Titagarh Rail Systems Limited vs Railway Board, Ministry Of Railways, … on 13 April, 2026

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    Delhi High Court

    Titagarh Rail Systems Limited vs Railway Board, Ministry Of Railways, … on 13 April, 2026

    Author: C. Hari Shankar

    Bench: C. Hari Shankar

                      $~75 & 76
                      *       IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
                      +       FAO(OS) (COMM) 103/2026, CM APPLs.24033-34/2026
                              TITAGARH RAIL SYSTEMS LIMITED
                                                                                    .....Appellant
                                                        Through:    Ms. Akanksha Mehra, Mr.
                                                        Tanay Agarwal, Mr. Shivam Bhimsaria, Mr.
                                                        Abhiraj Choudhary and Ms. Mili Tomar
    
                                                         versus
    
                             RAILWAY BOARD, MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS,
                             GOVERNMENT OF INDIA                  .....Respondent
                                         Through:   Mr. Sandeep Kumar Mahapatra,
                                         CGSC, Ms. Mrinmayee Sahu, Mr. Amit
                                         Acharya, GP, Mr. Tribhuvan, Mr.
                                         Abhimanyu and Ms. Anushka Sarraf,
                                         Advocates and Mr Vinay Kaushik
                                         Government Pleader
    
                      +       FAO(OS) (COMM) 104/2026, CM APPL. 24043/2026
                              TITAGARH RAIL SYSTEMS LIMITED                         .....Appellant
                                                        Through:   Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, Sr.
                                                        Advocate with Ms. Akanksha Mehra, Mr.
                                                        Tanay Agarwal, Mr. Shivam Bhimsaria, Mr.
                                                        Abhiraj Choudhary and Ms. Mili Tomar,
                                                        Advocates
    
                                                         versus
    
                              RAILWAY BOARD, MINISTRY OF
                              RAILWAYS                            .....Respondent
                                          Through:  Mr. Sandeep Kumar Mahapatra,
                                          CGSC, Ms. Mrinmayee Sahu, Mr. Amit
                                          Acharya, GP, Mr. Tribhuvan, Mr.
                                          Abhimanyu and Ms. Anushka Sarraf,
    
    Signature Not Verified
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                                                          Advocates and Mr     Vinay    Kaushik
                                                         Government Pleader
    
                                CORAM:
                                HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
                                HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
                                                      JUDGMENT (ORAL)
                      %                                  13.04.2026
    
                      C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
    
    
                      A.        The lis
    
    
    

    1. These appeals, under Section 37 of the Arbitration &
    Conciliation Act, 19961 , assail a judgment and an order, both dated 26
    February 2026, in OMP (Comm) 475/20242 and OMP (Comm)
    503/20243 , rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court. The
    principal judgment stands rendered in OMP (Comm) 475/2024, with
    the order in OMP (Comm) 503/2024 merely recording that the arbitral
    award, which formed subject matter of challenge in both OMPs,
    already stood set aside in OMP (Comm) 475/2025 and that, therefore,
    no separate orders were called for. The impugned judgment and order
    have, needless to say, been rendered under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.

    2. The learned Single Judge has allowed the OMPs filed by the
    Respondent-Railway Board on the ground that the learned arbitrator,
    who had rendered the award forming subject matter of challenge,
    having been a serving employee of the Railway Board, his very

    SPONSORED

    1 “the 1996 Act” hereinafter
    2 Railway Board v. Titagarh Rail Systems Ltd
    3 Railway Board v. Titagarh Rail Systems Ltd

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    appointment as an arbitrator was in the teeth of Section 12(5)4 read
    with the VII Schedule to the 1996 Act. Resultantly, the award
    rendered by the learned arbitrator has been held to be unsustainable, as
    the learned arbitrator was incompetent to arbitrate. In arriving at his
    conclusion, the learned Single Judge has placed exhaustive reliance on
    the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Bhadra International
    (India) (P) Ltd. v. Airport Authority of India5
    .

    3. Aggrieved by the decision of the learned Single Judge, Titagarh
    Rail Systems Ltd6 has preferred the present appeals under Section 13
    of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Section 37 of the 1996
    Act.

    4. We have heard Mr. Raj Shekhar Rao, learned Senior Counsel
    for TRSL and Mr. Sandeep Kumar Mahapatra, learned CGSC, at
    length.

    B. The Issue

    5. Mr. Raj Shekhar Rao does not dispute the fact that the learned
    arbitrator was facially ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator in
    terms of the main body of Section 12(5) of the 1996 Act. His precise
    contention is that the facts of the present case attract the proviso to

    4 (5) Notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary, any person whose relationship, with the
    parties or counsel or the subject-matter of the dispute, falls under any of the categories specified in the
    Seventh Schedule shall be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator:

    Provided that parties may, subsequent to disputes having arisen between them, waive the
    applicability of this sub-section by an express agreement in writing.

    5 2026 SCC OnLine SC 7
    6 “TRSL” hereinafter

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    Section 12(5), as the parties had, subsequent to the disputes arising
    between them, expressly waived the applicability of Section 12(5). To
    that extent, he submits that the decision in Bhadra International does
    not operate against the arbitral award or its legality. The learned
    Single Judge has, therefore, according to Mr. Rao, erred in setting
    aside the arbitral award on the ground that the appointment of the
    arbitrator was illegal in view of Section 12(5) of the 1996 Act read
    with the judgment in Bhadra International.

