Bombay High Court
Sunil (Bhau) Chandrakant Bhusara vs Harishchandra Sakharam Bhoye on 30 March, 2026
Author: Milind N. Jadhav
Bench: Milind N. Jadhav
2026:BHC-OS:7596
EP.19.2025.doc
HARSHADA H. SAWANT
(P.A.)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
APPLICATION (L) NO.9497 OF 2025
IN
ELECTION PETITION NO.19 OF 2025
Harishchandra Sakharam Bhoye and Ors. Applicant
.. (Orig. Respondent No.1)
IN THE MATTER OF:
Sunil (Bhau) Chandrakant Bhusara .. Petitioner
Versus
Harishchandra Sakharam Bhoye and Ors. .. Respondents
WITH
APPLICATION NO.6 OF 2025
IN
ELECTION PETITION NO.19 OF 2025
Harishchandra Sakharam Bhoye .. Applicant
Versus
Sunil (Bhau) Chandrakant Bhusara and Ors. .. Respondents
WITH
APPLICATION (L) NO.24590 OF 2025
IN
ELECTION PETITION NO.19 OF 2025
Chief Electoral Officer
General Administrative Department .. Applicant
In the matter between
Mr. Sunil Chandrakant Bhusara .. Petitioner
Versus
Mr. Harishchandra Sakharam Bhoye .. Respondents
.............
ï‚· Ms. Neeta P. Karnik, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Jimmy Gonsalves,
Mr. Shrirang P. Katneshwarkar, Mr. Anthony Floriyen Foss, Mr.
Kallis Albert Alphanso, Advocates for Petitioner in Election Petition
No.19 of 2025.
ï‚· Mr. Niteen Pradhan a/w. Ms. Shubhada Khot, Ms. Amita
Kuttikrishnan and Ms. Sonal Dabholkar, Advocates for Respondent
No.1.
ï‚· Mr. Abhijit P. Kulkarni a/w Ms. Shweta Shah, Mr. Abhishek Roy,
Advocates for Applicant in Application (L) No.24590 of 2025.
...................
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CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.
DATE : MARCH 30, 2026.
JUDGMENT:
1. Heard Ms. Karnik, learned Senior Advocate for Petitioner,
Mr. Pradhan, learned Advocate for Respondent No.1 in Election
Petition and Mr. Kulkarni, learned Advocate for Applicant in
Application (L) No.24590 of 2025.
2. Application (L) No.9497 of 2025 is filed by Mr.
Harishachandra Sakharam Bhoye – Applicant / Orig. Respondent No.1
and Returned candidate seeking dismissal of Election Petition under
Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, (for short “CPC“).
Respondent No. 1 is the returned candidate in the Election under
challenge. Affidavit-in-reply dated 10.07.2025 is filed by Petitioner to
oppose this Application.
3. Election Petition No.19 of 2025 is filed by Mr. Sunil (Bhau)
Chandrakant Bhusara on 07.01.2025 for the following reliefs :-
“(a) the election of the Respondent No.1 to the General Election
2024 to the State Assembly from 129- Vikramgad (S.T.)
Assembly Constituency, be declared to be void and it be further
declared that the Petitioner, who has secured second highest
votes/majority of votes in the said election, has been elected.”
4. Application No.6 of 2025 is filed by Mr. Harishachandra
Sakharam Bhoye – Respondent No.1 seeking direction to Petitioner to
furnish the copy of the Election Petition No.37 of 2025 along with its
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Annexures. However, vide order dated 06.11.2025 passed by this
Court Election Petition No.37 of 2025 has been disposed of as
withdrawn for the reason that Petitioner had filed identical Petition
through another Advocate in this Court for the same cause of action.
5. Application (L) No.24590 of 2025 is an Intervention
Application filed by Chief Electoral Officer, General Administration
Department to intervene in Election Petition No.19 of 2025 and seeks
following reliefs :-
“a) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to declare that the
EVM’s consisting of Ballot Units 358 and Control Units 358
which are kept in custody of the District Election Officer are not
necessary for the adjudication or determining the dispute in the
above Election Petition.
b) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to release 358 Ballot
Units and 358 Control Units which are kept in the custody of
the District Election Officer.”
6. Respondent No. 1 has filed Application (L) No. 9497 of 2025
under Order VII Rule 11 seeking dismissal of the Election Petition on
the grounds of violation of mandatory provision of Sections 83(1)(a),
100, 123(4) of RP Act read with Articles 173 and 191 of the
Constitution of India and sought its dismissal. Pleadings in this
Application are complete. By consent of parties Application (L) No.
9497 of 2025 is taken up for hearing and disposal.
7. Brief facts relevant for deciding the above application are as
follows:-
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7.1. Election Commission announced schedule for General
Election 2024 to the Legislative Assembly of the State of Maharashtra
as under:-
Poll Events Maharashtra (All 288 Assembly
Constituencies)
Date of issue of Gazette Notification 22.10.2024 (Tuesday)
Last Date of making nominations 29.102024 (Tuesday)
Date of Scrutiny of nominations 30.10.2024 (Wednesday)
Last Date for the withdrawal of
04.11.2024 (Monday)
candidatures
Date of Poll 20.11.2024 (Wednesday)
Date of counting 23.11.2024 (Saturday)
Date before which election shall be
25.11.2024 (Monday)
completed
7.2. Total 11 candidates were in the fray for Election from 129 –
Vikramgad Constituency, which included, inter alia, Petitioner from
National Congress Party and Respondent No.1 from Bharatiya Janata
Party. Voting in pursuance to Election to the said Constituency was
held on 20.11.2024. Counting of votes was conducted on 23.11.2024
and the final result was declared. Petitioner secured 73,106 votes
(second highest votes) whereas Respondent No.1 with 1,14,514 votes
was declared as the Returned Candidate.
8. Petitioner filed present Election Petition challenging election
of Respondent No.1 on three (3) main grounds:-
(i) Improper acceptance of Nomination Form of the Respondent
No.1 by Returning Officer;
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(ii) Failure to reproduce Note-1 to Note-5 below Verification
under Affidavit in Form-26; and
(iii) Violation of Sections 100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i), 100(1)(d)(iv)
or 123(4) of the RP Act.
9. Mr. Pradhan, learned Advocate appearing for Respondent
No.1 – the returned candidate has drawn my attention to the
Application filed under Order VII Rule 11 and while pressing the same
has made the following submissions :-
9.1. He would submit that Election Petition is liable to be rejected
under Order VII Rule 11 as it does not contain the concise statement of
material facts as mandated under Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act. He
would submit that it does not disclose any cause of action as
contemplated under Article 173 and Article 191 of the Constitution of
India (for short “COI”) read with Section 123(4) and Section 100 of
the RP Act. He would submit that for setting aside the Election of
Returned candidate, it is incumbent upon Petitioner to specifically
plead non-compliance either with the provisions of the COI, the RP Act
or Rules or Orders made thereunder. He would submit that present
Election Petition is replete with vague allegations, founded on mere
presumptions and assumptions without any cogent pleadings or
documentary evidence appended in support thereof.
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9.2. He would submit that Election of a Returned candidate
cannot be challenged on the grounds mentioned in Section 100 of the
RP Act without establishing the cause of action which is clearly absent.
He would submit that Petitioner has miserably failed to make out any
ground for declaring the Election of Respondent No.1 void as per the
aforesaid provisions of the COI and RP Act. He would submit that due
to failure of Petitioner to establish cause of action against Respondent
No.1, substantive relief sought by him in the Petition is not
maintainable and hence the Petition be dismissed under Order VII Rule
11.
9.3. He would submit that as per the Schedule announced on
15.10.2024, Election Commission of India vide press Note
No.ECI/PN/149/2024 conducted General Election to the Legislative
Assembly of Maharashtra. He would submit that a candidate who
wished to take part in the Election is required to submit his
Nomination Form along with Affidavit in Form-26 and documents in
support thereof. He would submit that the Nomination Form and
Affidavit in Form-26 is a printed copy supplied by the Election
Commission of India and made available by the Returning Officer to
the candidates of the relevant constituency. He would submit that all
desirous candidates have to purchase the said Nomination Form from
the Returning Officer which bear a distinct number of identification.
He would submit that in the present case the Nomination Form which
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was ultimately submitted was purchased by Respondent No.1 and
entry was made in the Register maintained with the Returning Officer
which reflects acceptance of the Nomination Form. He would submit
that this Nomination Form was duly filled in by Respondent No.1, filed
with the Returning Officer, it was scrutinized and thereafter accepted
in accordance with law.
9.4. He would submit that format of the Nomination Form is
uniform and printed as per provisions under Rule 4 of the Code of
Conduct Rules, 1961 (for short “said Rules”). He would submit that
Election Commissioner prints these forms and supplies them with
distinct serial numbers to the Returning Officer for their distribution to
the prospective candidates on payment of Rs.100/- which candidates
are supposed to receive, fill up and submit back to him without having
any say in its statutory format. He would submit that details of
purchase of one form on 28.10.2024 and two forms on 29.10.2024 by
Respondent No.1 are recorded in the Register for distribution of forms
serially numbered as 59, 60 and 61. He would submit that Respondent
No.1 submitted the said duly filled forms along with supporting
documents and Affidavit. He would submit that entry of acceptance of
Form No. 59 was made in the Register by the Returning Officer in the
case of Respondent No.1. He would submit that there is therefore no
truth in the allegation of Petitioner that Respondent No.1 has
manufactured or fabricated the Nomination Form on his own volition.
