Supreme Court – Daily Orders
The State Of Gujarat vs Dip Cooperative Housing Society … on 23 July, 2025
Bench: Sudhanshu Dhulia, Aravind Kumar
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ITEM NO.5 COURT NO.8 SECTION III
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) Diary No(s). 6420/2025
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 19-07-2024
in R/LPA No. 34/2008 in R/SCA No.4430/1992 passed by the High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad]
THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
DIP COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LIMITED & ORS. Respondent(s)
(IA No. 79493/2025 – C/DELAY IN FILING, IA No. 79494/2025 – C/DELAY
IN REFILING / CURING THE DEFECTS, IA No. 126097/2025 - PERMISSION
TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES)
Date : 23-07-2025 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHANSHU DHULIA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Balbir Singh, Sr. Adv.
Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, AOR
Mr. Anuj Chaudhary, Adv.
Mr. Naman Tandon, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Maninder Singh, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Rishabh Parikh, Adv.
Mr. Abhinav Agrawal, AOR
Mr. Piyush Bhardwaj, Adv.
Mr. Shivam Sengupta, Adv.
Ms. Niyati Kohli, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Delay condoned.
Heard Mr. Balbir Singh, learned senior counsel for the
petitioners and
Signature Not Verified
Mr. Maninder Singh, learned senior counsel for the
Digitally signed by
Nirmala Negi
Date: 2025.07.26
respondents.
12:18:27 IST
Reason:
The State of Gujarat appears before this Court as the
petitioner(s) challenging the order dated 19.07.2024 passed by the
2Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court which had come up before the
Full Bench on a reference due to the difference of opinion between
two Judges sitting in a Division Bench. The matter relates to a
piece of land which is claimed to have vested with the State on
28.02.1992 under the provisions of Section 10(3) of the Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short “Act of 1976”). The
land which is the subject of the present dispute before this Court
is measuring 12041 sq.mtr., out of which 10141 sq.mtr. was declared
surplus, and according to the State the remaining land measuring
2000 sq.mtr. was given to two individuals, in two parcels measuring
1000 sq.mtr.each. The surplus land measuring 10141 sq.mtr. was to
vest with the State and consequently a notice was given on
04.05.1992 under Section 10(5) of the Act of 1976 which reads as
follows:-
“10((5) Where any vacant land is vested in the State
Government under sub-section (3), the competent authority
may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in
possession of it to surrender or deliver possession
thereof to the State Government or to any person duly
authorised by the State Government in this behalf within
thirty days of the service of the notice.”Thereafter, as possession was not handed over to the State,
notice was again given on 09.06.1992 under Section 10(6) of the Act
of 1976, which reads as under:-
“10(6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an
order made under sub-section (5), the competent authority
may take possession of the vacant land or cause it to be
given to the concerned State Government or to any person
3duly authorised by such State Government in this behalf
and may for that purpose use such force as may be
necessary.
Explanation.—In this section, in sub-section (1) of
Section 11 and in Sections 14 and 23, “State Government”,
in relation to—
(a) any vacant land owned by the Central Government, means
the Central Government;
(b) any vacant land owned by any State Government and
situated in a Union territory or within the local limits
of a cantonment declared as such under Section 3 of the
Cantonments Act, 1924 (2 of 1924) means that State
Government.
Objectives and Scheme.—Act is self-contained code
providing machinery to deal with rights of landowners and
remedies for correcting errors committed by authorities.
It gives finality to orders passed by appellate authority.
Civil court cannot declare proceedings under the 1976 Act
as illegal or non est. Sections dealing with jurisdiction
of civil courts in are in pari materia with sections of
Land Acquisition Act, State of W.B. v. David Mantosh,
(2020) 12 SCC 542.”
