 days from the date of apprehension, the petitioner preferred a
second application seeking statutory/default bail, which came to
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be rejected by the Juvenile Justice Board on 29.11.2025 on the
premise that the charge-sheet had been filed on 21.11.2025
within the stipulated period. A subsequent application on merits
was also rejected on 08.12.2025. The appeal preferred
thereagainst was dismissed by the learned Special Judge, POCSO
Act No. 1, Jodhpur Metropolitan, vide judgment dated 17.12.2025.
2.2 It is the case of the petitioner that there exists a material
discrepancy between the charge-sheet initially made available and
the certified copy subsequently supplied, giving rise to a serious
doubt regarding the prosecution’s conduct. Being aggrieved by the
order of learned Board and appellate judgment, the present
criminal revision petition has been preferred.
OBSERVATION OF THIS COURT
3. Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and
perused the material available on record.
4. After perusing the record available on record, it is evident
that the present case pertains to a plea of statutory/default bail
raised at the instance of the delinquent before the learned
Juvenile Justice Board. It was contended that the delinquent was
taken into detention on 28.08.2025 and, in view of the mandate of
law, the investigation was required to be completed and the
charge-sheet must be filed within a period of ninety days. As per
the defence plea, no charge-sheet was filed within the stipulated
period. Upon expiry of ninety days, the delinquent moved an
application under Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita (hereinafter to be referred as “BNSS”) seeking default bail
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on the ninety-second day. However, vide order dated 29.11.2025,
the learned Juvenile Justice Board dismissed the application for
default bail on the premise that the charge-sheet had already
been filed on 21.11.2025 well within the prescribed period.
4.1. This Court has carefully and chronologically examined the
entire record, including the alleged charge-sheet dated
21.11.2025, the order-sheet dated 24.11.2025, the bail
proceedings dated 28.11.2025 and 29.11.2025, as well as the
subsequent orders passed by this Court on 30.01.2026 and
04.02.2026, and the explanations furnished on 02.02.2026 and
07.02.2026 respectively. For the sake of clarity and better
appreciation, the circumstances giving rise to the present doubt
are set out hereinbelow in chronological sequence, along with the
observations of this Court:-
(i) Registration of FIR and Facts of Custody
(a) An FIR No. 193/2025 was registered at Police Station Luni on
23.08.2025 for offences under Sections 308(2) and 64(2)(m) of
the BNS and Sections 5(i)(ii), 5(l) and 6 of the POCSO Act. The
accused is admittedly a juvenile aged 17 years and 8 months and
has remained in continuous custody since his apprehension.
(b) As per Section 187(2) of the BNSS, where investigation is
not completed within 90 days in cases punishable with
imprisonment of ten years or more, the accused acquires an
indefeasible statutory right to be released on bail upon expiry of
the prescribed period, provided he is prepared to furnish bail. In
the present case, 90 days from the date of his detention expired
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on 21.11.2025. Upon expiry of the said period, the statutory right
to default bail stood accrued in favour of the juvenile.
(ii) Alleged Filing of Charge-Sheet on 21.11.2025
(a) It is the stand of the learned Magistrate that the charge-
sheet was filed on 21.11.2025. However, there is no
contemporaneous judicial order-sheet dated 21.11.2025 recording
such filing. No judicial noting of that date reflects that the charge-
sheet was taken on record. The only document subsequently
relied upon is an endorsement on the reverse of the charge-sheet
cover page, made by the learned Magistrate himself, stating that
the charge-sheet was presented on 21.11.2025. Significantly, this
endorsement is not that of any clerk or reader but is stated to be
of the Presiding Officer himself, which renders the circumstance
self-conflicting in the absence of a supporting order-sheet. In
criminal judicial proceedings, every action is required to be
reflected in the order-sheet. The absence of any order-sheet dated
21.11.2025 recording filing of the charge-sheet is the first
circumstance that casts serious doubt.
iii) Order-Sheet dated 24.11.2025
(a) An order-sheet dated 24.11.2025 has been placed on record,
which contains the following recital among other facts:-
“अधिवक्ता किशोर द्वारा पृथक से एक जमानत प्रार्थना-पत्र पेश किया, जिस पर
आदे श पृथक से लिखाया जाकर अस्वीकार कर खारिज किया गया। किशोर की
ओ.एच. अवधि 05.12.2025 तक बढ़ाई जाती है।”
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(b) This recital states that Learned counsel for the juvenile
separately submitted a bail application, upon which a separate
order was passed and the same was rejected and dismissed. The
O.H. (Observation Home) period of the juvenile is extended till
05.12.2025. However, as per the admitted record, the bail
application was presented on 28.11.2025 and dismissed on
29.11.2025. Thus, a serious chronological inconsistency emerges,
how could an order-sheet dated 24.11.2025 record rejection of a
bail application and extension of custody till 05.12.2025 when the
bail application itself was presented only on 28.11.2025 and
rejected on 29.11.2025. A judicial order cannot precede the very
event which gives rise to it. The recording of filing and dismissal of
a bail application and its rejection in the order sheet of
24.11.2025, when such event happened on 29.11.2025, is wholly
incongruous with the judicial chronology. This circumstance
significantly strengthens the suspicion that the order-sheet dated
24.11.2025 is ante-dated.
(iv) Proceedings dated 28.11.2025
(a) On 28.11.2025, the bail application was presented. The
order-sheet of that date reveals that the learned Magistrate
directed the Public Prosecutor to call for the case diary from the
concerned police station. If, as claimed, the charge-sheet had
already been filed on 21.11.2025, there was no occasion to call for
the case diary on 28.11.2025 instead the file (charge-sheet), if
already received on 21.11.2025, should be directed to attach with
bail plea so as to complete the period. This action is inconsistent
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with the assertion that the investigation had already culminated in
filing of the charge-sheet.
(v) Order dated 29.11.2025
(a) On 29.11.2025, the bail application was dismissed on the
ground that the charge-sheet had been filed on 21.11.2025. Thus,
the fact that the bail was dismissed on 29.11.2025 cannot be
written in the order sheet of 24.11.2025, because this fact never
existed till that date. It appears from the record that the order
purportedly dated 24.11.2025, which this Court is now confronted
with, finds no reference whatsoever in the subsequent detailed
order dated 29.11.2025 in which the default bail was rejected.
Had the proceedings of 24.11.2025 in fact taken place in the
manner now suggested, namely, that the charge-sheet was
presented, cognizance was taken by the Court itself, and a
detailed judicial order-sheet running into one full page was
recorded, then, in the ordinary and natural course of judicial
functioning, the said order would have found specific and
unequivocal mention in the subsequent order dated 29.11.2025.
