Delhi High Court
Union Of India vs Lt Col Mukul Dev on 23 February, 2026
Author: C. Hari Shankar
Bench: C. Hari Shankar
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 15 November 2025
Pronounced on: 23 February 2026
+ W.P.(C) 12769/2024 & CM APPL. 53189/2024
UNION OF INDIA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, ASG,
with Ms. Aakanksha Kaul, Mr. Aditya
Kashyap, Mr. Varun Pratap Singh, Ms.
Ashima Chopra, Advs. with Major Anish
Muralidhar and Brig Ajeen Kumar
versus
LT COL MUKUL DEV .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Rajiv Manglik, Mr. A.K.
Trivedi, Mr. Ajit Kakkar and Ms. Sonal
Singh, Advs. with Col Mukul Dev
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
% JUDGMENT
23.02.2026
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
A. The Issue
1. We are required, in this writ petition, which emanates from a
detailed judgment dated 31 July 2024 of a Full Bench of three learned
Members of the Armed Forces Tribunal, New Delhi1, to interpret
1 “AFT” hereinafter
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 1 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
Sections 192 and 293 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 20074, read
with Rule 255 of the Armed Forces Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 20086.
2. Expressed otherwise, we are required to gauge the reach of the
arms of the AFT, in ensuring implementation of the orders passed by
it.
3. The issue is purely legal and, therefore, is fact agnostic.
4. The Armed Forces Tribunal Amendment Bill, 2012
Before, however, proceeding to the issue, it has to be mentioned that
the Armed Forces Tribunal Amendment Bill, 20127 proposed to
substitute Section 19 of the AFT Act to read as under:
“19. The Tribunal shall have, and exercise, the same jurisdiction,
powers and authority in respect of contempt of itself as a High
Court has and may exercise and, for this purpose, the provisions of2 19. Power to punish for contempt. –
(1) Any person who is guilty of contempt of the Tribunal by using any insulting or
threatening language, or by causing any interruption or disturbance in the proceedings of such
Tribunal shall, on conviction, be liable to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
years.
(2) For the purposes of trying an offence under this section, the provisions of Section 14, 15,
17, 18 and 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971) shall mutatis mutandis apply, as if
a reference therein to–
(a) Supreme Court or High Court were a reference to the Tribunal;
(b) Chief Justice were a reference to the Chairperson;
(c) Judge were a reference to the Judicial or Administrative Member of the
Tribunal;
(d) Advocate-General were a reference to the prosecutor; and
(e) Court were a reference to the Tribunal.
3 29. Execution of order of Tribunal. – Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules made
thereunder, the order of the Tribunal disposing of an application shall be final and shall not be called in
question in any Court and such order shall be executed accordingly.
4 “the AFT Act” hereinafter
5 25. Powers of the Tribunal with regard to certain orders and directions. – Nothing in these rules
shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Tribunal to make such orders or give
such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process
or to secure the ends of justice.
6 “the 2008 Rules” hereinafter
7 “the 2012 Bill” hereinafter
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 2 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 shall have effect subject to the
modifications that-
(a) the references therein to a High Court shall be construed as
including a reference to such Tribunal;
(b) the references to the Advocate-General in section 15 of the
said Act shall be construed in relation to the Armed Forces
Tribunal, as a reference to the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-
General or the Additional Solicitor-General.”
However, the 2012 Bill was withdrawn and, therefore, never received
Parliamentary or Presidential assent.
5. A Brief Preliminary Overview
5.1 The issue in controversy essentially revolves around the powers
of the AFT to ensure that its orders are implemented. As the impugned
order notes, 5612 orders, passed by the AFT, were unimplemented on
the date when the impugned order was passed. This resulted in a
serious relook being necessary, regarding the power of the AFT to
ensure that its orders were implemented.
5.2 The discussion before us as, indeed, before the AFT, largely
revolved around the power of civil contempt and as to whether such a
power inherently vests in a judicial or quasi judicial authority, in the
absence of specific conferment. This discussion is, however, to our
mind, really innocent of the actual issue in controversy.
5.3 The AFT Act does not refer either to civil contempt or criminal
contempt. The power of the AFT to punish for contempt cannot be
disputed, as Section 19(1) is clear on that score. Section 19(1) does
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 3 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
not use the expression “civil contempt” or “criminal contempt”.
Section 19(1) envisages any person who (i) uses insulting or
threatening language, or (ii) causes any interruption or disturbance in
the proceedings of the Tribunal, as having committed contempt and, if
convicted in that regard, being liable for imprisonment up to three
years.
5.4 The nomenclature of the contempt which such a person would
have committed hardly matters. The provision provides that, if the
person commits any of the acts envisaged in the provision, he has
committed contempt. Proprio vigore, he becomes liable to suffer the
penal consequence envisaged in the provision.
5.5 The AFT framed two issues as arising for consideration by the
Larger Bench. We follow the example set by the AFT and refer to
them as Issue 1 and Issue 2.
5.6 Issue 1 pertained to Section 19 and read thus:
“Whether a willful disobedience to or non-implementation of its
order may amount to causing any interruption or disturbance in the
proceedings of this Tribunal thereby attracting action for contempt,
under Section 19 of the Act read with Rule 25?”
5.7 In substance, therefore, what the first question before the Larger
Bench, as framed above, essentially set up for adjudication, was
whether willful disobedience with an order passed by the AFT could
be regarded as causing interruption or disturbance in its proceedings.
If it could, the person so guilty of disobeying the AFT’s order would
have to suffer the wrath of Section 19(1).
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 4 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
5.8 Issue 2, as framed by the Full Bench, read as under:
“To include any other question, as may be considered relevant by
the Larger Bench to the issue in question inclusive of the scope and
ambit of Section 29 of the AFT Act, 2007 for effecting
compliance/execution of the orders of this Tribunal”
B. The Impugned Order
6. The afore-noted two issues were answered by the AFT as under:
7. Regarding Issue 1, the AFT has held that it has powers to
punish for contempt of itself or of its orders for upholding its majesty
and dignity and for it to be effectively functional. Following this
observation, the AFT concludes its discussion with respect to Issue 1
thus:
“260. The contention thus raised on behalf of the applicants of
CA 4/2014, CA 7/2014, CA 4/2022 and observations in CA 1/2023
and CA 2/2023 and the submissions by the Ld. Amicus Curiae that
repeated defiance despite final adjudication of rights of the Armed
Forces personnel, and the repeated non-compliance of the said
orders by the respondents, where there is no stay of the operation
of the orders of which implementation has been sought, by the
applicant thereof, the continuous recalcitrant attitude and non-
compliance of the directions of this Tribunal has essentially to fall
within the ambit of contempt in terms of Section 19 of the AFT Act
2007, has to be accepted.
