Jammu & Kashmir High Court – Srinagar Bench
Ut Of J&K And Others vs Shabir Ahmad Yatoo on 12 March, 2026
Bench: Javed Iqbal Wani, Moksha Khajuria Kazmi
S. No. 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
Pronounced on:12.03.2026
Uploaded on: 23.03.2026
CM No.764/2025 in RP No.12/2025 CM No.765/2025
UT OF J&K AND OTHERS ...Appellant(s)
Through: Mr. Ilyas Nazir Laway, GA with
Mr. Mohd Younis Hafiz, Assisting Counsel.
Vs.
SHABIR AHMAD YATOO ...Respondent(s)
Through: Mr. Tasaduq H. Khawaja, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Naseer ul Akbar, Advocate and
Mr. Imaan Abdul Muizz, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE JAVED IQBAL WANI, JUDGE.
HON'BLE MS JUSTICE MOKSHA KHAJURIA KAZMI, JUDGE.
ORDER
12.03.2026
(Per Javed Iqbal Wani, J).
1. The instant time barred Review Petition has been filed by Union
Territory of Jammu and Kashmir seeking review of judgment dated
30.06.2022 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in WP(C) No.
174 of 2021 titled “Shabir Ahmed Yatoo Vs. Union Territory of India
and Others“, and has been filed on 14.02.2025, i.e., almost more than
900 days after expiry of period prescribed for filing review petition.
However, an application being CM No.764/2025 accompanying
therewith has been filed seeking condonation of delay in filing review
petition within prescribed time. The contents of the application are
reproduced in verbatim here under:-
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“1. …
2. The delay in filing the review petition is neither willful nor due to negligence
but resulted from genuine administrative and legal complexities. After the
judgment dated 30. 06. 2022, the matter was immediately taken up with the
Administrative Department, seeking instructions regarding the special
penalty of Rs. 10.00 lacs and legal recourse. The case was referred to the
Learned Advocate General, who advised that while the scope of success in
an SLP was limited, a review petition could be considered if an error
apparent on the face of the record was found. Meanwhile, ownership of the
disputed land was challenged by the Revenue Department, necessitating
verification before compensation payment. Further delay occurred due to
the resignation of the initially assigned Additional Advocate General,
requiring a new appointment and fresh sanction letter, which was issued
only on 09.03.2023. In the meantime, the Respondent initiated contempt
proceedings (CCP(D) No. 66/2022), complicating matters further, as the
Hon’ble Court did not accept the title dispute during contempt proceedings.
Given the multiple layers of government approval, legal scrutiny, and
procedural requirements, the delay was unavoidable. Since the delay was
caused by bona fide efforts to ensure compliance with the law and prevent
wrongful payment of compensation, it is prayed that the Hon’ble Court
condones the delay in filing the review petition in the interest of justice.
3. That it is most humbly submitted that the sanction to file review
against the order/judgment dated: 30.06.2022 passed in the main writ
petition was received vide letter dated: 18.11.2022 and letter dated:
09.03.2023 but could not be filled due to the reasons beyond the
control of respondents.
4. That, since the new facts with respect to ownership of the petitioner has
come fore therefore the matter was again taken up with the administrative
department, the matter remained under examination in the Administrative
Department and the matter was examined by the respondents in light of the
records. In the process, the respondents were required to collect the
records from various offices and also to obtain legal advice from the
Department of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs. Sanction to file
Review Petition was given by the law Department by virtue of
communication dated 07.02.2025. The examination of the matter and
consideration of the question of filing of the Review Petition at various levels
obviously led to consumption of time. The Ld. Counsel took up the matter
with the Petitioners for furnishing the requisite information along with
certified copy of the Judgment dated 30.06.2022. After receiving the
relevant records, the Ld. Counsel took some days for drafting and filing of
Review Petition. Thus, the delay has not been caused in filing of the Review
Petition deliberately, wilfully or intentionally.
5. The Applicants/petitioners submit that in the event this Hon’ble Court is
pleased to grant the indulgence of condoning the delay occasioned in filing
the review petition, the maximum that will happen is that the Review petition
would get decided on its merits and in such a case no prejudice would be
caused to the party opposite and on the contrary the cause of justice would
be advanced.