More particularly, the order dated 29.11.2025, whereby the prayer
for default bail came to be dismissed, is founded precisely upon
the assertion that the charge-sheet had already been presented. If
that be so, it was incumbent upon the Court, while dismissing the
application for default bail, to expressly record that a detailed
order-sheet dated 24.11.2025 had already been drawn up
reflecting the presentation of the charge-sheet on 21.11.2025 and
passing an order taking of cognizance. However, there is not even
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a whisper of reference to the alleged order dated 24.11.2025 in
the detailed order dated 29.11.2025. The silence of the record on
this material aspect assumes significance. Taking cognizance of an
offence is not a ministerial act to be performed by a clerk or
reader; it is a solemn judicial function to be discharged by the
Presiding Officer upon due application of mind. When such
cognizance is taken and a detailed judicial order is recorded, the
same necessarily becomes part of the continuum of judicial
proceedings and would ordinarily be adverted to in any
subsequent order dealing with the rights of the accused
particularly where the rejection of default bail hinges upon the
very factum of filing of the charge-sheet and taking of cognizance.
In these circumstances, the absence of any reference to the
alleged order dated 24.11.2025 in the detailed order dated
29.11.2025 lends credence to the prima facie inference that, till
29.11.2025, no such order-sheet dated 24.11.2025 was in
existence on the judicial record. This aspect, therefore, raises
serious concerns touching upon the integrity and continuity of the
judicial record, which cannot be lightly brushed aside.
(vi) Order dated 08.12.2025
(a) It is further borne out from the record that on 08.12.2025,
the Presiding Officer himself acknowledged that reference to
rejection of a bail application was wrongly incorporated in the
order-sheet dated 24.11.2025 mistakenly. However, this Court
finds itself unable to accept such explanation as a mere
typographical or clerical error. A typographical error, by its very
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nature, is confined to mistakes in spelling, dates, figures, or
accidental slips of expression. It cannot extend to incorporation of
a substantive judicial fact which was not in existence on the date
of the order. The recording in the order-sheet dated 24.11.2025
that a bail application was presented and rejected by a separate
order is not a minor clerical slip, but a categorical recital of a
judicial event. Significantly, the record reflects that the petitioner
preferred the bail application only between 28.11.2025 and
29.11.2025. If that be so, the very mention of its presentation and
rejection in an order-sheet dated 24.11.2025 defies logic and
chronology. A judicial record cannot anticipate a future event, nor
can proceedings yet to occur find place in an earlier order-sheet.
This chronological impossibility strikes at the root of the
explanation sought to be offered. To describe such incorporation of
a non-existent and future judicial act as a “typographical error” is,
prima facie, wholly untenable. The matter is not of an inadvertent
mis-typing of a word or date; it concerns the recording of a
judicial proceeding which, on the face of the record, had not taken
place as on 24.11.2025. Further, by recalling the said order on
08.12.2025, the learned Magistrate has, prima facie, not dispelled
the doubt but rather fortified it. The recall order unmistakably
clarifies that the reference made on 24.11.2025 pertained to the
rejection of a bail application which came to be decided on
29.11.2025, and not to any prior bail application. This subsequent
clarification, instead of curing the defect, lends credence to the
apprehension that the earlier recording was not an innocent
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mistake but a conscious insertion. Such an inconsistency disturbs
the conscience of this Court, for judicial orders are expected to
reflect accuracy, transparency, and fidelity to actual proceedings.
The integrity of the judicial record is sacrosanct, and any
unexplained deviation from chronological and factual correctness
cannot be lightly glossed over under the guise of clerical
inadvertence. In these circumstances, the explanation offered
does not inspire confidence and warrants serious consideration.
(vii) Order of this Court dated 30.01.2026 and Reply dated
02.02.2026
(a) Upon noticing these discrepancies, this Court vide order
dated 30.01.2026 specifically observed that there was no
endorsement on record reflecting filing of the charge-sheet on
21.11.2025, nor was there any judicial note evidencing such filing.
Clarification was sought, particularly as to why the case diary was
called on 28.11.2025 if the charge-sheet had already been
submitted on 21.11.2025. In reply dated 02.02.2026, the learned
Magistrate stated that the charge-sheet had been received on
21.11.2025 and that on 28.11.2025 the bail application was
presented. It was further stated that due to absence of clerical
staff, correct information could not be reflected. However, in this
detailed reply, there is no reference whatsoever to the order-sheet
dated 24.11.2025, though this Court had specifically asked
whether any judicial note or order-sheet existed showing filing of
charge-sheet on 21.11.2025. The omission of reference to such a
crucial order-sheet, if it indeed existed, materially deepens the
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suspicion. In the entire reply forwarded by him to this Court, there
is not even a whisper regarding the existence of order-sheet dated
24.11.2025, containing the factum of submission of the charge-
sheet and the taking of cognizance was duly reported and
recorded in the proceedings. Despite a pointed query raised by
this Court in this regard, there is not even the slightest reference
or explanation pertaining to the same. This gives rise to a serious
and legitimate doubt regarding the veracity of the stand taken.
(viii) Order of this Court dated 04.02.2026 and Reply dated
07.02.2026
(a) Again, vide order dated 04.02.2026, this Court required
clarification whether there was any endorsement either on the
charge-sheet itself or on a separate order-sheet showing filing on
21.11.2025. In reply dated 07.02.2026, a copy of the reverse side
of the charge-sheet cover page bearing endorsement dated
21.11.2025 by the Presiding Judge himself was produced. Yet
again, there is no mention of the order-sheet dated 24.11.2025.
The consistent omission of the order-sheet dated 24.11.2025 in
both replies, despite specific queries, reinforces the apprehension
that the said order-sheet was not in existence at the relevant time
and appears to have been subsequently prepared.
(ix) Statement of the Prosecutrix recorded on 09.01.2026
(a) During the trial/inquiry before the Special Judge, POCSO Act,
on oath statement of the prosecutrix came to be recorded under
due process of law. In her solemn narration, she, in substance,
stated as follows:-
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[2026:RJ-JD:8194] (12 of 38) [CRLR-13/2026]“That approximately one year prior to the lodging of
the report, she had gone outside her house in the early
hours for easing herself. At that time, the one Rakesh
appeared there. She stated that the maternal home of
the accused is situated just opposite her residence and,
as such, he used to frequently visit the village, owing
to which she was acquainted with him. She further
deposed that on the date of the incident, the maternal
uncle of Rakesh had passed away and therefore he had
come to the village. It is alleged that while she was
returning home after relieving herself, the accused
intercepted her on the way, forcibly caught hold of her,
threw her to the ground and committed sexual assault
upon her against her will and consent. Thereafter, the
accused extended a grave and life-threatening
intimidation, warning her that if she disclosed the
incident to anyone, he would kill her, her brother and
her mother. Having administered such threat, he fled
from the spot, leaving her in a state of trauma and fear.