    6. The dispute, therefore, actually narrows down to the issue of
    whether, in the facts of the present case, the proviso to Section 12(5)
    of the 1996 applies.

    C. Facts

    7. Given the limited nature of the controversy, it is not necessary
    to advert to the specifics of the controversy between the parties.
    Suffice it, therefore, to state that the arbitral proceedings related to a
    contract dated 30 September 2020, whereby the Railway Board had
    contracted with TRSL for supply of railway wagons. Clause 18.0 of
    the contract read as under:

    “18.0 TERMS AND CONDITIONS : The contract shall be
    governed by the General Conditions & Special Conditions of
    Contract for manufacture of wagons as enclosed (Annexure – I &
    IA) and Indian Railways Standard (IRS) Conditions of contract.”

    Thus, the contract between TRSL and the Railway Board was
    governed by the Indian Railways General Conditions of Contract for

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    the Manufacture and Supply of Wagons7. Clause 18.0 of the GCC
    envisaged settlement of disputes by arbitration, and read thus:

    “18.0 Settlement of Disputes (Arbitration) : The contract will be
    governed by the arbitration clause with amendments as specified in
    the Railway Board’s Letter No.2018/TF/Civil/Arbitration Policy
    dated 12.12.2018.”

    The letter dated 12 December 2018 of the Railway Board, to which
    Clause 18.0 of the GCC made reference, set out the arbitration policy
    of the Railway Board. The relevant clauses thereof, which are
    pertinent to the dispute before us, maybe reproduced as under:

    “2903: Demand for Arbitration:

    2903(i): In the event of any dispute or difference between the
    parties hereto as to the construction or operation of this contract, or
    the respective rights and liabilities of the parties on any matter in
    question, dispute or difference on any account, or if the Railway
    fails to make a decision within 120 days (as referred in 2902), then
    and in any such case, but except in any of the “excepted matters”

    referred to in Clause 2902 of these Conditions, parties to the
    contract, after 120 days but within 180 days of their presenting
    their final claim on disputed matters shall demand in writing that
    the dispute or difference be referred to arbitration. Provided that
    where the claim is raised by Railways para 2903(i) shall not apply.

    2903(ii)(b): The parties may waive off the applicability of Sub-
    Section 12(5) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (as
    amended), if they agree for such waiver in writing, after dispute
    having arisen between them.

    2903(iii)(a): The Arbitration proceedings shall be assumed to
    have commenced from the day, a written and valid demand for
    arbitration is received by the Railway.

    2905: Appointment of Arbitrator:

    7 “the GCC” hereinafter

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    2905(a): Appointment of Arbitrator where applicability of
    section 12(5) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act has been waived
    off :

    (i): In cases where the total value of all claims in question
    added together does not exceed ₹1,00,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore
    only), the Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of a Sole Arbitrator, who
    shall be a Gazetted Officer of Railway not below Junior
    Administrative Grade, nominated by the General Manager. The
    sole arbitrator shall be appointed within 60 days from the day when
    a written and valid demand for arbitration is received by General
    Manager.

    (ii): In cases where the total value of all claims in question
    added together exceeds ₹1,00,00,000 (Rupees One Crore Only), the
    Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of a panel of three Gazetted Railway
    Officers not below Junior Administrative Grade or 2 Railway
    Gazetted Officers not below Junior Administrative Grade and a
    retired Railway Officer, retired not below the rank of Senior
    Administrative Grade Officer, as the arbitrators. For this purpose,
    the Railway will send a panel of at least four (4) names of Gazetted
    Railway Officers of one or more departments of the Railway which
    may also include the name(s) of retired Railway Officer(s)
    empanelled to work as Railway Arbitrator to the Contractor within
    60 days from the day when a written and valid demand for
    arbitration is received by the General Manager.

    Contractor will be asked to suggest to General Manager at least 2
    names out of the panel for appointment as Contractor’s nominee
    within 30 days from the date of dispatch of the request by Railway.
    The General Manager shall appoint at least one out of them as the
    Contractor’s nominee and will, also simultaneously appoint the
    balance number of arbitrators either from the panel or from outside
    the panel, duly indicating the ‘presiding arbitrator’ from amongst
    the 3 arbitrators so appointed. General Manager shall complete this
    exercise of appointing the Arbitral Tribunal within 30 days from
    the receipt of the names of Contractor’s nominees. While
    nominating the arbitrators, it will be necessary in ensure that one of
    them is from the Accounts Department. An officer of Selection
    Grade of the Accounts Department may be considered of equal
    status to the officers in Senior Administrative Grade of other
    departments of the Railway for the purpose of appointment of
    arbitrator

    iii: The serving railway officer working in arbitral tribunal in
    the ongoing arbitration cases as per clause 2905(a)(i) and clause

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    2905(a)(ii) above, can continue as arbitrator in the tribunal even
    after his retirement.