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9.5. He would submit that such submitted forms are further
scrutinized by the Returning Officer who prepares a check list
reflecting compliances with regard to forms and documents in support
thereof. He would submit that on perusal of said check list in the case
of Petitioner it would reveal due compliance with the statutory
procedure by Respondent No.1. He would submit that Respondent
No.1 duly provided certified copies of Nomination Form, Affidavit in
Form-26 and all required documents along with the check list for
perusal of this Court in his Application.
9.6. He would submit that all prospective candidates including
Respondent No.1 and Petitioner were provided with identical forms by
the Returning Officer. He would submit that Petitioner has avoided to
place on record copy of his Nomination Form for Court’s perusal which
is absolutely identical and similar to that of Respondent No.1 for
obvious reasons. He would hence submit that this ground taken by
Petitioner to set aside Election of Respondent No.1 as Returned
candidate is untenable in law and cannot give rise to any cause of
action under Section 80 of the RP Act.
9.7. He would submit that Affidavit in Form-26 contains Clause-
(9) wherein the candidate is required to give details of his profession
or occupation of his self and his spouse. He would submit that
Respondent No.1 has disclosed the fact therein that he was working as
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“Headmaster” in Arvind Prathamik Ashramshala run by Arvind Smruti
Trust registered under the Maharashtra Public Trust Act, 1950. He
would submit that said Ashramshala is governed by the Ashram Shala
Sanhita 2019 (for short “said Sanhita”), published by the Adivasi Vikas
Vibhag of the State of Maharashtra and according to Clause 4.3.13
therein it is provided that management and teachers except Class IV
employees, temporary teachers and staff may contest Election with
prior written permission of the Management.
9.8. He would submit that on 23.10.2024 in accordance with the
aforesaid provision Respondent No.1 applied for permission to contest
the Election for which he was granted permission on 26.10.2024 on
terms and conditions contained therein in accordance with law. He
would submit that Respondent No.1 has already disclosed this fact in
Clause-(9) of his Affidavit in Form-26 that he was serving as Primary
Headmaster in a Private Institution.
9.9. He would submit that Petitioner’s allegation that Respondent
No.1 has procured Affidavit in Form-26 from the Internet Website of
Election Commission of India by Respondent No.1 and filed the same is
incorrect and vague and Petitioner has deliberately not annexed the
permission granted to Respondent No.1 to contest the Election in his
Election Petition. He would submit that this act on part of Petitioner
amounts to suppression of material fact which is prima facie
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misleading and hence Petitioner is liable to be proceeded against for
perjury.
9.10. With regard to ground of non-disclosure of liabilities and
disclaimers at the foot of Form-26 of the Affidavit of disclosure, he
would submit that Petitioner has failed to advert and place on record
any cogent material information or documents in support of this
allegation of improper acceptance of Nomination Form by the
Returning Officer. He would submit that Handbook for Candidates
2023 issued by Election Commission of India provide guidelines in the
light of Election management and Electoral machinery. He would
submit that as per Clause 3.25 Returning Officer has to satisfy himself
that details furnished by the candidate are same as those in the
Electoral roll and he is expected to check whether Affidavit in Form-26
(Annexure – 3) is duly filled up and attached with the Nomination
Form and if not so then bring it to the candidate’s notice through the
check list.
9.11. He would submit that Chapter-4 of the Handbook deals with
‘Scrutiny of Nominations’ by the Returning Officer; furthermore,
Section 36 of the RP Act also governs the same. He would submit that
Clause-4.4 of this chapter deals with ‘Objections which may be raised’
by the candidate and it specifically states that the candidate should not
raise any flimsy or technical objection in regard to any Nomination
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Form. He would submit that Section 36(4) of the RP Act states that
Returning Officer shall not reject any Nomination Form on the ground
of any defect which is not of substantial character. In this regard he
would submit that since provisions of the RP Act are duly followed in
the present case, no illegality can be attributed to the Returning Officer
in accepting the Nomination Form of Respondent No.1.
9.12. He would submit that in the present case on 30.10.2024
Scrutiny of Nomination Form was fixed as per schedule for the General
Election. He would submit that Clause 3.5.4 of the Handbook states
that copies of the Affidavits would be displayed in the premises of a
public place within the constituency freely accessible to the general
public. Hence, with regard to ground of non-disclosure of liabilities and
disclaimers he would submit that since no objection was taken by
Petitioner or for that matter by any of the contesting candidates to
Respondent No.1’s Nomination Form and Affidavit in Form-26, its
annexures and contents, the Petitioner cannot now claim that the
Election result has been materially affected after he has lost the
Election.
9.13. He would submit that according to result of Election
Respondent No.1 was declared as Returned candidate having secured
1,14,514 votes against Petitioner who secured 73,106 votes with a
huge difference of 41,408 votes. He would submit that this difference
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in margin proves that the result of Election has not been materially
affected because of any of the vague grounds alleged by Petitioner who
has failed to make out any case of corrupt practice against Respondent
No.1.
9.14. On the point of procuring Nomination Form and Affidavit in
Form-26 from the Internet website of Election Commission of India
which would be inadmissible document as contemplated under Section
65-B(4) of Indian Evidence Act, he would submit that this contention
of Petitioner is on the face of the record unacceptable since he form
collected from the Returning Officer was duly filled and submitted for
scrutiny. With regard to ground of not reproducing Note Nos. 1 to 5 on
disclaimer at the end of the Affidavit in Form-26, he would submit that
the same does not amount to a corrupt practice as contemplated under
Sections 100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i), 100(1)(d)(iv) or 123(4) of the RP
Act, neither it can be said to be an incorrect statement of fact nor
submission of incomplete Nomination Form along with Affidavit in
Form-26 because the Form was provided by the Returning Officer
which was duly filled and submitted and most importantly after
scrutiny was accepted therefore this cannot affect the result of
Election.
9.15. He would submit that ground of non-eligibility due to
qualification and violation of provisions of COI and Section 100(a)(i)
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of the RP Act to fill the seat is not maintainable for the reasons
mentioned in foregoing paragraphs. He would submit that Petitioner
has not averred specifically as to in what manner the result of Election
has been affected due to Respondent No.1’s failure to provide
supporting documents. He would submit that as far as employment of
Respondent No.1 is concerned, provisions of Civil Services Rules are
not applicable to him rather Rule 1(3) states that these Rules are
applicable to all persons appointed to Civil Services and posts in
connection with the affairs of State of Maharashtra.
9.16. He would submit that Respondent No.1 was appointed as
Headmaster in Ashramshala governed by Ashram Shala Sanhita 2019
published by the Adivasi Vikas Department, Maharashtra State, and
not under the Civil Services Rules. Hence, he would submit that
contention of Petitioner, that in view of the provisions of Rule-5 and
definition of “Government Servant” under Section 2(b) of Civil
Services Rules, Respondent No.1 ought not to have taken part in any
political movement or activity is completely devoid of merits. He would
submit that Respondent No.1 on 26.10.2024 duly obtained permission
from his employer in accordance with Clause 4.3.13 of the said Sanhita
for contesting the Election and submitted the same which is borne out
from the record.
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9.17. In support of his above submission, he has referred to and
relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Subhash
Desai Vs. Sharad J. Rao And Others1
9.18. Therefore, he would submit that Petitioner has failed to
make out any case materially affecting the result of Election on the
grounds of (i) Improper acceptance of Nomination Form of the
Respondent No.1 by Returning Officer; (ii) Failure to reproduce Note-
1 to Note-5 below Verification under Affidavit in Form-26; (iii)
Violation of Section 100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i), 100(1)(d)(iv) or 123(4)
of the RP Act; and therefore Application under Order VII Rule 11
deserves to be allowed and resultantly Election Petition be dismissed.
10. PER CONTRA, Ms. Karnik, learned Senior Advocate
appearing for Election Petitioner has vehemently opposed the
Application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC and made the following
submissions :-
10.1. She would submit that on 28.10.2024, Respondent No.1
filed his Affidavit in Form-26 wherein he did not produce information
in terms of Note 1 to Note 5 of said Rules below his Verification which
is required to be mandatorily produced as per Rule 4(A) of the Rules.
She would submit that Respondent No.1 failed to provide such
material information required as per provisions of the RP Act and said
1 1994 Supp (2) SCC 446
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Rules, and hence due to improper acceptance of such Nomination
Form result of Election of declaring him as Returned candidate has
been materially affected.
10.2. She would submit that Respondent No.1 submitted incorrect,
incomplete and faulty Form-26 which was further accepted by the
Returning Officer of 129-Vikramgad (S.T) Assembly Constituency. She
would submit that such action on the part of the Returning Officer is
thus illegal and against the provisions of law. She would submit that
due to improper acceptance of said Nomination Form, the result of
Election insofar as it concerned the Returned candidate, has been
materially affected.
10.3. She would submit that Respondent No.1 failed to provide
information as per format prescribed under Rule 4-A of the said Rules
by depicting Note 1 to Note 5 below his Verification. She would submit
that due to this suppression / omission the statement of facts provided
in Affidavit in Form-26 amounts to corrupt practice on the part of
Respondent No.1, as contemplated under Sections 123(4) of the RP
Act which in turn has materially affected the result of Election.
