Meghalaya High Court
The State Of Meghalaya Represented By … vs Shri Jolian Marak on 9 May, 2025
Author: W. Diengdoh
Bench: W. Diengdoh
2025:MLHC:372-DB
Serial No.01
Daily List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
FA No.2/2024
Date of CAV: 30.04.2025
Date of Pronouncement: 09.05.2025
1. The State of Meghalaya represented by the Commissioner and
Secretary, Community and Rural Development, Shillong.
2. The Director Community and Rural Development, Shillong.
3. The Executive Engineer, Community and Rural Development,
Shillong. ..... Appellants
Vs.
Shri Jolian Marak ..... Respondent
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice I.P. Mukerji, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellants : Mr. N.D. Chullai, AAG with
Ms. Z. E. Nongkynrih, GA.
Mr. E. R. Chyne, GA
For the Respondent : Mr. A. S. Siddiqui, Sr. Adv with
Mr. D. Hynniewta, Adv.
i) Whether approved for Yes
reporting in Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication Yes/No
in press:
Note: For proper public information and transparency, any media
reporting this judgment is directed to mention the
composition of the bench by name of judges, while reporting
this judgment/order.
Page 1 of 7
2025:MLHC:372-DB
JUDGMENT
(Delivered by the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice)
The State of Meghalaya has preferred this appeal. They are
aggrieved by a judgment and decree made on 24th May, 2023 by the
learned Judge, Commercial Court, East Khasi Hills, Shillong in Money
Suit No.1 of 2016 between the parties.
By this judgment and decree, the respondent/plaintiff has been
awarded ₹9,85,098/- with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum
from the date of filing of the suit i.e. 24th October, 2016 till payment. In
addition, the appellant was directed to refund the security deposit of
₹5,99,613/- with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from 24th
October, 2016 till payment. The respondent/plaintiff was also awarded
₹30,000/- as costs.
The principal ground of challenge of the appellant/defendant is
limitation. A hopelessly time-bared claim has been decreed for
₹9,85,098/-, it was submitted. Learned counsel for appellant/defendant
also attacked the decree on merits.
At this stage, it may be stated that it was conceded by learned
counsel for the appellant/defendant that his clients were ready and willing
to refund the security amount of ₹5,99,613/- as decreed.
Page 2 of 7
2025:MLHC:372-DB
The cause of grievance of the appellant/defendant is that the
agreement between the parties was entered into on 6th April, 2005. On
31st March, 2008 after completion of the work under the agreement, the
building was handed over by the respondent/plaintiff to the
appellant/defendant. After more than 5 years, on 19th August, 2013 a
revised claim was submitted by the respondent/plaintiff. The value of the
contract was ₹78,82,800/-. The respondent/plaintiff had been paid
₹68,97,704/- on handing over the completed building in full satisfaction
of his claim. The value of the contract was unilaterally revised by him to
₹1,07,03,265/-. The difference was claimed. On 15th April 2015, the
appellant/defendant refused payment of his claim. On that alleged cause
of action, the suit was filed in 2016, the respondent/plaintiff basing his
cause of action on the rejection of the revised bill and contending that the
suit had been filed within 3 years from that date, within the period of
limitation. According to the appellant/defendant, basing the accrual of the
cause of action and the right to sue on rejection of this revised bill of a
work completed long ago with the handing over of the building to the
appellant/defendant, was untenable. The suit was liable to be dismissed
outright on the ground of limitation.
Page 3 of 7
2025:MLHC:372-DB
In principle, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nikhila
Divyang Mehta & anr v. Hitesh P. Sanghvi & ors decided on 15th April,
2025 (S.L.P. (C) No.13459 of 2024), is in accordance with my notion of
the start of the period of limitation in respect of a cause of action. The
start date is to be reckoned from the date when the cause of action with
the right to sue first arose and not from subsequent facts simply adding
to the cause of action. (See paragraph 24 of the judgment). The exception
is in case of admission, acknowledgement or part payment and so on
which extend the period of limitation, if made within the period of
limitation. (See Sections 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963).
