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Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Ujjivan Small Finance Bank vs The State Of West Bengal & Anr on 24 April, 2026
Author: Tirthankar Ghosh
Bench: Tirthankar Ghosh
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
PRESENT:
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE TIRTHANKAR GHOSH
C.R.M. (DB) 42 of 2024
With
CRAN 1 of 2026
Ujjivan Small Finance Bank
-versus-
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Rajdeep Mazumder, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Moyukh Mukherjee, Adv.,
Ms. Sagnika Banerjee, Adv.,
Ms. Triparna Roy, Adv.
For the State : Mr. Rudradipta Nandy, Ld. APP,
Mr. Arup Sarkar, Adv.
For the Opposite Party No. 2 : Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Uday Sankar Chattopadhyay, Adv.,
Ms. Trisha Rakshit, Adv.,
Ms. Aishwarya Datta, Adv.,
Ms. Bidisha Chakraborty, Adv.,
Ms. Sadia Parveen, Adv.
For CRAN 1 of 2026 : Ms. S.S. Saha, Adv.
Reserved On : 22.04.2026
Judgement On : 24.04.2026
Tirthankar Ghosh, J. :-
The present application has been preferred challenging the order dated
29.09.2023 passed by the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Paschim
Medinipur in connection with Kotwali Police Station Case No. 177 of 2023
2
dated 25.02.2023 corresponding to G.R. Case No. 781 of 2023, wherein the
petitioner being the de-facto complainant of the case has challenged the
order of bail granted to one Moumita Addya Kar.
The allegations made in the FIR which was initiated by one Anirban
Biswas, Area Manager of Ujjivan Small Finance Bank, are as follows:
a. Moumita Addya Kar is an employee working at Ujjivan Small
Finance Bank Limited (Midnapur Cluster) having office at
Monima Palace, Rajabazar, opposite Head Post Office,
Midnapur, West Bengal. She was engaged as a Customer
Relationship Officer and was entrusted with the job to process
loan, collect the loan instalment amount from the customers
and to deposit the same with the Branch office.
b. On 18th January 2023, one of the customers, namely Baisakhi
Kajji of Centre No. 445 visited the Branch and informed that
she had not taken any loan from the bank but a loan of Rs.
50,000/- was shown against her name and after verifying her
CIBIL, she asked for investigation on the issue. During an
internal investigation being conducted as to whether Mrs. Kajji
applied for a loan of Rs. 50,000/- through the Customer
Relationship Officer, Moumita Addya Kar, it was found that the
Customer Relationship Officer informed that the loan had been
cancelled.
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c. An internal investigation was conducted across six centers from
where it reflected that Moumita processed huge number of
customer loans, collecting their KYC and opened their Savings
Bank Accounts showing fake customers, disbursed the loans
and forfeited them and it was also found in course of the
investigation that by utilising the bank's money, she had been
running a parallel lending company under the name and style
of Amrita Financial Services Private Limited in connivance with
Sheuli Dey. On verification through MCA, the existence of
Amrita Financial Services Private Limited was not found and it
was unearthed that about 65 customers loan were forfeited,
which amounts to Rs. 34,52,000/- out of which the outstanding
remained as Rs. 30,53,617/-. The complainant apprehends that
day by day, the list of such fake customers were increasing and
the loan account could reach Rs. 70,00,000/- with 145
customers.
d. During internal investigation, the accused Moumita Addya Kar
through a third-party cheque deposited an amount of Rs.
2,55,700/- out of the total misappropriated amount which
certified her involvement in the offence. It was also found that
the accused along with one Sheuli Dey committed such acts of
cheating, criminal breach of trust by banker, forgery of
documents and criminal conspiracy.
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e. The complainant therefore requested the Inspector In-Charge of
Kotwali Police Station, Medinipur to register a complaint and
investigate the case against the accused persons namely,
Moumita Addya Kar and Sheuli Dey.
On the basis of the aforesaid complaint, Kotwali Police Station Case
No. 177 of 2023 dated 25.02.2023 was registered for investigation under
Sections 419, 420, 406, 409, 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
The present application has been preferred for cancellation of the
interim bail granted to the accused Moumita Addya Kar on 29.09.2023. Mr.