10.4. She would submit that considering such failure of
Respondent No.1 to furnish information required as per Rules and
Regulations provided under the provisions of RP Act, he stood
disqualified to be chosen to fill the seat under the COI or under Section
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100(a)(i) of the said Act. She would submit that such acceptance of
improper Nomination Form of Respondent No.1 by the Returning
Officer has materially affected the result of Election as contemplated
under Section 100 (1)(d)(i) of the RP Act.
10.5. She would submit that Respondent No.1 is guilty of
altogether altering Form-26 on his own. She would submit that
original Form-26 under Rule 4-A of the said Rules provide for Note 1
to 5 as disclaimers which Respondent No.1 failed to mention or
reproduce in the Form. She would submit that Respondent No.1
deleted Note 1 to Note 5 below his verification and therefore submitted
a defective Form and Affidavit. She would submit that acceptance of
such incomplete Nomination Form of Respondent No.1 by the
Returning Officer is improper and against the provisions of law and
has materially affected the result of Election.
10.6. She would submit that submission of incomplete information
and publication of statement of fact by way of incorrect Affidavit in
Form-26 by Respondent No.1 amounts to non-compliance with
provisions of the COI and RP Act and hence amounts to corrupt
practice as contemplated under Section 123(4) of the said Act, and
therefore, Election of Respondent No.1 is required to be declared as
void under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) thereof.
10.7. She would submit that if not for violation of such statutory
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omissions on the part of Respondent No.1 and the Returning Officer,
Petitioner would have obtained a majority of valid votes as compared
to votes obtained by Respondent No.1 by way of corrupt practice to be
declared as the Returned candidate. She would submit that therefore
the Applicantion under Order VII Rule 11 is not maintainable and
deserves to be dismissed.
10.8. She would submit that filing incomplete affidavit by any
candidate is considered as violation of the provisions of RP Act and
Nomination of such candidate is liable to rejection by Returning Officer
at the time of scrutiny. She would submit that Respondent No.1’s
nomination therefore ought to have been rejected by Returning Officer
at the time of scrutiny for reason to furnish incomplete affidavit.
10.9. Next she would submit that Respondent No.1 was working
as Primary Principal of Arvind Ashramshala (School) managed by
Arvind Smruti Trust, at Village Dadade, Taluka – Vikramgad, District –
Palghar. She would submit that this is a 100% aided Ashram School
which receives grant-in-aid from the State Government. She would
submit that in view of Rule 5 of the Maharashtra Civil Services
(Conduct) Rules, 1979 (for short ” Civil Services Rules”), Respondent
No.1 being a Government Servant therefore cannot be a member of or
be otherwise associated with any political party or any organization
which takes part in, or subscribes in aid of, or assists in any other
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manner, any political movement or activity.
10.10. She would submit that Respondent No.1 was the Principal of
the school and hence belonged to the Management category. She
would submit that he cannot be categorized as teacher/employee of
the school and hence he could not have stood for Election in violation
of the aforesaid Rule. She would submit that No Objection Certificate
produced by Respondent No. 1 amounts to a self attested document
permitting himself to contest the Election and it is therefore bad in
law. She would submit that Respondent No.1 failed to disclose
information in respect of any prior permission sought by him from the
Competent Authority for contesting the Election while in Government
service.
10.11. She would submit that reliance of Respondent No.1 on
Clause 4.3.13 of said Sanhita is unacceptable because of definition of
management as contemplated under definition Nos.18 and 38 of the
said Sanhita. To support her submission she would submit that Clause
4.3.14 of the said Sanhita provides that all correspondence and
representation concerning the school is to be made by the Principal.
She would submit that provisions of said Sanhita make it clear that the
Principal being not only manages day-to-day operations of the school
but also all other functions like school finances, grants, mid-day meals,
scholarships, supplies and compliance, etc. She would submit that
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though the Principal may be a teacher simultaneously, but his main
duty is to supervise the academic functions, and hence he works as the
de facto Secretary i.e. as an intrinsic part of the Management of the
school.
10.12. She would submit that Respondent No.1 neither disclosed in
his Affidavit nor in his Nomination Form permission or leave obtained
by him from any Competent Authority before contesting the Election.
She would submit that Rule 5 of the Civil Services Rules do not allow
Government Servant to take part in politics and elections. She would
submit that according to the Civil Services Rules Respondent No.1 was
not eligible to contest the Election and hence Returning Officer
committed an error by accepting his nomination. She would submit
that improper acceptance of nomination of Respondent No.1 has
affected the result of the Election. She would submit that Respondent
No.1 thus has obtained majority votes by indulging in corrupt practices
and hence Petitioner secured the second highest valid votes in the
Election.
10.13. She would submit that Returning Officer should have
ensured that the Affidavit filed by candidates were as per Civil Services
Rules, and if not, they ought to have been rejected. She would submit
that purpose of filing Affidavit along with the Nomination Form serves
to effectuate the fundamental right of citizens guaranteed under
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Article 19(1)(a) of the COI. She would submit that the Returning
Officer has acted in connivance with Respondent No.1 who exerted
undue influence on him by accepting his incomplete Affidavit which
has materially affected the result of Election insofar as it concerned the
Returned candidate. She would submit that ingredients of Section 171
under Chapter IX-A of the Indian Penal Code provide meaning of
undue influence which relates to the words ‘direct and indirect’ used in
Section 123(2) of the RP Act.
10.14. She would submit that concept of undue influence is relevant
to prior as well as post voting period. She would submit that as per
Section 33 of the RP Act candidates are required to deliver complete
Nomination Form to the Returning Officer according to the
“prescribed” form as defined under Section 2(g) of the RP Act which
has admittedly not been done by Respondent No. 1.
10.15. She would submit that Section 169 of the RP Act authorizes
Central Government after consulting the Election Commission by
Notification in the Government Gazette to make rules for carrying out
the purposes of the RP Act according to which contents of the
Nomination Form should have been ascertained. In support of her
above submission she has referred to and relied upon decision the of
Supreme Court in Khaje Khaanavar Khanderkhan Hussain Khand &
Ors. Vs. Siddavanballi Nijalinagappa & Anr.2
2 1969 AIR 1034.
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10.16. She would submit that incomplete publication of statement
of fact by Respondent No.1 being the returned candidate is a corrupt
practice which has materially affected the result of Election. She would
submit that Returning Officer ought to have rejected the Affidavit filed
by Respondent No.1 for it not to be as per the prescribed format under
Rule 4(A) of the Civil Services Rules. She would therefore pray for
dismissal of the Application under Order VII Rule 11.
10.17. She would submit that requirement of concise statement of
material facts in case the Election Petition is filed on grounds other
than corrupt practices is not mandatory. In support of this submission
she has referred to and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court
in Ashraf Kokkur Vs. K. Vs. Abdul Khader And Others3;
10.18. Furthermore, in support of Petitioner’s case, she has referred
to and relied upon the following decisions of the Supreme Court:-
(i) Liverpool & London S. P. & I Association Ltd. Vs. M. V. Sea
Success I and Another4;
(ii) Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar Vs. Sukh Darshan Singh And
Others5;
(iv) Kisan Shankar Kathore Vs. Arun Dattatray Sawant And
Others7;
(v) Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju Vs. Peddireddigari
Ramachandra Reddy And Others8;
3 (2015) 1 SCC 129
4 (2004) 9 SCC 512
5 (2004) 11 SCC 196
6 (2007) 3 SCC 617
7 (2014) 14 SCC 162
8 (2018) 14 SCC 1
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(vi) Bhim Rao Baswanth Rao Patil Vs. K. Madan Mohan Rao And
Others9;
(vii) S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) By LRS. Vs. Jagannath
(Dead) By LRS. And Others10;
(viii) Mairembam Prithviraj Alias Prithviraj Singh Vs. Pukhrem
Sharatchandra Singh11;
(ix) Arjun Panditrao Khotkar Vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal
And Others12;
(x) Kuldeep Singh Pathania Vs. Bikram Singh Jaryal13;
11. I have heard Mr. Pradhan, learned Advocate for Respondent
No.1 and Ms. Karnik, learned Senior Advocate for Petitioner and with
their able assistance perused the Election Petition and Annexures
appended thereto. Submissions of both parties in the Application under
Order VII Rule 11 of CPC have received due consideration of the Court.
12. Prima facie, it is seen that the twenty four separate grounds
stated in paragraph no.9 of the Election Petition, can be effectively
compartmentalized into three main grounds only, viz. clubbing clauses
(a) to (m), clauses (o), (p), (q) and clauses (s), (v), (w) pertain to
principal ground that Respondent No.1 (Returned candidate) has
committed corrupt practice alleged on the basis of him filing an
incorrect Nomination Form-26 and the Returning Officer having
9 (2023) 18 SCC 231
10 (1994) 1 SCC 1
11 (2017) 2 SCC 487
12 (2020) 75 SCC 1
13 (2017) 5 SCC 345: (2017) 3 SCC (Civ)147: (2017) 5 SCC 59
14 2002 SCC OnLine Bom 386: (2002) 3 Mah LJ 659 (FB)
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accepted the same without raising any objection. This is the principal
ground of challenge. The second ground of challenge is contained in
clause (r) alleging that Respondent No.1 has exerted undue influence
on the Returning Officer thereby requiring him to accept his improper
Nomination Form and has therefore committed corrupt practice
affecting result of the Election materially. The third and final ground is
contained in clause (n) wherein it is alleged by Petitioner that
Respondent No.1 being a Government Servant was prohibited from
taking part in the Election in violation of Rule (5) of the MCS
(Conduct) Rules, 1979. Apart from the aforesaid three grounds there
are no other grounds stated in the Election Petition. The Petitioner has
alleged that the aforesaid three grounds amount to commission of
corrupt practices by Respondent No.1.