Meanwhile, the said Act of 1976 was repealed by the Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (for short “Act of
1999”). The saving clause in the repealing Act i.e. Section 3
reads as under:-
“3. Savings.—(1) The repeal of the principal Act shall not
affect—
(a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3)
of Section 10, possession of which has been taken over by
the State Government or any person duly authorized by the
State Government in this behalf or by the competent
authority;
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(b) the validity of any order granting exemption under
subsection (1) of Section 20 or any action taken
thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment of any court to
the contrary;
(c) any payment made to the State Government as a
condition for granting exemption under sub-section (1) of
Section 20.
(2) Where—
(a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State
Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the
principal Act but possession of which has not been taken
over by the State Government or any person duly authorised
by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent
authority; and
(b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with
respect to such land,
then, such land shall not restored unless the amount paid,
if any, has been refunded to the State Government.”A perusal of the above repealing Act shows that “Possession”
has an extremely important bearing in the matter. In the present
case when the occupants of the land were dispossessed, they were
constrained to file a writ petition before the High Court as they
claimed right of ownership over the land. During the hearing of the
writ petition, a statement was made by the State’s counsel
admitting that the State has not taken possession of the land.
Thereafter, writ petition was disposed of by the ld. Single Judge
on 06.05.1999 with a finding that the petitioner’s claim of
possession of the land is a fact which has not been disputed and
consequently the matter was covered by the repealing Act which was
also acknowledged by the State Government in Resolution dated
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13.03.1998.
All the same, the matter was taken in Letters Patent Appeal by
the State against the said order and the matter was remanded to the
Ld. Single Judge who ultimately dismissed the writ petition vide
order dated 29.10.2007. The writ petitioner(s) thereafter
challenged this order in a Letters Patent Appeal and there was a
difference of opinion between the two Judges on the question of
possession of the writ petitioner(s). Hence, the matter came up
before the Full Bench of the High Court which was of the opinion
that the possession remains with the writ petitioner(s) and
therefore ultimately the writ petition was allowed. The crucial
question as we have seen in this case is possession. The learned
senior counsel Mr. Balbir Singh would argue that there were
documents which have been placed before the Court in the form of
“Panchnama”, showing that the State has taken over the possession.
But there is nothing to show that the actual possession was ever
taken by the State. What is relevant for our purposes is actual
physical possession by the State as visualized under the Act. There
is a clear finding by the three Judges in paragraph 6.14 of the
impugned order, which reads as:-
“6.14 Therefore as laid out by the Supreme Court in case
of Hari Ram (supra) where the possession has not been
taken over by the State Government or by any duly
authorized person, the mere vesting of land without actual
possession is not sufficient. Paper possession is not
sufficient to vest land in the State Government when the
records of this case, in absence of any rebuttal, set us
to hold that allegations in the petition are that
proceedings under Section 10(5) and 10(6) are never taken.
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The record indicates that Shri Shah and Shri Tripathi were
issued notices under Section 10(5) and it is now an
admitted fact, in absence of any denial that they were
served on dead persons. The State, has not been able to
point out that actual possession was actually handed over.
Even if it was not so voluntarily handed over. Section
10(6) contemplates taking possession through coercion. In
absence of anything on record to suggest taking over of
possession in accordance with the provisions of Section
10(5) and 10(6), the taking over will be unlawful. Section
3 of the Repeal Act talks of the actual or de-facto
possession and not only de-jure possession.”The State has not been able to point out that actual
possession was at any time handed over to it. Even if it was not
voluntarily handed over, Section 10(6) contemplates taking
possession through force. There is nothing on record to suggest
taking over of possession in accordance with the provisions of
Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act of 1976 by the State.
Under these circumstances, the matter clearly revolves on the
fact of possession on which the three Judges have given a unanimous
finding that the possession remains with the writ petitioner(s) and
the actual possession was never taken over by the State.
We, thus, see no scope for our interference in the impugned
order passed by the High Court, in exercise of our jurisdiction
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. We, however, make
it very clear that our determination is confined to the facts of
the present case, that too on the limited question of possession as
we have already been determined.
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With these observations, the present petition is disposed of.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(NIRMALA NEGI) (RENU BALA GAMBHIR) ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