She further stated that owing to the terror instilled by
the accused, she did not muster the courage to disclose
the occurrence to any family member at that time.
However, after a lapse of about four months, she
confided in her mother and disclosed the entire
episode. She also informed her mother that she had
conceived as a consequence of the said incident.
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[2026:RJ-JD:8194] (13 of 38) [CRLR-13/2026]Thereafter, her mother apprised her uncle of the
matter, and subsequently she was taken to Jodhpur to
her elder uncle. In due course, she was brought to
Police Station Luni, where a formal report came to be
lodged.”
(b) The aforesaid statement, read in its entirety, reflects the
sequence of events as narrated by the prosecutrix and forms the
substratum of the prosecution case. A meticulous reading of the
statement of the prosecutrix, as reproduced hereinabove,
unmistakably reveals that throughout her entire narration, she has
not attributed any role whatsoever to the present petitioner, who
is a child in conflict with law. The only individual specifically
named in her statement is Rakesh, who stands as the co-accused
in the matter. Not even by implication, whisper, or remote
reference has the prosecutrix adverted to the presence or
participation of the present petitioner at the time of the alleged
occurrence. The substratum of her version, as it unfolds, is
confined exclusively to the acts allegedly committed by the said
Rakesh. In such circumstances, when the foundational statement
of the prosecutrix, which constitutes the bedrock of the
prosecution case, does not so much as mention the petitioner, the
inference that the petitioner was not present at the scene of
occurrence gains considerable strength. The absence of any
specific allegation or overt act attributed to him renders his
implication prima facie doubtful at this stage. This glaring
omission, therefore, assumes substantial significance while
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[2026:RJ-JD:8194] (14 of 38) [CRLR-13/2026]considering the prayer for bail. The liberty of a child in conflict
with law cannot be curtailed on conjectures or omnibus
allegations, particularly when the principal witness does not
implicate him in any manner. Consequently, this aspect fortifies
the petitioner’s claim for enlargement on bail.
(x) Legal Position
(a) Section 187(3) of the BNSS embodies what may be
described as a statutory reaffirmation of the constitutional promise
of personal liberty under Article 21. The provision stipulates that
where an investigation is not completed within the prescribed
period, namely, ninety days in cases where the offence is
punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for
a term of not less than ten years, and sixty days in all other cases,
the accused shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does
furnish bail. The legislative intent is manifest, investigative
authority must operate within temporal discipline; it cannot, under
the guise of inquiry, convert custody into punitive detention. The
Supreme Court, while interpreting the analogous provision under
Section 167(2) of the erstwhile CrPC, has consistently
underscored that the right accruing upon expiry of the statutory
period is not merely procedural but “indefeasible.” The
jurisprudential thread running through the pronouncements by
Hon’ble the Suprmee Court of India are unmistakable, once the
stipulated period lapses and the accused expresses readiness to
furnish bail, the Court is left with no discretion to prolong
detention. Section 187(3) is not a technical loophole but a
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[2026:RJ-JD:8194] (15 of 38) [CRLR-13/2026]constitutional sentinel, ensuring that the might of the State
remains tethered to the mandate of law, and that personal liberty
is not sacrificed at the altar of investigative delay. From the
cumulative circumstances, it prima facie appears that as on
24.11.2025, ninety days had elapsed and the charge-sheet had
not been filed. In such circumstances, under Section 187(3)
BNSS, an indefeasible right to default bail accrues, as laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uday Mohanlal Acharya vs. State
of Maharashtra reported in 2001 (5) SCC 453. Default bail is not
a matter of discretion but a legislative mandate. Once the
statutory conditions are satisfied and the right is invoked, the
Court is bound to enforce it. The failure to recognise and enforce
such right, particularly in the case of a juvenile, amounts to a
serious infraction of personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21
of the Constitution of India. Additionally, the accused being a
juvenile, Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice Act mandates that bail
is the rule and denial is an exception. No statutory ground
justifying denial of bail is discernible from the record. The
cumulative inconsistencies in the judicial record, the absence of
contemporaneous order-sheet entries, the contradictory conduct
in summoning the case diary, and the evolving explanations
furnished in response to specific judicial queries give rise to strong
and disquieting suspicion. The matter does not appear to be
confined to a mere typographical or clerical error. Maintenance of
judicial record is not a procedural ritual but the very foundation of
transparency and accountability. Public confidence in the justice
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[2026:RJ-JD:8194] (16 of 38) [CRLR-13/2026]delivery system rests upon the assurance that judicial proceedings
are accurately, chronologically, and faithfully recorded. Any lapse,
whether arising from inadvertence, negligence, or otherwise which
affects the liberty of a citizen, particularly a juvenile, must be
viewed with utmost seriousness.
(xi) Judicial Conduct
(a) No doubt, the offence alleged may be grave and serious in
nature; however, the gravity of the offence cannot justify an
approach that transgresses the settled norms of judicial propriety.
A judicial officer, while adjudicating a prayer for bail, is expected
to act with detachment, sobriety, and complete fidelity to the
record. The anxiety to deny bail, howsoever weighty the
allegations may appear, cannot eclipse the foundational principles
of truthfulness, fairness, and institutional integrity. The Court
cannot countenance a situation where, in order to sustain
rejection of bail, facts are either sought to be concealed or an
explanation is advanced which does not withstand objective
scrutiny. Over-enthusiasm on the part of a Magistrate, whether in
withholding material aspects of the record or in offering
explanations inconsistent with chronology is neither appreciable
nor consistent with the high standards expected of the judicial
office. The judicial function demands calm application of mind, not
defensive justification; transparency, not concealment; and
candour, not contradiction. If an error has occurred, the dignified
course is to acknowledge and correct it in accordance with law.
The preparation or reliance upon a note that appears to
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retrospectively justify an order, or the furnishing of an explanation
which attributes a substantive judicial recital to a mere clerical
lapse, strikes at the very root of judicial discipline. The majesty of
the judicial institution lies not in the rejection of bail, but in the
fairness of the process by which such rejection is arrived at.
Judicial conscience must remain unsullied, and the record must
remain sacrosanct. Any departure from these foundational
principles is a matter of serious concern and cannot be lightly
brushed aside.
(xii) Constitutional Perspective
(a) The continued detention of the juvenile despite accrual of the
statutory right also falls foul of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India, which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his life
or personal liberty except according to procedure established by
law. When the law itself mandates release upon expiry of the
prescribed period, continued incarceration becomes illegal and
arbitrary. The issue assumes even greater sensitivity in the case
of a juvenile. The statutory framework is reformative in character
and child-centric in approach. Denial of liberty in disregard of a
clear statutory mandate is contrary not only to the letter of the
law but also to its humane spirit.