13. It is seen that while describing and narrating the above
grounds no material particulars whatsoever as to how Respondent
No.1 committed corrupt practices before or during the Election
program have been narrated or stated by the Petitioner. Insofar as the
principal ground is concerned the allegation is that From-26 under
Rule 4(A) did not contain disclaimer Note-1 to Note-5 below the
Verification paragraph. Hence, it is alleged that this omission would
amount to corrupt practice which materially affected the Election
result. This issue can be squarely and prima facie answered on the
ground that non-reproduction of disclaimer Note-1 to Note-5 in the
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Nomination Form-26 cannot be attributable to the Respondent No.1.
This is for the simple reason that the format of Affidavit in Form-26
was issued by the Returning Officer to the Respondent No.1 on his
application which was duly filled in and submitted for scrutiny and
acceptance to the Returning Officer in accordance with law. What is
significant is that this Affidavit / Form is not downloaded from the ECI
website and / or prepared by the candidates who submit the same. It is
a statutory Form identified by distinct identification number disbursed
by the Returning Officer himself to each candidate on behalf of the
Election Commission of India when applied for. Hence, there is no case
made out whatsoever to allege that non-reproduction of Note-1 to
Note-5 as disclaimer in the Form is attributable to the candidate i.e.
Respondent No.1 and it relates to adoption of corrupt practice by the
him or for that matter the Petitioner or any other candidate who
contested the said Election as all candidates subitted similar / identical
duly filled pre – printed forms. Thus, merely alleging that filing of the
Affidavit in Form-26 without disclaimer Note-1 to Note-5 amounted to
corrupt practice as contemplated under section 100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)
(i), 100(1)(d)(iv) or 123(4) of the RP Act is not sustainable to be
equated as commission of corrupt practice materially affecting the
Election result without any material facts being pleaded in that
context. This ground is repeated and reiterated by the Petitioner
without giving any material particulars or statement of facts leading to
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commission of such corrupt practice by Respondent No.1 thereby
materially affecting the Election result. Hence, case of the Petitioner on
this ground prima facie fails and cannot be countenanced on the face
of record. Once there is absence of such concise statement of material
facts there can be no cause of action for maintainability of the Election
Petition.
14. The second ground pertaining to exerting undue influence as
stated in clause (r) is as vague, insufficient and bereft of material
particulars to prove that undue influence was exercised by Respondent
No.1 on the Returning Officer. It cannot be sustained at all as stated in
the Petition since it lacks material particulars altogether.
15. The third ground namely that Respondent No.1 was a
Government Servant and therefore ineligible to contest the Election is
also not sustainable on the face of record since employment of
Respondent No.1 was admittedly governed by the Ashram Shala
Sanhita 2019 published by the Adivasi Vikas Vibhag of State of
Maharashtra. It is borne out from the record that in accordance with
clause 4.3.13 of the said Sanhita Respondent No.1 applied for seeking
permission to contest the Election on 23.10.2024 and the Trust
accordingly granted permission to contest the Election on 26.10.2024.
Further from the affidavit filed in Form-26 appended to the Petition of
Respondent No.1 it is seen that he had duly filled in the necessary
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information relating to above clause (a) and also enclosed the written
permission granted by the Trust and duly submitted the same for
scrutiny to the Returning Officer. It is seen that Election Petition filed
by Petitioner suppresses this permission altogether despite the same
being otherwise uploaded and available on the website of the Election
Commission of India. Therefore, prima facie on the face of record
Petitioner has failed to make out any case for application of Section 84
of the RP Act and thus this ground also fails comprehensively.
16. On reading of the Election Petition it is observed that it
comprises of vague and generic pleadings and there is complete
absence of material facts. Rather at the outset, I wish to make a note
that Ms. Karnik, learned Senior Advocate has fairly argued that
whatever is stated in the Election Petition is bare enough for the
Petitioner to lay the foundation for challenging the Election of
Respondent No. 1 and the detail material facts can be pleaded by him
in evidence at Trial. I do not subscribe to or accept the above
submission of Ms. Karnik, since if the Election Petition has to be
sustained on maintainability under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) or under
Section 101 of the RP Act, then the entire cause of action in the form
of specific material facts or concise statement of material facts along
with full disclosure of names, dates, place, incidents, role etc. of such
parties involved needs to be stated specifically in the Election Petition
itself to prove commission of corrupt practices which is not the case
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seen herein. That is the sine qua non of an Election Petition. In this
regard attention is drawn to the statutory provisions of Section 83 of
the RP Act which read thus:-
“83. Contents of Petition.–
(1) An election petition–
(a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on
which the petitioner relies;
(b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that
the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible
of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such
corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of
each such practice; and
(c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner
laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for
the verification of pleadings:
Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the
petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed
form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the
particulars thereof.
(2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by
the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition.”
17. Applying the above statutory provisions, it is mandatory
under Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act that Election Petition must
contain a concise statement of the material facts with full particulars of
corrupt practices with all details on which Petitioner relies. When
provisions of Section 83(1)(a) are read in conjunction with provisions
of Section 100(1)(d)(iii) and (iv) of the RP Act what emerges is that
the Election Petition must contain a concise statement of material facts
to demonstrate the ground of improper reception, refusal or rejection
of any vote or reception of any vote which is void or a concise
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statement of material facts to demonstrate non-compliance with
provisions of the Constitution or of the said Act or Rules or orders
made thereunder.
18. The present Election Petition as it appear suffers from the
vice of nondisclosure of material facts as stipulated in Section 83(1)(a)
of RP Act on the face of record. Case of Petitioner is confined to
alleged violation of Section 100(1)(d) (iv) as argued by Ms. Karnik.
For the sake of reference, Section 100 is reproduced below:
“100. Grounds for declaring election to be void.–
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High court is of
opinion–
(a) that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not
qualified, or was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat under
the Constitution or this Act [or the Government of Union
Territories Act, 1963 (20 of 1963)]; or
(b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a returned
candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the
consent of a returned candidate or his election agent; or
(c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; or
(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a
returned candidate, has been materially affected–
(i) by the improper acceptance or any nomination, or
(ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the interests of
the returned candidate [by an agent other than his
election agent], or
(iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any
vote or the reception of any vote which is void, or
(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of the
Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or orders made
under this Act,
the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be
void.
(2) If in the opinion of the High Court, a returned candidate has been
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(a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the election by
the candidate or his election agent, and every such corrupt
practice was committed contrary to the orders, and without the
consent, of the candidate or his election agent;
(c) that the candidate and his election agent took all reasonable
means for preventing the commission of corrupt practices at the
election; and
(d) that in all other respects the election was free from any corrupt
practice on the part of the candidate or any of his agents,
Then the High Court may decide that the election of the returned
candidate is not void.”
19. From the above, it is seen that for invoking ground under
Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the RP Act, it is incumbent for Election
Petitioner to plead in the Election Petition that result of Election of the
Returned candidate has been materially affected by non-compliance
with provisions of the Constitution or provisions of the RP Act or of any
Rules or orders made thereunder by furnishing precise details and not
by merely making bald allegations. Meaning of concise material facts
mean all such relevant details for calling an Election. It needs to be
therefore clarified that Petitioner cannot be allowed to improve his
case in evidence subsequently by pleading facts not pleaded in the
Election Petition which is the settled law.
20. In the decision of this Court passed in the case of Ravindra
Dattaram Waikar Vs. Amol Gajanan Kirtikar and Ors. 15 (Coram : Mr.
Sandeep V. Marne, J.) this Court after referring to and relying upon
several decisions of the Supreme Court has reiterated the above settled
15 11 Application (L) No. 29930 of 2024 with Application (L) No. 29880 of 2024 in Election
Petition No.6 of 2024 decided on 19.12.2024.
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position of law under the RP Act dealing with the necessity of pleading
of material facts i.e. concise statement of facts for maintainability of an
Election Petition. Paragraph Nos. 26 to 33 in the above decision refer
to the well settled authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court
in similarly placed cases. What is held by this Court in the above
paragraph Nos. 26 to 33 is directly relevant and applicable to the facts
of the present case in hand and the discussion and submissions noted
herein above. Paras 26 to 33 are reproduced herein below for
reference:-
“26) Before proceeding ahead with the examination as to
whether the Election Petition filed by the Petitioner discloses
concise statement of material facts demonstrating grounds
under Section 100(1)(d)(iii) and (iv) of the RP Act, it would be
necessary to take stock of few judgments dealing with the
necessity for pleading of material facts for maintenance of an
Election Petition. By now it is well settled position of law that
Election Petition is a statutory remedy and not an action in
equity or a remedy in common law. It is also equally well settled
position that said Act is a complete and self-contained Code.