    2905(b): Appointment of Arbitrator where applicability of
    Section 12 (5) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act has not been
    waived off:

    (i) In cases where the total value of all claims in question
    added together does not exceed 50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakh
    only), the Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of a Retired Railway
    Officer, retired not below the rank of Senior Administrative Grade
    Officer, as the arbitrator. For this purpose, the Railway will send a
    panel of at least four (4) names of retired Railway Officer(s)
    empanelled to work as Railway Arbitrator duly indicating their
    retirement dates to the Contractor within 60 days from the day
    when a written and valid demand for arbitration is received by the
    General Manager

    Contractor will be asked to suggest so General Manager at least 2
    names out of the panel for appointment as arbitrator within 30 days
    from the date of dispatch of the request by Railway. The General
    Manager shall appoint at least one out of them as the arbitrator

    (ii) In cases where the total value of all claims in question
    added together exceeds 50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakh only), the
    Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of three (3) retired Railway Officers,
    retired not below the rank of Senior Administrative Grade Officer,
    For this purpose, the Railway will send a panel of at least four (4)
    names of retired Railway Officers) empanelled to work as Railway
    Arbitrators duly indicating their retirement date to the Contractor
    within 60 days from the day when a written and valid demand for
    arbitration is received by the General Manager.

    Contractor will be asked to suggest to General Manager at least 2
    names out of the panel for appointment as Contractor’s nominee
    within 30 days from the date of dispatch of the request by Railway.
    The General Manager shall appoint at least one out of them as the
    Contractor’s nominee and will, also simultaneously appoint the
    balance number of arbitrators either from the panel or from outside
    the panel, duly indicating the “Presiding Arbitrator from amongst
    the 3 arbitrators so appointed. General Manager shall complete this
    exercise of appointing the Arbitral Tribunal within 30 days from
    the receipt of the names of Contractor’s nominees. While
    nominating the arbitrators, it will be necessary to ensure that one of
    them has served in the Accounts Department.

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    2905(c)(ii)(a) Fast Track procedure: Parties to the
    arbitration agreement may, at any stage either before or at the time
    of appointment of the arbitral tribunal, agree in writing to have
    their dispute resolved by fast track procedure specified in Section
    29B8
    of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, as amended”

    8. The Railway Board short-closed the contract on 20 March 2023,
    cancelled the contract insofar as it related to the supply of the
    remaining 390 wagons and forfeited the bank guarantee provided by
    TRSL.

    9. Disputes, thereby, arose between TRSL and the Railway Board.

    10. On 29 May 2023, TRSL wrote to the Railway Board, seeking a
    reference of the disputes which had arisen to arbitration in terms of
    Clause 18.0 of the GCC read with letter dated 12 December 2018 of
    the Railway Board. The notice also stated that TRSL was not waving

    8 29-B. Fast track procedure. –

    (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the parties to an arbitration agreement,
    may, at any stage either before or at the time of appointment of the arbitral tribunal, agree in
    writing to have their dispute resolved by fast track procedure specified in sub-section (3).
    (2) The parties to the arbitration agreement, while agreeing for resolution of dispute by fast
    track procedure, may agree that the arbitral tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator who shall be
    chosen by the parties.

    (3) The arbitral tribunal shall follow the following procedure while conducting arbitration
    proceedings under sub-section (1):

    (a) The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute on the basis of written pleadings,
    documents and submissions filed by the parties without any oral hearing;

    (b) The arbitral tribunal shall have power to call for any further information or
    clarification from the parties in addition to the pleadings and documents filed by them;

    (c) An oral hearing may be held only, if, all the parties make a request or if the
    arbitral tribunal considers it necessary to have oral hearing for clarifying certain issues;

    (d) The arbitral tribunal may dispense with any technical formalities, if an oral
    hearing is held, and adopt such procedure as deemed appropriate for expeditious disposal
    of the case.

    (4) The award under this section shall be made within a period of six months from the date
    the arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference.
    (5) If the award is not made within the period specified in sub-section (4), the provisions of
    sub-sections (3) to (9) of Section 29-A shall apply to the proceedings.
    (6) The fees payable to the arbitrator and the manner of payment of the fees shall be such as
    may be agreed between the arbitrator and the parties.

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    the provisions of Section 12(5) of the 1996 Act. Paras 9 to 12 of the
    notice dated 29 May 2023 may be reproduced as under:

    “9. In light of the above facts and circumstances, it is evident
    that disputes and differences have arisen and still subsist between
    the parties out of and/or in relation to the contract.

    10. As such, we, hereby invoke the arbitration clause in the
    contract being clause 18 of the Indian Railways General Conditions
    of Contract for the Manufacture and Supply of Wagons (read with
    the Railway Board’s letter no. 2018/TF/Civil/Arbitration Policy
    dated 12th December 2018) and refer all and any disputes arising
    out of and/or in relation to the contract to arbitration before an
    arbitral tribunal consisting of 3 arbitrators. We reserve our right to
    furnish particulars and make appropriate claims in respect of the
    aforesaid disputes and differences before the arbitral tribunal, once
    constituted.

    11. Titagarh does not waive the provisions of Section 12 (5) of
    the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘said Act’).

    12. We are in the process of nominating an arbitrator on our
    behalf by a separate letter and will call upon you to nominate a
    nominee on your behalf. The two arbitrators so nominated will
    appoint a third arbitrator as the presiding arbitrator to adjudicate the
    disputes and differences between ourselves.”

