Patna High Court
Suman Kumar Sinha vs The State Of Bihar Through The Collector on 24 March, 2026
Author: Purnendu Singh
Bench: Purnendu Singh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.11755 of 2015
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Suman Kumar Sinha Son of Late Rajendra Prasad, Resident of Village +P.O. -
Kourihar, P.S. - Gamharia, District - Madhepura.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through the Collector, Madhepura.
2. Mr. Abrar Mohammad Kamar, Madhepura.
3. Sri Sudhir Kumar Sinha, Land Reforms Deputy Collector, madhepura.
4. The Circle Officer, Ghailadh Circle Office, Madhepura Presenting Officer.
5. The Commissioner, Koshi Division, Saharsa.
6. The District Magistrate, Madhepura.
... ... Respondent/s
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Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Awadhesh Kumar Mishra, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : AAG 14
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH
CAV JUDGMENT
Date : 24.03.2026
Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner and the learned counsel for the State.
2. The petitioner in paragraph no. 1 of the present writ
petition has sought inter alia following relief(s):
"(i) Charge-sheet dated 19.06.2014 issued
by the Collector, Madhepura against the petitioner
be set aside.
(ii) Departmental proceeding initiated vide
memo no.235-2 dated 30.07.2014 by Deputy
Collector Land Reforms Madhepura be directed to
be stopped during pendency of this writ petition.
(iii) Respondents authority be directed not
to take any coercive step against the petitioner."
3. The brief facts, of the case is that the petitioner was
appointed as a Revenue Clerk in the year 1986 and served at
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various Circle Offices including Murliganj, Alam Nagar,
Singeshwar, Udakisunganj and Madhepura, and while he was
posted at Ghailad Circle Office since June 2012, for alleged
misappropriation of government funds an FIR bearing
Madhepura (Parmanpur O.P.) Case No. 401 of 2014 dated
19.07.2014
was lodged by the Circle Officer, Ghailadh and
simultaneously he was served with Memo No. 235-2 dated
30.07.2014 issued by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector,
Madhepura, enclosing a charge memo contained in Prapatra ‘K’
dated 20.06.2014 issued by the District Magistrate, Madhepura.
It has been alleged that the petitioner had committed
irregularities in preparation of the list of landless Scheduled
Caste (Mahadalit) beneficiaries and registration of land in their
favour. The inquiry could not be held for a period of six years,
which related to the year, 2013. The petitioner has denied his
role to either allot the plots to the mahadalits or to sanction the
money for registration of the land in favour of the beneficiries.
Argument on behalf of the petitioner
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner submitted that departmental proceeding was directed
to be initiated against the petitioner by the District Magistrate,
Madhepura vide communication dated 20.06.2014. The Land
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Reforms Deputy Collector (L.R.D.C), Madhepura was
appointed the Conducting Officer and Anchal Adhikari (Circle
Officer) was appointed as the Presenting Officer. Inquiry could
not be held over a period of more than six years. Learned
counsel further submitted that petitioner submitted a detailed
explanation dated 20.06.2014, denying all charges contained in
Memo No.235-2 dated 30.07.2014 (Prapatra ‘K’) and
demonstrated that the beneficiary list was prepared in the year
2008 by his predecessor and he had no role in identifying
beneficiaries or making any requisition or report in respect of
the disputed land, appertaining to Khata No. 2583, Khesra No.
7220 of revenue village Bhatrandha. The land was not
registered in the name of Harijan people, as evident from
Khatiyan obtained under the Right to Information Act. It is
further contended that without proper verification or enquiry, the
charges were framed, which are not supported by evidence,
ignoring the petitioner’s unblemished service record. He
submitted that even prior to the issuance of the charge-sheet, an
FIR being Madhepura (Parmanpur O.P.) Case No. 401 of 2014
dated 19.07.2014 was lodged by the Circle Officer, Ghailadh, in
which the petitioner was not even named, rendering the
impugned charge-sheet dated 30.07.2014, arbitrary and liable to
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be set aside. The Petitioner for the same charges was served
with the Prapatra ‘K’ for initiating departmental proceeding,
vide memo no.461-2-Estm dated 20.06.2014. The DCLR, Sadar,
Madhepura was appointed as the Conducting Officer and in
compliance of direction contained in Memo No.461-2 dated
20.06.2014, the DCLR initiated disciplinary proceeding and the
petitioner was noticed, vide memo no.235-2 dated 30.7.2014.
