Bombay High Court
The Malad Co-Operative Housing Society … vs State Of Maharashtra And Ors. on 18 April, 2026
Author: Amit Borkar
Bench: Amit Borkar
2026:BHC-AS:18204
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AGK
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.1927 OF 2015
1. The Malad Cooperative Housing Society
Limited, a Society registered under the
provisions of Maharashtra Cooperative
Societies Act, 1960, bearing registration
No.BOM/HSG 38 of 1965, and having
its address at 1/9, Poddar Road,
Malad (East), Mumbai 400 097
ATUL
GANESH
KULKARNI 2. Nathmal Govindram Saraf,
Digitally signed
by ATUL GANESH
KULKARNI
(Secretary, Malad C.H.S.L.),
Date: 2026.04.18
12:12:46 +0530
R/at 4/90, Malad Coop. Housing
Society Limited, Poddar Park,
Malad (East), Mumbai 400 097 ... Petitioners
Vs.
1. State of Maharashtra
2. The Divisional Joint Registrar,
Coop. Societies, Mumbai Division,
Mumbai, Malhotra House, 6th Floor,
Opp. G.P.O., Mumbai 400 001
3. The Deputy Registrar of Coop.
Societies, 'P' Ward, 303, Municipal
Godown Building, Thakur Complex,
Near Sanskriti, 90 Feet Road,
Kandivali (East), Mumbai 400 101
4. Radheshyam Ramlal Dhanuka,
Age 60 years, Occupation Not known,
of Mumbai, Indian Inhabitant,
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Residing at 4/31, Malad Coop. Hsg.
Society Limited, Poddar Road,
Malad (East), Mumbai 400 097 ... Respondents
Mr. S.U. Kamdar, Senior Advocate i/by Mr. Jeet Gandhi
for the petitioners.
Ms. Sulbha Chipade, AGP for respondent Nos.1 to 3-
State.
Mr. Shrikrishna Ganbavale with Mr. Nikhil Sonar i/by
Mr. Ashok Saraogi for respondent No.4.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : APRIL 8, 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : APRIL 18, 2026
JUDGMENT:
1. By the present writ petition instituted under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have called in
question the legality, correctness, and propriety of the Judgment
and Award dated 13 November 2014 passed by Respondent No. 2,
namely the Divisional Joint Registrar, Co operative Societies, in
Revision Application No. 437 of 2013.
2. The facts giving rise to the filing of the present writ petition,
as borne out from the record, may briefly be stated thus. The
dispute pertains to Flat No. 31 situated in Building No. 4 of Malad
Co operative Housing Society Limited, Poddar Road, Malad East,
Mumbai 400097, hereinafter referred to as “the said flat”. It is the
case of the parties that late Shri Ramlal Dhanuka and his wife
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Bhagirathi Dhanuka had three sons born during the period
between 1934 and 1955, namely, Deokinandan Dhanuka also
known as D. R. Dhanuka, Kishanlal Dhanuka also known as K. R.
Dhanuka, and Radheshyam Dhanuka, who is arrayed as
Respondent No. 4 herein. It is the pleaded case that during the
period between 1969 and 1970, late Shri Ramlal Dhanuka, from
his personal funds and resources and from the proceeds arising out
of disposal of certain residential premises situated at Krishna Kunj,
acquired various immovable properties in the petitioner society
including Flat No. 31, Building No. 4, Flat No. 32, Building No. 4,
Shops Nos. 1, 9 and 17 in Building No. 3, and subsequently in the
year 1983, Flat No. 12, Building No. 4, in the names of different
family members. It is further stated that on 1 June 1970, Share
Certificate No. 165 in respect of the suit property being Flat No.
31, Building No. 4 comprising 80 shares bearing Nos. 9261 to
9340 was issued in the joint names of Pannadevi, wife of D. R.
Dhanuka, and late Shri Ramlal Dhanuka.
3. It is further the case on record that Smt. Pannadevi, wife of
D. R. Dhanuka, was a homemaker and allegedly had no
independent source of income. It is contended that from the year
1983 onwards, for maintaining privacy and separate residence of
the three sons of late Shri Ramlal Dhanuka, Flat No. 4/31 came to
be occupied by Respondent No. 4, namely Radheshyam Dhanuka,
Flat No. 4/32 by K. R. Dhanuka, and Flat No. 4/12 by D. R.
Dhanuka. It is further stated that late Shri Ramlal Dhanuka and his
wife Bhagirathi resided along with Respondent No. 4 in the said
suit flat. It is not in dispute that sometime in the year 1989 both
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late Shri Ramlal Dhanuka and Bhagirathi expired, leaving behind
the aforesaid three sons as their legal heirs. It is further averred
that in the year 1991, D. R. Dhanuka, upon being elevated as a
Judge of the Bombay High Court, vacated Flat No. 4/12 and
shifted his residence to Sarang, Nariman Point, Mumbai.
4. In the year 2007, Smt. Pannadevi Dhanuka acting through
her husband D. R. Dhanuka instituted Suit No. 2485 of 2007
before this Court claiming herself to be the sole and exclusive
owner of the said flat, namely Flat No. 31, Building No. 4, on the
basis of alleged exclusive title. In the said suit, it was specifically
pleaded that the other son namely K. R. Dhanuka had never
asserted any right, title or interest in the suit flat either as legal
heir of late Shri Ramlal Dhanuka or otherwise. By the said
proceedings, a declaration was sought that Respondent No. 4 had
no right, title or interest whatsoever in the said flat or in the
membership rights attached thereto in the petitioner society.
During pendency of the aforesaid suit, Smt. Pannadevi expired
intestate on 11 May 2008 leaving behind her legal heirs, namely
Chanda Premnarayan Goyal, Indira Sanjay Rungta, late Hemant D.
Dhanuka, Ramesh D. Dhanuka, Rajendra D. Dhanuka and D. R.
Dhanuka. Upon her demise, the said legal heirs were brought on
record in the proceedings by Chamber Order No. 1151 of 2008 on
22 July 2008. It further appears that by directions dated 7 March
2009, Respondent No. 3 directed the petitioner society not to deal
with the membership rights relating to the said flat until
conclusion of the said suit.
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5. It is further brought on record that in the 43rd Annual
General Meeting held on 28 November 2010, the petitioner society
resolved to continue the share certificate in its original names.