(xiii) Scope of Inquiry against the Judicial officer
(a) The scope of an inquiry against a judicial officer is neither
punitive in its inception nor condemnatory in its tone; it is
essentially fact-finding in character, undertaken to preserve the
purity of the judicial institution. Such an inquiry does not sit in
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appeal over the judicial reasoning of the officer, nor is it meant to
scrutinize the correctness of an order on merits, which is the
domain of appellate or revisional jurisdiction. The inquiry is
confined to examining whether there has been any conduct
unbecoming of a judicial officer, any procedural impropriety of a
grave nature, any act suggestive of mala fides, fabrication, or
deliberate deviation from the record, or any behaviour that shakes
public confidence in the administration of justice. It must remain
circumscribed by the principles of natural justice, ensuring full
opportunity to the concerned officer to explain the circumstances
appearing against him or her. At the same time, the inquiry must
be sufficiently robust to ascertain the truth, for the majesty of law
rests not merely on the correctness of outcomes but on the
transparency and integrity of the process. Thus, the exercise is a
delicate balance, protecting judicial independence on the one
hand, while safeguarding institutional credibility and accountability
on the other.
(b) This Court is fully conscious of the settled principle that an
order passed by a subordinate court is not to be lightly
condemned by the superior courts while exercising its jurisdiction,
since it transgress the bounds of judicial propriety. The discipline
of hierarchy mandates restraint, and this Court, while dealing with
the present matter, remains alive to that salutary principle.
However, judicial restraint cannot be stretched to the extent of
shutting one’s eyes to glaring and patent wrongdoing and
irregularities that strike at the very root of the administration of
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criminal justice. Upon a careful and anxious perusal of the
material placed on record, this Court finds certain blatant
discrepancies and procedural aberrations on the part of the
Presiding Judge, which prima facie create a cloud of doubt over
the sanctity of the proceedings. In criminal jurisprudence, the
cardinal principle is that an accused cannot be convicted on the
basis of doubt; the prosecution must establish its case beyond
reasonable doubt. Here, the irony is that the doubt is not in the
prosecution case alone but appears to emanate from the manner
in which certain proceedings were conducted. When material of
such nature surfaces before this Court, giving rise to a strong and
disturbing impression that, in order to justify a particular course
adopted, documents may have been brought into existence which
were not originally part of the record, the matter cannot be
brushed aside as a mere irregularity but to my mind, it seems to
be a case of fabrication of false document prepared only with a
view to justify the stand taken. This Court is perceiving a serious
doubt in this regard. If such documents were indeed created
subsequently, the same may fall within the ambit of making a
false document or fabrication of record, an issue of grave concern.
That being said, this Court hastens to clarify, with a sense of
judicial balance, that it is not recording any final or conclusive
finding on the culpability of any judicial officer at this stage. Even
before adverting to the expression of any suspicion or doubt, this
Court has, with utmost circumspection and judicial restraint,
minutely examined the record and the attending circumstances.
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The officer concerned was duly heard, not once but on two distinct
occasions, and was afforded adequate opportunity to furnish an
explanation. It is made clear that no observation has been
recorded lightly or in a casual manner. This Court is conscious that
even the expression of a doubt carries its own weight and
consequences; therefore, such doubt has not been articulated
without prior hearing and careful scrutiny. The present
observations are thus not founded on any loose or conjectural
premise, but are preceded by due consideration, vigilance, and
adherence to the principles of natural justice. The principles of
natural justice are not empty formalities. No adverse conclusion
can be drawn unless a fair and impartial inquiry is conducted and
the concerned officer is afforded a full opportunity to explain the
circumstances. Nevertheless, the material on record is sufficient to
persuade this Court that an independent inquiry is warranted so
that the truth is unearthed and the lingering doubt is dispelled.
Doubt, when it creeps into the record of a court, must either be
substantiated through due process or decisively eliminated; but in
no way be allowed to remain festering.
(c) In Krishna Prasad Verma (D) thr. L.Rs. Vs. State of
Bihar and Ors. reported in (2019) 10 SCC 640, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled contours of disciplinary
jurisdiction under Article 235 of the Constitution. The Court
cautioned that mere error of judgment, legality, propriety or
correctness of an order cannot, by themselves, form the
foundation of disciplinary action, unless accompanied by
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extraneous considerations, corrupt motive or misconduct. For the
ease of reference, the relevant paragraphs of the judgment are
reproduced herein below:-
“3. Article 235 of the Constitution of India vests control of
the subordinate Courts upon the High Courts. The High
Courts exercise disciplinary powers over the subordinate
Courts. In a series of judgments, this Court has held that
the High Courts are also the protectors and guardians of the
judges falling within their administrative control. Time and
time again, this Court has laid down the criteria on which
actions should be taken against judicial officers. Repeatedly,
this Court has cautioned the High Courts that action should
not be taken against judicial officers only because wrong
orders are passed. To err is human and not one of us, who
has held judicial office, can claim that we have never passed
a wrong order.
4. No doubt, there has to be zero tolerance for corruption
and if there are allegations of corruption, misconduct or of
acts unbecoming a judicial officer, these must be dealt with
strictly. However, if wrong orders are passed that should not
lead to disciplinary action unless there is evidence that the
wrong orders have been passed for extraneous reasons and
not because of the reasons on the file.
5. We do not want to refer to too many judgments because
this position has been laid down in a large number of cases
but it would be pertinent to refer to the observations of this
Court in Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab &
Haryana and Anr. (1988) 3 SCC 370, wherein this Court
held as follows:
14. Under the Constitution the High Court has control over
the subordinate judiciary. While exercising that control it is
under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect judicial
officers. An honest strict judicial officer is likely to have
adversaries in the mofussil courts. If complaints are
entertained on trifling matters relating to judicial orders
which may have been upheld by the High Court on the
judicial side no judicial officer would feel protected and it
would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an
honest and independent manner. An independent and
honest judiciary is a sine qua non for Rule of law. If judicial
officers are under constant threat of complaint and enquiry
on trifling matters and if High Court encourages anonymous
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[2026:RJ-JD:8194] (22 of 38) [CRLR-13/2026]be able to administer justice in an independent and honest
manner. It is therefore imperative that the High Court
should also take steps to protect its honest officers by
ignoring ill-conceived or motivated complaints made by the
unscrupulous lawyers and litigants. Having regard to facts
and circumstances of the instant case we have no doubt in
our mind that the resolution passed by the Bar Association
against the Appellant was wholly unjustified and the
complaints made by Shri Mehlawat and others were
motivated which did not deserve any credit. Even the
vigilance Judge after holding enquiry did not record any
finding that the Appellant was guilty of any corrupt motive
or that he had not acted judicially. All that was said against
him was that he had acted improperly in granting
adjournments.