5. Learned counsel further submitted that the
petitioner is presently posted as Revenue Karamchari and the
disciplinary action taken against him relates to the year, 2013,
which was proceeded based on the inquiry report submitted by
the Additional Collector, Madhepura contained in Letter
No.89/C dated 21.11.2013.
6. Learned counsel further submitted that the
petitioner is not assigned with the duty of sanctioning any
money for any work to be done at the level of the Circle Office.
The Circle Officer is the one who had been held guilty.
7. The District Magistrate subsequently dropped the
departmental proceeding by order dated 26.02.2020 in light of
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in case of
Dr.(Mrs.) Kalpana Sinha Vs. Union of India, reported in PLJR
2016 (Vol-2) page 197, which has no bearings on the facts of the
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present case as the issue in the said case related to the service
condition relating to the pay scale of Associate Professor. It is
thus the District Magistrate cum Collector imposed the penalty
of automatic reduction in pay and reduction in the post of the
petitioner to basic grade category in most mechnical manner.
Aggrieved by the said order of the District Magistrate,
Madhepura, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Divisional
Commissioner, Koshi Division, Saharsa, who directed for
reconsideration of the penalty order in respect of the charges
framed against the petitioner. The District Magistrate,
Madhepura issued letter No. 189 dated 17.03.2025 calling upon
the petitioner to submit his show cause regarding the charges
contained in Prapatra-K in the departmental proceeding.
However, the authorities have not proceeded in accordance with
the provision of Rule 17 of Bihar Government Servant
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005 (CCA Rules)
without any change having been proved to impose major
penalty rendering the order passed by the District Magistrate
and the Divisional Commissioner to reconsider the case of the
petitioner on the point of penalty to be without authority of law
and had remanded back the matter to the Disciplinary Authority
for holding a fresh disciplinary proceeding.
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8. Learned counsel further submitted that it is well
settled by the Apex Court that the protracted disciplinary
proceeding is itself penal in nature and as such, the same
requires interference of this Court as in the present case, the
charges were framed way back in the year, 2014 for alleged
irregularity in allotment of the land in the year, 2008. In above
background, learned counsel submitted that if the disciplinary
proceeding is allowed to be initiated afresh after delay of more
than 16 years. The same will give room to bias, mala fide and
misuse of power and is likely to cause prejudice to him.
Argument on behalf of the Respondent State
9. Per contra, learned counsel for the State submitted
that while the petitioner was posted as Revenue Karamchari in
Ghailadh Anchal, he had submitted a report to the Anchal
Adhikari recommending allotment of land to 33 Mahadalit
families, treating them as landless persons, on the basis of
which, 3-3 decimals of land each, totaling 99 decimals of land
of Mauza Bhatrandha, Thana No. 33, Khata No. 2583, Khesra
No. 7220, was purchased and allotted as homestead land.
However, it subsequently came to light that the said
beneficiaries were not landless, as they were already residing on
homestead land and some of them had also received benefits
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under the Indira Awas Scheme, and further the said land
belonged to Hirday Yadav and the same was under dispute
among his four sons. Upon a complaint filed by one Tarni Yadav
before the Anchal Adhikari and the District Magistrate,
Madhepura, the matter was examined and the Anchal Adhikari
reported that the names of the 33 Mahadalit beneficiaries had
been recommended by the Revenue Karamchari and Circle
Inspector. Thereafter, the District Magistrate, Madhepura vide
letter No. 2455/G.O dated 22.10.2013 directed the Additional
Collector, Madhepura to conduct an enquiry, who submitted
report No. 893 dated 21.11.2013 pointing out several
irregularities in the allotment process. Consequently,
departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner by
order No. 46 dated 20.06.2014 with the Land Reforms Deputy
Collector, Madhepura as Conducting Officer and the Anchal
Adhikari as Presenting Officer. The District Magistrate
subsequently stayed the departmental action by order dated
26.02.2020 in light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court reported in case of Dr.(Mrs.) Kalpana Sinha (Supra), the
matter was later reconsidered pursuant to letter No. 342 dated
23.02.2022 issued by the Commissioner, Koshi Division,
directing reconsideration of punishment in respect of the
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charges framed against the petitioner, and accordingly the
District Magistrate, Madhepura issued letter No. 189 dated
17.03.2025 calling upon the petitioner to submit his show cause
regarding the charges contained in Prapatra-K in the
departmental proceeding, which clearly shows that the
authorities have acted strictly in accordance with law and
principles of natural justice by providing the petitioner due
opportunity to explain the allegations levelled against him.