Therefore, strict compliance with the provisions of the said Act
is mandatory requirement for exercising the statutory remedy
under the RP Act. Reference in this regard can be made to the
judgment of the Apex Court in Jyoti Basu (supra) wherein the
Apex Court has held in paragraph 8 as under:-
“8. A right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy,
is, anomalously enough, neither a fundamental right nor a
common law right. It is pure and simple, a statutory right. So
is the right to be elected. So is the right to dispute an
election. Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right
to be elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory
creations they are, and therefore, subject to statutory
limitation. An election petition is not an action at common
law, nor in equity. It is a statutory proceeding to which
neither the common law nor the principles of equity apply
but only those rules which the statute makes and applies. It is
a special jurisdiction, and a special jurisdiction has always to
be exercised in accordance with the statute creating it.
Concepts familiar to common law and equity must remain
strangers to election law unless statutorily embodied. A court30
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policy because policy in such matters as those, relating to the
trial of election disputes, is what the statute lays down. In the
trial of election disputes, court is put in a strait-jacket. Thus
the entire election process commencing from the issuance of
the notification calling upon a constituency to elect a
member or members right up to the final resolution of the
dispute, if any, concerning the election is regulated by the
Representation of the People Act, 1951, different stages of
the process being dealt with by different provisions of the
Act. There can be no election to Parliament or the State
Legislature except as provided by the Representation of the
People Act, 1951 and again, no such election may be
questioned except in the manner provided by the
Representation of the People Act. So the Representation of
the People Act has been held to be a complete and self-
contained code within which must be found any rights
claimed in relation to an election or an election dispute. We
are concerned with an election dispute. The question is who
are parties to an election dispute and who may be impleaded
as parties to an election petition. We have already referred to
the scheme of the Act. We have noticed the necessity to rid
ourselves of notions based on common law or equity. We see
that we must seek an answer to the question within the four
corners of the statute. What does the Act say? ”
27) In Dharmin Bai Kashyap Vs. Babli Sahu and others 16 , the
Apex Court has reiterated the position that where a right or a
liability is created by a statute, which gives a special remedy for
enforcing it, the remedy provided by the statute must be availed
of in accordance with the statute and that if a statute provides
for doing a thing in a particular manner it has to be done in that
matter alone and in no other manner. The Supreme Court has
held in paragraph 17 as under:-
“17. There is hardly any need to reiterate the trite position of
law that when it comes to the interpretation of statutory
provisions relating to election law, jurisprudence on the
subject mandates strict construction of the provisions [Laxmi
Singh v. Rekha Singh, (2020) 6 SCC 812]. Election contest is
not an action at law or a suit in equity but purely a statutory
proceeding, provision for which has to be strictly construed.
The petitioner having failed to make any application in
writing for re-counting of votes as required under Section 80
of the Nirvachan Niyam, 1995, and having failed to seek
relief of declarations as required under Rule 6 of the 1995
Rules, the election petition filed by the petitioner before the
SubDivisional Officer (R) seeking relief of re-counting of
votes alone was not maintainable.”
28) Having held that strict compliance with provisions of RP Act
is mandatory requirement for exercise of statutory remedy, it
16 (2023) 10 SCC 461
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would be appropriate to discuss the relevant case law on the
subject dealing with the nature of pleadings that are required
for maintainability of a valid Election Petition. In Mangani Lal
Mandal (5 th supra), the Apex Court held that the sine qua non
for declaring an election of returned candidate to be void under
Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the RP Act is further proof of the fact
that such breach or nonobservance results in materially affecting
the result of returned candidate. It is further held that mere
violation or breach or non-observance of the provisions of
Constitution, the Act, Rules or orders made thereunder would
not ipso facto render the election of returned candidate void.
The Supreme Court held in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 as under:-
“10. A reading of the above provision with Section 83 of the
1951 Act leaves no manner of doubt that where a returned
candidate is alleged to be guilty of noncompliance with the
provisions of the Constitution or the 1951 Act or any rules or
orders made thereunder and his election is sought to be
declared void on such ground, it is essential for the election
petitioner to aver by pleading material facts that the result of
the election insofar as it concerned the returned candidate
has been materially affected by such breach or non-
observance. If the election petition goes to trial then the
election petitioner has also to prove the charge of breach or
non-compliance as well as establish that the result of the
election has been materially affected. It is only on the basis
of such pleading and proof that the Court may be in a
position to form opinion and record a finding that breach or
non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or the
1951 Act or any rules or orders made thereunder has
materially affected the result of the election before the
election of the returned candidate could be declared void.
11. A mere non-compliance or breach of the Constitution or
the statutory provisions noticed above, by itself, does not
result in invalidating the election of a returned candidate
under Section 100(1) (d)(iv). The sine qua non for declaring
the election of a returned candidate to be void on the ground
under clause (iv) of Section 100(1)(d) is further proof of the
fact that such breach or nonobservance has resulted in
materially affecting the result of the returned candidate. In
other words, the violation or breach or non-observation or
non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or the
1951 Act or the rules or the orders made thereunder, by
itself, does not render the election of a returned candidate
void Section 100(1) (d)(iv). For the election petitioner to
succeed on such ground viz. Section 100(1)(d)(iv), he has
not only to plead and prove the ground but also that the
result of the election insofar as it concerned the returned
candidate has been materially affected. The view that we
have taken finds support from the three decisions of this
Court in: (1) Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal [AIR 1964 SC 1200 :
(1964) 6 SCR 54] ; (2) L.R. Shivaramagowda v. T.M.
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EP.19.2025.docChandrashekar [(1999) 1 SCC 666];and (3) Uma Ballav Rath
v. Maheshwar Mohanty [(1999) 3 SCC 357] .
12. Although the impugned judgment runs into 30 pages, but
unfortunately it does not reflect any consideration on the
most vital aspect as to whether the non-disclosure of the
information concerning the appellant’s first wife and the
dependent children born from that wedlock and their assets
and liabilities has materially affected the result of the
election insofar as it concerned the returned candidate. As a
matter of fact, in the entire election petition there is no
pleading at all that the suppression of the information by the
returned candidate in the affidavit filed along with the
nomination papers with regard to his first wife and
dependent children from her and nondisclosure of their
assets and liabilities has materially affected the result of the
election. There is no issue framed in this regard nor is there
any evidence let in by the election petitioner. The High Court
has also not formed any opinion on this aspect.”
29) In Shambhu Prasad Sharma (supra) the Apex Court dealt
with an Appeal arising out of order passed by the High Court
dismissing the Election Petition on the ground that the same did
not make concise statement of material facts and did not
disclose of cause of action. Upholding the rejection of Petition
under provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, the Apex
Court held in paragraphs 15, 18 and 20 as under:-
“15. Suffice it to say that the case pleaded by the appellant
was not one of complete failure of the requirement of filing
an affidavit in terms of the judgment of this Court and the
instructions given by the Election Commission but a case
where even according to the appellant the affidavits were not
in the required format. What is significant is that the election
petition did not make any averment leave alone disclose
material facts in that regard suggesting that there were
indeed any outstanding dues payable to any financial
institution or the Government by the returned candidate or
any other candidate whose nomination papers were
accepted. The objection raised by the appellant was thus in
the nature of an objection to form rather than substance of
the affidavit, especially because it was not disputed that the
affidavits filed by the candidates showed the outstanding to
be nil. 16. to 17. xxxxx
18. From the above it is evident that the form of the
nomination papers is not considered sacrosanct. What is to
be seen is whether there is a substantial compliance with the
requirement as to form. Every departure from the prescribed
format cannot, therefore, be made a ground for rejection of
the nomination paper.
19. xxxxx
20. Coming to the allegation that other candidates had also
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acceptance of their nomination papers improper, we need to
point out that the appellant was required to not only allege
material facts relevant to such improper acceptance, but
further assert that the election of the returned candidate had
been materially affected by such acceptance. There is no such
assertion in the election petition. Mere improper acceptance
assuming that any such improper acceptance was supported
by assertion of material facts by the appellant-petitioner,
would not disclose a cause of action to call for trial of the
election petition on merit unless the same is alleged to have
materially affected the result of the returned candidate.”
30) In Mairembam Prithviraj alias Prithviraj Singh (supra), the
Apex Court has relied upon its judgment in Durai Muthuswami
Versus. N Nachiappan17, and held in paragraphs 22 and 23 as
under:-
“22. The facts, in brief, of Durai Muthuswami [Durai
Muthuswami v. N. Nachiappan, (1973) 2 SCC 45] are that
the petitioner in the election petition contested in the
election to the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly from
Sankarapuram constituency. He challenged the election of
the first respondent on the grounds of improper acceptance
of nomination of the returned candidate, rejection of 101
postal ballot papers, ineligible persons permitted to vote,
voting in the name of dead persons and double voting. The
High Court dismissed the election petition by holding that
the petitioner failed to allege and prove that the result of the
election was materially affected by the improper acceptance
of the nomination of the first respondent as required by
Section 100(1)(d) of the Act. The civil appeal filed by the
petitioner therein was allowed by this Court in Durai
Muthuswami [Durai Muthuswami v. N. Nachiappan, (1973)
2 SCC 45] in which it was held as follows : (SCC pp. 48-49,
para 3).