Mazumder, Learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner,
contended that the accused being a Customer Relationship Officer of the
petitioner Bank was placed in a position of trust, confidence and
responsibility, which she misused and betrayed. The accused was handling
public money and having misconducted herself while discharging her
official duty as an employee of the Bank eroded public confidence in the
banking system. As such, it was prayed that the interim bail which was
granted on 29.09.2023 by the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Paschim
Medinipur be cancelled. Elaborating his argument, Learned Advocate for the
petitioner submitted that the genesis of the present case lies in the
complaint dated 18.01.2023, when a customer namely, one Baisakhi Kajji
approached the Bank stating that although she had not availed any loan, a
loan amount of Rs. 50,000/- was reflecting against her account. Upon
internal enquiry, it was found that the accused had processed loan
applications using customer's KYC details, subsequently, misrepresenting
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that such loans were cancelled, while in reality she disbursed and siphoned
off the funds. The investigation further disclosed that the accused
systematically created fake accounts, manipulated loan disbursements and
misappropriated the funds for personal gain including routing money
through fictitious entities such as Amrita Financial Services Private
Limited, which do not exist. According to the petitioner, the magnitude of
the offence is grave and alarming and the petitioner during the internal
enquiry was able to detect fraud of approximately Rs. 34 lakhs involving
around 65 customers. Consequent to such detection, a complaint was filed
with Kotwali Police Station which led to registration of the case. The
materials collected in course of the investigation as seizure are loan
documents, customer complaints, bank statements, ATM transaction
reports and biometric data. The aforesaid acts clearly established a strong
prima-facie case against the accused/opposite party no. 2 and the
transaction reports matched with the ATM withdrawals and the presence of
the accused/ opposite party No. 2, demonstrating a systematic modus
operandi involving misuse of customer's credentials, OTP manipulation
through fake mobile numbers and subsequent destruction of evidence such
as SIM cards. Such materials unequivocally demonstrated the active and
central role played by the accused/opposite party No.2 in commission of the
offences. As such, the investigating authorities thought it fit and proper to
arrest the accused/ opposite party No. 2 on 31.08.2023. Surprisingly, the
Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate granted interim bail on 29.09.2023 within
a short span of time without adequate consideration of the gravity and
seriousness of the allegations.
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The petitioner thereafter preferred an application for cancellation of
interim bail before the Learned Sessions Judge, Paschim Medinipur and the
Learned Sessions Court by order dated 19.12.2023, was pleased to reject
the prayer for cancellation of interim bail, primarily on the sole ground that
the opposite party No. 2 did not violate the conditions of interim bail.
Subsequently, charge-sheet was submitted on or about 31.08.2024 under
Sections 419/420/409/406/34 of Indian Penal Code along with Sections
467/468/470/471 Indian Penal Code, against the accused/opposite party
no. 2 and one Sheuli Dey. The charge-sheet revealed that the accused
cheated nearly 120 customers, which exceeded total amount of Rs. 56 lakhs
and was approaching approximately Rs. 1 crore.
Learned Advocate for the petitioner argued that the interim bail which
was granted to the accused/opposite party no. 2 by order dated 29.09.2023
should be cancelled by this Court. In order to substantiate his argument, it
was submitted that it is settled proposition of law that an order granting
interim bail can be assailed on two broad grounds which are, (i) The
propriety and legality of the order granting bail and (ii) The supervening
circumstances and/or post-bail conduct of the accused. The petitioner
submitted that he intended to confine his argument and/or challenge so far
as the manifest impropriety of the order granting interim bail by the
Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Paschim Medinipur is concerned.
According to the petitioner, a bare perusal of the interim bail order would
reflect that the Learned Court below was persuaded to grant such bail
primarily on the grounds:
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a) There was no prima facie documentary evidence against the
accused;
b) That the accused was not holding a key position;
c) That the accused is a woman and the trial is likely to take time;
d) That the offences are magistrate triable.
Petitioner contends that such considerations are factually erroneous
or legally not tenable, rendering the order perverse and unsustainable.
During the course of the investigation, substantial materials were collected,
which directly contradict the very foundation on which the interim bail was
granted. The prosecution placed on record seizure materials including
photographs and CCTV footage clearly depicting opposite party No. 2 along
with co-accused Sheuli Dey withdrawing money using ATM card issued in
the name of customers of the petitioner Bank. Further, financial trail
revealed that funds were transferred from the petitioner Bank into the
account of opposite party No. 2 and thereafter, siphoned off to entities such
as Amrita Financial Services Private Ltd., which clearly establishes a
systematic modus operandi of misappropriation. Such materials formed
part of the charge-sheet and unequivocally established the existence of
strong prima facie documentary evidence against the accused/opposite
party No. 2. It was further contended that the finding of the Learned Court,
that opposite party No. 2 did not enjoy a key position is wholly misconceived
and immaterial in the facts of the present case, as a Customer Relationship
Officer she stood in a fiduciary relationship with the complainant Bank and
8
had direct access to customers, their KYC documents and banking
processes. The abuse of such position of trust is evident from the charge-
sheet as well as the multiple complaints lodged by customers demonstrating
the manner in which they were systematically deceived. In offences
involving breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of public money,
the nature of access and trust reposed assumes greater significance than
the nomenclature of the post held. Petitioner further challenged the ground
assigned by the Learned Magistrate that interim bail ought to be granted,
merely because the accused is a woman and trial may take time. It was
contended that such factors may be relevant in appropriate cases, but this
should not override the seriousness of the allegations, particularly in cases
involving large-scale financial fraud affecting public money and institutional
integrity. Additionally, it was contended that in placing undue emphasis on
such considerations, the Learned Court failed to balance the gravity of the
offence with the settled principles governing grant of interim bail and the
further reasoning of the Learned Magistrate that the offences complained of
are Magistrate triable and is also not acceptable. At the relevant time, when
interim bail was granted, investigation under Section 409 of the Indian
Penal Code was going on and the said offence by its very nature and
severity, cannot be treated lightly. The Section is not Magistrate triable and
the same has been wrongly observed by the Learned Court. It was further
reiterated by the petitioner that the chain of evidence which was collected
by the investigating agency as is reflected from the charge-sheet,
particularly the transaction reports of ATM withdrawals which were
meticulously analysed and compared with the bank account details of the
9
accused and co-accused, as well as the specific timing of their presence at
the ATM location, do unmistakably point towards the direct involvement of
the accused/ opposite party No. 2 in the unauthorised withdrawal of funds.