    11. Following this, TRSL wrote to the Railway Board on 11 August
    2023, invoking the arbitration clause in the agreement between the
    parties, again stating that it was not waving the provisions of Section
    12(5)
    of the 1996 Act and proposing the name of a learned retired
    Supreme Court judge as the nominee arbitrator of TRSL. The letter
    may be reproduced, in extenso, thus:

                              To,                                       Date: 11.08.2023
                              The Executive Director Railway Stores (S)
                              Railway Board,
                              Ministry of Railways,
                              Government of India,
                              New Delhi.
    
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    Sub: 2020/RS(I)/954/130/1863 DATED 30TH SEPTEMBER 2020
    AND REFERENCE OF DISPUTES TO
    ARBITRATION
    Re: Our letter dated 29.05.2023

    Sir,

    This letter has reference to the subject contract and the disputes
    arising out of it as well as our letter dated 29.05.2023. The details
    of the disputes are omitted here for the sake of brevity as we
    specifically refer to our letter dated 29.05.2023, (a copy of whereof
    is enclosed herewith for your ready reference) where we accepted
    your decision to short close the subject Contract No
    2020/RS(1)/954/130/1863 dated 20.03.2023, by cancelling the
    balance quantity of 390 BCNA wagons, and submitted that the
    following penalties aggregating Rs. 14,68,98,663/- levied by you
    are grossly unfair, unjust, and hence not legally tenable:

    1. Forfeiture, of the Bank Guarantee submitted by us towards
    the Security Deposit of Rs 5,00,00,000/-

    2. Liquidated damages amounting to Rs 5,19,15,870/- and

    3. Not allowing us the benefit of price variance resulting in
    loss of Rs 4,49,82,793/- approx.

    We have not received any reply from Indian Railway to the
    abovementioned letter, and in view of the same we, hereby invoke
    the arbitration clause in the contract being clause 18 of the Indian
    Railways General Conditions of Contract for the Manufacture and
    Supply of Wagons (read with the Railway Board’s letter no.
    2018/TF/Civil/Arbitration Policy dated 12th December 2018) and
    refer all and any disputes arising out of and/or in relation to the
    contract to arbitration before an arbitral tribunal consisting of 3
    arbitrators.

    Titagarh does not waive the provisions of Section 12 (5) of the
    Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘said Act’). In view thereof
    we propose the appointment of Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta, (Retd.
    Judge, Supreme Court of India) as our nominee Arbitrator for
    adjudicating the disputes between us. We reserve our right to
    furnish particulars and make appropriate claims in respect of the
    aforesaid disputes and differences before the arbitral tribunal, once
    constituted.

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    This letter is being issued without prejudice to our lawful rights and
    contentions.

    Yours faithfully,

    For Titagarh Rail Systems Limited
    (formerly Titagarh Wagons Limited)

    (Dinesh Arya)
    Company Secretary”

    12. As the Railway Board did not respond to the above notice
    issued by TRSL, TRSL filed Arb P 970/2023 before this Court under
    Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act, praying that a sole arbitrator be
    appointed by this Court to arbitrate on the disputes between TRSL and
    the Railway Board. On 3 October 2023, the Railway Board submitted,
    to this Court, that the arbitration would be decided by the Fast Track
    procedure envisaged in the Railway Board Circular dated 12
    December 2018. Accordingly, this Court disposed of Arb P 970/2023
    as withdrawn.

    13. Following this, on 17 October 2023, TRSL addressed the
    following communication to the Railway Board:

                              "No.: BCNA/Arbit/23/01                           17 October 2023
    
                              To, Director, RS(W)
                              Railway Board
                              New Delhi
    
    

    Subject: Arbitration in the matter w.r.t. Contract No.
    2020/RS(I)/954/130/1863 dated 30.09.2020 between M/s Titagarh
    Wagons Limited, Kolkata and Ministry of Railways

    Ref: Our letter dated 29.05.2023

    Dear Sir,

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    With reference to the abovementioned letter the Claimant hereby
    gives its consent for conduct of arbitration through the Fast Track
    Procedure as per para 2905(c)(ii)(a) of the IRS Conditions of
    Contract as revised by circular No.2018/TF/Civil/Arbitration
    Policy dated 12.12.2018, r.w. Section 298 of the Arbitration and
    Conciliation Act, 1996, (as amended).

    Thanking You.

    Yours Sincerely,
    For Titagarh Rail Systems Limited
    (formerly Titagarh Wagons Limited)

    Sd/-

    Dinesh Arya
    Company Secretary & Chief Compliance Officer”

    14. The Railway Board responded, on 16 November 2023, thus:

    “No.2020/RS(1)/954/130/1863

    New Delhi-110001, Dated: 16.11.2023

    M/s. Titagarh Rail Systems Limited,
    Titagarh Towers,
    756, Anandapur,
    E.M. Bypass,
    Kolkata-700107.

    Dear Sir,

    Sub: Arbitration request in the Contract No.
    2020/RS(I)/954/130/1863 dated 30.09.2020 between M/s. Titagarh
    Wagons Limited, Kolkata (Now M/s. Titagarh Rail Systems Ltd.)
    and Ministry of Railways.

    Ref: Your Letter No. BCNA/Arbit/23/01 dated 17.10.2023.