6. Thereafter, following the dicta laid down in Union of India
and Ors. v. A.N. Saxena (1992) 3 SCC 124 and Union of
India and Ors. v. K.K. Dhawan (1993) 2 SCC 56, this Court
in P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. and Ors. (2001) 6 SCC 491 held
as follows:
7. In the present case, though elaborate enquiry has been
conducted by the enquiry officer, there is hardly any
material worth the name forthcoming except to scrutinize
each one of the orders made by the Appellant on the judicial
side to arrive at a different conclusion. That there was
possibility on a given set of facts to arrive at a different
conclusion is no ground to indict a judicial officer for taking
one view and that too for alleged misconduct for that reason
alone. The enquiry officer has not found any other material,
which would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good
faith or devotion to duty or that he has been actuated by
any corrupt motive. At best he may say that the view taken
by the Appellant is not proper or correct and not attribute
any motive to him which is for extraneous consideration that
he had acted in that manner. If in every case where an order
of a subordinate court is found to be faulty a disciplinary
action were to be initiated, the confidence of the subordinate
judiciary will be shaken and the officers will be in constant
fear of writing a judgment so as not to face a disciplinary
enquiry and thus judicial officers cannot act independently
or fearlessly. Indeed the words of caution are given in K.K.
Dhawan case and A.N. Saxena case that merely because the
order is wrong or the action taken could have been different
does not warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings
against the judicial officer. In spite of such caution, it is
unfortunate that the High Court has chosen to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against the Appellant in this case.
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7. In Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad and
Anr. (2007) 4 SCC 247, a three-judge Bench of this Court,
after considering the entire law on the subject, including the
authorities referred to above, clearly disapproved the
practice of initiating disciplinary proceedings against the
officers of the district judiciary merely because the
judgment/orders passed by them are wrong. It was held
thus:
12. This Court on several occasions has disapproved the
practice of initiation of disciplinary proceedings against
officers of the subordinate judiciary merely because the
judgments/orders passed by them are wrong. The appellate
and revisional courts have been established and given
powers to set aside such orders. The higher courts after
hearing the appeal may modify or set aside erroneous
judgments of the lower courts. While taking disciplinary
action based on judicial orders, The High Court must take
extra care and caution.
xxx xxx xxx
17. In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India this
Court held that wrong exercise of jurisdiction by a quasi
judicial authority or mistake of law or wrong interpretation
of law cannot be the basis for initiating disciplinary
proceeding. of course, if the judicial officer conducted in a
manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or
good faith or there is a prima facie material to show
recklessness or misconduct in discharge of his duties or he
had acted in a manner to unduly favour a party or had
passed an order actuated by corrupt motive, the High Court
by virtue of its power Under Article 235 of the Constitution
may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
under such circumstances it should be kept in mind that the
Judges at all levels have to administer justice without fear or
favour. Fearlessness and maintenance of judicial
independence are very essential for an efficacious judicial
system. Making adverse comments against subordinate
judicial officers and subjecting them to severe disciplinary
proceedings would ultimately harm the judicial system at
the grassroot level.
8. No doubt, if any judicial officer conducts
proceedings in a manner which would reflect on his
reputation or integrity or there is prima facie material
to show reckless misconduct on his part while
discharging his duties, the High Court would be
entitled to initiate disciplinary cases but such material
should be evident from the orders and should also be
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[2026:RJ-JD:8194] (24 of 38) [CRLR-13/2026]
placed on record during the course of disciplinary
proceedings.”
From bare perusal of the judgment, it is evident that Article
235 of the Constitution entrusts the High Court not only with
control over the subordinate judiciary, but also with the solemn
responsibility of ensuring that such control is exercised to
preserve the purity and integrity of the institution.
(d) At the outset, this Court deems it necessary to clarify that
the present proceedings are not directed towards examining the
legality, propriety, correctness or justness of the impugned order
on its judicial side. Those aspects fall within the supervisory and
appellate jurisdiction of the superior courts and can always be
corrected in accordance with law. An erroneous or even an
improper order, by itself, may not warrant anything beyond
correction or, at best, a word of caution for future guidance.
However, the matter at hand presents a situation of an altogether
different hue. Upon a careful and anxious consideration of the
material placed on record, this Court cannot remain oblivious to
what unmistakably emanates from the impugned order. A foul and
disturbing undertone pervades the record, suggestive not merely
of a flawed exercise of jurisdiction, but of acts which prima facie
appear to attract the ingredients of an offence expressly defined
under the penal statute. The nature of the acts complained of
does not rest in the realm of judicial error; rather, they bear the
imprint of culpability. We are, therefore, not merely constrained
but compelled to examine the matter. To remain passive in the
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[2026:RJ-JD:8194] (25 of 38) [CRLR-13/2026]
face of such material would amount to abdication of the
constitutional duties cast upon this Court. While it is true that an
improper order may, in a given case, be ignored or corrected in
the ordinary course, the situation assumes a grave dimension
when the record discloses conduct which is prima facie unethical,
unbecoming of a judicial officer, and suggestive of commission of
a cognizable wrong. In such circumstances, to turn a blind eye
would itself run counter to constitutional obligation. The impugned
order, if left unaddressed, has the potential to erode the faith of
citizens who repose unwavering trust in the sanctity and
sacredness of the judicial institution. Public confidence in the
administration of justice is not sustained merely by
pronouncements of law, but by the unimpeachable conduct of
those who dispense it. This case, therefore, stands on a footing far
more serious than what is contemplated in paragraph 8 of
Krishna Prasad Verma (supra). It is not a matter of mere
error, oversight or mistaken interpretation; the circumstances, as
presently emerging, compel this Court to scrutinize whether the
conduct travels into the domain of malfeasance. Where the
material prima facie indicates commission of an offence or
deliberate misconduct to justify an action already undertaken,
constitutional conscience does not permit inaction. Accordingly,
while this Court remains ever vigilant to protect honest judicial
officers from motivated or trivial complaints, it is equally duty-
bound to act where the integrity of the institution itself appears to
be imperilled.
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(e) Moving on, in Ayub Khan vs. The State of Rajasthan
reported in AIR 2025 SC 419, Hon,ble the Supreme Court once
again reiterated the settled principle that judicial officers ought
not to be subjected to personal criticism in judicial
pronouncements. In the said matter, the Court deemed it
appropriate to expunge the adverse remarks made against the
judicial officer, observing that while judicial orders are open to
scrutiny and correction in accordance with law, personal
aspersions against the officer concerned are neither warranted nor
conducive to the dignity of the institution. The Hon’ble Court
emphasized that restraint, sobriety and judicial discipline must
guide the language employed in judgments, and that criticism, if
any, must be confined to the reasoning or legality of the order
under challenge, without descending into personal commentary
upon the officer concerned. For the ease of reference, the relevant
paragraphs of the judgment are reporduced herein below:-
“17. Injustice has been done to the Appellant by passing the
orders which we have referred to above. Before we part
with this judgment, we may refer to a decision of this Court
in the case of Sonu Agnihotri. In paragraphs Nos. 15 and
16, this Court held thus:
15. The Courts higher in the judicial hierarchy are invested
with appellate or revisional jurisdiction to correct the errors
committed by the courts that are judicially subordinate to it.