Learned Counsel submitted that the writ petition is premature
and the same is fit to be dismissed.
Analysis and conclusion
10. Heard the Parties
11. The petitioner was initially appointed as a
Revenue Clerk in the year, 1986. He was issued memo dated
30.07.2014 by the DCLR, Madhepura along with a charge sheet
dated 19.06.2014 and in reply denying the charges, the
petitioner submitted that a list of scheduled caste, which was
prepared by the then Revenue Clerk in the Year, 2008, denying
his role in the purchase or allotment of land to the landless
persons, as such, the charge-sheet having been issued without
application of mind and entire disciplinary proceeding initiated
against him based on no evidence has no legal sanctity.
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12. From the perusal of the records and the argument
advanced by the parties, it is evident that the petitioner was
posted as Revenue Kramchari in Ghailadh Anchal and his
predecessor had submitted a report to the Anchal Adhikari,
Ghailadh to allot lands to 33 Mahadalit family to rehabilitate for
construction of their house and on the basis of the report. A total
33 Mahadalit family as who were landless and as per
government scheme, 3-3 Dec. land of Mauza Bhatrandha, Thana
No.33, Khata 2583, Khesra 7220, total area of 99 Dec. land
after purchase was allotted to them as homestead land. It was
reported that Mahadalit had got homestead land and they were
living in their houses and among them some persons had got
Indira Awas too. The said land i.e. Khesra No.7220 belong to
Hirday Yadav and there was litigation among the four sons of
Hirday Yadav.
13. The District Magistrate, Madhepura vide letter
no.2455/GO dated 22.10.2013 had directed the Additional
Collector, Madhepura for inquiry and the Additional Collector,
Madhepura vide letter no.893 dated 21.11.2013 submitted
having found the above irregularities that allottes were not
landless persons. The departmental proceeding was directed
against the petitioner by the District Magistrate, Madhepura
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vide order contained in letter no.46 dated 20.06.2014. The Land
Reforms Deputy Collector, Madhepura was the Conducting
Officer and Anchal Adhikari as the Presenting Officer.
14. The District Magistrate even without submission
of the inquiry report passed the order dated 26.02.2020 by
dropping the proceeding in the light of the judgment passed in
case of Dr.(Mrs.) Kalpana Sinha (supra), which is not
applicable in the facts of the present case, at the same time, also
imposed punishment of penalty, reduction in the rank and in the
basic grade in complete violation of Rule 17 (3) of CCA Rules
and Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India.
15. Aggrieved by the order of the District Magistrate,
the preferred Appeal before the Divisional Commissioner, Koshi
Division, the District Magistrate against the punishment
imposed upon the petitioner by the District Magistrate,
communicated vide Letter No.342/Legal dated 23.02.2022. The
Divisional Commissioner in the said Appeal after an inordinate
delay of almost three years issued notice, vide Letter No.189
dated 17.03.2025, to give opportunity to the petitioner and
conclude the disciplinary proceeding.
16. It further appears from the records that the
disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner in the
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year, 2013 for the alleged misconduct which took place in the
year, 2008, whereas the order of punishment was passed in the
year, 2020. Even thereafter, the matter remained pending for
consideration without any meaningful progress and without
holding of inquiry in accordance with with the Rule 17 of CCA
Rules, 2005. Such prolonged delay in not concluding
disciplinary proceedings is contrary to the settled principles of
service jurisprudence, which mandates that the departmental
proceeding must be concluded within a reasonable time so as to
avoid undue prejudice to the delinquent employee.