“3. Before dealing with the question whether the learned
Judge was right in holding that he could not go into the
question whether the 1 st respondent’s nomination has been
improperly accepted because there was no allegation in the
election petition that the election had been materially
affected as a result of such improper acceptance, we may
look into the relevant provisions of law. Under Section 81 of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951 an election
petition calling in question any election may be presented on
one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of
Section 100 and Section 101. It is not necessary to refer to
the rest of the section. Under Section 83(1)(a), insofar as it is
necessary for the pusaidose of this case, an election petition
shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on
which the petitioner relies. Under Section 100(1) if the High17 (1973) 2 SCC 45
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(a) that on the date of his election a returned candidate
was not qualified, or was disqualified, to be chosen to fill
the seat under the Constitution or this Act…
(b)-(c) ***
(d) that the result of the election, insofar as it concerns a
returned candidate, has been materially affected–
(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination, or
(ii)-(iii) ***
the High Court shall declare the election of the returned
candidate to be void. Therefore, what Section 100 requires is
that the High Court before it declares the election of a
returned candidate is void should be of opinion that the
result of the election insofar as it concerns a returned
candidate has been materially affected by the improper
acceptance of any nomination. Under Section 83 all that was
necessary was a concise statement of the material facts on
which the petitioner relies. That the appellant in this case has
done. He has also stated that the election is void because of
the improper acceptance of the 1st respondent’s nomination
and the facts given showed that the 1st respondent was
suffering from a disqualification which will fall under Section
9-A. That was why it was called improper acceptance. We do
not consider that in the circumstances of this case it was
necessary for the petitioner to have also further alleged that
the result of the election insofar as it concerns the returned
candidate has been materially affected by the improper
acceptance of the 1st respondent’s nomination. That is the
obvious conclusion to be drawn from the circumstances of
this case. There was only one seat to be filled and there were
only two contesting candidates. If the allegation that the 1st
respondent’s nomination has been improperly accepted is
accepted the conclusion that would follow is that the
appellant would have been elected as he was the only
candidate validly nominated. There can be, therefore, no
dispute that the result of the election insofar as it concerns
the returned candidate has been materially affected by the
improper acceptance of his nomination because but for such
improper acceptance he would not have been able to stand
for the election or be declared to be elected. The petitioner
had also alleged that the election was void because of the
improper acceptance of the 1st respondent’s nomination. In
the case of election to a single-member constituency if there
are more than two candidates and the nomination of one of
the defeated candidates had been improperly accepted the
question might arise as to whether the result of the election
of the returned candidate had been materially affected by
such improper reception. In such a case the question would
arise as to what would have happened to the votes which had35
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EP.19.2025.docbeen cast in favour of the defeated candidate whose
nomination had been improperly accepted if it had not been
accepted. In that case it would be necessary for the person
challenging the election not merely to allege but also to
prove that the result of the election had been materially
affected by the improper acceptance of the nomination of the
other defeated candidate. Unless he succeeds in proving that
if the votes cast in favour of the candidate whose nomination
had been improperly accepted would have gone in the
petitioner’s favour and he would have got a majority he
cannot succeed in his election petition. Section 100(1)(d)(i)
deals with such a contingency. It is not intended to provide a
convenient technical plea in a case like this where there can
be no dispute at all about the election being materially
affected by the acceptance of the improper nomination.
“Materially affected” is not a formula that has got to be
specified but it is an essential requirement that is
contemplated in this section. Law does not contemplate a
mere repetition of a formula. The learned Judge has failed to
notice the distinction between a ground on which an election
can be declared to be void and the allegations that are
necessary in an election petition in respect of such a ground.
The petitioner had stated the ground on which the 1st
respondent’s election should be declared to be void. He had
also given the material facts as required under Section 83(1)
(a). We are, therefore, of opinion that the learned Judge
erred in holding that it was not competent for him to go into
the question whether the 1st respondent’s nomination had
been improperly accepted.”
23. It is clear from the above judgment in Durai Muthuswami
[Durai Muthuswami v. N. Nachiappan, (1973) 2 SCC 45]
that there is a difference between the improper acceptance of
a nomination of a returned candidate and the improper
acceptance of nomination of any other candidate. There is
also a difference between cases where there are only two
candidates in the fray and a situation where there are more
than two candidates contesting the election. If the
nomination of a candidate other than the returned candidate
is found to have been improperly accepted, it is essential that
the election petitioner has to plead and prove that the votes
polled in favour of such candidate would have been polled in
his favour. On the other hand, if the improper acceptance of
nomination is of the returned candidate, there is no necessity
of proof that the election has been materially affected as the
returned candidate would not have been able to contest the
election if his nomination was not accepted. It is not
necessary for the respondent to prove that result of the
election insofar as it concerns the returned candidate has
been materially affected by the improper acceptance of his
nomination as there were only two candidates contesting the
election and if the appellant’s nomination is declared to have
been improperly accepted, his election would have to be set
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aside without any further enquiry and the only candidate left
in the fray is entitled to be declared elected.”
31) The conspectus of the above discussion is that for
maintaining an Election Petition and for taking it to the stage of
trial, it is necessary that there is strict compliance with the
provisions of Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act. The concise
statement of material facts must constitute a complete cause of
action. Failure on the part of the Election Petitioner to raise
necessary pleadings to make out a case of existence of ground
under Section 100(1)(d)(iii) or (iv) of the RP Act would
necessarily result in dismissal of Election Petition by invoking
powers under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. The Apex Court
has summed up the legal position in this regard after taking
stock of various judgments rendered in the past in Kanimozhi
Karunanidhi (supra) in paragraph 28 as under:-
“28. The legal position enunciated in afore-stated cases may
be summed up as under:–
i. Section 83(1)(a) of said Act, 1951 mandates that an
Election petition shall contain a concise statement of
material facts on which the petitioner relies. If material
facts are not stated in an Election petition, the same is
liable to be dismissed on that ground alone, as the case
would be covered by Clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of
the Code.
ii. The material facts must be such facts as would afford a
basis for the allegations made in the petition and would
constitute the cause of action, that is every fact which it
would be necessary for the plaintiff/petitioner to prove, if
traversed in order to support his right to the judgment of
court. Omission of a single material fact would lead to an
incomplete cause of action and the statement of plaint
would become bad.
iii. Material facts mean the entire bundle of facts which
would constitute a complete cause of action. Material facts
would include positive statement of facts as also positive
averment of a negative fact, if necessary.
iv. In order to get an election declared as void under
Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the said Act, the Election
petitioner must aver that on account of noncompliance
with the provisions of the Constitution or of the Act or any
rules or orders made under the Act, the result of the
election, in so far as it concerned the returned candidate,
was materially affected.
v. The Election petition is a serious matter and it cannot
be treated lightly or in a fanciful manner nor is it given to
a person who uses it as a handle for vexatious pusaidose.
vi. An Election petition can be summarily dismissed on the
omission of a single material fact leading to an incomplete37
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of material facts on which the petitioner relies for
establishing a cause of action, in exercise of the powers
under Clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order VII CPC read with
the mandatory requirements enjoined by Section 83 of the
said Act.”
32) The above principles are reiterated in subsequent judgment
in Karim Uddin Barbhuiya (supra), in which it is held in
paragraph Nos. 13, 14, 15, 22 and 24 as under:-
“13. It hardly needs to be reiterated that in an Election
Petition, Election Petition does not disclose a cause of action,
it is liable to be dismissed in limine. It may also be noted that
the cause of action in questioning the validity of election
must relate to the grounds specified in Section 100 of the
said Act. As held in Bhagwati Prasad Dixit in Dhartipakar
Madan Lal ‘Ghorewala’ v. Rajeev Gandhi and Agarwal v.
Rajiv Gandhi , if the allegations contained in the petition do
not set out the grounds as contemplated by Section 100 and
do not conform to the requirement of Section 81 and 83 of
the Act, the pleadings are liable to be struck off and the
Election Petition is liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule
11 CPC.
14. A beneficial reference of the decision in case of Laxmi
Narayan Nayak v. Ramratan Chaturvedi be also made,
wherein this Court upon review of the earlier decisions, laid
down following principles applicable to election cases
involving corrupt practices:–
“5. This Court in a catena of decisions has laid down the
principles as to the nature of pleadings in election cases,
the sum and substance of which being:
(1) The pleadings of the election petitioner in his petition
should be absolutely precise and clear containing all
necessary details and particulars as required by law vide
Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi [1987
Supp SCC 93] and Kona Prabhakara Rao v. M. Seshagiri
Rao [(1982) 1 SCC 442].
(2) The allegations in the election petition should not be
vague, general in nature or lacking of materials or
frivolous or vexatious because the court is empowered at
any stage of the proceedings to strike down or delete
pleadings which are suffering from such vices as not
raising any triable issue vide Manphul Singh v. Surinder
Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 599 : (1974) 1 SCR 52], Kona
Prabhakara Rao v. M. Seshagiri Rao [(1982) 1 SCC 442]
and Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi
[1987 Supp SCC 93].
(3) The evidence adduced in support of the pleadings
should be of such nature leading to an irresistible38
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made, have been committed rendering the election void
under Section 100 vide Jumuna Prasad Mukhariya v.