The High Court has jurisdiction Under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India and Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure to correct the errors committed by the
courts which are judicially subordinate to it. We must hasten
to add that no court can be called a “subordinate court”.
Here, we refer to “subordinate” courts only in the context of
appellate, revisional or supervisory jurisdiction. The superior
courts exercising such powers can set aside erroneous
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[2026:RJ-JD:8194] (27 of 38) [CRLR-13/2026]
orders and expunge uncalled and unwarranted observations.
While doing so, the superior courts can legitimately criticise
the orders passed by the Trial Courts or the Appellate Courts
by giving reasons. There can be criticism of the errors
committed, in some cases, by using strong language.
However, such observations must always be in the context
of errors in the impugned orders. While doing so, the courts
have to show restraint, and adverse comments on the
personal conduct and calibre of the Judicial Officer should be
avoided. There is a difference between criticising erroneous
orders and criticising a Judicial Officer. The first part is
permissible. The second category of criticism should best be
avoided. The reasons are already explained by this Court in
Re:’K’, A Judicial Officer. There are five reasons given in
paragraph 15 of the decision why judicial officers should not
be condemned unheard. As observed in the decision, the
High Court Judges, after noticing improper conduct on the
part of the Judicial Officer, can always invite the attention of
the Chief Justice on the administrative side to such conduct.
Whenever action is proposed against a judicial officer on the
administrative side, he gets the full opportunity to clarify
and explain his position. But if such personal adverse
observations are made in a judgment, the Judicial Officer’s
career gets adversely affected.
16. The Judges are human beings. All human beings are
prone to committing mistakes. To err is human. Almost all
courts in our country are overburdened. In the year 2002, in
the case of “All India Judges’ Association (3) v. Union of
India, this Court passed an order directing that within five
years, an endeavour should be made to increase the judge-
to-population ratio in our trial judiciary to 50 per million.
However, till the year 2024, we have not even reached the
ratio of 25 per million. Meanwhile, the population and
litigation have substantially increased. The Judges have to
work under stress. As stated earlier, every Judge,
irrespective of his post and status, is likely to commit errors.
In a given case, after writing several sound judgments, a
judge may commit an error in one judgment due to the
pressure of work or otherwise. As stated earlier, the higher
court can always correct the error. However, while doing so,
if strictures are passed personally against a Judicial Officer,
it causes prejudice to the Judicial Officer, apart from the
embarrassment involved. We must remember that when we
sit in constitutional courts, even we are prone to making
mistakes. Therefore, personal criticism of Judges or
recording findings on the conduct of Judges in judgments
must be avoided.
(emphasis supplied)
18. The High Court ought to have shown restraint. The High
Court cannot damage the career of a judicial officer by
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[2026:RJ-JD:8194] (28 of 38) [CRLR-13/2026]
passing such orders. The reason is that he cannot defend
himself when such orders are passed on the judicial side.”
(f) Lastly, in this context, reference may profitably be made to
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kaushal Singh v.
State of Rajasthan (Criminal Appeal No. 3053 of 2025 arising
out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2254 of 2025), decided on 18.07.2025,
wherein it was emphasized that High Courts must refrain from
making adverse personal remarks against judicial officers without
affording them an opportunity of explanation. The Hon’ble Court
underscored the necessity of maintaining judicial decorum and
institutional respect while simultaneously ensuring accountability
in accordance with law. For ready reference, the relevant
paragraphs of the said judgment are reproduced herein below:-
“18. Suffice it to say that the law is well-settled by a catena
of decisions rendered by this Court that High Courts should
ordinarily refrain from passing strictures against the judicial
officers while deciding matters on the judicial side.
Reference in this regard may be made to in Re: ‘K’, A
Judicial Officer (2001) 3 SCC 54. In paragraphs 15, 16 and
17, this Court dealt with the validity and legality of
strictures passed by the High Court against a Judicial Officer
serving as a member of the district judiciary which are
reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:
15. In the case at hand we are concerned with the
observations made by the High Court against a judicial
officer who is a serving member of subordinate judiciary.
Under the constitutional scheme control over the district
courts and courts subordinate thereto has been vested in
the High Courts. The control so vested is administrative,
judicial and disciplinary. The role of High Court is also of
a friend, philosopher and guide of judiciary
subordinate to it. The strength of power is not
displayed solely in cracking a whip on errors,
mistakes or failures; the power should be so wielded
as to have propensity to prevent and to ensure
exclusion of repetition if committed once innocently
or unwittingly. “Pardon the error but not its
repetition”. The power to control is not to be
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[2026:RJ-JD:8194] (29 of 38) [CRLR-13/2026]
exercised solely by wielding a teacher’s cane; the
members of subordinate judiciary look up to the High
Court for the power to control to be exercised with
parent-like care and affection. The exercise of statutory
jurisdiction, appellate or revisional and the exercise of
constitutional power to control and supervise the functioning
of the district courts and courts subordinate thereto
empowers the High Court to formulate an opinion and place
it on record not only on the judicial working but also on the
conduct of the judicial officers. The existence of power in
higher echelons of judiciary to make observations
even extending to criticism incorporated in judicial
orders cannot be denied, however, the High Courts
have to remember that criticisms and observations
touching a subordinate incorporated judicial in officer
judicial pronouncements have their own mischievous
infirmities. Firstly, the judicial officer is condemned
unheard which is violative of principles of natural
justice. A member of subordinate judiciary himself
dispensing justice should not be denied this minimal
natural justice so as to shield against being
condemned unheard. Secondly, the harm caused by
such criticism or observation may be incapable of
being undone. Such criticism of the judicial officer
contained in a judgment, reportable or not, is a
pronouncement in open and therefore becomes public.
The same Judge who found himself persuaded, sitting
on judicial side, to make observations guided by the
facts of a single case against a Subordinate Judge
may, sitting on administrative side and apprised of
overall meritorious performance of the Subordinate
Judge, may irretrievably regret his having made those
observations on judicial side, the harming effect
whereof even he himself cannot remove on
administrative side. Thirdly, human nature being what
it is, such criticism of a judicial officer contained in
the judgment of a higher court gives the litigating
party a sense of victory not only over his opponent
but also over the Judge who had decided the case
against him. This is subversive of judicial authority of
the deciding Judge. Fourthly, seeking expunging of
the observations by a judicial officer by filing an
appeal or petition of his own reduces him to the
status of a litigant arrayed as a party before the High
Court or Supreme Court – a situation not very happy
from the point of view of the functioning of the
judicial system. May be for the purpose of pleading his
cause he has to take the assistance of a legal
practitioner and such legal practitioner may be one
practising before him. Look at the embarrassment
involved. And last but not the least, the possibility of a
single or casual aberration of an otherwise honest,
upright and righteous Judge being caught unawares
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[2026:RJ-JD:8194] (30 of 38) [CRLR-13/2026]
in the net of adverse observations cannot be ruled
out. Such an incident would have a seriously
demoralising effect not only on him but also on his
colleagues. If all this is avoidable, why should it not
be avoided?