6. It is further submitted that it is trite principle of law that where the cause of
technicality is pitted against the cause of substantial justice, the later shall
prevail. The Application seeking Condonation of delay, on this count as well
deserve to be allowed in the interest of justice.
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7. The Applicants/Appellants submit that granting of indulgence prayed for
through the medium of this Application would, therefore, be in consonance
with law and justice. The delay occasioned in filing the accompanying
Review petition be condoned in the interests of justice and the accompany
Review Petition deserves to be taken on record and decided on merits in
accordance with law.
8. That it is settled position of law that since the Government Is impersonal
machinery and decisions are taken at slow pace and certain amount of
latitude is not impermissible and above all Government and private parties
cannot be put on same footing in the matters of condonation of delay and
peculiar characteristics of functioning of the Governmental conditions
require adaptation of pragmatic approach for the applications for
condonation of delay.
9. That, it is submitted that the matter covered by the Review Petition involves
very important questions of law, which require authoritative adjudication of
this Hon’ble Court. The respondents have a strong case and are sure to
succeed on merits, thus having regard to facts and circumstances of the
case, the delay in filing the Review Petition deserves to be condoned so that
a meritorious case is not thrown out without examining the case on merits”.
2. The respondent herein has filed objections to the application for
condonation of delay and prayed that application in filing review
petition be dismissed as no sufficient cause that prevented the review
petitioner in filing review petition in time has been disclosed in the
application. The respondent herein has stated that even after obtaining
second sanction for filing the review petition on 09.03.2023, the
petitioner has failed to disclose any cause, let alone, sufficient cause,
to justify delay of about 712 days after issuance of the said sanction.
Heard counsel for the parties, perused the record and considered
the matter.
3. The moot question involved herein the instant application is whether
in the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay of about 900 days
in filing the review petition should be condoned. The answer to that
question is contingent upon showing a sufficient cause that prevented
the review petitioner from filing review petition within time or as
early thereafter, meaning an adequate and enough reason that
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prevented a party from approaching the Court within the prescribed
period.
4. Perusal of application would show that a decision to file a review
petition had been taken by the petitioner on 18.11.2022 and it is
claimed that since Additional Advocate General, who had been
assigned the case, had resigned and second sanction was issued on
09.03.2023. As to why review petition had not been filed immediately
thereafter, no cause thereof is shown. There is nothing to show on
record as to what prevented review petitioner from filing review
petition immediately after sanction to file review petition has been
granted excepting stating that matter remained under examination in
the Administrative Department and that matter was examined in the
light of records. It is also claimed that since government is an
impersonal machinery, decisions are taken at slow pace and as such
certain latitude deserves to be given as private parties and government
cannot be put on same footing. It is also claimed that since petitioner
has a strong case, therefore, delay needs to be condoned, and that
otherwise also no prejudice would be caused to the respondent in case
the application is allowed.
5. Before proceeding further in the matter, legal position enunciated by
the Apex Court on the issue needs to be referred here under:-
In “Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi“, reported in 2021
SCC Online SC 1260, it has been laid down that even though
limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied
with all its rigour when prescribed by statute.
4
Likewise in the case of “Basawaraj v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer” reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court while rejecting an application for condonation of
delay for lack of “sufficient cause” has concluded in Paragraph 15 as
follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a
case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona
fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have
not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground
to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to
be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to
the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order
in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature.”
In “Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D)
through his legal heir”, reported in 2024 INSC 262, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court after referring to various decisions on the issue has in
unequivocal terms observed that delay should not be excused as a
matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause
prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant paragraphs of the same is
profitably extracted below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going
to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that
sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and
inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of
India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If
the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time
prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn
around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the5
delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime
in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date
the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would
be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days
and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal
proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or
not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they
want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for
which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party
has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his
own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay
and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the
substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical
considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the
court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a
duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party
seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant
and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the
delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound
public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of
Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of
time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.”
In Pathapati Subba Reddy Vs. Special Deputy Collector 2024 (12) SCC 336
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has ruled observed as under:
“15 It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of limitation is based, the
object behind the law of limitation and the mandatory and the directory
nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act that we have to
examine and strike a balance between Section 3 and Section 5 of the
Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay.
