Become a member

Get the best offers and updates relating to Liberty Case News.

― Advertisement ―

A Constitutional Analysis Through the Doctrine of Pith and Substance – Law School Policy Review

Sanskriti Verma Abstract: This post examines how the Promotion and Regulation of Online Gaming Act, 2025 fails constitutional scrutiny under the Doctrine of Pith...
HomeHigh CourtAndhra Pradesh High Court - AmravatiUnknown vs Airports Authority Of on 18 February, 2026

Unknown vs Airports Authority Of on 18 February, 2026

Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati

Unknown vs Airports Authority Of on 18 February, 2026

            HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI

          MAIN CASE: W.P. Nos. 4140, 4220, 3644 and 3645 of 2026
                              PROCEEDING SHEET

Sl.                                                                                OFFICE
        DATE                               ORDER                                    NOTE
No

      18.02.2026 MRK, J
                                   I.A.No.1 of 2026 in
                       W.P. Nos.4140, 4220, 3644 and 3645 of 2026
                      Heard Sri Dama Seshadri Naidu, learned Senior
                Counsel assisted by Sri Y.N. Vivekananda, learned counsel
                for the petitioner in W.P.Nos.3644 and 3645 of 2026; Sri C.
                Prakash Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner in
                W.P.No.4140 of 2026, Sri Venkat Challa, learned counsel
                for the petitioner in W.P.No.4220 of 2026, and learned
                Government Pleader for Industries & Commerce.
                2.    Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in all
                the writ petitions raised their advanced arguments and
                confined themselves to the seminal issue of jurisdiction.
                3.    It is their prime submission that the very initiation of
                the proceedings before A.P. Micro and Small Enterprises
                Development     Facilitation   (hereinafter   referred   to   as
                'APMSEFC') is coram non judice as it lacks the statutory
                competence.
                4.    In view of the jurisdictional issue raised in all these
                matters against the very same respondent-APMSEFC,

these applications are being disposed of by way of this
common order with the consent of parties’ counsel and the
2

learned Government Pleader.

5. According to the petitioners, until and unless the
claimants are established as suppliers in terms of the
definition under Section 2(n) and Section 8 (1) of Act 27 of
2006, their claims are beyond the jurisdictional powers of
APMSEFC. Whereas, in the instant case, the APMSEFC,
without going through the said aspect, has entertained the
claim and proceeding for adjudication.

6. To substantiate their assertions, the learned counsels
specifically pointed out in their respective writ petitions
about the dates of registration and dates of supply of the
un-official respondents’ entities.

7. Another facet stated by the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners is that despite their specific
pleas urged in their appeals by way of objections/statement
of defenses before the APMSEFC, the said points were not
adverted to at all.

8. Conversely, the learned Government Pleader submits
that, admittedly, under the provisions of Act 27 of 2006,
there is an alternative remedy of appeal. Therefore, the
writ petitions are not maintainable.

9. Considering the rival submissions advanced across
the bar, for the sake of comprehensive view, it is relevant to
extract Section 2 (n) of Act 27 of 2006, hereunder:

“2 Definition-

(n). “supplier” means a micro or small enterprise,
which has filed a memorandum with the authority
3

referred to in sub-section (1) of section 8, and
includes,-

(i) the National Small Industries Corporation, being
a company, registered under the Companies Act,
1956
(1 of 1956);

(ii) the Small Industries Development Corporation
of a State or a Union territory, by whatever name
called, being a company registered under the
Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);

(iii) any company, co-operative society, trust or a
body, by whatever name called, registered or
constituted under any law for the time being in
force and engaged in selling goods produced by
micro or small enterprises and rendering services
which are provided by such enterprises;”

10. It is also apt to extract Section 8 (1) of the Act 27 of
2006, which read as under:-

“8. Memorandum of micro, small and medium
enterprises.-

(1) Any person who intends to establish,

(a) a micro or small enterprise, may, at his
discretion, or

(b) a medium enterprise engaged in providing or
rendering of services may, at his discretion; or

(c) a medium enterprise engaged in the
manufacture or production of goods pertaining to
any industry specified in the First Schedule to the
Industries (Development and Regulation) Act,
1951
(65 of 1951), shall file the memorandum of
micro, small or, as the case may be, of medium
enterprise with such authority as may be
specified by the State Government under sub-

section (4) or the Central Government under
sub-section (3):”

4

11. Keeping in view of the above statutory provisions and
on a conjoint reading of Section 2(n) and 8 (1) of Act 27 of
2006, apparently, as per the petitioners, the un-official
respondents are not fulfilling the above statutory
prerequisites. Hence, the very entertainment and
adjudication of the claim and its consequential proceedings
thereto are vitiated under the statutory realm. Also, in the
absence of statutory prerequisites from the un-official
respondents, the very entertainment of the respective
claims arising out of the writ petitions would come under the
principle of coram non judice.