Thereafter, by order dated 20 January 2012 passed in the said suit,
the legal heirs of deceased Pannadevi Dhanuka, who had been
substituted in her place, unconditionally withdrew the suit. The
consequence thereof was withdrawal and abandonment of all
claims raised therein pertaining to title, possession, membership
rights, nomination, maintenance and all allegations made against
Respondent No. 4 concerning the said flat. According to
Respondent No. 4, by virtue of such unconditional withdrawal, the
cloud cast over the title and rights of late Shri Ramlal Dhanuka in
respect of the said flat stood removed. After withdrawal of the suit,
Respondent No. 4 claiming himself to be one of the legal heirs of
late Shri Ramlal Dhanuka, submitted an application dated 20
March 2012 to the petitioner society seeking grant of membership
in respect of the said flat along with requisite application forms,
undertakings, fees and charges. It is alleged that despite receipt of
the said application, the petitioner society failed to take any
decision thereon for nearly one year and did not communicate any
response. In such circumstances, Respondent No. 4 approached
Respondent No. 3 on 15 April 2013 seeking declaration of his
status as deemed member of the petitioner society.
6. It further appears that on 18 April 2013, the petitioner
society adjusted maintenance dues after accounting for refund
allegedly payable by the society to Respondent No. 4 and accepted
from him cheques towards maintenance charges due up to 31
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March 2013 in relation to the said flat. The petitioner society
thereafter filed its reply dated 20 May 2013 to the application for
deemed membership. It is the contention of Respondent No. 4 that
in the said reply no specific objection to his application was raised
and no disclosure was made regarding any steps taken by the
society on his earlier application. Respondent No. 4 filed his
affidavit in rejoinder on 29 May 2013. However, by order dated 11
July 2013, received by Respondent No. 4 on 19 July 2013, his
application for deemed membership came to be rejected on the
ground that title documents of late Shri Ramlal Dhanuka had not
been produced.
7. Aggrieved thereby, Respondent No. 4 preferred Revision
Application No. 437 of 2013 on 4 September 2013 before the
Divisional Joint Registrar, Co operative Societies, Mumbai Division,
Mumbai. In the said revision proceedings, it was specifically
contended that Respondent No. 4 was asserting rights through his
father late Shri Ramlal Dhanuka and that the other two sons had
never claimed any independent right in the suit flat as legal heirs
of late Shri Ramlal Dhanuka. The petitioner society filed its reply
before Respondent No. 2 on 24 November 2013 substantially
reiterating the stand already taken in its earlier reply dated 20 May
2013 before Respondent No. 3.
8. During the course of hearing of the revision proceedings in
the period 2013 to 2014, Respondent No. 2, upon consideration of
the pleadings and replies filed by the petitioner society, is stated to
have orally inquired whether any objection had been received from
any legal heirs of deceased Pannadevi Dhanuka or late Shri Ramlal
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Dhanuka. The petitioner society is stated to have answered the
said query in the negative. Thereafter, by the impugned order
dated 13 November 2014, Respondent No. 2 set aside the earlier
order dated 11 July 2013 and allowed the application of
Respondent No. 4 for deemed membership principally on the
grounds that late Shri Ramlal Dhanuka was admittedly one of the
shareholders of the said flat; Respondent No. 4 was admittedly in
possession thereof; the title suit instituted by late Pannadevi
Dhanuka had been unconditionally withdrawn by her legal heirs;
the petitioner society had failed to communicate any decision on
the application submitted by Respondent No. 4; Respondent No. 4
had tendered maintenance charges in respect of the flat; grant of
membership would not extinguish any substantive proprietary
rights in relation to the flat; and lastly, the petitioner society had
failed to produce any objection from any legal heir of late
Pannadevi Dhanuka or late Shri Ramlal Dhanuka.
9. It is further stated that Respondent No. 4 subsequently came
to know of a letter dated 8 December 2014 addressed by late D. R.
Dhanuka to the petitioner society wherein he allegedly expressed
unwillingness to prefer any appeal or undertake any litigation
against Respondent No. 4 and conveyed that the order dated 13
November 2014 be implemented. Notwithstanding the said
communication, the petitioner society instituted the present writ
petition on 4 February 2015 impugning the aforesaid Judgment
and Award dated 13 November 2014, principally contending that
there exist several other legal heirs and claimants who may assert
rights in respect of the said flat.
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10. Mr. Kamdar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
the petitioners, submitted that the application preferred by
Respondent No. 4 before the petitioner society was in substance
and form an application seeking transfer of membership and not
transmission thereof. Inviting attention to Bye Law No. 35, he
submitted that the said provision specifically governs the
contingency where a member of the society dies intestate without
making any nomination. He contended that Bye Law No. 35
prescribes a mandatory procedure requiring the society, within one
month of receiving information regarding the death of such
member, to invite claims or objections in relation to the proposed
transfer of the shares and interest of the deceased member by
issuance of public notice in the prescribed format and by
displaying such notice on the notice board of the society, as also by
publication in a local newspaper. He further submitted that after
following the aforesaid procedure, and after deducting the
expenses thereof from the value of the shares and interest of the
deceased member, the managing committee is required to
determine the person who, in its opinion, is the legal
representative of the deceased, subject to such person being
otherwise eligible for admission as a member and furnishing an
indemnity bond together with an application in the prescribed
form indemnifying the society against rival claims in respect of the
shares. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the application
tendered by Respondent No. 4 was in Form No. 23 prescribed
under Bye Law No. 38(e)(ii), which according to him pertains to
transfer of membership, whereas in a case of succession after
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death, the applicable provision was transmission under Bye Law
No. 35. He further pointed out that even in the prayer clause of the
said application, Respondent No. 4 had sought admission and
transfer of the shares and interest of the transferor, thereby clearly
demonstrating that the application itself proceeded on the footing
of transfer and not transmission. It was then contended that the
application was otherwise incomplete and defective inasmuch as
neither the requisite affidavit nor the original share certificate was
annexed thereto as contemplated under Rule 19 and the
prescribed form appended thereto. He therefore urged that in the
absence of due compliance with the statutory and procedural
requirements, the deeming fiction regarding conferment of
membership under Section 22(2) of the Maharashtra Cooperative
Societies Act could not have been invoked. He further submitted
that as on the date of the application for membership, namely 20
March 2012, and even on the date of the order passed by the
Deputy Registrar on 11 July 2013, no material was placed on
record by Respondent No. 4 to establish that there was any
consensus amongst the legal representatives regarding the person
to be admitted as member. On the contrary, according to him, the
material placed on record disclosed subsisting disputes amongst
the legal heirs themselves.
11. Placing reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case
of Bajarang Labour Cooperative Society, Mahagaon (Z) vs.