Issue No. 1 is answered accordingly.
However, we consider it essential to observe that there can be no
unfettered use of the powers of contempt in terms of Section 19 of
the AFT Act 2007, which as rightly contended by the learned
amicus curiae Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, Sr. Advocate is an
extraordinary action to be taken by the Tribunal. The invocation of
the said powers of ‘contempt’ in terms of Section 19 of the AFT
Act 2007 thus have to be exercised with caution and care, in the
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 5 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
specific facts and circumstances of each case.
REFERENCE ANSWERED QUA ISSUE NO. 2 BEFORE THIS
BENCH
Issue No. 2 reads to the effect:-
“To include any other question, as may be considered relevant by
the Larger Bench to the issue in question inclusive of the scope and
ambit of Section 29 of the AFT Act, 2007 for effecting
compliance/execution of the orders of this Tribunal.””
8. With respect to Issue 2, unfortunately, the impugned order does
not provide any categorical opinion except for referring to Rule 25 of
the 2008 Rules.
9. In arriving at its decision, the AFT proceeded on the following
reasoning:
(i) The principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat requires a
court, when faced with a choice between two interpretations of a
statute, one of which is narrower and would fail to achieve the
purpose of the legislation, and the other which would promote
the purpose of the legislation but may be bold in its nature, to
prefer the bold interpretation.
(ii) Despite the sheer magnitude of number of orders of the
AFT which had not been complied with, the departmental
authorities were seeking to contend that the AFT could not take
any action against them under Section 19 of the AFT Act. In
other words, it was sought to be contended that Section 19 did
not address a situation of non-compliance with the orders passed
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 6 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
by the AFT.
(iii) Article 338 of the Constitution of India did empower the
Parliament to modify the fundamental rights conferred by Part III
of the Constitution in its application to members of the Armed
Forces, but such abridging could only be to the extent it was
provided by Parliament. Fundamental rights of Armed Forces
personnel could not be abridged beyond the extent provided by
Parliament in terms of Article 33 of the Constitution. Thus, the
ordinary right of every citizen to invoke the inherent power of
contempt vested in a body which was charged with the duties to
adjudicate on disputes was sacrosanct and remained preserved.
(iv) The right to ensure that orders passed by the AFT were
enforceable by the AFT also flowed from the principle ubi jus ibi
remedium.
(v) Section 14(1)9 of the AFT Act provided that the AFT
would exercise, on and from the appointed day, all jurisdiction,
power and authority exercisable immediately before that day by8 33. Power of Parliament to modify the rights conferred by this Part in their application to Forces,
etc. – Parliament may, by law, determine to what extent any of the rights conferred by this Part shall, in their
application to,–
(a) the members of the Armed Forces; or
(b) the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order; or
(c) persons employed in any bureau or other organisation established by the State for
purposes of intelligence or counter intelligence; or
(d) persons employed in, or in connection with, the telecommunication systems set up for the
purposes of any Force, bureau or organisation referred to in clauses (a) to (c),
be restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of
discipline among them.
9 14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority in service matters. –
(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Tribunal shall exercise, on and from
the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority, exercisable immediately before that
day by all courts (except the Supreme Court or a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Articles
Signature Not Verified 226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to all service matters.W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 7 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
all courts except the Supreme Court or a High Court exercising
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in
relation to service matters. Thus, by virtue of Article 215 10 of the
Constitution of India, the AFT would be deemed to have all
powers of a court of record, which would include the power to
punish for contempt of itself.
(vi) Where the order made by a court – in the instant case, by
the AFT – was disobeyed by contumacious defiance, and the
person disobeying the order conducted himself or itself through
its agents in a manner which amount to obstruction to, or
interference with, the course of justice, it amounted to contempt
of a mixed character, civil as well as criminal, but, in any case,
amounted to commission of contempt within the meaning of
Section 19 of the AFT Act.
(vii) Section 41 of the AFT Act empowered the Central
Government to make rules for carrying the provisions of the AFT
Act by notification. The Armed Forces Tribunal (Practice) Rules
200911 were notified vide SRO 26(E) dated 17 September 2008.
Rule 10(2)12 of the Practice Rules required contempt applications
10 215. High Courts to be courts of record. – Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have
all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself.
11 “the Practice Rules” hereinafter
12 10. Scrutiny of application or petition or other pleadings and papers. –
(1) The Scrutiny Branch of the Registry shall, on receipt of the application or appeal or
pleadings from the receiving branch, scrutinise the same as expeditiously as possible but not
beyond two days from the date of receipt:
Provided that if, for any reason, the scrutiny is not completed within the said period, the
same shall be immediately reported to the Registrar, who shall take prompt steps to complete the
scrutiny.
(2) The report of the scrutiny of the application shall be in Form No. 2 and of Contempt
Application either Civil or Criminal in Form No. 3 and the scrutiny report shall be annexed to the
Signature Not Verified application or appealW.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 8 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
to be scrutinized in Form No. 3, whether civil or criminal, and for
the scrutiny report to be annexed to the application or appeal.
Note 2 in the said Form specifically identified the parties to be
impleaded in the case of civil contempt as well as criminal
contempt. Thus, the Practice Rules envisaged power, with the
AFT, to proceed for civil contempt.
(viii) The rules framed under Section 41 of the AFT Act were
required, in terms of Section 4313, to be placed before each House
of Parliament, when in session, for a period of 30 days after they
were made. The consequent Gazette Notification enforcing the
rules had, therefore, the same force as an Act of Parliament.
(ix) The AFT possessed all the trappings of a Court and
exercised the powers vested in High Courts in respect of service
matters relating to members of the Armed Forces, before they
were transferred to the AFT on coming into effect of the AFT
Act. This clearly indicated that the AFT had powers to punish
for contempt of itself and its orders for upholding majesty and
dignity of the institution and for it to be effectively functional.
(x) That said, proceedings under Section 19 of the AFT Act
were extraordinary proceedings, which could be taken only in
extreme cases. Section 19 was not meant to be routinely invoked,
13 43. Laying of rules. – Every rule made under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made,
before each House of Parliament while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be
comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session
immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any
modification in the rule or both Houses agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have
effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such
modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that
rule.
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 9 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
where the circumstances did not so warrant.
C. Rival Contentions
10. We have heard Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, learned Additional
Solicitor General for the Union of India and Mr. Manglik, learned
Counsel for the respondent, at length.