16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the
phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to
condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply
law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. In
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. v. Katiji and Ors. AIR 1987
SC 1353, this Court in advocating the liberal approach in condoning the
delay for ‘sufficient cause’ held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to
benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day’s
delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay
may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest
of justice that cause of substantial justice should be allowed to prevail upon
technical considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be
condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is
adopted in condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing
the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary
power to condone the delay. The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-
oriented approach’ and cause for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’
cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale6
matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by
taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient cause’ in
deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the
period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour
of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed.
The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and
may proceed on such assumption creating new rights.
18-21 ……..
22. It has also been settled, vide State of Jharkhand Vs. Ashok Kumar
Chokhani, AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be
considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in
filing the appeal.
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC
81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be
exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation
Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide
is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly
affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as
prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the
law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable
grounds.
24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision which
clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be maintained
between adopting liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it
stands. Paragraph 12 reads as under:
“12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly
affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour
when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend
the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a
statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore
that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its
operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to
enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex
sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands
attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while
interpreting a statute.”
25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide paragraph 15
went on to observe as under:
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where
a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the
applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient
cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party
is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the
facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted
diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to7
condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by
this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was
no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature.”
26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid,
and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be
an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the
right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of
for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed
period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed
differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense
whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach,
justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept
in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the
delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of
power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if
sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where
there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not
mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is
not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in
condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the
parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the
delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed,
tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has discussed the
evolving approach of the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering
application for condonation of delay in case titled “State of Odisha
Vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School“
reported as 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191. In the aforesaid case State of
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Odhisa had filed an SLP after a delay of 178 days and soughtcondonation of delay by claiming that delay was procedural and not
intentional. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while refusing to condone
the delay has referred to evolving approach of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court while considering applications for condonation of delay and
scope of sufficient cause. It would be advantageous to reproduce here
under the relevant portions of the judgment;
“11. We now proceed to assign our reasons.
12. No cause, much less sufficient cause, has been shown for exercise
of discretion in favour of the State of Odisha. The nature of
explanation in the application for condonation of delay is such that
with much ado, the proceedings could be closed.
13. However, since there is a long line of decisions of this Court
propounding the law that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed
by the legislature in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is
adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a
meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice and in view
of the submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have considered it appropriate
to consider the matter in some depth.
14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag
v. Mst Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107, a coordinate Bench noting that the
justifiably liberal approach which this Court has been adopting in
matters instituted before it is not being followed by the courts lower
in the hierarchy, mandated that a justice oriented approach is indeed
called for when a ‘State’ seeks condonation of delay as
distinguished from ‘a private party’.
15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon’ble Justice M.N.
Venkatachaliah speaking for the coordinate Bench in G.
Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer (1988) 2 SCC 142 had
referred to Katiji (supra) in paragraph 14 and quoted the following
passage therefrom:
“When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted
against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay …
It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its
power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is
capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.”
Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it was held as under:
15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet
another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If9
appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults,
no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate
analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of
Government are collective and institutional decisions and do
not share the characteristics of decisions of private
individuals.
16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private
citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any
other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or
omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different
complexion is imparted to the matter where Government
makes out a case where public interest was shown to have
suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its
officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at
cross purposes with it.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case,
constitutes “sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it
might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the
considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors
which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of
the government. Governmental decisions are proverbially
slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of
procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain
amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly
said that those who bear responsibility of Government must
have “a little play at the joints”. Due recognition of these
limitations on governmental functioning — of course, within
reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial approach is
not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair
and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the
same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the
very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay
incidental to the decision-making process. In the opinion of
the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the
Government placed the Government in a predicament and
that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the
officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon
and trusted its law officers. …
16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegow Ramegowda (supra) were consistently
followed by this Court until adoption of a different and seemingly
strict approach while dealing with applications for condonation of
delay during the last decade and a half became discernible starting
with the decision in Postmaster General v. Living Media India
Limited (2012) 3 SCC 563 where a delay of 427 days in filing the
relevant special leave petition was not condoned. University of Delhi
v. Union of India (2020) 13 SCC 745 is another decision (of a three
Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of 916 days was not
condoned. While upholding the decision of the relevant high court
under challenge refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days in
presentation of an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 by the heirs of a deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench
in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA) (2024) 12 SCC 336 very
recently reiterated that the law of limitation is founded on public10
policy, the object is that a legal remedy is put to an end so that no
litigation remains pending for an indefinite period. It was also held,
departing from the earlier view, that the merits of the case cannot be
considered at the stage of considering the application for
condonation of delay.