Divisional Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Nagpur and
Others, reported in 2016 (2) Mh.L.J. 849, learned Senior Counsel
submitted that a Coordinate Bench of this Court, upon considering
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Sections 158 and 23(1 A) of the Maharashtra Cooperative
Societies Act, 1960, has held that the State Government in exercise
of powers under Section 158 delegated the powers of the Registrar
to the Deputy Registrar by Notification dated 11 September 2012,
and consequently while entertaining applications under the said
provisions, the District Deputy Registrar exercises powers as
delegate of the Registrar. It was thus submitted that once such
powers are exercised by the District Deputy Registrar as delegate
of the Registrar, the Divisional Joint Registrar would have no
jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate upon a revision application
against such order. He further submitted that the said view has
subsequently been followed by another Coordinate Bench of this
Court in Ravi Vishwanath Ghumre vs. Divisional Joint Registrar,
Maharashtra Cooperative Society and Others, Writ Petition No.
1234 of 2019 decided on 26 August 2021, as also in Deepali
Majoor Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit vs. State of Maharashtra and
Others in Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2025 decided on 11 July 2025.
On the strength of the aforesaid precedents, it was contended that
the impugned order passed by the Divisional Joint Registrar
allowing the revision preferred by Respondent No. 4 was wholly
without jurisdiction and therefore liable to be quashed and set
aside.
12. In rejoinder Mr. Kamdar, learned Senior Counsel, further
submitted that the Coordinate Bench in Bajarang Labour
Cooperative Society has specifically considered the scheme of
Sections 3 and 158 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act,
1960 and has expressly rejected contentions similar to those
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canvassed by the contesting respondents in the present matter. He
submitted that the Coordinate Bench had examined the precise
question relating to determination of deemed membership under
Section 23(1 A) of the Act, which falls to be decided by the
Registrar, and therefore according to him the reliance sought to be
placed on the Division Bench judgment by the respondents is
wholly misplaced and distinguishable on facts as well as in law.
13. Per contra, Mr. Ganbavale, learned Counsel appearing on
behalf of Respondent No. 4, submitted that it is an admitted
position on record that the share certificate in respect of the
subject flat continued to remain in the original names of Pannadevi
Dhanuka and Ramlal Dhanuka. He submitted that Suit No. 2485 of
2007 instituted by late Pannadevi Dhanuka, and thereafter
prosecuted through her substituted legal heirs, pertaining to
ownership of the subject property, came to be unconditionally
withdrawn on 20 January 2012. According to him, the
unconditional withdrawal of the said suit put an end to the dispute
concerning title and ownership then being asserted against
Respondent No. 4. He further invited attention to the letter dated
8 December 2014 addressed by Shri D. R. Dhanuka, whereby the
said D. R. Dhanuka allegedly categorically expressed that he was
not desirous of filing any appeal or engaging in any litigation
against Respondent No. 4 and had requested the petitioner society
to forthwith implement the order dated 13 November 2014.
Learned Counsel further submitted that the petitioner society itself
has accepted and recovered maintenance charges for the preceding
ten years aggregating to Rs.4,28,878/- along with interest from
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Respondent No. 4 after adjusting the repair fund account, thereby
recognizing his status in relation to the subject premises.
14. Inviting attention to the application submitted by
Respondent No. 4 before the society, learned Counsel submitted
that even assuming that there may have been an incorrect
reference to a particular provision or form, the same would not
alter the true nature and substance of the application. According to
him, the application was in essence one seeking transmission of
membership, since Respondent No. 4 asserted his entitlement in
the capacity of legal representative and heir of late Shri Ramlal
Dhanuka and not by way of any inter vivos transfer. It was thus
contended that mere defect in nomenclature or erroneous citation
of provision cannot defeat the substantive claim when the
foundational basis of the application unmistakably disclosed
succession by inheritance.
15. Placing reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Usha
Jhaveri vs. State of Maharashtra in Writ Petition No. 659 of 2011
decided on 4 July 2011, learned Counsel submitted that it is well
settled that a cooperative housing society is not expected to
adjudicate inter se disputes of title or proprietary rights amongst
rival claimants to a property. According to him, the limited
function of the society is merely to recognize one amongst the
claimants for purposes of administration, collection of
maintenance charges and other dues, without thereby conferring
or adjudicating upon absolute title in the property concerned.
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16. Learned Counsel further relied upon the Division Bench
judgment of this Court in Krishnarao Bakaramji Hadge vs. State of
Maharashtra, reported in 1966 Bom LR LXIX 150, and submitted
that the Division Bench while interpreting Section 3 of the
Cooperative Societies Act dealing with delegation of powers of the
Registrar has authoritatively held that even where powers of the
Registrar are delegated to subordinate officers, such officers
continue to remain subordinate to the Registrar and function
under his guidance, superintendence and control. It was
emphasized that the Division Bench has clarified that merely
because an Assistant Registrar or subordinate officer exercises
delegated powers of the Registrar, the order passed by such officer
does not ipso facto become an order of the Registrar himself. The
Division Bench further held that where an order is passed by the
delegatee independently and without approval or sanction of the
Registrar, the revisional jurisdiction would lie before the Registrar;
whereas only in cases where the delegatee has acted with prior
approval or sanction of the Registrar would the revisional
jurisdiction lie to the State Government.
17. On the basis of the aforesaid legal position, learned Counsel
for Respondent No. 4 submitted that the settled principle emerging
from the judgment in Krishnarao Bakaramji Hadge is that only
where the delegate exercises powers with prior approval or
sanction of the Registrar would the revisional remedy lie before
the State Government, whereas where the order has been
independently passed by the delegate without such approval, the
revisional jurisdiction remains exercisable by the Registrar. It was
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therefore submitted that the objection to jurisdiction as raised by
the petitioners is misconceived and untenable in law.
REASONS AND ANALYSIS:
18. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival
submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the respective parties. I have also carefully examined the
statutory provisions governing the field as well as the judicial
precedents cited across the Bar. Upon undertaking such exercise,
the real question which emerges is that the controversy placed
before the society was never a dispute of title requiring
adjudication of ownership rights in respect of the flat in question.
The matter before the society arose because, after the death of one
of the original holders of the flat, Respondent No. 4 sought
recognition in the records of the cooperative housing society by
claiming membership in his capacity as legal representative of the
deceased holder. Thus, the nature of the proceedings was relating
to the internal management of the society and not adjudication of
proprietary rights.
