Punjab-Haryana High Court
Sunil Baba vs State Of Punjab on 19 February, 2026
231
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-8638-2026
Sunil Baba
....Petitioner
versus
State of Punjab
....Respondent
Date of Decision: 19.02.2026
Date of Uploading: 19.02.2026
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present:- Mr. Randeep Singh Waraich (Rana), Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Baljinder Singh Sra, Addl. AG, Punjab.
*****
SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)
1. Present petition is the second attempt, which has been filed under
Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short
‘BNSS’) for grant of regular bail to the petitioner, in case bearing FIR No.70
dated 15.04.2025, registered for the offences punishable under Sections
21/29/61/85 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
(for short ‘NDPS Act‘), at Police Station Salem Tabri, District Ludhiana.
2. The gravamen of the FIR in question is that the petitioner is an
accused of being involved in an FIR pertaining to NDPS Act involving alleged
recovery of 270 grams of heroin, recovered from the petitioner.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner
is in custody since 15.04.2025. Learned counsel has further submitted that
mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have not scrupulously been complied
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with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent defects. Learned
counsel has argued that the petitioner has been falsely implicated into the FIR
in question. Learned counsel has iterated that the contraband alleged to have
been recovered from the petitioner is of 270 grams of heroin, which is
marginally above the threshold limit of non-commercial quantity specified in
the notification issued under the NDPS Act. Learned counsel has further
iterated that the petitioner has suffered incarceration for more than 07 months.
Thus, regular bail is prayed for.
4. Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by
arguing that the allegations raised against the petitioner are serious in nature
and, thus, the petitioner does not deserve the concession of the regular bail.
Learned State counsel has further submitted that the instant bail plea is barred
by the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and thus, the same ought to be
dismissed. Learned State counsel seeks to place on record custody certificate
dated 18.02.2026, in the Court today, which is taken on record.
5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through
the available records of the case.
6. The petitioner was arrested on 15.04.2025, whereinafter,
investigation was carried out and challan has been presented on 03.07.2025.
Total 16 prosecution witnesses have been cited, out of which, none has been
examined till date. Indubitably, conclusion of the trial will take long. It is not
in dispute that the contraband allegedly recovered from the petitioner is 270
grams of heroin, which is marginally above the threshold limit of non-
commercial quantity. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon the orders
passed by this Court in Rajdev Giri versus State of Punjab, CRM-M-44898-
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2019, decided on 18.09.2020; Rahish versus State of Haryana, CRM-M-
36498-2020, decided on 11.11.2020; Karambir versus State of Haryana,
CRM-M-31820-2019, decided on 28.08.2019: Jagjit Singh @ Jagga Gill
versus State of Punjab, CRM-M-41242-2019, decided on 27.02.2020 and
Baljit Kaur @ Baljito versus State of Punjab, CRM-M-12849-2020, decided
on 04.06.2020, wherein accused were enlarged on bail in cases where the
alleged recovery was slightly more than the quantity prescribed for
commercial category under the NDPS Act. The rival contentions raised at Bar
give rise to debatable issues, which shall be ratiocinated upon during the
course of trial. This Court does not deem it appropriate to delve deep into
these rival contentions, at this stage, lest it may prejudice the trial. Nothing
tangible has been brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner
absconding from the process of justice or interfering with the prosecution
evidence.
6.1. The trial is indeed procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be
saddled upon the petitioner. As per custody certificate dated 18.02.2026 filed
by the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration
for a period of 10 months & is shown to be involved in two other cases/FIRs.
However, this factum cannot be a ground sufficient by itself, to decline the
concession of regular bail to the petitioner in the FIR in question when a case
is made out for grant of regular bail qua the FIR in question by ratiocinating
upon the facts/circumstances of the said FIR. Reliance in this regard can be
placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maulana Mohd.
Amir Rashadi v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (1) RCR (Criminal) 586; a
Division Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in case of
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Sridhar Das v. State, 1998 (2) RCR (Criminal) 477 & judgments of this Court
in CRM-M No.38822-2022 titled as Akhilesh Singh v. State of Haryana,
decided on 29.11.2021, and Balraj v. State of Haryana, 1998 (3) RCR
(Criminal) 191. In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section
37 of the NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the Constitution
of India.