I. Submissions of learned ASG
11. The learned ASG submits that power to punish for civil
contempt cannot be conferred by implication. The AFT Act does not
confer any power on the AFT to punish for disobedience of orders
passed by it, and that is how it must be. He submits that the Court
cannot, by judicial fiat, confer, on the AFT, a power to punish for civil
contempt, where the legislature has not thought it fit to do so.
12. The learned ASG has emphasized the fact that the 2012 Bill,
which in fact proposed to confer civil contempt powers on the AFT,
was withdrawn. The legislative intent, therefore, he submits, is clear,
which is that the AFT should not be clothed with the power to punish
for contempt in the face of disobedience of the orders passed by it.
13. The learned ASG further submitted that depriving the AFT of
the power to punish for civil contempt of itself would not render its
orders unenforceable, as the High Court would, under Section 1014 of
14 10. Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate courts. – Every High Court shall have
and
Signature Not Verified exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice,
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 10 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, be able to punish any person who
contumaciously disobeys an order passed by any judicial or quasi-
judicial authority over which it exercises superintending powers,
which would include the AFT.
14. Insofar as Rule 25 of the 2008 Rules is concerned, the learned
ASG submits that it confers, on the AFT, the power to execute its
orders, and not to punish for civil contempt. In any event, submits the
learned ASG, a power to punish for contempt cannot be conferred by a
Rule. He relies for the purpose, on para 22 of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Kanwar Singh Saini v. Delhi High Court15. The
learned ASG further cites para 23 of T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Govt of
A.P.16
15. The learned ASG particularly draws attention to the following
paragraphs of the impugned order which, he submits, are ex facie
unsustainable in law:
“251. That the rules framed under Section 41 of the AFT Act
2007 in terms of Section 43 of the said enactment are mandatorily
required to be placed before each House of Parliament, where it is
in session for a period of 30 days after they are made, and thus, the
consequential enforcement of the Rules vide the gazetted
notification has to be held to be an act of Parliament, and thus, it
cannot be contended as sought to be contended by the respondents
that the Rules that have been framed as the Armed Forces Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules 2008 of which Rule 25 thereof brings forth the
non-obstante clause of ensuring unaffected exercise of inherent
powers by this Tribunal to make such orders or to give such
directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to itsin respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself:
Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in
respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (45 of 1860)
15 (2012) 4 SCC 307
16 (2001) 1 SCC 516
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 11 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
orders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of
justice and the AFT (Practice) Rules 2009 which specifically put
forth the submission of forms for action to be taken thereunder
specifying civil and criminal contempt specifying the aspect of
disobedience of orders of the Tribunal as falling within the ambit
of contempt,- the contention raised by the respondents that the AFT
(Procedure) Rules 2008 and AFT (Practice) Rules 2009 are
subordinate legislations and not the Rules formulated by the
legislature cannot be accepted in terms of the express content of
Sections 41 and 43 of the AFT Act 2007.
*****
258. Another aspect that cannot be overlooked is that this
Tribunal has the trappings of a Judicial Tribunal in view of its
composition comprising of the Chairperson who has essentially to
be a former Supreme Court Judge or a former Chief Justice of the
High Court of the country and the Judicial Members till the
amendment made by the Tribunals Reforms Act 2021 were all
necessarily required to have been a Judge of a High Court and even
pursuant to the Tribunal Reforms Act 2021, the eligibility criteria
for a person being appointed as a Judicial Member of this Tribunal
are coupled with the factum that this Tribunal in terms of Section
14(5) of the AFT Act 2007 is required to decide both questions of
law and facts that may be raised before it in relation to all service
matters except for exercise of powers by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court or a High Court exercising all jurisdiction under Article 226
and Article 227 of the Constitution of India, coupled with the
factum that in terms of Section 15 of the AFT Act 2007, this
Tribunal is empowered to dispose of appeals against conviction by
a court-martial and to substitute the finding of the court-martial, if
required, or to remit the sentences or mitigate the punishment
awarded or commute such punishment or enhance the sentences
awarded by a court-martial, to suspend the sentence of
imprisonment, to release the appellant if sentenced to
imprisonment on parole with or without conditions, coupled with
the factum that this Tribunal also is to hear appeals and pass and
substitute its findings if required, inclusive of the punishment, even
in relation to a death sentence that may be prescribed in terms of
Section 71 (a) of the Army Act 1950 or sentence of death awarded
in terms of Section 73 (a) of the Air Force Act 1950 or sentence of
death in terms of Section 71 (1) (a) of the Navy Act, 1957, coupled
with the factum that the decision of the Tribunal is final in terms of
Section 29 of the AFT Act 2007. This Armed Forces Tribunal,
which possesses all trappings of a Court with it exercising all
powers of the High Courts of the country before transfer of
proceedings to the Tribunal on the Armed Forces Tribunal Act
2007 coming into force except for the powers under Article 226
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 12 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
and 227 of the Constitution of India, this Tribunal has to be held
to have powers to punish for contempt of itself of its orders for
upholding the majesty and dignity of the institution and for it
to be effectively functional.”
16. The learned ASG submits that the AFT could not have
conferred, on itself, status of a court of record. He submits that there
are only three Courts of Record, recognized by law – the High Court,
the Supreme Court, and the Court of the Judicial Commissioner at
Manipur, vide Section 14 of the Manipur Courts Act, 195517.
17. The learned ASG further cited para 7 of State of U.P. v.
Roshan Singh18, para 9 of Niaz Mohammad v. State of Haryana19
and paras 43 to 45, 47 and 52 of Union of India v. Air Commodore
N.K. Sharma20.
II. Submissions of Mr. Rajiv Manglik
18. Responding to the submissions of the learned ASG, Mr.
Manglik submits that the AFT is indeed a court of record. He submits
that the judgment in Sudhakar Prasad dealt with Tribunals under
Article 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution of India. He draws
attention to the proceedings of the 10th Parliamentary Standing
Committee for Defence, in which the Minister informed the
Parliament that the AFT was a court of record. To support his
contention, Mr. Manglik further relies on para 12 of the judgment of
the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Supreme Court Bar
17 The Court of Judicial Commissioner was abolished in 1971 and a common High Court established in 1972.
18 AIR 2008 SC 1190
19 (1994) 6 SCC 332
20 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1673
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 13 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
Association v. Union of India21 and para 9 of the judgment of the
High Court of Kerala in A. Shihabudeen v. Principal Controller of
Defence.22
19. Mr. Manglik further submits that Section 10 of the Contempt of
Courts Act would not apply to the AFT, as it is not subordinate to the
High Court, which does not exercise supervisory jurisdiction over it.