It was further contended that the accused/ opposite party No. 2 was
involved in a deliberate systematic scheme of fraud while she was
discharging duties in her official capacity and as such, granting an interim
bail within a period of 30 days without assigning any reason do frustrate
the purpose of custody which has been enshrined in the Code.
It was further canvassed before this Court that even at the present
stage when the charge-sheet has been filed, the interim bail of the
accused/opposite party no. 2 should be cancelled by the High Court as at
the time when the petitioner initially approached for cancellation of the
interim bail, the investigation was still in progress and the charge-sheet was
not submitted. Subsequently, the charge-sheet was submitted on
31.08.2024. The accused/ opposite party No. 2 on several occasions sought
adjournments and adopted dilatory tactics which contributed to the delay in
the present proceeding and the accused/opposite party no. 2 as such
should not be allowed to take advantage of the grounds of delay or the
charge-sheet having been submitted she may be allowed to continue on
interim bail. Learned Advocate for the petitioner emphasized on the issue
that mere rejection of the cancellation of bail application by the Learned
Sessions Court do not prevent the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction as
the Sessions Court and the High Court are having concurrent jurisdiction
and reference was also made to Abhimanue v. State of Kerala reported in
10
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2037. Lastly, it was contended that the
accused/opposite party no. 2 in their opposition failed to make out any
grounds for rejection of the cancellation of bail application as the accused
mainly emphasized on issues relating to supervening circumstances or
post-bail misconduct, which was never the contention of the petitioner
before this Court. Summarizing his argument, Learned Advocate for the
petitioner submitted that the offence alleged are not of a trivial nature but
constitute serious economic offence involving criminal breach of trust,
cheating and forgery, which was committed in a planned and systematic
manner by abusing an official position. As such, the prayer for interim bail
granted should be cancelled.
In order to fortify his argument, Learned Advocate for the petitioner
relied upon Abhimanue v. State of Kerala reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC
2037. Reference was made to paragraphs 14 and 15 which hold as follows:
"14. Before proceeding further, we consider it appropriate to
begin our analysis by addressing one of the arguments
raised by Mr. Chakraborty. He has challenged the very
maintainability of the application filed before the High Court.
According to him, once an application under
Section 439(2), Cr.P.C. seeking cancellation of bail has been
rejected by the Sessions Judge, a second application under
the same provision cannot be filed directly before the High
Court. Instead, the proper course would be either to challenge
the Sessions Judge's order in a petition for revision, or to
invoke the inherent powers of the High Court under
Section 482, Cr.P.C.
11
15. We are unable to agree with this argument. We note that,
in the present case, the application before the High Court was
filed under "Section 482 r/w 439(2) of Code of Criminal
Procedure". That being the case, nothing prevented the High
Court from exercising its inherent powers."
Petitioner also referred to Rameshbhai lallubhai Luni v. Devraj
Bhalabhai and Others reported in 1987 SCC OnLine Guj 76. Attention of the
Court was drawn to paragraphs 5, 8, 9, 12, 13 and 16, which reads as
follows:
"5. In effect, the question which falls for consideration by,
and the decision of, the Division Bench is whether a person
seeking cancellation of a bail order made by a judicial
magistrate, can directly approach the High Court under
Section 439(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code or he should
first approach the concerned Sessions Judge and can
approach the High Court only thereafter if he is aggrieved by
the order of the Sessions Judge. In other words, the question
is, whether, if a person seeking cancellation of a bail order
approaches the High Court directly under Section 439(2) of the
Criminal Procedure Code, without having recourse to the
concerned Sessions Judge for the purpose, his application
should be entertained by the High Court or he should be
asked first to approach the concerned Sessions Judge.
8. It is manifest on a plain reading of Section 439(2) of the
Criminal Procedure Code that the jurisdiction to direct that
any person, who has been released on bail under Chapter
XXXIII of the Code, be arrested and committed to the custody,
is vested both in the Court of Session and the High Court,
even though the bail order may have been made by a
12
magistrate. Even a bare reading of the provision leaves no
doubt as to the fact that the jurisdiction of the Court of
Session and the High Court is a concurrent jurisdiction and
there is nothing in the provision itself even remotely
suggesting that the High Court cannot entertain an application
for cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code directly, that is, without an approach having
been first made to the Court of Session in that behalf. It is
also not brought to our notice that a practice has grown in our
High Court whereby an application for cancellation of bail is
not directly entertained by the High Court and if somebody
makes such an application directly to the High Court the is
asked to approach the Sessions Court first or that such an
application directly made to the High Court is transmitted
down to the concerned Sessions Judge for hearing and
disposal. In fact, we were told at the Bar that all along such
applications for cancellation of bail are directly entertained by
the High Court even though the bail order might have been
made by a judicial magistrate.
9. Still, however, the question is whether there is anything in
the decision of R.A. Mehta, J. in the case of Rameshchandra
Kahiram Vora v. State of Gujarat (supra) to show that there is
any embargo on the power of the High Court in entertaining
such an application directly or there is even, a practice that
such an application should not be entertained by the High
Court directly. We find nothing in the decision of R.A. Mehta,
J. to show or to suggest that an application for cancellation of
bail under Section 439(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code
cannot or should not be entertained directly by the High
Court. The case before R.A. Mehta, J. was certainly not a case
for cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, but it was a case where anticipatory bail
13
was sought from the High Court directly under Section 438 of
the Criminal Procedure Code without first making an
approach to the concerned Sessions Court. It is true that R.A.