16. We must not be understood as meaning that any
conduct of a subordinate judicial officer unbecoming of him
and demanding a rebuff should be simply overlooked. But
there is an alternate safer and advisable course available to
choose. The conduct of a judicial officer, unworthy of him,
having come to the notice of a Judge of the High Court
hearing a matter on the judicial side, the lis may be
disposed of by pronouncing upon the merits thereof as
found by him but avoiding in the judicial pronouncement
criticism of, or observations on the “conduct” of the
subordinate judicial officer who had decided the case under
scrutiny. Simultaneously, but separately, in office
proceedings may be drawn up inviting attention of
Hon’ble Chief Justice to the facts describing the
conduct of the Subordinate Judge concerned by
sending a confidential letter or note to the Chief
Justice. It will thereafter be open to the Chief Justice
to deal with the subordinate judicial officer either at
his own level or through the Inspecting Judge or by
placing the matter before the full court for its
consideration. The action so taken would all be on the
administrative side. The Subordinate Judge concerned
would have an opportunity of clarifying his position or
putting forth the circumstances under which he acted.
He would not be condemned unheard and if the
decision be adverse to him, it being on administrative
side, he would have some remedy available to him
under the law. He would not be rendered remediless.
17. The remarks made in a judicial order of the High
Court against a member of subordinate judiciary even
if expunged would not completely restitute and
restore the harmed Judge from the loss of dignity and
honour suffered by him. In Judges by David Pannick
(Oxford University Press Publication, 1987) a wholesome
practise finds a mention suggesting an appropriate course to
be followed in such situations:
Lord Hailsham explained that in a number of cases, although I
seldom told the complainant that I had done so, I showed the complaint to the
Judge concerned. I thought it good for him both to see what was being said
about him from the other side of the court, and how perhaps a lapse of
manners or a momentary impatience could undermine confidence in his
decision.
(Emphasis supplied)
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19. The said judgment has been relied on by a 3- Judge
bench of this Court in Sonu Agnihotri v. Chandra Shekhar
and Ors. 2024:INSC:888 where this Court again implored
that the Courts higher in the judicial hierarchy should
refrain from commenting on the conduct and calib of judicial
officers. Reference may be made to Paragraph 15 of Sonu
Agnihotri (supra), reproduced hereinbelow:
15. The Courts higher in the judicial hierarchy are invested
with appellate or revisional jurisdiction to correct the errors
committed by the courts that are judicially subordinate to it.
The High Court has jurisdiction Under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India and Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure to correct the errors committed by the
courts which are judicially subordinate to it. We must
hasten to add that no court can be called a
“subordinate court”. Here, we refer to “subordinate”
courts only in the context of appellate, revisional or
supervisory jurisdiction. The superior courts
exercising such powers can set aside erroneous
orders and expunge uncalled and unwarranted
observations. While doing so, the superior courts can
legitimately criticise the orders passed by the Trial
Courts or the Appellate Courts by giving reasons.
There can be criticism of the errors committed, in
some cases, by using strong language. However, such
observations must always be in the context of errors
in the impugned orders. While doing so, the courts
have to show restraint, and adverse comments on the
personal conduct and calibre of the Judicial Officer
should be avoided. There is a difference between
criticising erroneous orders and criticising a Judicial Officer.
The first part is permissible. The second category of criticism
should best be avoided. The reasons are already explained
by this Court in Re: ‘K’, A Judicial Officer. There are five
reasons given in paragraph 15 of the decision why judicial
officers should not be condemned unheard. As observed in
the decision, the High Court Judges, after noticing
improper conduct on the part of the Judicial Officer,
can always invite the attention of the Chief Justice on
the administrative side to such conduct. Whenever
action is proposed against a judicial officer on the
administrative side, he gets the full opportunity to
clarify and explain his position. But if such personal
adverse observations are made in a judgment, the
Judicial Officer’s career gets adversely affected.
16. The Judges are human beings. All human beings are
prone to committing mistakes. To err is human. Almost all
courts in our country are overburdened. In the year 2002,
in the case of “All India Judges’ Association (3) and
Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., this Court passed an
order directing that within five years, an endeavour
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should be made to increase the judge-to-population
ratio in our trial judiciary to 50 per million. However,
till the year 2024, we have not even reached the ratio
of 25 per million. Meanwhile, the population and
litigation have substantially increased. The Judges
have to work under stress. As stated earlier, every
Judge, irrespective of his post and status, is likely to commit
errors. In a given case, after writing several sound
judgments, a judge may commit an error in one
judgment due to the pressure of work or otherwise.
As stated earlier, the higher court can always correct
the error. However, while doing so, if strictures are
passed personally against a Judicial Officer, it causes
prejudice to the Judicial Officer, apart from the
embarrassment involved. We must remember that
when we sit in constitutional courts, even we are
prone to making mistakes. Therefore, personal
criticism of Judges or recording findings on the
conduct of Judges in judgments must be avoided.
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Furthermore, in the present case, the fact remains that
the strictures and/or the scathing observations were made
by the learned Single Judge of the High Court to the
detriment of the Appellant- Judicial Officer without providing
him any opportunity of explanation or showing cause. In
addition, thereto, we find that the entire foundation of the
High Court’s order seems to be based on the judgment in
the case of Jugal (supra) which stands reversed by this
Court in the case of Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan
2024:INSC:994 vide judgment dated 17th December, 2024.
A bare perusal of the judgment itself unmistakably reflects
that a superior court, while exercising its constitutional and
supervisory jurisdiction, is expected to function not as a fault-
finding authority alone, but as a friend, philosopher and guide to
the judiciary subordinate to it. The relationship between the
superior and subordinate judiciary is founded upon institutional
trust, guidance, and corrective supervision, rather than
condemnation. Errors of judgment, procedural lapses born out of
human fallibility, or inadvertent omissions may, in appropriate
circumstances, be pardoned or corrected within the framework of
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[2026:RJ-JD:8194] (33 of 38) [CRLR-13/2026]
law. However, any deliberate interference, manipulation with the
judicial process particularly with the sanctity of court records or
the fairness of proceedings cannot be viewed with leniency. While
mistakes may invite correction, any act that tends to undermine
the purity of the judicial process strikes at the very root of the
administration of justice and, therefore, cannot be ignored or
brushed aside under the cloak of judicial discretion.