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of
India (2023) 10 SCC 531 authoring the judgment for a coordinate
Bench adopted the view taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra)
and a host of other decisions following the same while not interfering
with an order of condonation of delay passed by the relevant High
Court. However, it was observed that a distinction ought to be drawn
between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that is proffered as cause
for condonation of delay. It was also emphasized that a different
approach has to be adopted while this Court is considering an
application for condonation of delay in presentation of an
appeal/application and when it sits in appeal over a discretionary
order of the high court granting the prayer for condonation of delay.
In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the
only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper
exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation
has to be examined.
18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of the decisions
post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal
approach is the exasperation and consequent lament expressed by
none other than Hon’ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of
authoring a brief order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v.
Amateur Riders Club, Bombay 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603 and
admonishing officers of the “revenue” in not acting with promptitude.
This order was made within six years of the decision in Ramegowda
(supra). We can do no better than quoting the same in its entirety
hereunder:
1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned senior
counsel for the Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is
delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in the past, this
Court has been making observations as to the grave
prejudice caused to public interest by appeals brought on
behalf of the Government being lost on the point of limitation.
Such observations have been made for over a few years in
the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous
improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is
filed in November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had
better be set out in petitioner’s own words:
“(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition
drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for
approval to the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case
file.
(h) The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-on-
Record on July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to the Board
on September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP was not
approved by the Board. The Board after approving the draft
SLP sent this file to CAS on October 1, 1993.”
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3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially
acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier
observations of this Court made in several cases in the past,
we hoped that the matters might improve. There seems to be
no visible support for this optimism. There is a point beyond
which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the
litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of
bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of
limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of
granting relief. It is true that Government should not be
treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of
the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals
are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily
bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits
to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered
for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the
attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its
common interests. The affidavit is again one of the
stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism
that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to
the need for promptitude even where it affects its own
interest.
4. The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly,
dismissed. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed
as barred by time.
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur Riders (supra), one after
the other, leaves none in doubt that it did not take much time for this
Court to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down
in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much optimism
that matters would improve. Their Lordships, however, found no
visible support for such optimism and the Court’s patience having
been tested to the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond
which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant
labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the
Government.
20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly lethargic, tardy and
indolent not only before the High Court but also before this Court.
Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the
High Court, this Court has been approached by the State of Odisha
four months after expiry of the period of limitation.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is
entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone delay.
Despite all the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of the clear
opinion that the cause sought to be shown here by the State of
Odisha is not an explanation but a lame excuse. No case for
exercise of discretion has been set up.”
6. Analysing the present application seeking condonation of delay on the
touchstone of aforesaid principles, it is manifest that no cause much
less a sufficient cause has been shown, which prevented the
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petitioners from filling review petition particularly after sanction to
file appeal had been granted. Even if it is admitted that the then
Additional Advocate General had resigned, there is considerable delay
of about 700 days after second sanction is claimed to have been
granted and no sufficient cause, whatsoever, has been even shown
after second sanction for filing the appeal had been granted on
09.02.2023, and admittedly review petition has been filed more than
two years thereafter without any explanation for the intervening
period. Petitioners seemingly have been totally negligent in availing
the remedy well within time inasmuch as to show a sufficient cause
for availing the same beyond time.
7. Viewed thus, the application seeking condonation of delay is
dismissed, as a corollary whereof the accompanying review petition
shall also stand dismissed along with connected CM/s.
(MOKSHA KHAJURIA KAZMI) (JAVED IQBAL WANI)
JUDGE JUDGE
SRINAGAR
12.03.2026
Ishaq
Whether the judgement/order is speaking? Yes
Whether the judgement/order is approved for reporting ? Yes
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