Lachhi Ram [(1954) 2 SCC 306 : (1955) 1 SCR 608 : AIR
1954 SC 686] and Rahim Khan v. Khurshid Ahmed
[(1974) 2 SCC 660].
(4) The evidence produced before the court in support of
the pleadings must be clear, cogent, satisfactory, credible
and positive and also should stand the test of strict and
scrupulous scrutiny vide Ram Sharan Yadav v. Thakur
Muneshwar Nath Singh [(1984) 4 SCC 649].
(5) It is unsafe in an election case to accept oral evidence
at its face value without looking for assurances for some
surer circumstances or unimpeachable documents vide
Rahim Khan v. Khurshid Ahmed [(1974) 2 SCC 660], M.
Narayana Rao v. G. Venkata Reddy [(1977) 1 SCC 771 :
(1977) 1 SCR 490], Lakshmi Raman Acharya v. Chandan
Singh [(1977) 1 SCC 423 : (1977) 2 SCR 412] and Ramji
Prasad Singh v. Ram Bilas Jha [(1977) 1 SCC 260].
(6) The onus of proof of the allegations made in the
election petition is undoubtedly on the person who assails
an election which has been concluded vide Rahim Khan v.
Khurshid Ahmed [(1974) 2 SCC 660], Mohan Singh v.
Bhanwarlal [(1964) 5 SCR 12 : AIR 1964 SC 1366] and
Ramji Prasad Singh v. Ram Bilas Jha [(1977) 1 SCC
260].”
15. The legal position with regard to the noncompliance of
the requirement of Section 83(1)(a) of the said Act and the
rejection of Election Petition under Order VII Rule 11, CPC
has also been regurgitated recently by this Court in case of
Kanimozhi Karunanidhi v. A. Santhana Kumar (supra):–
xxxxx
22. So far as the ground contained in clause (d) of Section
100(1) of the Act, with regard to improper acceptance of the
nomination of the Appellant is concerned, there is not a
single averment made in the Election Petition as to how the
result of the election, in so far as the appellant was
concerned, was materially affected by improper acceptance
of his nomination, so as to constitute a cause of action under
Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act. Though it is true that the
Election Petitioner is not required to state as to how corrupt
practice had materially affected the result of the election,
nonetheless it is mandatory to state when the clause (d)(i) of
Section 100(1) is invoked as to how the result of election was
materially affected by improper acceptance of the
nomination form of the Appellant.
xxxxx
24. As stated earlier, in Election Petition, the pleadings have
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contained in Election Petition do not set out grounds as
contemplated in Section 100 and do not conform to the
requirement of Section 81 and 83 of the Act, the Election
Petition is liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of
CPC. An omission of a single material fact leading to an
incomplete cause of action or omission to contain a concise
statement of material facts on which the Election petitioner
relies for establishing a cause of action, would entail
rejection of Election Petition under Order VII Rule 11 read
with Section 83 and 87 of the said Act.”
33) The Apex Court in Karikho Kri (supra) held in paragraph
Nos.40 and 41 as under:-
40. Having considered the issue, we are of the firm view that
every defect in the nomination cannot straightaway be
termed to be of such character as to render its acceptance
improper and each case would have to turn on its own
individual facts, insofar as that aspect is concerned. The case
law on the subject also manifests that this Court has always
drawn a distinction between nondisclosure of substantial
issues as opposed to insubstantial issues, which may not
impact one’s candidature or the result of an election. The
very fact that Section 36(4) of the Act of 1951 speaks of the
Returning Officer not rejecting a nomination unless he is of
the opinion that the defect is of a substantial nature
demonstrates that this distinction must always be kept in
mind and there is no absolute mandate that every non-
disclosure, irrespective of its gravity and impact, would
automatically amount to a defect of substantial nature,
thereby materially affecting the result of the election or
amounting to ‘undue influence’ so as to qualify as a corrupt
practice.
41. The decision of this Court in Kisan Shankar Kathore
(supra), also demonstrates this principle, as this Court
undertook examination of several individual defects in the
nomination of the returned candidate and found that some of
them were actually insubstantial in character. This Court
noted that two facets required consideration – Whether there
is substantial compliance in disclosing requisite information
in the affidavits filed along with the nomination and whether
non-disclosure of information on identified aspects materially
affected the result of the election. This Court observed, on
facts, that non-disclosure of the electricity dues in that case
was not a serious lapse, despite the fact that there were dues
outstanding, as there was a bonafide dispute about the same.
Similar was the observation in relation to non-disclosure of
municipal dues, where there was a genuine dispute as to re-
valuation and reassessment for the pusaidose of tax
assessment. Earlier, in Sambhu Prasad Sharma v. Charandas
Mahant, this Court observed that the form of the nomination
paper is not considered sacrosanct and what is to be seen is
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whether there is substantial compliance with the requirement
as to form and every departure from the prescribed format
cannot, therefore, be made a ground for the rejection of the
nomination paper.”
21. Applying the above yardstick and authoritative
pronouncements of the Supreme Court to the facts in the present case,
it is seen that there is absolute non-compliance of the provisions of
Section 83 of the RP Act which contemplate that an Election Petition
has to mandatorily contain a concise statement of material facts to
begin with on which the Petitioner relies and full particulars of corrupt
practices that he alleges including as full statement as possible of
names of parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practices and
the date and place of commission of each such corrupt practice be
made.
22. The material facts stated in the present Election Petition
prima facie do not conform to the provision of Section 83(1)(a) of RP
Act. As enunciated and settled by the Supreme Court, the material
facts must be such facts as would afford a basis for the allegation made
out in the Petition and would constitute the cause of action. The
Supreme Court has categorically, repeatedly held and reiterated that
omission of even a single material fact would lead to incomplete cause
of action and statement of Plaint would be bad. The Supreme Court
held that what constitutes material facts are the entire bundle of facts
which will have to be pleaded as positive statement of facts or positive
averment of negative facts. In the instant case, no such facts rather no
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material facts leading to cause of action whether positive or negative
averments of facts are pleaded and however at the time of argument
Court is informed that such material facts will be brought on record in
evidence during the Trial. The Supreme Court has held that non
pleading of material facts amount to non disclosure of cause of action
and incomplete cause of action or omission to contain such statement
of material facts not disclosing cause of action would lead to dismissal
of Election Petition in limine. Once there is a failure of Election
Petitioner to raise necessary pleadings to make out a case from
existence of any ground under Section 100(1)(d) of RP Act, it would
necessarily result in dismissal of the Election Petition under Order VII
Rule 11 of the CPC. Thus it is summarized that pleading in present
Election Petition are not precise and clearly containing all necessary
details of material facts. The three principle grounds of challenge are
mere allegations which are vague, general in nature, clearly lack
material which cannot prima facie raise any triable issue on reading of
Election Petition. The Petitioner cannot be permitted to enhance,
escalate and improve his case at trial or in evidence. Prima facie there
is not an iota of evidence adduced in support of the pleading in the
present case which can lead to an irresistible conclusion that the
allegations made have been committed by the Election Petitioner or
the Returning Officer rendering the Election void. Further alleging that
result of Election is materially affected merely by accepting the
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Nomination Form of Respondent No.1 is not good enough as it is
completely devoid of cogent, credible and satisfactory pleadings. In
fact, the principle ground of challenge i.e. non – disclosure of
disclaimer Note-1 to Note-5 cannot be in my view be termed to be part
of such character to render its acceptance improper in the facts of the
present case. That apart the Nomination Form has stood the test of
Section 36(4) of RP Act after scrutiny. Infact non-disclosure of
disclaimer Notes cannot be considered as departure from the
prescribed Form and ground for rejection or challenge since it is a
statutory Form distributed by the Returning Officer himself.
23. In the present case, it is concluded on reading of the Election
Petition that Petitioner has merely alleged general and vague violations
by Respondent No. 1 without specifying and supplying any material
details whatsoever. It is observed on perusal of the Petition that there
is no concise statement of material facts alleging violation under
Section 83 of the RP Act is stated. All that Petitioner has pleaded are
grounds (j) and (k) which read thus :-
“(j) The petitioner further submits that submissions of
incomplete and incorrect Affidavit in Form 26 by the
Respondent No.1 amounts to noncompliance with the provisions
of the Constitution and Representation of the People Act and on
this ground also the present election of the Respondent No. 1 is
required to be declared as void, as contemplated under Section
100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951;
(k) The Petitioner submits that as aforesaid, Respondent No.1
has failed to submit the proper Affidavit and, therefore,
accepting the nomination of the Respondent No.1 by the
Returning Officer is illegal and against the provisions of law and43
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EP.19.2025.docdue to improper acceptance of said nomination the result of the
election, insofar as it concerns a returned candidate, has been
materially affected and that but for the votes obtained by the
Respondent No.1 / returned candidate by corrupt practices, the
Petitioner would have obtained a majority of the valid votes
and, therefore, it is just and necessary to declare that the
election of the Respondent No.1 to be void and to declare the
Petitioner has been elected in the said election, under the
provisions of Section 101 of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951;”
24. From the above pleadings it is seen that the said grounds are
prima facie inadequate and does not contain details of any particulars
of any corrupt practices allegedly indulged by Respondent No. 1 in the
Election. The grounds which are stated in paragraph Nos. (j) and (k) in
the Petition are prima facie not in consonance with the violation
alleged under Section 83 read with Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of RP Act
since no particulars are given by the Petitioner therein.