19. The petitioners have attempted to project the controversy as
if the society was required to determine who amongst the family
members was the owner of the flat before considering the question
of membership. Such an approach proceeds upon a
misunderstanding of the role assigned to a cooperative housing
society under the scheme of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies
Act. A cooperative housing society is not a forum constituted for
adjudicating title disputes, succession claims, partition matters or
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proprietary entitlements between legal heirs. It is not vested with
powers akin to a civil court. The society’s function is confined to
management of its affairs, regulation of membership, maintenance
of internal records and recognition of persons for purposes
connected with administration of the premises and collection of
dues.
20. What, therefore, the society was required to examine was
not the question of who is the owner of the flat, but who could be
recognised for the purpose of being entered in the society’s records
as member and for transacting with the society concerning the flat.
This distinction between adjudication of title and recognition for
society purposes is of importance. The recognition granted by the
society neither creates title nor extinguishes title. It enables the
society to function and maintain administration in relation to the
property. If any question of beneficial ownership or succession
survives amongst the heirs, such question must be adjudicated by a
civil court in appropriate proceedings instituted for that purpose.
The society cannot convert itself into a tribunal of title and cannot
refuse to discharge its statutory function merely because multiple
heirs may exist. Mere existence of more than one legal heir is not
sufficient to indefinitely postpone recognition of any claimant.
21. Since the controversy in the present matter admittedly arose
prior to the introduction of Chapter VIIIB by the Maharashtra Act
of 2019, the rights of the parties and the legality of the impugned
action are required to be examined with reference to the statutory
provisions as they stood prior to such amendment. The provision
of Section 30, as applicable prior to introduction of Chapter VIIIB
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of 2019, reads thus as under:
“30. Transfer of interest on death of member.–
(1) On the death of a member of a society, the society shall
transfer the share or interest of the deceased member to a
person or persons nominated in accordance with the rules or,
if no person has been so nominated, to such person as may
appear to the committee to be the heir or legal
representative of the deceased member:
Provided that, such nominee, heir or legal
representative, as the case may be, is duly admitted as a
member of the society:
Provided further that, nothing in this sub-section or in
section 22 shall prevent a minor or a person of unsound
mind from acquiring by inheritance or otherwise, any share
or interest of a deceased member in a society.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),
any such nominee, heir or legal representative, as the case
may be, may require the society to pay to him the value of
the share or interest of the deceased member, ascertained in
accordance with the rules.
(3) A society may pay all other moneys due to the
deceased member from the society to such nominee, heir or
legal representative, as the case may be.
(4) All transfers and payments duly made by a society in
accordance with the provisions of this section, shall be valid
and effectual against any demand made upon the society by
any other person.”
22. Section 30 of the Maharashtra Co operative Societies Act
assumes importance in the peculiar facts of the present
proceedings, for the reason that the controversy which has
travelled before this Court has its genesis in the death of one of the
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holders of the subject flat and in the consequential claim raised by
Respondent No. 4 on the basis that he is the legal representative
and heir of the deceased member. The foundation of Respondent
No. 4’s claim is based on succession. Therefore, whenever the
claim of a person arises after death of an member and is based
upon inheritance of the estate of the deceased member, the matter
attracts the framework under Section 30, prior to 2019.
23. A reading of sub-section (1) of Section 30 stipulates that
upon the death of a member of a cooperative society, the society
shall transfer the share or interest of such deceased member, in the
first instance, to the nominee if any nomination has validly been
made in accordance with the Rules. In the absence of such
nomination, the statute further mandates that the transfer shall be
effected in favour of such person as may appear to the committee
to be the heir or legal representative of the deceased member. The
wording employed does not provide that the society must transfer
the share only after conclusively determining who is the owner.
Nor does it direct the society to undertake adjudication of
succession. Instead, the legislature has employed the phrase “such
person as may appear to the committee to be the heir or legal
representative.”
24. The use of the aforesaid phrase demonstrates that the
satisfaction contemplated by the statute is f prima facie
administrative satisfaction based upon the materials available
before the committee. The committee is required to form an
opinion as to who appears to be the heir or legal representative.
The statute thus contemplates prima facie satisfaction. It does not
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contemplate a conclusive declaration. If the legislature intended
that the society should first conduct a inquiry into title and render
binding findings upon inheritance claims, it would have used
different language and would have conferred adjudicatory powers.
The absence of such language is indicative of the scope intended
by the legislature.
25. The use of the expression “may appear to the committee”
reflects recognition of the limitations under which cooperative
societies function. The legislature has framed Section 30 so that
the society may make a administrative determination based upon
the record before it. The committee is therefore expected only to
identify the person who appears to be the proper person for
recognition.
26. The first proviso to Section 30(1) lays down that even if a
nominee, heir or legal representative is identified by the
committee, the transfer can be effected only provided such person
is admitted as a member of the society. It demonstrates that
Section 30 contemplates a two stage process. Firstly, the society
must identify the person who appears to be nominee, heir or legal
representative. Secondly, such person must satisfy the legal
requirements for admission as member in accordance with the Act,
Rules and Bye laws. Thereafter, can the share or interest be
transferred.
27. This shows that Section 30 recognises that succession claims
stand on a different footing from fresh claims of applicants,
because such claims arise by operation of law. The second proviso
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appended to Section 30(1) further states that nothing in Section
30(1) or Section 22 shall prevent a minor or person of unsound
mind from acquiring by inheritance or otherwise the share or
interest of a deceased member, the legislature has acknowledged
that rights arising through inheritance are to be treated differently
from ordinary applications for admission. Sub-sections (2) and (3)
of Section 30 provide that nominee, heir or legal representative
may require the society to pay the value of the share or interest of
the deceased member and may also receive other monies due to
the deceased from the society. These provisions demonstrate that
the legislature intended resolution of issues arising upon death of
members.
28. Sub-section (4) of Section 30 has a bearing upon the
controversy before this Court. It indicates that once the society,
acting bona fide and in accordance with Section 30, transfers the
share or interest to the person recognised by it as nominee, heir or
legal representative, such action is protected against future claims
by third parties. The legislature has therefore insulated the society
from liability once it has acted bona fide in accordance with law.
The purpose of sub-section (4) is to protect the society in
circumstances where it has acted on prima facie satisfaction, even
though some other claimant may emerge. Thus the statute itself
recognises that the society may be required to choose one amongst
possible claimants and proceed on that basis. Accordingly, the
argument advanced by the petitioners that unless all heirs first
consent or unless all succession issues are settled, the society
cannot act, stands negatived by the language of Section 30. Such
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an interpretation would defeat the object of the provision and
render the protection under sub-section (4) meaningless.
29. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
case, once Respondent No. 4 approached the petitioner society
claiming through late Ramlal Dhanuka and asserting that he was
legal representative of the deceased holder, the obligation cast
upon the society was to examine whether Respondent No. 4
appeared to be the heir or legal representative for purposes of
Section 30. The society was required to undertake a prima facie
assessment of the materials before it. What the society was
required to ascertain was whether Respondent No. 4 had disclosed
prima facie nexus with the deceased member, whether his status as
legal representative appeared plausible on the record, whether any
rival objection had been raised by claimants, and whether the
legal requirements relating to admission stood satisfied. Once
these considerations were addressed, the society was bound to act
in accordance with Section 30 and process the claim.
30. The petitioners have next argued that the application filed by
Respondent No. 4 was submitted in an incorrect form and by
reference to a wrong bye-law and, therefore, the same was not
maintainable in law. Though the submission has been pressed with
seriousness, I do not find myself persuaded to accept it in the strict
form. A careful reading of the application filed by Respondent No.
4 clearly discloses that the foundation of his claim was not as fresh
applicant but as legal representative of late Ramlal Dhanuka. The
application in substance was a request that his name be recognised
and entered in place of the deceased member on account of
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succession. The substance of the prayer was therefore for stepping
into the place of the deceased holder. It may be that the form
employed by Respondent No. 4 was not drafted with precision or
that the reference made therein to the relevant bye-law may not
have been entirely accurate. However, in matters concerning
administration of cooperative societies substance must prevail
over mere form especially where the intention of the applicant is
ascertainable from the document. Procedural forms exist to
facilitate administration. They are not intended to become
instruments of injustice by defeating substantive claims on clerical
grounds. So long as the nature of the application is evident and the
society itself understood the application as a claim arising from
succession and acted upon the same, minor defects in reference
cannot be permitted to destroy the claim.
31. This position becomes evident from the conduct of the
society itself. The petitioner society did not reject the application
on the ground that the form was incompetent. On the contrary, it
entertained the same, called for replies, processed the application,
and acted in relation thereto. Such conduct shows that the society
understood the nature of the request and treated it as requiring
consideration. Once that is so it is not open to the society to turn
around and contend that the claim must fail merely because the
form number may have been inaccurately mentioned. A wrong
label attached to a legal request does not destroy the character of
the request when the substance is discernible and the factual
foundation supports the claim.
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32. The petitioners have further contended that the application
was incomplete because the requisite affidavit and original share
certificate were not furnished along with the same. This
submission, though not without legal basis, does not go to the root
of the controversy in the facts of the present case. The record
indicates that the petitioner society was aware of the background
of the subject flat. It was within the knowledge of the society that
the share certificate stood in the joint names of Pannadevi and late
Ramlal Dhanuka. It was equally within its knowledge that
litigation had earlier been initiated by Pannadevi asserting title,
and that such litigation had thereafter been withdrawn. The
society was therefore not dealing with a stranger. The foundational
facts were already within the knowledge of the society.
33. In such circumstances it would not be proper for the society
to keep the matter pending for a prolonged period without
communicating deficiencies and thereafter reject the claim solely
by taking shelter under technical defects. Rule 19 and the
applicable bye-laws no doubt contemplate compliance with
procedural requirements and ordinarily such compliance is
expected. However procedural provisions are intended to facilitate
processing of applications and not to enable rejection after
inaction on the part of the authority. Where the society does not
promptly point out the alleged defects, does not call upon the
applicant to cure such defects and allows the matter to remain
pending, it would be unjust to non suit the applicant on technical
grounds. A hyper technical approach in such matters would defeat
the purpose of the statutory scheme.
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34. Much emphasis was laid by the petitioners on the distinction
between transfer of membership and transmission of membership.
There can be no quarrel with the proposition that in law the
distinction exists and is recognised. Transfer ordinarily
contemplates a voluntary act inter vivos between living persons,
whereas transmission contemplates devolution of rights upon
death by operation of law. However, the same does not assist the
petitioners in the present factual matrix. Respondent No. 4 was not
claiming membership by purchase, assignment, gift or transfer
from a transferor. He was claiming through his deceased father,
who according to him was one of the original shareholders. His
claim thus arose by reason of succession after death of a
shareholder. Once that position is accepted, the character of the
request becomes one of transmission. Merely because the wording
in the application may have employed language associated with
transfer does not change the nature of the claim. The Court must
look to the substance. If the basis of the claim is inheritance
through a deceased member, the matter remains one of
transmission.
35. The test, therefore, is whether the society had before it a
claim from a person showing prima facie nexus with the deceased
member and whether any material existed before the society to
reject such claim. On that aspect, the petitioners have not
demonstrated any material disqualifying Respondent No. 4. No
evidence has been shown to indicate that Respondent No. 4 was
unrelated to the deceased shareholder or that his claim was
untenable. In absence of such material, mere imperfection in
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drafting cannot become fatal.
36. It is also important that the title suit earlier filed by
Pannadevi was unconditionally withdrawn by her legal heirs. Once
such withdrawal took place, the cloud which had been cast over
the flat by reason of the pendency of said litigation ceased to
operate.
37. Conduct of parties often throws light upon the factual
position. Here the conduct of the society indicates that for
administrative purposes it regarded Respondent No. 4 as the
person associated with the flat. Such conduct weakens the society’s
present stand.
38. The learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 4 has
further invited attention of this Court to the letter dated 8
December 2014 addressed by Shri D. R. Dhanuka to the petitioner
society. By the said communication, Shri D. R. Dhanuka conveyed
that he was not desirous of preferring any appeal or initiating any
litigation against Respondent No. 4 and had further requested the
petitioner society to give effect to and implement the order dated
13 November 2014 passed by the revisional authority. Though the
said letter may not be treated extinguishing any proprietary
entitlement of any person in the flat, nevertheless the same cannot
be brushed aside as irrelevant. When such person, after passing of
the impugned order, communicates that he does not intend to
challenge the said order and does not desire litigation against
Respondent No. 4, that fact assumes relevance while appreciating
whether opposition in fact existed to the claim of Respondent No.
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4. The importance of the said communication is seen from the fact
that one of the grounds canvassed by the petitioners is that there
existed multiple heirs therefore the society was justified in not
acting upon the request of Respondent No. 4. However where one
of the material members of the family communicates unwillingness
to dispute the matter and requests implementation of the order in
favour of Respondent No. 4, the submission that there existed
inter se contest amongst the family loses of its force. At the same
time, it must be clarified that this Court is not treating the said
letter as conclusive proof that all heirs consented to the claim of
Respondent No. 4, nor as amounting to waiver of rights by every
possible claimant. Thus the said letter constitutes an additional
circumstance showing that the petitioner society was not facing
any impediment in giving effect to the order dated 13 November
2014. The submission advanced on behalf of Respondent No. 4 in
that regard therefore deserves acceptance to the extent indicated
above.