6.2. This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of
Punjab passed in CRM-M-64074-2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after relying
upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul
Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh
vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494; Mohd
Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311;
Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020 titled as “Chitta Biswas Alias
Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal“; “Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The
State of West Bengal”, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated
22.08.2022 titled as “Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of
Gujarat“; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal
Krishna Patra @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus:
“7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate
anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any
impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an
overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right has
been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of the
above-referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have laid down a series of
decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of
speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint4 of 8
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CRM-M-8638-2026imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent
incarceration which continues at all stages, namely, the stage of
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible
prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since
the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal proceedings
consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early
hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The
overcrowded Court-dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant
pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire
criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this
cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the
accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to the
criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The
guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent
delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an obligation to
proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a
threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive pre-
trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and
public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects
against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the
passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend himself.
It goes without saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention are
grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to
psychological and physical deprivations of jail-life, usually under onerous
conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused
frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family.
There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves
consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to
accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of
contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail petition
in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the
rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates
that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public
prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin conditions which are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence
charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence while on
bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be
meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused’s fundamental
right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty cannot be
rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process,
particularly where such delay(s) is neither attributable to the accused nor
justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual
cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge
in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The legislature
in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases
under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts under
Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson’s eye to
the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this
legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does not
become complicit in violation of an individual’s fundamental rights,
notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with bail
petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act,
1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative
intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused
to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable5 of 8
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CRM-M-8638-2026cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into punitive imprisonment, an
outcome antithetical to the principle of justice and equity.
Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has
failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged
incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life
and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty
overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other
words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the
ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37
of the NDPS Act, 1985.”
6.3 Indubitably, the present petition is the second attempt on behalf
of the petitioner for securing regular bail. The last one bearing no. CRM-M-
42176-2025 was dismissed as withdrawn on 23.09.2025 (Annexure P-5).
However, keeping in view the entirety of facts and circumstance of the case
in hand especially keeping in view the extended custody and pace of trial, this
Court is inclined to favourably consider the instant plea for bail. A profitable
reference, in this regard, can be made to a judgment of this Court passed in
CRA-S-2332-2023 titled as Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and
another; relevant whereof reads as under:
“10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following principles
emerge:
I Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is maintainable in
law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected solely on the ground of
maintainability thereof.
II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is maintainable
whether earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn/dismissed as not
pressed/dismissed for non-prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed
on merits.
III For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to succeed, the
petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently required to show
substantial change in circumstances and showing of a mere superficial or
ostensible change would not suffice. The metaphoric expression of seeking
second/successive bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal
iterations of petition(s) without substantial, effective and consequential
change in circumstances.
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CRM-M-8638-2026IV No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what
would constitute substantial change in circumstances as every case has its
own unique facts/circumstance. Making such an attempt is nothing but an
utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and
discretion of the Court dealing with such second/successive regular bail
petition(s).
V In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular bail
petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently required to be
recorded for granting such plea despite such a plea being
second/successive petition(s). In other words, the cause for a Court having
successfully countenanced/entertained such second/successive petition(s)
ought to be readily and clearly decipherable from the said order passed.”
Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial
is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is
ordered to be released on regular bail, if not required in any other case, on his
furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial
Court/Duty Magistrate. However, in addition to conditions that may be
imposed by the concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall
remain bound by the following conditions:
(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or
documentary, during the trial.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before
the trial.
(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.
(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the
trial Court.
(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the
Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station
and shall not change his cell-phone number without prior
permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.
(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.
(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of
every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court,
to the effect that he has not been involved in commission
of any offence after being released on bail. In case the
petitioner is found to be involved in any offence after his
being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of
his affidavit or otherwise, the State is mandated to move,7 of 8
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CRM-M-8638-2026forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which plea, but of
course, shall be ratiocinated upon merits thereof.
8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those
which may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as directed
hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the
State/complainant shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the
petitioner.
9. Ordered accordingly.
10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of
opinion on the merits of the case.
11. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous
application, if any, shall also stands disposed off.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
February 19, 2026
Naveen
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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