Mehta, J. has held that it would be sound exercise of judicial
discretion not to entertain each and every application for
anticipatory bail directly, by-passing the Court of Sessions.
This view of the learned Single Judge is based on the
convenience or inconvenience of the parties, and especially of
the Public Prosecutor and the investigating officer, because the
Sessions Court is nearer to the accused persons and is easily
accessible and even if an accused person fails in getting an
order for anticipatory hair from the Sessions Court, he has a
further remedy to approach the High Court and, therefore, the
practice of insisting upon the petitioners for anticipatory bail
first approaching the Sessions Court will not prejudice them. It
is said that it is only where there are special and exceptional
circumstances to approach the High Court directly that the
High Court should entertain anticipatory bail applications
directly without insisting upon the petitioners first
approaching the Sessions Court.
12. Furthermore, the incidence of bail cancellation
applications may not be as high as that of anticipatory bail
applications. In view of that fact also it may not be proper to
whittle down the clear effect of the language of Section 439(2)
of the Criminal Procedure Code which confers concurrent
jurisdiction on the High Court and the Court of Session to
cancel bail without any words of limitation such as that the
petitioner must first move the Sessions Court and can
approach the High Court only if he is aggrieved by the order of
the Sessions Court.
13. It is true that Section 439(2) of the Criminal Procedure
Code invests the High Court and the Court of Session with
14
judicial discretion to cancel bail. The question is whether
exercise of this discretion embraces or implies any power to
restrict the petitioner's choice of forum where the legislature
has in clear and unequivocal terms given him such choice by
conferring concurrent jurisdiction on two courts. We are clearly
of the opinion that the discretion to be exercised is only with
respect to the question whether the facts and circumstances of
the case would justify cancellation of bail which is already
granted. The exercise of discretion cannot be extended to the
question whether the petitioner should have approached the
Sessions Court first or should be allowed to approach High
Court first. In fact, we have also some doubts about High
Court's power to evolve any practice which would fly in the
face of the clear and unequivocal language of the enactment.
The assumption, in our opinion, should be that the Parliament
has, advisedly and in all its wisdom, conferred concurrent
jurisdiction after considering all pros and cons and all the
implications of what it was doing. We may, however, hasten
to add that we are deliberately refraining from entering into
the question of correctness or otherwise of the view taken by
R.A. Mehta, J. in the case of Rameshchandra Kashiram
Vora v. State of Gujarat (Supra) in respect of anticipatory bail
applications under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure
Code because we feel that we are not called upon to enter into
that question for the purpose of deciding the present
reference. We may only note that a view similar to one taken
by R.A. Mehta, J. in respect of anticipatory bail applications is
taken by certain other High Courts also, to wit, by the
Rajasthan High Court in Hajialisher v. State of
Rajasthan (1376 Cri. L.J. 16578), by the Karnatak High Court
in K. Iyya and etc. v. State of Karnataka (1985 Cr. L.J. 214)
and by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Chhajju Ram
Godara v. State of Haryana (1978 Cr. L.J. 608). A contrary
15
view has also been taken in Mohan Lal v. Prem Chand (AIR
1980 Himachal Pradesh, 36) which is a Full Bench decision.
There is also the case of Amiya Kumar Sen v. State of West
Bengal (1979 Cr. L.J. 288) wherein the propositions laid down
are (i) choice is given to the petitioner for anticipatory bail to
choose either of the forums that is either the High Court or the
Sessions Court and (ii) this choice is, however, restricted, in
the sense that he cannot approach both the forums one after
the other. In that case, an application for anticipatory bail was
first made to the Sessions Court and it was rejected by the
Sessions Court and then a fresh application for anticipatory
bail was made to the High Court but it was held that it cannot
be made because the party can approach either the Sessions
Court or the High Court and not both the courts even though it
may be one after the other. One may or may not agree with
this view but the necessary corollary which flows from the
view taken by the Calcutta High Court in this decision is that
one can apply directly to the High Court for anticipatory bail
under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code without
first approaching the Sessions Court. But these conflicting
views are all in respect of anticipatory bail applications under
Section 438, Criminal Procedure Code.
16. We are in respectful disagreement with the aforesaid
view, because we find that the Parliament must be assumed
to have considered all the implications of conferring
concurrent jurisdiction on two courts, one superior and the
other inferior, and must then have deliberately and advisedly
conferred concurrent jurisdiction. Once concur-current
jurisdiction is conferred without limiting the choice of forum to
which a party may take recourse, no practice which runs
counter to such a provision can be countenanced. In our view,
considerations of appropriateness cannot be allowed to arise
in such a case. When a right is given to a party to choose one
16
or the other forum, he must be taken to be the best Judge as
to the forum which would be more convenient to him. We feel,
with due respect, that the choice which the legislature has
given to a party in respect of the forum to be taken recourse to
by him, cannot be taken away by the High Court even for the
reasons mentioned in the aforesaid decision in 1972 Cr. LJ
1607."