    Your above referred letter regarding conducting Arbitration
    through Fast Track Procedure against the subject contract is under
    consideration in Board’s office.

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    In this regard, the names of 04 Railway Officers for appointment of
    Sole Arbitrator in the subject contract are as under:

    (a) Shri Ajeet Singh Yadav – EDRS/P, Railway Board

    (b) Shri V. Appa Rao – EDRS/RS, Railway Board

    (c) Shri Randhir Sahay – EDF/S, Railway Board

    (d) Shri M.K. Gupta – EDRS/G, Railway Board

    It is requested to suggest names of two Railway Officers indicated
    above for the appointment of Sole Arbitrator in the subject
    contract. Out of two Railway Officers, one Officer will be
    appointed as Sole Arbitrator to resolve the dispute against the
    subject contract.

    Yours faithfully

    Sd/-

    (Vipul Kanaujia)
    Director, Railway Stores (W)”

    We may note, here, that it is one of Mr. Rao’s principal submissions
    that, by adopting the Fast Track Procedure envisaged by Clause
    2905(c)(ii)(a) of the Circular dated 12 December 2018, the Railway
    Board had effectively waived the applicability of Section 12(5), as the
    Fast Track Procedure applied only in such a case.

    15. TRSL, vide its reply dated 24 January 2024, shortlisted the
    names of two of the Railway Board officers named in the afore-
    extracted communication dated 16 November 2023 of the Railway
    Board. This communication read as under:

                              "No.: BCNA/Arbit/23/03                          24 January 2024
    
                              To,
                              Director, RS(W)
                              Railway Board
                              New Delhi
    
    
    
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    Subject: Arbitration in the matter w.r.t. Contract No.
    2020/RS(I)/954/130/1863 dated 30.09.2020 between M/s Titagarh
    Wagons Limited, Kolkata and Ministry of Railways

    Ref: 1. Your letter dated 16.11.2023

    2. Our letter dated 29.12.2024

    Dear Sir,

    With reference to the abovementioned letters, we would request
    you to note our suggestion as follows:-

    1. Shri Ajeet Singh Yadav

    2. Shri Randhir Sahay

    Please treat our letter dated 29.12.2023 as withdrawn.

    We await your response on the nomination of the Sole Arbitrator
    from the aforesaid proposed name,

    Thanking You,

    Yours Sincerely,

    For Titagarh Rail Systems Limited
    (formerly Titagarh Wagons Limited)

    Sd/-

    Dinesh Arya
    Company Secretary & Chief Compliance Officer”

    16. The Railway Board, vide its response data 30 January 2024,
    appointed Shri Randhir Sahay, Executive Director, Finance(S) in the
    Railway Board, as the sole arbitrator to arbitrate on the disputes
    between TRSL and the Railway Board.

    17. Thereafter, arbitral proceedings commenced before Shri
    Randhir Sahay, as the learned Sole Arbitrator. These proceedings
    culminated in arbitral award dated 5 August 2024, whereby the
    learned arbitrator directed reinstatement of the contract, extended the

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    delivery period for the wagons by 4½ months from the date of the
    award without liquidated damages for delivery of the remaining 390
    wagons and also held TRSL to be entitled to refund of liquidated
    damages to the extent of ₹ 5,19,15,870.

    18. The arbitral award was challenged, before the learned Single
    Judge, by TRSL as well as by the Railway Board.

    19. TRSL, vide OMP (Comm) 503/2024, challenged the arbitral
    award to the extent that it (i) did not grant interest on the amount
    awarded in favour of TRSL, (ii) granted only 4 ½ months to TRSL for
    supplying the remaining 390 wagons and (iii) did not direct refund of
    the security deposit paid by TRSL with interest.

    20. The Railway Board, vide OMP (Comm) 475/2024, also
    challenged the arbitral award on the ground that the appointment of
    the learned arbitrator was illegal in view of Section 12(5) of the 1996
    Act.

    D. The Impugned Judgment

    21. The learned Single Judge has, in the judgment under challenge,
    noted, at the outset, the fact that TRSL had, in its notices dated 29
    May 2023 and 11 August 2023, specifically stated that it was not
    waiving Section 12(5) of the 1996 Act. The learned Single Judge
    notes that there was, in fact, no written waiver either by TRSL or by
    the Railway Board, of the applicability of Section 12(5). The learned

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    Single Judge has found no substance in TRSL’s contention that the
    adoption of the Fast Track Procedure as envisaged in Clause
    2905(c)(ii)(a) of the Railway Board Circular dated 12 December 2018,
    the suggestion of four serving Railway Board employees by the
    Railway Board to TRSL in order to enable TRSL to choose a name
    therefrom, and the selection, by TRSL, of one name from the said
    panel of four names as the arbitrator to arbitrate on the disputes
    between the parties, constituted waiver of Section 12(5) as envisaged
    in the proviso thereto. In this context, the learned Single Judge has
    placed extensive reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in
    Bhadra International.