If, therefore, civil contempt power is to be declined to the AFT, he
submits that orders passed by the AFT would be rendered
unenforceable.
D. Analysis
20. Certain basic principles are self-apparent.
I. AFT Act and Rules framed thereunder constitute a self-
contained code
21. The AFT is a creature of the AFT Act. Its powers and authority
stand circumscribed by the AFT Act and the Rules framed thereunder.
No power can, therefore, be conferred, on the AFT, which is not
traceable to a source to be found in the AFT Act, or the Rules.
22. As this Bench has had an occasion to observe in Manish
Kumar Giri v. Union of India23, the AFT Act is not enacted under
Article 323A or Article 323B of the Constitution of India. Article
21 (1998) 4 SCC 409
22 2010 SCC OnLine Ker 4643
23 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6230
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 14 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
323A does not apply because the AFT is not an Administrative
Tribunal, and Article 323B does not apply because the subject matter
of jurisdiction of the AFT is not one of those enlisted in Article 323B,
which are exhaustive.
II. No power of contempt outside Section 19
23. The AFT has been statutorily conferred the power of contempt,
but by Section 19 of the AFT Act. It is clear, to us, that it is not open
to any Court, therefore, to confer, on the AFT, any power of contempt
in excess of that conferred by Section 19. That would clearly amount
to judicial legislation, which is impermissible.
24. Significantly, Section 19 does not use the word “civil
contempt” or “criminal contempt”. Clearly, therefore, Section 19 is
self-contained, apropos the contempt power that vests in the AFT.
Where the legislature has deemed it appropriate to circumscribe the
contempt power that vests in the AFT by Section 19, the will and
mandate of the legislature has to be respected. We are clear, therefore,
that there can be no power of contempt, exercisable by the AFT,
which is not circumscribed by Section 19.
25. Incidentally, Section 19 is not in challenge.
III. Would disobedience of an order of the AFT fall within Section
19?
26. Section 19 categorises using of inserting or threatening
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 15 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
language, causing interruption in the proceedings of the AFT and
causing disturbance in the proceedings of the AFT as contempt and
empowers the AFT to award punishment to the contemnor in such a
case.
27. Mere disobedience of an order passed by the AFT, even if
contumacious, would clearly not attract the expression “using of any
insulting or threatening language”. Which takes us to the question of
whether contumacious disobedience of an order would attract the
expression “causing any interruption or disturbance in the proceedings
of” the AFT.
28. The “proceedings” of the AFT would, in ordinary course, come
to an end with the passing of a final order adjudicating a lis.
Disobedience of a final order passed by the AFT, contumacious or
otherwise, cannot, therefore, be regarded as causing interruption or
disturbance in the proceedings of the AFT.
29. The position may, however, be different if the order is
interlocutory in nature, or requires compliance, by one or other party,
of directions issued by the AFT, on which the future course of
proceedings is dependent to some extent. There may, therefore,
conceivably be a situation in which the AFT, at an interlocutory stage
of proceedings before it, issues directions, compliance with which is
necessary for the proceedings to smoothly continue. If disobedience
with such directions, by either party, results in disturbing or causing
interruption in the further course of the proceedings before the AFT,
and if the disobedience is contumacious, it may well attract Section
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 16 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
19(1) of the AFT Act, and amount to contempt within the meaning of
the provision.
30. We, therefore, are not in entire agreement with the learned ASG
in his contention that disobedience with an order passed by the AFT
would not, in any case, constitute contempt within the meaning of
Section 19(1) of the AFT Act. If the disobedience is contumacious,
and if it interrupts or disturbs further proceedings before the AFT in
the manner envisaged hereinabove, it would constitute contempt
within the meaning of Section 19(1), and the contemnor would be
liable to punishment as envisaged in the said provision.
31. Disobedience of a final order passed by the AFT would not,
however, attract Section 19, as, with the passing of the final order, the
proceedings before the AFT come to an end, and any future
disobedience of the said order cannot, therefore, result in interruption
or disturbance of the proceedings before the AFT.
IV. Whether Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act would apply
32. Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act empowers the High
Court to punish for contempt of any court subordinate to it.
33. In its decision in All India Judges Association v. Union of
India24, the Supreme Court has observed thus:
“No longer should this Court refer to the District Judiciary as
24 (2024) 1 SCC 546
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 17 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
‘subordinate judiciary’. Not only is this a misnomer because the
District Judge is not per se subordinate to any other person in the
exercise of her jurisdiction but also is disrespectful to the
constitutional position of a District Judge. Our Constitution
recognizes and protects a District Judge as a vital cog in the
judicial system. Respect ought to be accorded to this institution
and its contribution to the country.”
34. In a similar vein, the Supreme Court has also clarified, in
Sakhawat v. State of Uttar Pradesh25, that describing a Court as a
“lower Court” is “against the ethos of our Constitution”.
35. The use of the word “subordinate”, while referring to any
judicial authority who may be lower in the judicial hierarchy to the
High Court is, therefore, anachronistic. Section 10 of the Contempt of
Courts Act may, therefore, required to be more appropriately
reworded. We, however, have to interpret the provision as it stands,
gleaning its intent.
36. There is no legal or statutory definition for the expression
“subordinate” as employed in Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts
Act, perhaps advisedly. Inasmuch as the provision is one which
empowers the High Court to ensure, through power of contempt,
compliance with orders passed by judicial authorities “subordinate” to
it, the ambit of the provision has, clearly, to be as wide as possible.
Remedial and beneficial statutes have, it is trite, to be accorded the
widest possible interpretation, ensuring, of course, that the statute is
not stretched beyond legitimately elastic limits. The Privy Coucil, in
Sayad Mir Ujmuddin Khan v. Ziaulnisa Begum26, held that, in
25 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1205
26 (1897) ILR 3 Bom 422 (PC)
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 18 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
construing a remedial statute, the Court ought to give it the “widest
operation which its language will permit”, and that the Court has only
to ensure that “that the particular case is within the mischief to be
remedied and falls within the language of the enactment”. In Gover’s
Re. Coal Economic Gas Co.27, approvingly cited in In re. Hindu
Women’s Right To Property Act28, it was observed that the words of
such a statute must be so construed as to “give the most complete
remedy which the phraseology will permit”, so as “to secure that the
relief contemplated by the statute will not be denied to the class
intended to be relieved”29. In Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala
Uttam More30, the Supreme Court held thus:
“12. It is thus evident that Section 92-A was in the nature of a
beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer the benefit of
expeditious payment of a limited amount by way of compensation
to the victims of an accident arising out of the use of a motor
vehicle on the basis of no fault liability. In the matter of
interpretation of a beneficial legislation the approach of the courts
is to adopt a construction which advances the beneficent purpose
underlying the enactment in preference to a construction which
tends to defeat that purpose. The same approach has been adopted
by this Court while construing the provisions of the Act.”