Petitioner further referred to State of West Bengal v. Noor Ahmed
reported in 2002 SCC OnLine Cal 88, and drew the attention of the Court to
paragraphs 14, 15 and 16, which reads as follows:
"14. In view of the aforesaid two decisions of the Apex Court
we are of the view that intervening misconduct on the part of
the accused is not the only ground for cancellation of bail.
When an accused has been earlier granted bail by ignoring
convincing materials on record or on a wrong interpretation of
law is also equally good ground for cancellation of bail. Such
circumstances for cancellation of bail may be only illustrative
but certainly not exhaustive. If an accused has been granted
bail in a case of a serious offence having far reaching effect
by ignoring convincing materials on record or on a wrong
interpretation of law, the Superior Court has always
jurisdiction to correct such abuse of power and cancel the
bail.
15. In the instant case we have no doubt in our mind to hold
that the case against the opposite parties is not of an ordinary
case of extortion. The type of extortion allegedly committed by
the opposite parties is bound to adversely affect the trade and
commerce of the country and also our foreign exchange
income. It is bound to create panic in the mind of those
17
engaged in trade and commerce in view of the serious nature
of the allegation made against the opposite parties in the
complaint and due to the perverse order passed by the
learned Magistrate and hence we have no hesitation in our
mind to hold that the bail of the accused must be cancelled.
16. Ultimately, in view of the aforesaid position of law, we are
unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the
opposite parties that even if the accused was wrongly and
improperly granted bail, such bail cannot be cancelled
subsequently merely on that ground unless it is found that the
accused persons have misconducted themselves after their
release on bail."
Attention of the Court was drawn to Puran v. Rambilas and Another
reported in (2001) 6 SCC 338, on the ground that bail can be cancelled if in
the order of granting bail, there is serious infirmity and to that effect,
emphasis was made on paragraphs 11, 12 and 13, which states as follows:
"11. Further, it is to be kept in mind that the concept of
setting aside the unjustified illegal or perverse order is totally
different from the concept of cancelling the bail on the ground
that the accused has misconducted himself or because of
some new facts requiring such cancellation. This position is
made clear by this Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi
Admn.) [(1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41 : AIR 1978 SC
179] . In that case the Court observed as under: (SCC p. 124,
para 16)
"If, however, a Court of Session had admitted an
accused person to bail, the State has two options. It
may move the Sessions Judge if certain new
circumstances have arisen which were not earlier
18
known to the State and necessarily, therefore, to that
court. The State may as well approach the High Court
being the superior court under Section 439(2) to
commit the accused to custody. When, however, the
State is aggrieved by the order of the Sessions Judge
granting bail and there are no new circumstances
that have cropped up except those already existing, it
is futile for the State to move the Sessions Judge
again and it is competent in law to move the High
Court for cancellation of the bail. This position follows
from the subordinate position of the Court of Session
vis-Ã -vis the High Court."
12. It must be mentioned that in support of the above
submission Mr Lalit had also relied upon the authorities in the
cases of Subhendu Mishra v. Subrat Kumar Mishra [2000
SCC (Cri) 1508 : 1999 Cri LJ 4063] , State (Delhi
Admn.) v. Sanjay Gandhi [(1978) 2 SCC 411 : 1978 SCC (Cri)
223] and Bhagirathsinh v. State of Gujarat [(1984) 1 SCC 284
: 1984 SCC (Cri) 63] . These need not be dealt with separately
as they are of no assistance in a case of this nature where
bail has been cancelled for very cogent and correct reasons.
13. Our view is supported by the principles laid down in the
case of Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1978) 1 SCC
118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41 : AIR 1978 SC 179] . In this case it
has been held by this Court that under Section 439(2), the
approach should be whether the order granting bail was
vitiated by any serious infirmity for which it was right and
proper for the High Court, in the interest of justice, to
interfere."
19
Petitioner also referred to Ajwar v. Waseem and Others reported in
(2024) 10 SCC 768, and stressed the parameters of granting bail on being
violated, which may result in cancellation, to that effect, attention was
drawn to paragraphs 26 and 27 of the reported judgment, which would be
quoted later.
Attention of the Court was drawn to X v. State of Maharashtra reported
in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 279, wherein it was observed that addition of a
serious offence can be a circumstance for cancellation of bail of the accused
and to that effect, emphasis was laid on paragraphs 30 and 31 of the said
judgment which reads as follows:
"30. In Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand called upon to
deal with a situation where an accused had been bailed out
in a criminal case in which new offences were added
subsequently and a question arose as to whether it would be
necessary to cancel the bail granted earlier for taking the
accused in custody, a Division Bench of this Court took pains
to examine the view taken by several High Courts including
the High Courts of Rajasthan, Madras, Allahabad and Jammu
and Kashmir as also the observations made by this Court in
previous decisions on this aspect and held thus:--
"31. In view of the foregoing discussions, we arrive at
the following conclusions in respect of a circumstance
where after grant of bail to an accused, further
cognizable and non-bailable offences are added:
31.1. The accused can surrender and apply for bail for
newly added cognizable and non-bailable offences. In
event of refusal of bail, the accused can certainly be
arrested.
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31.2. The investigating agency can seek order from the
court under Section 437(5) or 439(2) CrPC for arrest of
the accused and his custody.