    22. Aggrieved by the said decision, TRSL has filed the present
    appeal.

    E. Submissions of Mr. Rajshekhar Rao

    23. Appearing for TRSL, Mr. Rao submits that there is a stark
    difference between the facts of the present case and those which
    obtained in Bhadra International. He submits that the contract
    between TRSL and the Railway Board specifically envisaged a
    situation in which the parties waived the applicability of Section 12(5)
    and where the parties did not do so. Different procedures were to be
    followed, depending on whether Section 12(5) was, or was not,
    waived. The question of selection of a sole Arbitrator out of a panel of
    four arbitrators to be provided by the Railway Board, from its serving
    employees was specifically contemplated, in Clause 2905(a)(ii), only

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    where there was waiver of Section 12(5) of the 1996 Act. As such,
    Mr. Rao’s contention is that, by calling upon the Railway Board to
    suggest a panel of its officers, in response to which the Railway Board
    suggested a panel of four of its serving officers, from which TRSL
    selected one as the sole Arbitrator, the parties had consciously adopted
    and followed the procedure envisaged in a case where Section 12(5)
    was waived. He submits that, having done so, the Railway Board
    could not seek to wish away an adverse arbitral award by attempting
    to invoke Section 12(5) after the award had been rendered. The
    impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge, he submits, has not
    holistically taken into account all these factors and has mechanically
    applied the ratio decidendi of Bhadra International, unmindful of the
    factual and legal differences between this case and that. Ergo, submits
    Mr. Rao, the impugned judgment cannot sustain in law or on facts.

    F. Analysis

    24. After Bhadra International, it is not possible for us to accept
    the line of reasoning canvassed by Mr. Rao. Bhadra International,
    we may note, arose out of a judgment rendered by one of us (C. Hari
    Shankar, J.) sitting singly in Bhadra International (India) (P) Ltd. v.
    Airport Authority of India9
    . In that case, the parties had, in fact,
    openly stated before the learned Arbitrator that they were agreeable to
    his arbitrating on the dispute between the parties and that consent had
    been reduced to writing by the Arbitrator in one of the orders passed
    in the arbitral proceedings. It was in these circumstances that this

    9 2024 SCC OnLine Del 10223

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    Court adopted the view that there was, in effect, written agreement to
    the arbitration of the dispute by the Arbitrator in that case.

    25. Even in such a case, the Supreme Court has held, while
    reversing the judgment of this Court, that Section 12(5) of the 1996
    Act requires a written agreement in writing, waiving the applicability
    of Section 12(5) and nothing less than that. There cannot be any
    implied waiver of Section 12(5). We may reproduce, to advantage the
    following passages from Bhadra International, which evocatively lay
    down the law:

    “75. The essentials of the proviso to Section 12(5) are:–

    i. The parties can waive their right to object under sub-section
    (5) of Section 12;

    ii. The right to object under the sub-section can be waived
    only subsequent to a dispute having arisen between the parties;

    iii. The waiver must be in the form of an express agreement in
    writing.

    *****

    77. Waiver means the intentional giving up of a right. It
    involves a conscious decision to abandon an existing legal right,
    benefit, claim, or privilege that a party would otherwise have been
    entitled to. It amounts to an agreement not to enforce that right. A
    waiver can occur only when the person making it is fully aware of
    the right in question and, with complete knowledge, chooses to
    give it up. [See: State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar10]

    78. What flows from the aforesaid is when a right exists, i.e.,
    the right to object to the appointment of an ineligible arbitrator in
    terms of Section 12(5), such a right cannot be taken away by mere
    implication. For a party to be deprived of this right by way of
    waiver, there must be a conscious and unequivocal expression of
    intent to relinquish it. Needless to say, for a waiver to be valid, it is

    10 (2011) 14 SCC 770

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    necessary that the actor demonstrates the intention to act, and for an
    act to be intentional, the actor must understand the act and its
    consequences.

    79. The expression “express agreement in writing”

    demonstrates a deliberate and informed act that although a party is
    fully aware of the arbitrator’s ineligibility, yet it chooses to forego
    the right to object against the appointment of such an arbitrator.
    The requirement of an express agreement in writing has been
    introduced as it reflects awareness and a conscious intention to
    waive the right to object under sub-section (5) of Section 12. A
    clear manifestation of the expression of waiver assumes greater
    importance in light of the fact that the parties are overcoming a
    restriction imposed by law.

    *****

    81. It is only through an express agreement in writing, waiving
    the bar under sub-section (5) of Section 12, that the other party can
    be said to have voluntarily consented to the unilateral appointment
    of such an arbitrator. The proviso conveys that the arbitrator,
    although ineligible to be appointed, yet can continue to perform his
    functions, as it is oriented towards facilitating party autonomy.
    Thus, the proviso reinforces party autonomy and equal treatment of
    parties in arbitration.

    82. In other words, even though the appointment had been
    made by one of the parties, by the act of entering into an agreement
    in writing, the other party expresses its consent. The manner of the
    agreement prescribed by the statute demonstrates voluntariness by
    the parties.

    *****

    84. Undoubtedly, the statute does not prescribe a format for the
    agreement. However, the absence of a prescribed format cannot be
    construed to mean that the waiver may be inferred impliedly or
    through conduct. We say so because the legislature has consciously
    prefaced the term “agreement” with the word “express” and
    followed it with the phrase “in writing”. This semantics denote the
    intention of the legislature that the waiver under the proviso to
    Section 12(5) must be made only through an express and written
    manifestation of intention.