37. Section 123(c) of the Railways Act, 1989 defines “untoward
accident” to include “accidental falling of a passenger from a train
containing passengers”. The Supreme Court, in Union of India v.
Prabhakaran Vijay Kumar31, was seized with the issue of whether a
passenger who fell off while boarding the train would be covered by
the expression. Recognizing the fact that two interpretations were
27 (1875) 1 Ch D 182
28 AIR 1941 FC 72
29 Raghuraj Singh v. Hari Kishan, AIR 1944 PC 35, per Lord Atkin
30 (1991) 3 SCC 530
31 (2008) 9 SCC 527
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 19 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
possible, the Supreme Court held:
“11. No doubt, it is possible that two interpretations can be
given to the expression “accidental falling of a passenger from a
train carrying passengers”, the first being that it only applies when
a person has actually got inside the train and thereafter falls down
from the train, while the second being that it includes a situation
where a person is trying to board the train and falls down while
trying to do so. Since the provision for compensation in the
Railways Act is a beneficial piece of legislation, in our opinion, it
should receive a liberal and wider interpretation and not a narrow
and technical one. Hence, in our opinion the latter of the
abovementioned two interpretations i.e. the one which advances
the object of the statute and serves its purpose should be preferred
vide Kunal Singh v. Union of India32, B.D. Shetty v. Ceat Ltd.33
and Transport Corpn. of India v. ESI Corpn.34
12. It is well settled that if the words used in a beneficial or
welfare statute are capable of two constructions, the one which is
more in consonance with the object of the Act and for the benefit of
the person for whom the Act was made should be preferred. In
other words, beneficial or welfare statutes should be given a
liberal and not literal or strict interpretation vide Alembic
Chemical Works Co. Ltd. v. Workmen35, Jeewanlal
Ltd. v. Appellate Authority36, Lalappa Lingappa v. Laxmi Vishnu
Textile Mills Ltd.37, S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District
Manager .”38
38. Recently, these principles stand reiterated by the Supreme Court
in the following passages from Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit39:
“8. To answer the issue at hand, it is imperative for this Court
to discuss the rules of interpretation to be applied when
interpreting a beneficial legislation akin to the Act at hand. While
dealing with certain provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, this
Court in Brahampal v. National Insurance Co.40, observed that a
beneficial legislation must receive a liberal construction in
32 (2003) 4 SCC 524
33 (2002) 1 SCC 193
34 (2000) 1 SCC 332
35 AIR 1961 SC 647
36 (1984) 4 SCC 356
37 (1981) 2 SCC 238
38 (2003) 4 SCC 27
39 (2025) 2 SCC 787
40 (2021) 6 SCC 512
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 20 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
consonance with the objectives that the Act concerned seeks to
serve.
9. This Court in K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob41 reiterated
the above expositions and stated that:
“11. Provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be
construed with a purpose-oriented approach. [Kerala
Fishermen’s Welfare Fund Board v. Fancy Food42] The
Act should receive a liberal construction to promote its
objects. [Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. ESI
Corpn.43 and Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya
Kumar44] Also, literal construction of the provisions of a
beneficial legislation has to be avoided. It is the Court’s
duty to discern the intention of the legislature in making the
law. Once such an intention is ascertained, the statute
should receive a purposeful or functional interpretation.
[Bharat Singh v. New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre45]*****
13. While interpreting a statute, the problem or mischief
that the statute was designed to remedy should first be
identified, and then a construction that suppresses the
problem and advances the remedy should be adopted.
[Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia46]
It is settled law that exemption clauses in beneficial or
social welfare legislations should be given strict
construction. [Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram
Kowshik47] It was observed in Shivram A.
Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik that the
exclusionary provisions in a beneficial legislation should be
construed strictly so as to give a wide amplitude to the
principal object of the legislation and to prevent its evasion
on deceptive grounds. Similarly, in Minister Administering
the Crown Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal Land Council48,
Kirby, J. held that the principle of providing purposive
construction to beneficial legislations mandates that
exceptions in such legislations should be construed
narrowly.”
(emphasis supplied)
41 (2020) 14 SCC 126
42 (1995) 4 SCC 341
43 (2009) 9 SCC 61
44 (2008) 9 SCC 527
45 (1986) 2 SCC 614
46 (2015) 10 SCC 161
47 (1984) 1 SCC 588
48 (2008) 237 CLR 285
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 21 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
10. More recently, in Kozyflex Mattresses (P) Ltd. v. SBI
General Insurance Co. Ltd.49, this Court held the definition of a
consumer under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to include a
company or corporate person in view of the beneficial purpose of
the Act.
11. While considering the provisions of the Medical
Termination of Pregnancy Act, this Court in X2 v. State (NCT of
Delhi)50, reiterated that interpretation of the provisions of a
beneficial legislation must be in line with a purposive construction,
keeping in mind the legislative purpose. Furthermore, it was stated
that beneficial legislation must be interpreted in favour of the
beneficiaries when it is possible to take two views.”
39. Another, wider, manifestation of the same principle, also
reflected in Urmila Dixit (supra), is Heydon’s rule of construction of
statutes, which ordains that a statute should be interpreted keeping in
mind the mischief that the statute seeks to remedy. Further, in
Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla51 and Richa
Mishra v. State of Chhatisgarh52, the Supreme Court has held that,
with the passage of time, the principle of purposive interpretation has
replaced the principle of literal interpretation of a statute as the
“golden rule”.
40. The mischief that Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act
seeks to address is, clearly, the possibility of orders of “subordinate
Courts” being disobeyed, or not complied with. If the “subordinate
Court” is not, statutorily, conferred with the power to punish such
disobedience in contempt proceedings, the High Court must be able to
step in and do so. Else, the possibility of orders and directions of all
49 (2024) 7 SCC 140
50 (2023) 9 SCC 433
51 (2016) 3 SCC 619
52 (2016) 4 SCC 179
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 22 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
judicial authorities, over which the High Court exercises
superintendence but which have not been conferred independent
powers of contempt to punish for disobedience, never being complied
with, looms disquietingly large.
41. We have already held that conferment, on the AFT, of the
power to punish disobedience of final orders passed by it, disposing of
the proceedings, would not attract Section 19. The AFT, therefore,
does not possess the power to punish disobedience of a final order
passed by it by way of contempt action.
42. In such circumstances, Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts
Act has to be available, to ensure that decisions of the AFT are
respected and implemented.