31.3[Ed. : Para 31.3 corrected vide Official Letter dated
31-7-2020.]. The court, in exercise of power under
Section 437(5) or 439(2) CrPC, can direct for taking into
custody the accused who has already been granted bail
after cancellation of his bail. The court in exercise of
power under Section 437(5) as well as Section 439(2)
can direct the person who has already been granted
bail to be arrested and commit him to custody on
addition of graver and non-bailable offences which may
not be necessary always with order of cancelling of
earlier bail.
31.4. In a case where an accused has already been
granted bail, the investigating authority on addition of
an offence or offences may not proceed to arrest the
accused, but for arresting the accused on such addition
of offence or offences it needs to obtain an order to
arrest the accused from the court which had granted the
bail."
31. As can be discerned from the observations made
in Pradeep Ram (supra), addition of a serious offence can be a
circumstance where a Court can direct that the accused be
arrested and committed to custody even though an order of
bail was earlier granted in his favour in respect of the
offences with which he was charged when his application for
bail was considered and a favourable order was passed. The
recourse available to an accused in a situation where after
grant of bail, further cognizable and non-bailable offences are
added to the FIR, is for him to surrender and apply afresh for
bail in respect of the newly added offences. The investigating
21
agency is also entitled to move the Court for seeking the
custody of the accused by invoking the provisions of
437(5) and 439(2) Cr. P.C., falling under Chapter XXXIIII of
the Statute that deals with provisions relating to bails and
bonds. On such an application being moved, the Court that
may have released the accused on bail or the Appellate
Court/superior Court in exercise of special powers conferred
on it, can direct a person who has been released on bail
earlier, to be arrested and taken into custody."
Lastly, petitioner relied upon X v. State of Bihar reported in 2025 SCC
Online SC 1490, to emphasize that when facts are grave and shakes the
conscience of the Court, bail should be cancelled. To that effect, reference
was made to paragraph 24, which reads as follows:
"24. It is trite that bail once granted should not be cancelled
ordinarily, but where the facts are so grave that they shake
the conscience of the Court; and where the release of the
accused on bail would have an adverse impact on the society,
the Courts are not powerless and are expected to exercise
jurisdiction conferred by law to cancel such bail orders so as
to subserve the ends of justice. The present one is precisely a
case of such nature."
Learned Advocate appearing for the accused/opposite party No.2
submitted that once the application under Section 439(2) of the Cr.PC was
cancelled/dismissed by the Learned Sessions Judge on merit, then in that
case the order of granting bail cannot be challenged on merit as parameters
of granting bail and cancellation of bail are completely different.
22
To that effect, Learned Advocate relied upon Yogesh Kumar Garg v.
State of UP and Another, reported in (2024) SCC online All 8092, and
referred to the following paragraph:
"...In the case at hand, the applicant/first informant herein
had already approached the Court of Sessions, Ghaziabad
seeking cancellation of the bail granted by it under
Section 439(2) of the Cr. P.C. The Court of Sessions vide order
dated 10.9.2024 refused to cancel the bail already granted.
In the opinion of the Court, the applicant having exercised his
option to seek cancellation under Section 439(2) of Cr.
P.C. before the Court of Sessions cannot now approach this
Court by moving another Bail Cancellation Application under
Section 439(2) Cr. P.C. A challenge would have to be made to
the orders rejecting the Bail Cancellation Application and the
same cannot be achieved in the present proceedings. Had the
applicant/first informant approached this Court at the first
instance seeking the cancellation of the bail granted to the
opposite party No. 2 by the Court of Sessions by its order
dated 23.12.2022 invoking the provisions of
Section 439(2) of Cr. P.C., the application would be
maintainable of Section 439(2) of Cr. P.C., the application
would be maintainable..."
On the same issue, Learned Advocate for the opposite party No. 2,
referred to Kailash Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. reported in
23
2025 SCC Online SC 3035, and drew the attention of the Court to paragraph
10, 12, 13 of the judgment, which reads as follows:
"10. The decision of this Court in Ajwar v. Waseem1, relied on
by the High Court, has been perused. In terms of such
decision, while seized of an application for
cancellation/revocation of bail, the considerations (illustrative,
not exhaustive) which ought to weigh with the courts are
whether: (i) the accused has misused the concession of liberty;
(ii) he has been delaying the trial; (iii) he has been
influencing/threatening the witnesses; (iv) he has been
tampering evidence in any manner; and (v) there has been
any supervening circumstance after grant of bail warranting a
relook. The decision also lays down that orders granting bail
could be interfered with if the same are found to be perverse
or illegal in the sense that the Court's conscience is shocked or
extraneous material has been considered.
12. Instead, what the High Court did was to embark upon
conducting sort of a mini-trial at the stage of considering
whether the bail should be cancelled or not. According to the
High Court, presence of the appellant and the co-accused at
the scene of occurrence and causing of injury to the
complainant-PW1 by the appellant being undisputed and
notwithstanding that the injury caused by him is simple, there
was common intention for which Section 34 of the IPC is
attracted. There are also other observations in the impugned
judgment having the potential of affecting the trial and
sounding the death knell for the appellant, which we do not
consider necessary to refer at this stage.
13. Suffice to observe, liberty of an individual being a
precious right under the Constitution, the Courts ought to be
wary that such liberty is not lightly interfered. We are
24
satisfied that there was no valid reason for the High Court to
cancel the bail without there being any material to show,
even prima facie, that conduct of the appellant post grant of
bail has been such that he should be deprived of his liberty.