12. It may be worthwhile to mention that any
order/decision or award passed by the forum lacking
jurisdiction to adjudicate the said disputes, it strikes out the
very root of the matter.

13. It is apposite to mention the case of Bhadra
International (India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Airports Authority of
India1
, wherein the Apex Court expressed its view that an
objection to the inherent lack of jurisdiction can be taken at
any stage of the proceedings. Hence, under any stage,
including the primary or final, the proceedings before
pending decision or after passing decision or after passing
award by APMSEFC, would be amenable to questioning its
jurisdiction, which is maintainable.

14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court (Two Judge) in

1
2026 SCC OnLine SC 7
5

Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. State of
Rajasthan, after interpreting the provisions of Act 27 of
2006, held that the writ petition is maintainable once the
award itself suffers from a jurisdictional error.

15. Later on, the Hon’ble Supreme Court (Two Judge) in
Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. Vs.
Mahakali Foods Pvt. Ltd.2
, without noticing the ratio held
in Jharkhand Ujra Nigam (supra), took note of non
obstante clause in Section 4 (1) of Act 27 of 2006 and
opined that writ is not maintainable against the arbitral
award and also further held that the said award should be
challenged as per the provisions of the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act
.

16. Significantly, the Apex Court (Three Judge Bench) in
India Glycols Ltd. Vs. Micro and Small Enterprises
Facilitation Council, Medchal3
, while referring to the
judgment of Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation
(supra), had expressed that against the award under Act 27
of 2006, the writ petition is not maintainable under Article
226
of the Constitution of India.

17. Notably, in Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd.
Vs. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council4
,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court (Three Judge Bench), while
interpreting the dictums held in Jharkhand Urja Vikas

2
(2023) 6 SCC 401
3
(2025) 5 SCC 780
4
2025 (4) SCC 1
6

Nigam, Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation and
India Glycols Ltd. cases (supra), had categorically
expressed its reservation on the dictum of India Glycols
Ltd.
(supra). For the sake of clarity, the relevant para
No.50 of the judgment is extracted hereunder:-

“50. We also have reservations on the
dictum in India Glycols which holds that a writ
petition is not maintainable against any order
passed by MSEF and the only recourse
available is in terms of Section 34 of the A&C
Act, and that too would require a deposit in
terms of Section 19 of the A&C Act.”

Further in the said judgment, it had framed the following
questions and referred the matter to the Larger Bench of
Five, for authoritative pronouncement, which is pending
adjudication:-

“64. In the light of the aforesaid decisions, we
deem it appropriate to refer the following
questions raised in the present appeal to a
larger Bench of five Judges, namely:-

64.1. (i) Whether the ratio in India Glycols
that a writ petition could never be entertained
against any order/award of MSEFC,
completely bars or prohibits maintainability of
the writ petition before the High Court?
64.2. (ii) If the bar/prohibition is not absolute,
when and under what circumstances will the
principle/restriction of adequate alternative
remedy not apply?

64.3 (iii) Whether the members of Merc who
undertake conciliation proceedings, upon
failure, can themselves act as arbitrators of the
Arbitral Tribunal in terms of Section 18 of the
MSMED Act, read with Section 80 of the A&C
7

Act?

The first and second question will subsume the
question of when and in what situation a writ
petition can be entertained against an
order/award passed by MSEFC acting as an
Arbitral Tribunal or conciliator.

65. The Registry is directed to place the papers
before the Chief Justice so that an appropriate
decision can be taken on the administrative
side for the constitution of a larger Bench in the
present case.”

18. In the wake of the above substantial foundational
jurisdiction issue, the plea urged by the learned
Government Pleader that the effective alternative remedy of
appeal does not stand. Hence, there shall be interim
direction as prayed for, for a period of (6) six weeks.

W.P. Nos. 4140, 4220, 3644 and 3645 of 2026
In the light of the above contentious and intricate
jurisdictional issue involved in the above cases, it requires
full-fledged adjudication and also detailed hearing.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioners are permitted to
take out personal notices on the un-official respondents
through RPAD and file proof of service in the Registry
within a period of (4) four weeks.

3. List after (6) six weeks.

______
MRK, J
GVK



Source link