43. Even if, therefore, arguendo, the issue of whether the AFT is, or
is not, a “subordinate Court” may be regarded as arguable to some
degree, applying the principle enunciated in Prabhakaran Vijay
Kumar, Section 10 would be required to be liberally and purposively
interpreted, with a view to ensuring that the mischief of orders of
judicial and quasi-judicial authorities over which the High Court
exercises superintendence but which may not be statutorily conferred
with the power of civil contempt, remaining uncomplied with, is
remedied.
44. We, therefore, are of the view that non-compliance, or
disobedience, with a final order passed by the AFT in a lis before it
would attract the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court under
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 23 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
V. Is the AFT empowered to punish for disobedience, by either
side, of a final order passed by it, disposing of the proceedings? Rule
25 of the 2008 Rules and the decision in T. Sudhakar Prasad
45. The answer to this query, to our mind, is to be found in Rule 25
of the 2008 Rules.
46. Rule 25 is not an empowering, or enabling, provision. It does
not confer power on the AFT. What it does, positively, however, is to
recognise the existence of “inherent powers” in the AFT “to make
such orders or give such directions as may be necessary or expedient
to give effect to its orders or… to secure the ends of justice”.
47. Clearly, therefore, the AFT does possess inherent powers to
make orders, or give directions, as may be necessary or expedient to
give effect to its orders.
48. The submission of the learned ASG that no power to punish for
contempt, in the face of disobedience of an order passed by the AFT,
cannot be conferred by a Rule, is, therefore, clearly beside the point.
Rule 25 does not confer any such power. That power inherently vests
in the AFT, and Rule 25 merely recognizes this fact.
49. The 2008 Rules commences with the recital that they have been
made by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 24 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
by Section 41(2)(f), (g) and (k)53. It is not open, therefore, for the UOI
to question the 2008 Rules, or argue that they do not apply. Per
sequitur, inasmuch as Rule 25 itself states, in explicit terms, that the
AFT does possess the inherent power to issue necessary orders or
directions to give effect to its orders, the UOI cannot be heard to argue
to the contrary. Simply stated, the UOI cannot argue contrary to the
wording of the Rule which the UOI itself has enacted.
50. The AFT is not, therefore, powerless to pass orders or issue
directions to ensure that its orders are implemented. It has inherent
power to do so.
51. The question is – How far do those powers extend?
52. The vesting in inherent powers in an authority flows from the
maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine
quo res ipsa esse non potest which translates to “when the law gives
anything to anyone, it also gives all those things without which the
thing itself could not exist”.
53. The Rule making authority appears to have borrowed the words
53 (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of
the following matters, namely:–
*****
(f) the form in which an application may be made under sub-section (2) of Section 14, the
documents and other evidence by which such application shall be accompanied and the fee payable
in respect of the filing of such application or for the service of execution of processes;
(g) the other matter which may be prescribed under clause (i) of sub-section (4) of Section
14;
*****
(k) any other matter which may be prescribed or in respect of which rules are required to be made
by the Central Government.
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 25 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
in Rule 25 from Section 48254 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973. In the context of Section 482, the Supreme Court, in State of
Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa55, held thus:
“6. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case
of this nature is an exception and not the rule. The section does not
confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the
inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of
the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the
inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to
an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of
court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither
possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would
govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative
enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that
may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart
from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper
discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That
is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely
recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All
courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any
express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers
as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course
of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid
alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non
potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that
without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the
section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or
revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to
be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when
such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the
section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and
substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts
exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if
any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce
injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be
an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would
result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of
the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it
finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise
54 482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court. – Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or
affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any
order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice.
55 (2002) 3 SCC 89
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 26 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the
complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a
complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the
materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether
any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in
toto.”
54. There can, therefore, be no strict guideline regarding the
measures which the AFT could take, in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Rule 25. The power to pass orders, or issue directions, as may
be necessary to ensure implementation of its orders cannot, however,
be disputed, as it is in the nature of a statutory conferment.
55. The learned ASG relied on the decision in T. Sudhakar Prasad.
56. T. Sudhakar Prasad was concerned with the issue of whether
Administrative Tribunals set up under the Administrative Tribunals
Act, 198556, possessed the power of civil contempt. Section 17 of the
AT Act specifically vests Administrative Tribunals with the power of
civil contempt, and the issue before the Supreme Court was only
whether, post the decision of the seven Judge Bench of the Supreme
Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India57, this position had
undergone a change.
57. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative.
58. Inasmuch as the AFT Act does not contain any provision
analogous to Section 17 of the AT Act, the controversy in T.
Sudhakar Prasad is qualitatively different from that before us. Three
56 “the AT Act” hereinafter
57 (1997) 3 SCC 261
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 27 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
observations in T. Sudhakar Prasad are, however, of some relevance.
59. The first is in para 11 of the report, in which the Supreme Court
holds:
“The power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial
superintendence over the decisions of all courts and Tribunals
within their respective jurisdictions is also part of the basic
structure of the Constitution and a situation where the High Courts
are divested of all other judicial functions apart from that of
constitutional interpretation is equally to be avoided.”
The High Court, therefore, exercises judicial superintendence over the
AFT. However, that would not render the AFT a “Court subordinate
to” the High Court within the meaning of Section 10 of the Contempt
of Courts Act.
60. The second pertinent observation is to be found in para 17 of
the report, in which it is held, unequivocally, that Tribunals are not
courts of record. The finding, in the impugned order, to the contrary,
cannot, therefore, sustain.
61. Thirdly, the following penultimate paragraph of the report,
which specifically addresses the need for contempt jurisdiction, is
instructive:
“22. Contempt jurisdiction is exercised for the purpose of
upholding the majesty of law and dignity of the judicial system as
also of the courts and Tribunals entrusted with the task of
administering delivery of justice. Power of contempt has often
been invoked, as a step in that direction, for enforcing compliance
with orders of courts and punishing for lapses in the matter of
compliance. The majesty of judicial institution is to be ensured so
that it may not be lowered and the functional utility of the
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 28 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
constitutional edifice is preserved from being rendered ineffective.
The proceedings for contempt of court cannot be used merely for
executing the decree of the court. However, with a view to
preserving the flow of the stream of justice in its unsullied form
and in unstinted purity wilful defiance with the mandate of the
court is treated to be contemptuous. Availability of jurisdiction to
punish for contempt provides efficacy to functioning of the judicial
forum and enables the enforcement of the orders on account of its
deterrent effect on avoidance. Viewed from this angle the validity
of Section 17 of the Act is protected not only by sub-clause (b) of
clause (2) of Article 323-A but also by sub-clause (g) thereof.”