39. For proper adjudication of the objection relating to
jurisdiction, it is further necessary to consider Sections 3, 154 and
158 of the Maharashtra Co operative Societies Act, 1960, which
deal with appointment of the Registrar, his subordinate officers,
confers revisional powers upon the State Government and the
Registrar.
“3. Registrar [and his subordinates.–
The State Government may appoint a person to be the
Registrar of Co-operative Societies for the State; and may
appoint one or more persons to assist such Registrar, with25
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State, as it may specify in that behalf, and may, by general or
special order, confer on any such person or persons all or any
of the powers of the Registrar under this Act. The person or
persons so appointed to assist the Registrar and on whom
any powers of the Registrar are conferred, shall work under
the general guidance, superintendence and control of the
Registrar. They shall be subordinate to the Registrar, and
subordination of such persons amongst themselves shall be
such as may be determined by the State Government.
158. Delegation of power of Registrar to [certain authorities
and officer.–
The State Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, and subject to such conditions (if any) as it may
think fit to impose, delegate all or any of the powers of the
Registrar under this Act to any federal authority or to an
officer thereof 4 [or to any other authority] 5 [and such
officers or authorities] shall work under the general
guidance, superintendence and control of the Registrar
specified in the notification.
154. Revisionary powers of State Government and
Registrar.–
(1) The State Government or the Registrar, suo motu or on
an application, may call for and examine the record of any
inquiry or proceedings of any matter, other than those
referred to in sub-section (9) of section 149, where any
decision or order has been passed by any subordinate officer,
and no appeal lies against such decision or order, for the
purpose of satisfying themselves as to the legality or
propriety of any such decision or order, and as to the
regularity of such proceedings. If, in any case, it appears to
the State Government, or the Registrar, that any decision or
order so called for should be modified, annulled or reversed,
the State Government or the Registrar, as the case may be,26
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of being heard, pass such orders thereon as to it or him may
seem just.
(2) Under this section, the revision shall lie to the State
Government if the decision or order is passed by the
Registrar, the Additional Registrar or a Joint Registrar, and to
the Registrar if passed by any other officer. 2
(2A) ………………………
(3) ................................
(3A) .............................
(4) ................................
In order to properly appreciate the objection raised by the
petitioners with regard to jurisdiction of the revisional
authority, it becomes necessary to examine the statutory
scheme contained in Sections 3, 158 and 154 of the
Maharashtra Co operative Societies Act. These provisions are
required to be read harmoniously so that the legislative
intention behind the scheme under the Act may be correctly
understood. A reading of one provision in isolation without
reference to the others may lead to incorrect interpretation
and therefore all the said provisions must be considered
together.”
40. Section 3 of the Act deals with appointment of the Registrar
and persons appointed to assist him. The said provision empowers
the State Government to appoint a person as Registrar of Co
operative Societies for the State and also authorises appointment
of one or more persons to assist such Registrar in discharge of
statutory functions. The provision enables the State Government to
confer upon such officers all or any of the powers of the Registrar
under the Act. At first blush, this may appear to suggest that once
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powers of the Registrar are conferred upon another officer, such
officer may stand in the same footing as the Registrar himself.
However, the latter part of the section makes the legislative intent
clear. Section 3 specifically provides that every person appointed to
assist the Registrar and upon whom powers of the Registrar are
conferred shall work under the general guidance, superintendence
and control of the Registrar. The provision declares that such
officers shall be subordinate to the Registrar. The legislature has
therefore used language which preserves the distinction between
the Registrar and the officers upon whom his powers may be
conferred. The conferment of powers does not elevate the
subordinate officer into the position of Registrar. The conferment
enables such officer to discharge certain statutory functions while
continuing to remain under the supervisory control of the
Registrar. This statutory language is of importance. If the
legislative intention was that every officer upon whom powers of
the Registrar are conferred should be treated as Registrar himself
for all purposes, there was no necessity for the legislature to
declare that such officers shall remain subordinate to the Registrar
and act under his superintendence and control. The very fact that
such words are expressly incorporated shows that the Act never
intended to obliterate the distinction between the principal
authority and the subordinate officer merely because powers have
been conferred.
41. Section 158 indicates the same legislative intent. Under
Section 158, the State Government is empowered to delegate all or
any powers of the Registrar to certain authorities, officers, federal
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authorities or other bodies. However, the legislature has
maintained that such officers or authorities shall work under the
general guidance, superintendence, and control of the Registrar.
Therefore, even where delegation takes place, the delegate does
not become independent of the Registrar. The delegate remains
subject to Registrar’s control. Thus, whether powers are conferred
under Section 3 or delegated under Section 158, the statute
maintains that delegation of power does not destroy the position
of the Registrar nor remove the character of the delegate officer.
42. Section 154 provides for revisional powers of the State
Government and the Registrar. Section 154(1) authorises the State
Government or the Registrar to call for and examine the record of
proceedings where any decision or order has been passed by a
subordinate officer and no appeal lies therefrom, for the purpose
of satisfying themselves regarding legality, propriety and regularity
of such proceedings. Upon such examination, the revisional
authority may modify, annul or reverse the decision after hearing
affected parties. The language employed in Section 154(1) is
significant. The power of revision is conferred in respect of
decisions or orders passed by “subordinate officer.” The legislature
thus contemplated that there would be officers subordinate to the
Registrar whose decisions may be scrutinised by revisional
authority. This language cannot be ignored while interpreting the
scheme of delegation. If every delegate exercising Registrar’s
powers were to be treated as Registrar, then no question of
revising orders of subordinate officers would arise in respect of
delegated powers and the language of Section 154 would stand
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diluted.
43. Section 154(2) provides that revision shall lie to the State
Government where the impugned decision or order is passed by
the Registrar, Additional Registrar or Joint Registrar, and revision
shall lie to the Registrar where the decision or order is passed by
any other officer. Thus, the Act itself creates categories of officers
and determines revisional forum depending upon the rank and
designation of the officer who has passed the impugned order. The
statute does not say that the test is whether the officer exercised
delegated power. The statute says the test is who passed the order.
The legislature despite being aware that officers may exercise
delegated powers of the Registrar has still maintained classification
between Registrar, Additional Registrar, Joint Registrar and “any
other officer.” This shows that for purpose of revision, the Act
attaches significance not to source of power exercised, but to the
status of the authority passing the order. If the legislature intended
delegated exercise of Registrar’s powers to convert every
subordinate officer into Registrar for all purposes, Section 154(2)
would have been drafted differently.