25. In the present case, Petitioner has challenged Election of
Respondent No.1 on the ground that result of the Election, insofar as it
concerned Respondent No.1 was materially affected by non-
compliance with Rule 4(A) of the said Rules read with Section 33 of
the RP Act. Section 33 of the RP Act pertains to presentation of
Nomination Form and the requirement for a valid nomination. Section
36 pertains to scrutiny of nomination by the Returning Officer.
Subsection (2) of Section 36 empowers the Returning Officer either on
objections made to any nomination or on his own motion to reject any
nomination on the grounds mentioned therein. One of the ground to
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reject a nomination is if there is failure to comply with any of the
provisions of Section 33. Sub-section (4) of Section 36 states that
Returning Officer shall not reject any nomination paper on the ground
of any defect which is not of a substantial character.
26. Part-II of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 deals with
General Provisions. Rule 4 and Rule 4(A) pertain to submission of
Nomination Form and Affidavit in Form-26 to be filed at the time of
delivering nomination paper which are reproduced below for
reference:-
“4. Nomination paper- Every nomination paper presented under
sub-section (i) of section 33 shall be completed in such one of
the Forms 2A to 2E as may be appropriate: Provided that a
failure to complete or defect in completing, the declaration as to
symbols in a nomination paper in Form 2A or Form 2B shall not
be deemed to be a defect of a substantial character within the
meaning of sub-section (4) of section 36.
4A. Form of affidavit to be filed at the time of delivering
nomination paper- The candidate or his proposer, as the case
may be, shall, at the time of delivering to the returning officer
the nomination paper under sub-section (1) of section 33 of the
Act, also deliver to him an affidavit sworn by the candidate
before a Magistrate of the first class or a Notary in Form 26.”
27. In the present case, Respondent No.1’s nomination has been
duly scrutinized under Section 36 and no objection is sustained by the
Returning Officer and his nomination is accepted as valid. Thus once
such scrutiny attains finality, then election can only be set aside under
Section 100 if it is shown that the result of such an election has been
materially affected by non-compliance with the provisions of the
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Constitution or the RP Act. Hence the principal ground of challenge in
the Election Petition is unsustainable. The pleadings in the Petition
however do not disclose how the alleged omissions have had a
material bearing on the result of the Election.
28. I am of the considered view that while disclosure in Form-26
is mandatory, non-disclosure or partial disclosure constitutes an
irregularity attracting Section 125A of the Act, and it cannot be a
ground for setting aside the Election under Section 100(1)(d)(iv). In
the present case the alleged omissions do not amount to non-
compliance with provisions of Section 33 or Rule 4(A) so as to
constitute a defect of substantial character under Section 36(4) of the
RP Act. In any event, Respondent No.1 cannot be held liable for such
non – disclosure of disclaimer on the Statutory Form disbursed by the
Returning Officer.
29. It is also significant to note that Affidavit in Form-26 along
with nomination papers is required to be furnished by the candidate as
per Rule 4(A) of the Rules read with Section 33 of RP Act. It is seen
that the Returning Officer is empowered, either on objections made to
any nomination or on his own motion, to reject any nomination on
grounds mentioned in Section 36(2), including the ground that there
has been a failure to comply with any of the provisions of Section 33 of
the Act. However in the case of Respondent No.1, at the time of
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scrutiny of his nomination paper and his Affidavit in Form No.26
neither any objection is raised nor Returning Officer has found any
lapse or non-compliance of Section 33 or Rule 4(A) of Rules. Petitioner
has exercised his right to question the Affidavit by filing the present
Election Petition under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the RP Act. However,
there are no material facts stated in the Petition constituting cause of
action to maintain challenge on this ground under Section 100(1)(d)
(iv) of the RP Act.
30. Insofar as the issue of non-disclosure is concerned, case of
Petitioner is that in Form-26, appended below Exhibit ‘C’ at page No.69
of the Petition, Respondent No.1 has not disclosed information in
respect of any prior permission sought from the Competent Authority
for contesting the said Election while in Government Service. Mr.
Pradhan has vehemently argued that Respondent No.1 on 26.10.2024
had duly obtained permission in accordance with Clause 4.3.13 of the
said Sanhita from Arvind Smruti Trust for contesting the Election by
following the prescribed procedure and the same was submitted and
uploaded on the website of the Election Commission of India. Copy of
the same is appended to the Application of Respondent No.1 at Page
No.136.
31. It is seen that on scrutiny, the Returning Officer has not
found any ambiguity or mistake much less, non-disclosure or falsehood
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which can be deemed as suppression. It is in this context that when
Election Petitioner approaches the Court he has to make a concise
material statement of facts with all details in the Petition itself at the
threshold. Once the nomination of Respondent No.1 is held to be valid,
it is deemed to be accepted as per Section 33 of RP Act and it can only
be rejected at the time of scrutiny under Section 36(2) of the RP Act.
In this regard provisions of Section 36(3) and (4) are therefore
extremely crucial and apply to Respondent No.1’s case. The said
provisions read as under:-
“36. Scrutiny of nominations.–
(1) xxxxxx
(2) xxxxxx
(3) Nothing contained in clause (b) or clause (c)] of sub-section
(2) shall be deemed to authorise the rejection of the nomination
of any candidate on the ground of any irregularity in respect of
a nomination paper, if the candidate has been duly nominated
by means of another nomination paper in respect of which no
irregularity has been committed.
(4) The returning officer shall not reject any nomination paper
on the ground of any defect which is not of a substantial
character.”
32. Thus once scrutiny is held by the Returning Officer and he
endorses each nomination paper, his decision of accepting the same
and the list of validly nominated candidates is prepared i.e. to say that
candidates whose nominations have been found valid. It is a statutory
process envisaged under Sections 30, 33 and 34 of the RP Act.
Therefore I am not inclined to accept the submissions advanced by Ms.
Karnik in the present case regarding suppression and nondisclosure
which are adequately dealt with herein above. In fact the Petitioner
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has made an incorrect statement about non – disclosure of permission
which clearly reflects in item No.9 of the Affidavit and copy of which is
enclosed thereto.
33. Hence, in the absence of specific and necessary pleadings
and reliance placed on aforesaid findings and observations including
the citations discussed, in my opinion on a holistic consideration of the
pleadings stated the grounds of the Petition, the present Election
Petition is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
34. Further, considering the winning margin and the averments
made in the Election Petition, Petitioner’s case is vague and thoroughly
inadequate. Petitioner has miserably failed to raise appropriate
pleadings to disclose cause of action for setting aside the Election of
Respondent No.1 under any of the grounds enumerated in Section 100
of the said Act. Mere narration of figures without any backup data
cannot be considered as a concise statement of material facts. Hence,
in the absence of necessary pleadings and the above observations and
findings, the Election Petition is liable to be rejected under Order VII
Rule 11 of CPC on consideration of the pleadings in Petition. In view of
the above, I am inclined to agree with the submissions and arguments
advanced by Mr. Pradhan in Application filed below Order VII Rule 11
of the CPC seeking dismissal of the Election Petition.
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35. I am of the view that Petitioner has failed to ensure strict
compliance with the statutory provisions of the RP Act namely Section
83(1)(a) of the RP Act. Therefore following the mandate under various
judgments of the Supreme Court, particularly in the case of Kanimozhi
Karunanidhi Vs. A. Santhana Kumar and others18 and Karim Uddin
Barbhuiya Vs. Aminul Haque Laskar and others 19 that even a singular
omission of statutory requirement must entail dismissal of the Election
Petition by having recourse to provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of CPC,
in my view, the present Election Petition fails as it does not disclose
any cause of action for making out any of the grounds stated under
Sections 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) read with Section 83 of the
RP Act. Hence Application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC filed by
Respondent No.1 is allowed and made absolute in terms of prayer
clause (a). In view thereof, the Election Petition is liable to be rejected
by having recourse to the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of CPC.
Resultantly, the Election Petition fails and stands dismissed.
36. In view of the above, Application (L) No.9497 of 2025 is
allowed. Resultantly, Election Petition No.19 of 2025 is rejected.
37. Election Petition No.19 of 2025 is accordingly dismissed. No
costs.
38. Application No.6 of 2025 is disposed of as infructuous since
18 2023 SCC Online SC 573
19 2024 SCC Online SC 509
50
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EP.19.2025.doc
vide order dated 06.11.2025 Election Petition No.37 of 2025 has been
disposed of as withdrawn and present Election Petition No.19 of 2025
is dismissed.
39. Application (L) No.24590 of 2025 is allowed in terms of
prayer clause (a) and (b). District Election Officer is directed to release
the 358 Ballot Units and 358 Control Units which are kept in his
custody within two (2) weeks from the date of uploading of this order
and accordingly it is also disposed in the above terms.
H. H. SAWANT [ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ] Digitally signed by AJAY AJAY TRAMBAK TRAMBAK UGALMUGALE UGALMUGALE Date: 2026.03.30 12:34:28 +0530 51 ::: Uploaded on - 30/03/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 30/03/2026 20:34:15 :::