62. Thus, it is settled, in law, that enforceability of orders passed by
judicial and quasi-judicial authorities is of the essence. Adjudicatory
functions are not exercised by such authorities, normally peopled by
persons well-trained in the law, often with years of judicial experience
behind them, for a lark. They are adversarial in nature, with rival
rights being tested, tried and balanced by deft application of settled
legal principles. Decisions taken by judicial, or even quasi-judicial
authorities, are not intended to be consigned to oblivion.
63. It is, to say the least, startling – rather, shocking – that, on the
date when the impugned order was passed by the AFT, 5612 orders
passed by it remained to be complied with. This betokens a sorry state
of affairs, and we understand and appreciate the concerns which
prompted the AFT to hold as it did.
64. Para 22 of T. Sudhakar Prasad makes it clear that judicial
orders have to be enforceable. We do not know the present statistics,
but the fact that 5612 orders of the AFT were unenforced makes it
clear that, absent any sanction or method of enforcement, personnel of
the Armed Forces, who lay down their lives for the country without a
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 29 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
moment’s hesitation, can never be certain that, even if they succeed in
their litigation in the AFT, any relief would be forthcoming.
65. Which brings us back to the issue of the scope of Rule 25 of the
2008 Rules.
66. We are clear that Rule 25 cannot be construed so expansively as
to encompass, within itself, all powers which a court possessed of
civil contempt jurisdiction could exercise. Doing so would amount to
expanding the scope of contempt jurisdiction of the AFT beyond the
boundaries which the legislature chalked out, under Section 19 of the
AFT Act. We would, then, be doing, indirectly, via an adventurous
interpretation of the Rule, what we could not directly do under the
Act. This, clearly, would be impermissible.
67. At the same time, there being no other provision in the AFT
Act, or elsewhere, which would ensure that contumacious
disobedience of orders passed by the AFT do not go unpunished, it is
necessary to interpret Rule 25 as widely as possible.
68. A Division Bench of this Court, in Prem Kumar Gupta v. Bank
of India58, was seized with the issue of interpreting Section 19(25) of
the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act,
199359, which is practically in haec verba to Rule 25 of the 2008
Rules, and read thus:
“The Tribunal may make such orders and give such directions as
58 2015 SCC OnLine Del 8232
59 “the RDDBFI Act” hereinafter
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 30 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its orders or to
prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice.”
The Division Bench held thus, in para 29 of the report:
“29. We do not approve of the observations of DRAT that the
above noted clause Section 19(25), confers upon the DRT a
jurisdiction akin to the one vested in the High Court under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The language employed in
the two provisions may be similar but the import thereof cannot be
equated. The provision in Section 19(25) may at best be compared
with the one contained in Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which saves the “inherent power” of the civil court to
secure ends of justice or make orders to prevent abuse of the
judicial process. It is trite that such inherent jurisdiction to render
justice cannot be taken resort of so as to nullify the other statutory
provisions put in position to regulate the procedure. Where the
legislation deals expressly with a particular matter, the provisions
so enacted would normally be regarded as exhaustive.”
69. Applying the principle enunciated in the concluding sentence
from the above passage, the legislature having vested contempt
powers on the AFT by Section 19 of the AFT Act, the provision
would normally be regarded as exhaustive of the scope of contempt
jurisdiction of the AFT.
70. This reinforces our conclusion, supra, that no contempt power
vests in the AFT, civil or criminal, outside the peripheries of Section
19 of the AFT Act, the scope of which we have already attempted to
delineate.
71. Given the fact that (i) ensuring enforeability of the orders
passed by the AFT is a matter of utmost expediency, which cannot
brook compromise, (ii) Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act does
not empower this Court to punish for civil contempt of the AFT and
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 31 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
(iii) the contempt power vested in the AFT by Section 19 of the AFT
Act, we are of the opinion that Rule 25 has to be given its widest
scope and amplitude. That said, we are also convinced that no
parameters, within which the AFT could act under Rule 25 to ensure
compliance with its orders, can be laid down. In the absence of any
statutory provision empowering the AFT to incarcerate a recalcitrant
officer who refuses to comply with its order, we are sanguine that the
AFT cannot do so, as Article 21 of the Constitution of India does not
allow deprivation of life and liberty except according to procedure
established by law, and “law”, for the purposes of Part III of the
Constitution of India, is defined, by Article 13(3)(a), as including “any
Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or
usage having in the territory of India the force of law”.
72. Short of incarceration, however, we are of the view that the
powers of the AFT, under Rule 25, to issue orders or directions to
ensure implementation of its orders, is practically unbridled. They
may extent to imposing service sanctions or proceeding against the
assets of the officer, among other things. It is however not possible, in
the very nature of things, to precisely delineate the extent of the
power.
VI. Re. Article 33 of the Constitution of India
73. The invocation of Article 33 of the Constitution, by the AFT is,
in our view, misconceived. The right to move a court in contempt is
not a fundamental right. Moreover, it is also settled that there is no
inherent power of contempt, and that contempt power has to be
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 32 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
conferred by statute.
VII. Re. reliance, by the AFT, on the Practice Rules
74. The use of the words “either Civil or Criminal” in Rule 10(2) of
the Practice Rules, quite clearly, cannot be determinative of the issue
of whether the AFT can proceed in civil contempt against an officer or
authority for disobeying its final order.
VIII. Re. judgment in Supreme Court Bar Association
75. Para 12 of Supreme Court Bar Association, on which Mr.
Manglik relies to submit that the AFT is a court of record, merely
explains what a court of record is. It reads:
“12. A court of record is a court, the records of which are
admitted to be of evidentiary value and are not to be questioned
when produced before any court. The power that courts of record
enjoy to punish for contempt is a part of their inherent jurisdiction
and is essential to enable the courts to administer justice according
to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner and to uphold the
majesty of law and prevent interference in the due administration
of justice.”
76. This passage does not, in any way, indicate that the AFT is a
court of record. Rather, it is has been categorically held, in T.
Sudhakar Prasad, that Administrative Tribunals are not courts of
record. That decision would apply, mutatis mutandis, to the AFT.
IX. Re. judgment of the High Court of Kerala in A. Shihabudeen
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 33 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
77. Mr. Manglik relies on para 9 of this decision, which
unquestionably supports his stand, and reads:
“9. No doubt, definition clauses of the Contempt of Courts Act
and the whole provisions of the said Act as such are not
incorporated in the Act herein. However, under Section 19(1),
causing any interruption or disturbance in the proceedings of the
Tribunal is a contempt, which is made punishable thereunder.