There are also no allegations of influence being exerted or
threat extended to the witnesses or of tampering the evidence.
Material to demonstrate that dilatory tactics have been
adopted to procrastinate the trial is also conspicuous by its
absence."
On the same issue, Learned Advocate relied upon Ajwar v. Waseem
and Others reported in (2024) 10 SCC 768, and referred to paragraph 26,
27, 28, 29 and 30 which holds as follows:
"Relevant parameters for granting bail
26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted
in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court
must consider relevant factors like the nature of the
accusations made against the accused, the manner in which
the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the
offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of
the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are
released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being
unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of
obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice
and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail.
[Refer : Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of
U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974] ; Kalyan
Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra
Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri)
1977] ; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P.,
(2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368] ; Prasanta
25
Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar
Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC
(Cri) 765] ; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State
of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] ; Anil
Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Anil Kumar
Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3
SCC (Cri) 425] ; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh
Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .]
27. It is equally well settled that bail once granted, ought not
to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an
unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to
interference by the superior court. If there are serious
allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused
the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the
same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be
revoked by a superior court if it transpires that the courts
below have ignored the relevant material available on record
or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on
the society resulting in such an order. In P v. State of
M.P. [P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211] decided by a
three-Judge Bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima
Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations that must weigh
with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an
accused under Section 439(1)CrPC in the following words :
(SCC p. 224, para 24)
"24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for
cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider
whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or
the conduct of the accused post grant of bail
demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial
to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the
concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of
26
Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237] . To
put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court
would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the
court below granting bail but if such an order is found to
be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is
irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny
and interference by the appellate court."
Considerations for setting aside bail orders
28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate court for
setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by
the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances
that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused,
the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the
part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the
trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses
while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to
tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that
this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the
court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only
a prima facie case needs to be examined and detailed
reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause
prejudice to the accused, ought to be avoided. Suffice it is to
state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have
been considered by the Court for granting relief to the
accused.
29. In Jagjeet Singh [Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9
SCC 321 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560] , a three-Judge Bench of
this Court, has observed that the power to grant bail under
Section 439CrPC is of wide amplitude and the High Court or a
Sessions Court, as the case may be, is bestowed with
considerable discretion while deciding an application for bail.
27
But this discretion is not unfettered. The order passed must
reflect due application of judicial mind following well-
established principles of law. In ordinary course, courts would
be slow to interfere with the order where bail has been
granted by the courts below. But if it is found that such an
order is illegal or perverse or based upon utterly irrelevant
material, the appellate court would be well within its power to
set aside and cancel the bail. (Also refer
: Puran v. Rambilas [Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338 :
2001 SCC (Cri) 1124] ; Narendra K. Amin v. State of
Gujarat [Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 13 SCC
584 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 813] .)
Discussion
30. Keeping in mind the aforesaid parameters, we may now
proceed to examine the pleas taken by the parties so as to
decide as to whether the impugned orders can be sustained
or not. On a careful consideration of the entire records, we are
inclined to agree with submission made by the learned
counsel for the appellant complainant that the impugned
orders are unjustified and suffer from grave infirmity. The
primary factor that has swayed the learned Single Judge of
the High Court in granting bail to the accused Waseem is that
even though the prosecution version is that 11 accused
persons had assaulted the appellant complainant and
members of his family on indiscriminate firing taking place,
only three persons had sustained injuries and two had
expired on the side of the appellant complainant. At the same
time, serious injuries were also received on the side of the
accused which could not be explained by the prosecution. In
the case of the accused Nazim, the High Court observed that
there was no distinction between the role attributed to him
and the co-accused Waseem and that the injuries suffered on
the side of the respondent had not been explained by the
28
prosecution. The High Court has also gone on to observe that
the investigation conducted by the police was one-sided and
the case set up by the accused side was ignored. In the case
of Aslam, his bail application was allowed [Aslam v. State of
U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine All 3136] and the learned Single
Judge observed that there is a cross-version of the incident
inasmuch as the accused side had also received serious
injuries which were not satisfactorily explained by the
prosecution. In the case of Abubakar, noting that the co-
accused Aslam was granted bail by a coordinate Bench and
the case of Abubakar was similar to that of Aslam, he was
granted [Abubakar v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine All
5281] the benefit of bail on grounds of parity."
In order to substantiate his argument, Learned Advocate
chronologically placed the list of events leading to the registration of the
case as well as the Court proceedings. According to the Learned Advocate,
on 25.02.2023, the complaint was filed by the Area Manager of Ujjivan
Small Finance Bank Ltd. against the accused/opposite party no. 2, and
Sheuli Dey. The accused/opposite party No. 2, was arrested on 31.08.2023
and produced before the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Paschim
Medinipur. Learned Magistrate was pleased to allow the prayer for police
remand/custody of the accused for four days. On 14.09.2023, the
investigating officer applied for obtaining specimen handwriting of the
accused/opposite party no. 2, when the same was allowed and on
18.09.2023, such specimen handwriting of the accused/opposite party no.