Usually in a works contract Article 18 of the schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 applies. It lays down that where no time for
payment is prescribed, the period of limitation is three years from the date
the work is done. In case of contracts where running accounts of payment
are maintained by a RA bill, usually 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
applies. This Article provides that where no period of limitation is
provided in the schedule, time would be three years from when the right
to sue accrues. It would have to be seen when the running accounts bills
could be claimed to be payable and the suit is to be instituted within three
years from that date.
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2025:MLHC:372-DB
The case of the respondent, however, is identical on facts with
Aries & Aries v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board decided by the Supreme
Court on 21st March, 2017 and reported in (2018) 12 SCC 393. Here the
work had been completed and payment made on 13th January, 1981.
Thereafter, the plaintiff contractor raised supplementary bills claiming
additional amounts through a legal notice dated 16th May, 1981. The
defendant in that case informed the plaintiff on 25th August, 1981, that
the matter was “under-study” and the reply would be sent in due course.
After about six months on 6th November 1981, the defendant replied that
the claims of the plaintiff were rejected. The suit was filed on 6th
November, 1984. The High Court dismissed the suit on the ground of
limitation.
The Supreme Court held that there was accrual of a fresh cause
of action and right to sue from the date the bills claiming additional
amounts in respect of the contract were rejected on 6th November, 1981.
The time period again started running for three years from such rejection.
In our case also a similar thing has happened.
I feel myself bound by the above decision. Therefore, the
argument based on the ground of limitation fails.
Now, I deal with the merit of the claims.
Page 5 of 7
2025:MLHC:372-DB
The value of the work to be done under the agreement was
₹78,82,800/-.
The appellants are agreeable to release the security deposit of
₹5,99,613/-. Hence, out of the contract value of ₹78,82,800/-,
₹68,97,704/- is deemed to have been received by the respondent/plaintiff,
inclusive of the security deposit.
The agreement was of 6th April, 2005. The construction was
completed in about three years and the building handed over to the
appellant on 31st March, 2008. Hence, the contract was fully discharged
by performance and came to an end. The respondent/plaintiff accepted
such payment and was silent for five years. Only on 19th August, 2013, a
revised claim was submitted. A claim for the balance ₹9,85,098/- was
also made.
Once a contract is concluded and discharged by full performance
and acceptance of payment, there is no scope of any additional claims or
payments under the same contract and that too after five years. Hence,
the claim for the balance ₹9,85,098/- was completely misconceived and
speculative. The learned judge made a serious error in entertaining such
claims. The part of the decree granting such claim is set aside. Such error
of the learned judge was aggravated by further entertainment of claims
Page 6 of 7
2025:MLHC:372-DB
based on a purported revised estimate. The decree which she has sought
to pass on such claim is vague and untenable. A decree must always be a
certain sum and not uncertain, contingent and vague.
For all those reasons, the respondent/plaintiff shall only be
entitled to a refund of the security deposit of ₹5,99,613/- with interest at
the reduced rate of seven per cent per annum from the date of filing the
suit i.e., 24th October, 2016 till payment. The order for payment of costs
is set aside. The impugned judgment and decree is modified to the above
extent.
The appeal is partly allowed to the above extent.
After pronouncement of the judgment, it was submitted by Mr.
N.D. Chullai, learned AAG that the appellant has deposited ₹20,00,000/-
with the Registrar General of this Court. This deposit may be made over
to the appellant No.1 by the Registrar General within two weeks of
communication of this order.
(W. Diengdoh) (I.P. Mukerji)
Judge Chief Justice
Meghalaya
09.05.2025
"Lam DR-PS"
Page 7 of 7
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
LAMPHRANG KHARCHANDY
Date: 2025.05.09 03:35:22 IST