Basically, the interruption or disturbance provided therein is
physical obstruction affecting the smooth functioning of the
Tribunal. We feel, even refusal to enforce the Tribunal’s orders
could also be brought within the scope of interruption or
disturbance of the proceedings of the Tribunal because execution
of orders of the Tribunal being the duty of the Tribunal under
Section 29 read with Rule 25 quoted above, the proceedings of the
Tribunal continue until the orders are executed and implemented.
In other words, with the passing of interim orders or final orders
the Tribunal is not relieved of the matter, and the proceedings
before it continues until the Tribunal executes it’s orders under
Section 29. For this purpose, it’s inherent powers are retained and it
has all the powers to enforce it’s orders under Sections 29 & 19
read with Rule 25. We do not see any other mechanism to enforce
an order except to punish those guilty of non-implementation for
contempt. In other words, only on fear of contempt action, the
orders of the Tribunal could be enforced. Clauses (ii) & (iii) of the
definition of criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt
of Courts Act cover interference with the due course of any
judicial proceedings or obstruction of the administration of justice
in any other manner. Non implementation of the orders of the
Tribunal that has become final is certainly an obstruction or
interference with the course of justice, and so much so is a criminal
contempt for which the Tribunal is entitled to initiate prosecution
proceedings under Section 19(1) of the Act.”
78. We respectfully express our inability to concur with the
reasoning of the High Court of Kerala, as contained in this passage
which, we feel, stretches Section 19 of the AFT Act beyond its
permissible limits. The observation that “refusal to enforce the
Tribunal’s orders could … be brought within the scope of interruption
or disturbance of the proceedings of the Tribunal” cannot, to our
mind, sustain, as the proceedings of the Tribunal would come to an
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 34 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
end with the rendition of the final order or judgment in the Original
Application filed before it.
79. The finding, of the High Court, that the proceedings continue
till the order is executed, to our mind, does not flow from the statute.
Section 29, which refers to execution of orders of the AFT, only states
that the order would be final and would “be executed accordingly”.
The AFT does not continue to deal with an OA filed before it till its
order is executed. The “proceedings”, therefore, come to an end with
the disposal of the OA, and do not continue thereafter.
80. Equally, and with respect, we are unable to agree with the
observation, in the context of the AFT Act, that “non implementation
of the orders of the Tribunal that has become final is certainly an
obstruction or interference with the course of justice”. Section 19
does not use the word “obstruction or interference with the course of
justice”, but reads “interruption or disturbance in the proceedings of
such Tribunal”. In fact, we find, from the impugned order, that the
AFT, too, has, at one point, read Section 19 as referring to obstruction
or interference with the course of justice. That woud amount to re-
writing Section 19, which is impermissible.
81. In fact, the characterization, in A. Shihabudeen, of non-
implementation of orders of the AFT as amounting to criminal
contempt effectively effaces the distinction between civil and criminal
contempt.
82. We, therefore, express our regretful inability to agree with the
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 35 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
decision of the High Court of Kerala in A. Shihabudeen, insofar as it
deals with the power of the AFT to proceed in contempt for non-
implementation of any final order passed by it in the proceedings is
concerned.
83. Qua interim orders or directions, however, the AFT could
invoke Section 19 in an appropriate case, as already held by us earlier
in this judgment.
X. Re. Report of 18th Standing Committee on Defence and the fate
of the 2012 Amendment Bill
84. We are somewhat surprised at the stand taken by the Defence
authorities as recorded in the Report of the 18th Standing Committee
on Defence, at the time of presentation of 2012 Amendment Bill, on
which the learned ASG relied. The submissions of the UOI record that
the Vice-Chiefs of the three Forces “emphasized the operational
difficulties likely to be faced by the armed services if such power of
civil contept are conferred on the Ld. AFT”.
85. This stand, to our mind, is both unreasonable and unsustainable
in law. There can be no question of any “operational difficulties” if
orders of the AFT are required to be complied with. If the order is
unpalatable to the authorities, remedies by way of judicial review are
available. The authorities have only two options with them; to obey
the order, or challenge it. Conferment of powers of civil contempt is
only to ensure enforcement of judicial orders, and it cannot lie in
anyone’s mouth to urge that enforcement of judicial orders results in
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 36 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
“operational difficulties”. Such a plea, if accepted, would render our
entire judicial edifice powerless.
86. We are also not inclined to accord, to the fact that the 2012
Amendment Bill did not go through, more importance than it
deserves. We do not know, finally, why it was not tabled. Be that as it
may, we have to decide the issue before us on the basis of the existing
statutory position. We have humbly attempted to do so.
E. Our Conclusions
87. We sum up our conclusions thus:
(i) Section 19 of the AFT Act does not empower the AFT to
proceed against any person for disobeying a final order or
judgment rendered by it, disposing of a lis.
(ii) However, if any disobedience, of any interim order or
direction issued by the AFT interferes with, or disturbs, further
proceedings before it, the AFT can proceed against the officer
responsible, by way of contempt action, under Section 19.
(iii) Once the legislature has conferred contempt jurisdiction
on the AFT – without categorizing it as “civil” or “criminal”
contempt, the AFT cannot be conferred, by judicial fiat, with
any additional power of contempt. Section 19 of the AFT Act
is, therefore, exhaustive, regarding the power of contempt
which the AFT can exercise.
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 37 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
(iv) Disobedience of any final order or judgment of the AFT
would, however, attract Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts
Act, and be punishable thereunder.
(v) The AFT is, further, empowered, by Rule 25 of the 2008
Rules, to issue all necessary directions or orders to give effect to
the orders passed by it, interim as well as final. The AFT
cannot, however, deprive any officer, howsoever recalcitrant, of
his liberty, in exercise of power under this provision.
F. A passing comment
88. While we have set out, above, the legal position as we see it, we
are sanguine that there is no want of compassion, in the executive, for
the members of our Armed Forces, and any delay or reluctance in
implementing the decisions of the AFT would ordinarily be bona fide.
We only request the authorities to, if they are aggrieved by any such
decision or order, to challenge it in a manner known to law, rather
than just leave it unimplemented. The right to challenge a judicial
decision is always available, to the citizen as well as the executive.
Failure to implement the decision, without challenging it, or, if it is
challenged, obtaining any interlocutory or final order impeding its
implementation, is completely unacceptable. Our Armed Forces are
meant to protect our lives and our borders, and cannot remain
embroiled in litigation.
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 38 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
89. The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly, with no orders
as to costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J
FEBRUARY 23, 2026
AR/dsn
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12769/2024
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 39 of 39
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.02.2026
12:50:14