2 was also taken. On 22.09.2023, the investigating officer prayed for jail
interrogation which was also allowed. On 29.09.2023, the Learned Chief
29
Judicial Magistrate, Paschim Medinipur was pleased to grant interim bail to
the accused/ opposite party no. 2 on stringent conditions, which included,
amongst others:
a. Not to leave jurisdiction of the court without the permission of
the court;
b. Notify the change of address, keeping operational the mobile
numbers;
c. Not to tamper with the evidence or;
d. Not to influence the witnesses and co-operate with the
Investigating Officer.
Learned Advocate thereafter submitted that such order of Learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Paschim Medinipur was challenged before the
Learned Sessions Judge, Paschim Medinipur under the provisions of
Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by way of filing Criminal
Misc. Case No. 5120 of 2023. On 19.12.2023, the Learned Session Judge,
Paschim Medinipur was pleased to reject the prayer for cancellation of bail
on the grounds that the accused, Moumita Addya Kar was in police custody
for four days and there were no material on record, including the case diary,
which suggests that the accused violated and or attempted to violate the
conditions imposed upon her. On 31.08.2024, charge-sheet was submitted
before the Jurisdictional Court and next date i.e. 22.04.2026, date has been
fixed for framing of charge.
According to the Learned Advocate, once the Sessions Court has
considered all the issues canvassed by the petitioner in respect of the
30
interim bail which was granted on 29.09.2023, which is more than two
years and six months ago, at this stage, there are no requirements for
taking the accused/opposite party no. 2 into custody. It was further
contended that the case is based on documents, charge-sheet has already
been submitted and there are no complaints till date that the accused have
ever flouted the conditions which have been imposed. Neither any witness
has complained that there was any threat or coercion at the behest of the
accused. As such, the application for cancellation of bail filed by the
petitioner is devoid of merit and the same as such is liable to be dismissed.
I have taken into account the submissions advanced by the Learned
Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner and the Accused. Before proceeding
with the arguments in respect of the application for cancellation of bail is
concerned, the preliminary issue is required to be considered i.e., whether
the application under Section 439 (2) of Code of Criminal Procedure
preferred by petitioner is maintainable once the petitioner has approached
the Learned Sessions Court with similar reliefs which were rejected?
The provisions of Section 439 of Code of Criminal Procedure vests
the High Court and Sessions Court with concurrent powers and the
petitioner having restricted his submission only to the limited extent of
propriety and legality of the order of bail being granted, I am of the opinion,
that the order passed by the Learned Sessions Court in Criminal Misc. Case
No. 5102 of 2023, vide order dated 19.12.2023, will not operate as a bar, as
the High Court apart from exercising its jurisdiction under Section 439(2) of
Code of Criminal Procedure is also vested with the inherent powers under
31
Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure. As such the application
preferred by the petitioner is maintainable.
Now so far as the other issue is concerned, petitioner's main thrust
relates to the following:
i. The quantum of amount in respect of which the accused in
discharge of her official capacity, misused the office thereby
misappropriating the money, by establishing a fake company
namely, Amrit Financial Services Pvt Ltd;
ii. The modus operandi adopted by the accused to deceive the
customers by misusing her fiduciary relationship with the
bank;
iii. The systematic manner in which huge number of customers
have been duped and wrongful loss was suffered by the bank;
iv. The CCTV coverage which reflects the ATM withdrawals in close
proximity of time by the accused /opposite party No. 2 and
her associates;
v. The observations of the Learned Magistrate in the order dated
29.9.2023 which reflects the issues which weighed with the
Learned Magistrate while granting bail to the accused.
Each of the issue canvassed above by the petitioner have definite
relevance but at the same time it is to be considered what would be the
effect today if the interim bail granted on 29.9.2023 is cancelled after
almost 2 years 6 months. There is already a change of circumstance as in
32
the meantime charge sheet has been submitted before the jurisdictional
court and the State could not advance any argument as to why the
custodial detention as on date is relevant when the charge sheet has been
submitted before the jurisdictional court on or about August, 2024.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments has
categorically observed that in the parlance of Indian criminal jurisprudence,
punishment begins only after conviction and an accused continues to enjoy
the presumption of innocence until duly tried and found guilty. In Sanjay
Chandra vs. CBI, reported in (2012) 1 SCC 40, it has been observed that the
sole object of bail is to secure the presence of the accused at trial and it
disapproved the spirit of refusing a bail to an unconvicted person for the
purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson. It was further
observed that the seriousness of a charge is relevant consideration but not
the sole determinant to deny bail. The aforesaid spirit has been reflected in
several judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court including Kapil Wadhawan
vs. CBI, reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 3038.
Taking into account the present stage of the criminal case wherein
charge sheet has already been submitted and the petitioner was granted
bail on 29.09.2023, apart from the fact that the case is absolutely based on
documentary evidence, at this stage, the custodial detention which would
be a consequence of interfering with the order dated 29.09.2023 granting
interim bail by the Learned Magistrate is of no relevance.
33
Thus, at this stage, I am of the opinion that no interference is called
for belatedly in respect of the order under challenge.
As such, the application being CRM (DB) 42 of 2024 is dismissed.
Pending applications if any are consequently disposed of.
A copy of the judgment be forwarded to the learned Trial Court
immediately.
All parties shall act on the server copy of this judgment duly
downloaded from the official website of this Court.
Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties upon compliance of all requisite formalities.
.
(Tirthankar Ghosh, J.)
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