44. The only harmonious reading is that a subordinate officer
exercises powers delegated from the Registrar, such officer remains
subordinate, and his order continues to be his order as subordinate
officer, though passed in exercise of delegated power. Such order
therefore is amenable to revision under Section 154 depending
upon the rank of officer. Sections 3 and 158 clearly establish that
delegation of powers under the Act does not make the subordinate
officer equivalent to the Registrar. They permit exercise of
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specified powers while preserving supervision and control. Section
154 indicates that the Act contemplates revisional scrutiny over
orders passed by subordinate officers notwithstanding that such
officers may have exercised powers originally vesting in the
Registrar. Hence, the revisional jurisdiction exercised in the present
matter cannot be faulted on that count.
45. The question regarding the effect of delegation, particularly
in the field of cooperative Act, is not res integra and has directly
fallen for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of
Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Coop. Society Ltd. v.
Secretary (Food and Agriculture), Government of Andhra Pradesh,
reported in (1977) 4 SCC 337. In my considered opinion, the
principles laid down in the said judgment bear direct relevance to
the controversy involved in the present proceedings. In Chintapalli,
the objection raised before the Supreme Court was similar to the
objection sought to be canvassed before this Court. In that matter
also, an argument was advanced that the Registrar could not
entertain and decide a revision petition against an order passed by
the Deputy Registrar because the Deputy Registrar, while passing
the impugned order, had exercised powers of the Registrar
delegated to him under the statute. On that premise, it was argued
that once the Deputy Registrar was exercising delegated powers of
the Registrar, the order passed by him must be treated as if it were
an order of the Registrar. Proceeding on such logic, the submission
was that the Registrar could not sit in revision over what would
amount to his own order. Thus, the argument was founded upon
the principle that an act of delegate is to be treated as act of
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delegator.
46. The Supreme Court after examination of the scheme of the
concerned Co operative Societies Act, rejected the said contention.
The Court observed that though the Deputy Registrar had been
empowered by the Government to exercise statutory powers vested
in the Registrar, the exercise of such power was not detached from
the authority of the Registrar. On the contrary, the statute itself
specifically provided that the Deputy Registrar while exercising
such powers would continue to function under the general
superintendence of the Registrar. The Supreme Court therefore
took note of the legislative arrangement and held that despite
conferment of powers, the Deputy Registrar remained one amongst
the category of “other persons” appointed to assist the Registrar
and did not lose his identity as subordinate officer. The Supreme
Court thereafter examined the arrangement of the enactment and
noted that the statute itself recognised the Registrar and the
Deputy Registrar as two authorities occupying separate places
within the Act. It was also noticed that the enactment provided for
appellate or supervisory remedies before the Registrar in respect of
orders passed by “other persons” even where such persons were
exercising powers delegated by the Registrar. This arrangement
was considered by the Supreme Court to be a indicator that the
statute did not equate the delegate officer with the Registrar
merely because delegated powers were being exercised. In other
words, the source of the power exercised may be the same, but the
identity of the authority exercising it remains distinct.
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47. The Supreme Court laid down that where the statute
preserves distinction between the Registrar and subordinate
officers and where supervisory authority of the Registrar over such
officers is maintained by statute, the conferment of delegated
power upon the subordinate officer does not have the effect of
converting such subordinate officer into the Registrar. Delegation
in such circumstances only enables the subordinate officer to
discharge certain functions vested in the superior authority. It does
not alter his status. The Registrar continues to retain power to
examine the correctness, legality and propriety of the proceedings
undertaken by such subordinate officer in exercise of revisional or
supervisory jurisdiction, if such power is conferred by statute.
48. An important feature of the judgment in Chintapalli is that
the Supreme Court distinguished the earlier Constitution Bench
decision in Roop Chand v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1503,
upon which reliance is often placed in matters involving delegated
powers. The Supreme Court observed that while in certain
enactments the act of a delegate may be attributable to the
delegator, so as to make the delegate’s act same from that of the
principal, such principle cannot be applied in every statutory
context. The Court held that where the statute itself creates a
separate structure where the delegate remains subject to the
control, supervision and superintendence of the principal, the
principle in Roop Chand cannot be imported.
49. The Supreme Court clarified that the power exercised by the
Deputy Registrar may be the power of the Registrar, yet the Deputy
Registrar does not exercise such power as the Registrar himself,
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but as officer acting under superintendence of the Registrar. This
distinction means that the power may be derived from the
Registrar, but the order passed remains the order of the
subordinate officer exercising delegated authority. Hence, where
statute provides the Registrar may revise the same.
50. In my considered view, the ratio laid down in Chintapalli
applies to the controversy involved in the present case. The
Maharashtra Co operative Societies Act, similar to Act considered
in Chintapalli, contains provisions of the superiority of the
Registrar over officers upon whom his powers are delegated.
Section 3 clearly states that officers appointed to assist the
Registrar and upon whom powers are conferred shall function
under the general guidance, superintendence and control of the
Registrar and shall remain subordinate to him. Section 158
similarly provides that officers or authorities to whom powers are
delegated shall function under the guidance, superintendence and
control of the Registrar. The legislative language is thus explicit
and unambiguous. Further, Sections 152 and 154 of the
Maharashtra Co operative Societies Act maintain the distinction
between the Registrar and subordinate officers by creating distinct
appellate and revisional forums depending upon the rank of the
officer passing the impugned order. This arrangement indicates
that even though subordinate officers may exercise powers vested
in the Registrar, the Act does not intend to obliterate the
distinction between such officers and the Registrar himself.
51. The statutory structure under the Maharashtra enactment is
therefore materially similar in principle to the statutory framework
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examined by the Supreme Court in Chintapalli. In both
enactments, powers of the Registrar may be delegated to
subordinate officers. In both enactments such officers remain
subordinate and subject to Registrar’s supervision. In both
enactments, the legislature preserves supervisory jurisdiction.
Therefore, the ratio of Chintapalli squarely applies and furnishes
direct authority on the point presently under consideration. The
judgment in Chintapalli thus supports the proposition that where
the statutory scheme preserves supervisory control, the order
passed by a subordinate officer exercising delegated powers can be
subject to revisional scrutiny.
52. Consequently, when the petitioners contend that the Deputy
Registrar while deciding the deemed membership application must
be treated as the Registrar himself because delegated powers were
exercised and that therefore no revision could lie before the
superior authority, such submission cannot be accepted. The said
submission runs contrary to the ratio laid down by the Supreme
Court in Chintapalli and contrary to the statutory scheme of the
Maharashtra Co operative Societies Act.