    85. The conscious use of the prefatory expression also serves to
    differentiate such waiver from ‘deemed waiver’ as stipulated under
    Section 4 of the Act, 1996. We must be mindful of the fact that if

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    the legislature intended that waiver under Section 12(5) could
    similarly arise by implication or conduct as mentioned under
    Section 4, it would have refrained from introducing a heightened
    and mandatory requirement, more particularly, in light of the
    rigours of the Seventh Schedule. The statutory design therefore
    makes it evident that the bar under Section 12(5) can be removed
    only by a clear, unequivocal, and written agreement executed after
    the dispute has arisen, and not by any form of tacit acceptance or
    procedural participation.

    86. The mandate of an express agreement in writing in the
    present case may looked at from one another angle. The unilateral
    appointment of an arbitrator is assessed from the viewpoint of the
    parties. However, when the parties later execute an express written
    agreement waiving the ineligibility of the proposed arbitrator, the
    position gets altered. Such written waiver supplies the very consent
    that was previously missing, thereby placing the appointment on
    the same footing as a mutually agreed appointment and addresses
    concerns regarding neutrality and fairness.

    87. In Bharat Broadband (supra)11, this Court categorically
    held that the expression “express agreement in writing” refers to an
    agreement made in words and cannot be inferred by conduct. The
    word “express” denotes that the agreement must be entered into
    with complete knowledge that although the proposed arbitrator is
    ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator, yet they express their
    confidence in him to continue as the arbitrator. The relevant
    observations read thus:–

    “20. This then brings us to the applicability of the
    proviso to Section 12(5) on the facts of this case. Unlike
    Section 4 of the Act which deals with deemed waiver of the
    right to object by conduct, the proviso to Section 12(5) will
    only apply if subsequent to disputes having arisen between
    the parties, the parties waive the applicability of sub-section
    (5) of Section 12 by an express agreement in writing. For
    this reason, the argument based on the analogy of Section 7
    of the Act must also be rejected. Section 7 deals with
    arbitration agreements that must be in writing, and then
    explains that such agreements may be contained in
    documents which provide a record of such agreements. On
    the other hand, Section 12(5) refers to an “express
    agreement in writing”. The expression “express agreement
    in writing” refers to an agreement made in words as
    opposed to an agreement which is to be inferred by

    11 Bharat Broadband Network Ltd v. United Telecons Ltd, (2019) 5 SCC 755

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    conduct. Here, Section 9 of the Contract Act, 1872 becomes
    important. It states:

    “9. Promises, express and implied.–Insofar as
    the proposal or acceptance of any promise is made in
    words, the promise is said to be express. Insofar as
    such proposal or acceptance is made otherwise than
    in words, the promise is said to be implied.”

    It is thus necessary that there be an “express” agreement in
    writing. This agreement must be an agreement by which
    both parties, with full knowledge of the fact that Shri Khan
    is ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator, still go ahead
    and say that they have full faith and confidence in him to
    continue as such. The facts of the present case disclose no
    such express agreement. The appointment letter which is
    relied upon by the High Court as indicating an express
    agreement on the facts of the case is dated 17-1-2017. On
    this date, the Managing Director of the appellant was
    certainly not aware that Shri Khan could not be appointed
    by him as Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule only
    went to the invalidity of the appointment of the Managing
    Director himself as an arbitrator. Shri Khan’s invalid
    appointment only became clear after the declaration of the
    law by the Supreme Court in TRF Ltd. [TRF
    Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd.12
    ] which, as we have
    seen hereinabove, was only on 3-7-2017. After this date, far
    from there being an express agreement between the parties
    as to the validity of Shri Khan’s appointment, the appellant
    filed an application on 7-10-2017 before the sole arbitrator,
    bringing the arbitrator’s attention to the judgment in TRF
    Ltd. and asking him to declare that he has become de jure
    incapable of acting as an arbitrator. Equally, the fact that a
    statement of claim may have been filed before the
    arbitrator, would not mean that there is an express
    agreement in words which would make it clear that both
    parties wish Shri Khan to continue as arbitrator despite
    being ineligible to act as such. This being the case, the
    impugned judgment is not correct when it applies Section 4,
    Section 7, Section 12(4), Section 13(2) and Section 16(2) of
    the Act to the facts of the present case, and goes on to state
    that the appellant cannot be allowed to raise the issue of
    eligibility of an arbitrator, having itself appointed the
    arbitrator. The judgment under appeal is also incorrect in
    stating that there is an express waiver in writing from the

    12 (2017) 8 SCC 377

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    fact that an appointment letter has been issued by the
    appellant, and a statement of claim has been filed by the
    respondent before the arbitrator. The moment the appellant
    came to know that Shri Khan’s appointment itself would be
    invalid, it filed an application before the sole arbitrator for
    termination of his mandate.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    88. In CORE II (supra)13, this Court underscored the rationale
    behind the first two essentials of the proviso. It reads thus:–