(g) I am guided by the rulings referred to hereinabove and I am
of the considered opinion that errors such as an error of
judgment, misappreciation or wrong interpretation of facts and
law, aberration or deviation from settled principles, non-
application of mind, recording of incorrect or improper
conclusions, exceeding jurisdiction, acting beyond jurisdiction,
passing an improper, incorrect, illegal or irregular order, or even a
wrongful exercise of discretion are essentially curable in nature.
Such infirmities, though serious, fall within the realm of judicial
error and are amenable to correction by the superior courts by
setting aside, modifying or remanding the order in accordance
with law; no further directions of a penal or disciplinary nature are
warranted, as the error stands rectified by judicial correction
alone. However, the controversy at hand does not pertain to a
mere erroneous exercise of jurisdiction or an incorrect
adjudication on the question of default bail. The issue transcends
the boundaries of judicial error. Here, the matter does not rest
upon a wrong decision simpliciter; rather, it raises a grave and
disturbing question as to the commission of an act expressly
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defined as an offence under the penal statute. In such
circumstances, mere setting aside of the impugned order would
not cleanse the taint. Annulment of the order may efface its
operative effect, but it cannot obliterate the alleged
misdemeanour embedded in its foundation. This is not a case
where judicial correction would suffice. Even if the order is set
aside, the alleged act does not stand neutralised. The defect, if
the allegations are borne out, is not curable in the ordinary sense
known to judicial review. If, in fact, a document has been created
in a manner amounting to making of a false document and the
same has thereafter been used as genuine for the purpose of
supporting or justifying a judicial order, the matter assumes
serious proportions. Such an act, if established, would not remain
confined within the four corners of judicial impropriety; it would
partake the character of a substantive offence. Yet, it is equally
imperative to observe that no final opinion on the culpability of the
concerned person should be recorded without a complete and
exhaustive probe. The seriousness of the allegation itself demands
a thorough, fair and comprehensive inquiry so that the truth is
unearthed in accordance with law.
CONCLUSION AND VERDICT
5. Prima facie, upon a careful perusal of the material placed on
record, this Court is constrained to observe that the charge-sheet
does not appear to have been filed on 21.11.2025, nor at any
time prior to the filing of the application for default bail by the
petitioner. What causes further disquiet to this Court is the
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subsequent preparation of order-sheets, which, on the face of the
record, seem to have been brought into existence thereafter. The
sequence of events, coupled with the attendant circumstances,
gives rise to a serious apprehension that such proceedings may
have been recorded with a view to defeat the statutory right of the
petitioner and to lend justification to the action of the concerned
Judicial Officer. Had the charge-sheet in fact been filed prior
thereto, there would have been no occasion for the Magistrate to
call the complete case diary, particularly when it was well within
the knowledge of the concerned Court that the charge-sheet had
not been presented till that date. It is further significant to note
that the endorsement dated 21.11.2025 shown to be made on the
reverse side of the cover page of the charge-sheet, and the same
bears the handwriting of the Presiding Officer himself. Had such
an endorsement been made by a Reader or ministerial staff in the
ordinary course of administrative functioning, the matter might
have stood on a different footing. When the endorsement is
admittedly in the hand of the Presiding Officer, the circumstances
assume a far more serious complexion. Such conduct, viewed in
totality, prima facie gives rise to grave and disturbing doubts
regarding the authenticity of the record and the manner in which
the proceedings have been sought to be projected. This Court
harbours a serious and prima facie doubt with regard to the very
existence and authenticity of the facts as portrayed in the order-
sheet projected to have been inscribed on 24.11.2025 and having
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two order sheets of 08.12.2025 with mismatch is a further
suspicious circumstance.
5.1 In view of the above chronological examination and the
strong and compelling circumstances emerging from the record,
this Court is constrained to observe that the juvenile is entitled to
be enlarged on bail on account of statutory default under Section
187(3) BNSS and under the mandate of Section 12 of the Juvenile
Justice Act and in view of the non-incriminating statements of the
prosecutrix against the juvenile.
5.2 Accordingly, the instant revision petition is allowed and
impugned order dated 17.12.2025 passed by the learned Special
Judge, POCSO Cases and orders dated 29.11.2025 and
08.12.2025 passed by the Juvenile Justice Board are hereby
quashed and set aside. The juvenile is accordingly ordered to be
released forthwith in accordance with law upon furnishing a
personal bond of Rs. 50,000/- and a surety of like amount to the
satisfaction of the learned Board.
5.3 If it be so that a document has been wilfully and deliberately
prepared falsely and thereafter projected or utilised as a genuine
one, such conduct, on the face of it, would not comport with the
standards expected of a judicial officer and may assume serious
proportions. An act of this nature, if established upon due
examination, would transcend the realm of a mere judicial error
and may invite deeper institutional scrutiny. Upon a careful, and
conscious perusal of the material presently available on record,
this Court is constrained to observe that the matter appears to
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warrant a closer and more comprehensive examination. The
allegations, by their very nature, touch upon issues of institutional
propriety and probity, and therefore cannot be lightly overlooked.
However, this Court refrains from expressing any conclusive
opinion at this stage. It would be appropriate that the issue be
placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for kind consideration to
take an appropriate view and determine the further course of
action, if so deemed necessary.
5.4 Before parting with the matter, this Court considers it not
only appropriate but imperative to observe that the circumstances
elaborately enumerated in preceding paragraphs, prima facie raise
serious and disquieting concerns touching upon the integrity,
purity and authenticity of the judicial record. The sanctity of
judicial proceedings rests upon the unimpeachable accuracy of the
order-sheet and contemporaneous recording of events. The
conduct of a Judicial Officer and the quality of his judicial work are
expected to be of the highest order, imbued with purity, ethical,
and of sterling worth. If circumstances give rise to a reasonable
doubt touching upon such standards, be it in conduct or in the
discharge of judicial functions, it becomes imperative that the
matter be subjected to a fair and impartial enquiry. The sanctity of
the institution cannot brook even a semblance of compromise, and
any cloud cast upon it must be dispelled through due process in
accordance with law. Any deviation therefrom, particularly when it
bears upon the liberty of a citizen, has ramifications far beyond
the confines of the present case and impacts public confidence in
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the administration of justice. In view of the above, the Registry is
directed to place the matter, along with this order sheet, before
Hon’ble the Chief Justice for kind perusal and consideration to take
such further action as may be warranted in the facts and
circumstances of the case, so as to preserve the purity of the
judicial process and obviate recurrence of such irregularities in
future.
6. Stay petition and any pending applications stands disposed
of.
(FARJAND ALI),J
212-Mamta/-
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