53. Further support to the aforesaid view is available from the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Yogendra Prasad v. Additional
Registrar, Co operative Societies, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 720, wherein
the Supreme Court again had occasion to consider an similar issue
relating to the revisional authority of superior officers over orders
passed by subordinate officers exercising powers of the Registrar.
In the said decision, the Supreme Court, while relying upon the
earlier ratio in Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Cooperative
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Society Ltd., held that merely because a subordinate officer or
Assistant Registrar exercises powers originally vesting in the
Registrar, the Registrar is not divested of his supervisory and
revisional authority under the statute. The Supreme Court
emphasised that where the statutory scheme maintains distinction
between “the Registrar” and “a person exercising powers of the
Registrar,” and where the Act preserves the Registrar as the
supervisory authority over subordinate officers, the exercise of
delegated powers by subordinate authorities is subject to revisional
scrutiny. The Court further observed that the purpose of such
revisional jurisdiction is to correct palpable errors and to remedy
injustice arising from orders of subordinate officers, and such
supervisory jurisdiction cannot be excluded merely because
delegated power was exercised. The Supreme Court again
distinguished the principle laid down in Roop Chand and clarified
that the same would not apply where the statutory enactment
itself maintains distinction between the original authority and the
officer empowered to exercise delegated functions. In my
considered opinion, the ratio of Yogendra Prasad lends additional
support to the conclusion already reached hereinabove that under
the scheme of the Maharashtra Co operative Societies Act, the
Registrar continues to occupy a supervisory position over
subordinate officers notwithstanding delegation of powers, and
therefore an order passed by such subordinate officer cannot be
treated as equivalent to the order of the Registrar merely because
delegated powers were exercised.
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54. Further support to the aforesaid interpretation is also
available from the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in
Cipla Limited v. Competent Authority and the District Deputy
Registrar, Co operative Society and Others, reported in 2021 SCC
OnLine Bom 622, wherein while considering the scheme of the
Maharashtra Cooperative societies Act and the status of officers
functioning thereunder, the Division Bench has reiterated the
distinction between the Registrar and subordinate officers
functioning below him. In paragraphs 131 to 133 of the said
judgment, the Division Bench took note of the position of
Registrars and subordinate officers and observed that the office of
the Deputy District Registrar is not at par with the post of the
Registrar. The Division Bench thereafter referred to the earlier
binding precedent in Krishnarao Bakaramji Hadge and reiterated
that even where powers of the Registrar are conferred upon
subordinate officers under Section 3 of the Act, such officers
continue to function under the superintendence of the Registrar
and remain subordinate to him. The Division Bench further
observed that merely because an Assistant Registrar, Deputy
Registrar or similar subordinate officer exercises delegated powers
of the Registrar, it cannot be contended that the order passed by
such officer must be treated as the order of the Registrar himself.
In my considered opinion, the aforesaid observations of the
Division Bench directly go against the contention sought to be
raised by the petitioners in the present matter that once delegated
powers are exercised by the Deputy Registrar, the resulting order
must be equated with an order of the Registrar himself. The ratio
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of Cipla Limited, read with Krishnarao Bakaramji Hadge, clearly
affirms that delegation of power does it obliterate the distinction
between the principal authority and the subordinate officer
exercising delegated powers. Thus, even on the basis of the
binding Division Bench precedent of this Court, the submission
advanced by the petitioners on the question of jurisdiction cannot
be sustained.
55. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has
placed considerable reliance upon the judgment of a Coordinate
Bench of this Court in Bajarang Labour Cooperative Society and
submitted that the said decision, after considering Sections 158
and 23(1A) of the Maharashtra Co operative Societies Act, took
the view that by virtue of the Government Notification dated 11
September 2012, powers of the Registrar stood delegated to the
Deputy Registrar and therefore while entertaining such
applications the District Deputy Registrar acts as delegate of the
Registrar, and no revision could thereafter lie before the Divisional
Joint Registrar. It has further been pointed out that the said view
has thereafter been followed in Ravi Vishwanath Ghumre and also
in Deepali Majoor Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit . This Court is unable
to accept the same as in the first place, the proposition canvassed
in Bajarang Labour appears to proceed on a application of the
doctrine that an act of delegate is to be treated as act of delegator.
However, such proposition, with respect, cannot be read divorced
from binding precedents of superior Courts. As already discussed
hereinabove, the Supreme Court in Chintapalli Agency and
Yogendra Prasad has held that where the statute itself preserves
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supervision and distinction between the Registrar and subordinate
officers, the conferment of delegated powers upon subordinate
officers does not elevate such officer to the status of Registrar.
Equally, Division Bench judgments of this Court in Krishnarao
Bakaramji Hadge and Cipla Limited have reiterated that
subordinate officers exercising delegated powers remain
subordinate. These authorities explain the statutory scheme and
make it clear that delegation under Sections 3 or 158 does not
obliterate statutory position of Registrar. Further, Section 154 itself
provides that revision shall lie depending upon the rank of the
officer who passed the order, and not merely upon the source from
which power is derived. In that view of the matter, the reasoning
in Bajarang Labour does not align with Supreme Court and
Division Bench precedents noticed above. Mere subsequent
following of Bajarang Labour by coordinate Benches in Ravi
Vishwanath Ghumre and Deepali Majoor Sahakari Sanstha would
not change the position where the issue stands covered by
judgments of Supreme Court. Accordingly, with utmost respect, the
reliance placed by the petitioners upon the aforesaid line of
judgments does not persuade this Court to accept the contention
that the Divisional Joint Registrar lacked jurisdiction to entertain
the revision merely because the original order was passed by the
Deputy Registrar exercising delegated powers.
56. On a proper reading of the record, I am satisfied that the
impugned order is not perverse. It is based on relevant materials
and as per the legal scheme of the Act and bye-laws. The
petitioners have not been able to show any patent illegality,
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jurisdictional error, or manifest injustice. The grounds urged are in
the nature of a request to re-appreciate the facts and reach a
different conclusion. That is not a sufficient ground for
interference under Articles 226 and 227, especially when the order
under challenge is supported by both facts and law.
57. For all these reasons, I hold that the impugned order dated
13 November 2014 calls for no interference. The writ petition,
therefore, has no merit.
58. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. Rule stands
discharged. No order as to costs.
59. At this stage, learned Advocate for respondent No.4 seeks
continuation of ad-interim relief. However, for the reasons stated
in this judgment, the request for continuation of ad-interim relief is
rejected.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
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