    “121. An objection to the bias of an adjudicator can be
    waived. [Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record
    Assn. v. Union of India14] A waiver is an intentional
    relinquishment of a right by a party or an agreement not to
    assert a right. [State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh
    Bhullar15]
    The Arbitration Act allows parties to waive the
    application of Section 12(5) by an express agreement after
    the disputes have arisen. However, the waiver is subject to
    two factors. First, the parties can only waive the
    applicability of Section 12(5) after the dispute has arisen.
    This allows parties to determine whether they will be
    required or necessitated to draw upon the services of
    specific individuals as arbitrators to decide upon specific
    issues. To this effect, Explanation 3 to the Seventh Schedule
    recognises that certain kinds of arbitration such as
    maritime or commodities arbitration may require the
    parties to draw upon a small, specialised pool. The second
    requirement of the proviso to Section 12(5) is that parties
    must consciously abandon their existing legal right through
    an express agreement. Thus, the Arbitration Act reinforces
    the autonomy of parties by allowing them to override the
    limitations of independence and impartiality by an express
    agreement in that regard.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    89. What can be discerned from the above discussion is that the
    ineligibility of an arbitrator can be waived only by an express
    agreement in writing. In the present case, there is no agreement in
    writing, after the disputes arose, waiving the ineligibility of the sole
    arbitrator or the right to object under Section 12(5) of the Act,
    1996.

    13 Central Organization for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIR SMO MCML (JV) A Joint Venture

    Company, (2025) 4 SCC 641
    14 (2016) 5 SCC 808
    15 (2011) 14 SCC 770

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    90. The conduct of the parties is inconsequential and does not
    constitute a valid waiver under the proviso. The requirement of the
    waiver to be made expressly in the form of agreement in writing
    ensures that parties are not divested of their right to object
    inadvertently or by procedural happenstance.

    ******

    96. The net effect of the aforesaid is that a notice invoking the
    arbitration clause under Section 21 of the Act, 1996, a procedural
    order, submission of statement of claim by the appellants, the filing
    an application seeking interim relief, or a reply to an application
    under Section 33 of the Act, 1996, cannot be countenanced to mean
    “an express agreement in writing” within the meaning of
    the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 12 of the Act, 1996.

    97. One could argue that a miscreant party may participate in
    the arbitral proceedings up to the passing of the award, despite
    having full knowledge of the arbitrator’s ineligibility. While after
    an adverse award is rendered, such a party may then seek to
    challenge it with a view to having it set aside. Such an
    apprehension is reasonable, however, to obviate the possibility of
    such misuse, the party making unilateral appointment must
    endeavour to enter into an express written agreement as stipulated
    in the proviso to Section 12(5), so as to safeguard the proceedings
    from being rendered futile.

    98. Thus, all the High Court decisions taking a contrary view to
    the present judgment would stand overruled.”

    (Emphasis in the original)

    26. There is no contest even by Mr. Rao to the finding of the
    learned Single Judge that in the present case, there is, in fact no
    written communication much less a written agreement, inter parties to
    that effect, by either side waiving the applicability of Section 12(5).

    27. While it may be true that the procedure followed by the parties
    was that which was envisaged, in the contract between them, as
    applying where there was waiver of Section 12(5), following of the
    procedure cannot by itself result in such waiver. The argument
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    effectively puts the cart before the horse. There must, in the first
    instance, be waiver of the applicability of Section 12(5) by written
    agreement in writing as required by the proviso to the said clause read
    with the decision in Bhadra International, and, only thereafter, if
    there exists such express waiver in writing, would the arbitral
    procedure envisaged in that situation as contained in Clause
    2905(a)(ii) apply. The situation cannot be read in reverse. We cannot
    accept the argument that by invoking the procedure applicable in a
    case of waiver of Section 12(5), Section 12(5) stands waived, despite
    the absence of any written agreement in writing to that effect.

    28. In fact, the situation which exists in the present case is that the
    very invocation of the procedure, envisaged in the contract between
    the parties as being applicable in a case in which Section 12(5) stood
    waived, was itself illegal. That procedure applies only where there is
    waiver of the applicability of Section 12(5). Inasmuch as there was no
    such waiver in the present case, the procedure itself would not apply.
    By erroneously invoking the procedure which applies where Section
    12(5)
    has been waived, waiver of Section 12(5) cannot be implied.

    29. Besides, we find this argument, emerging from TRSL,
    surprising, as TRSL had initially, in its communication dated 29 May
    2023 and 11 August 2023, expressly stated that it was not waiving
    Section 12(5) of the 1996 Act. We have not been shown any
    communication thereafter by which this earlier communication was
    revoked. Nor have we been shown any communication by which

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    TRSL – or the Railway Board – stated that it was waiving the
    applicability of Section 12(5) of the 1996 Act.

    30. Mr. Rao’s submission that the selection of the learned
    Arbitrator was from a panel which was discussed between the parties
    cannot aid his case. Bhadra International has specifically held that
    consensual appointment of the arbitrator, absent any written waiver of
    Section 12(5), would be insufficient to render the proviso to Section
    12(5)
    applicable.

    31. In that view of the matter, the learned Single Judge is correct in
    his view that Section 12(5) of the Act never stood waived between the
    parties by express agreement in writing as required by the proviso
    thereto and the law as it stands declared in Bhadra International. The
    learned Single Judge was also, therefore, right in setting aside the
    arbitral award on that ground.

    32. There is, therefore, no cause for us to interfere in the present
    appeals which are accordingly dismissed in limine with no orders as to
    costs.

    C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

    OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.

    APRIL 13, 2026/yg/aky

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