17. The Apex Court, as well as, this Court have time
and again held that for initiation of disciplinary action against a
Government servant over the misconduct committed by him/her,
it is the bounden duty of every authority to follow the
procedures as contemplated under the provisions of the CCA
Rules, to initiate proceedings in a reasonable time. Admittedly,
in the present case, the charge memo was issued on 30.07.2014
and the order of penalty passed in the year, 2022 and same has
been interfered by the Divisional Commissioner and the
disciplinary proceeding is still pending, causing mental agony
and sufferings all along to the petitioner. If the ratio laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the law laid down in the case
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of P.V. Mahadevan Vs. Md. T.N. Housing Board, reported in
2005 (6) SCC 636 is applied to the case in hand, then no other
conclusion is arrived than holding the delay caused by the
disciplinary authority to be allowed to stand, the same will be
miscarriage of justice.
18. The Apex Court while dealing with the situation
like present in the case of Allahabad Bank Vs. Krishna
Narayan Tiwari reported in (2017) 2 SCC 308 wherein the
Apex Court in Para 8 has held inter alia as under :
“8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that
in cases where the High Court finds the enquiry to be
deficient, either procedurally or otherwise, the proper
course always is to remand the matter back to the authority
concerned to redo the same afresh. That course could have
been followed even in the present case. The matter could be
remanded back to the disciplinary authority or to the
enquiry officer for a proper enquiry and a fresh report and
order. But that course may not have been the only course
open in a given situation. There may be situations where
because of a long time-lag or such other supervening
circumstances the writ court considers it unfair, harsh or
otherwise unnecessary to direct a fresh enquiry or fresh
order by the competent authority. That is precisely what the
High Court has done in the case at hand.”
(Emphasis supplied).
19. In case of State of Punjab and others Vs.
Chaman Lal Goyal, reported in 1995 (2) SCC 570, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held as follows:
“9.Now remains the question of delay. There is undoubtedly a
delay of five and a half years in serving the charges. The
question is whether the said delay warranted the quashing of
charges in this case. It is trite to say that such disciplinary
proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities
are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities.
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would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also
makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not
also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of
proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias,
mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is
unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the
charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends
upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is
likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending
himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a
plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing
for and against the said plea and take a decision on the
totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to
indulge in a process of balancing… ”
(Emphasis supplied)
20. The inordinate and unexplained delay vitiates the
impugned charge memo and the same is liable to be quashed as
has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in above cases.
The disciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated after a lapse of
considerable time, it would not be fair to the delinquent officer.
Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult
and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed
initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of
bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long
and is unexplained, the Court may well interfere and quash the
charges. Here, in the present case, the petitioner has raised a
plea that the delay is likely to cause prejudice to him in
defending himself. If such plea is raised, the court has to weigh
the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a
decision on the totality of circumstances.
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21. In case of S.Sekar Vs. Commissioner of Social
Welfare, Ezhilagam, Chennai reported in 2010 (1) MLJ 708,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph no. 11 has observed
inter alia as follows:
“11.Also, it is a settled proposition that while considering
whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings,
the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity
and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is
unexplained, prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ
large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much
the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges
against its employee. It is the basic principle of
administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a
particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently
and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this
path, he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally,
disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course
as per relevant rules; but then, delay defeats justice. Delay
causes prejudice to the charged officers unless it can be
shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is
proper explanation for the delay in conducting disciplinary
proceedings. Ultimately, the Court is to balance these two
diverse considerations”. In the above reported case, there
was a delay of 12 years in concluding the disciplinary
proceedings and that there was no explanation for such delay.
22. The District Magistrate even without considering
the fact that in inquiry report, the petitioner has been exonerated
of all the charges had passed the order dated 26.02.2020 by
dropping the proceeding and at the same time, also imposed
punishment of penalty reduction in the rank and in the basic
grade in complete violation of Rule 17(3) of CCA Rules and
Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India.
23. From the materials available on record, it is
evident that the primary responsibility for the alleged
irregularity in the execution of the lease deed and utilization of
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government funds lay with the Circle Officers concerned, under
whose authority the work was executed. The role attributed to
the petitioner, who was serving as a Revenue Karamchari, was
limited to submission of a report after physical verification of
the site. There is nothing on record to suggest that the petitioner
had any authority to sanction the amount in question or that he
had acted in connivance with any other official for personal gain
or to cause wrongful loss to the State exchequer.
24. Significantly, no material has been brought on
record to demonstrate that the report submitted by the petitioner
was manipulated, motivated, or influenced by any extraneous
consideration. In absence of any specific allegation establishing
deliberate misconduct or mala fide conduct on the part of the
petitioner, continuation of the departmental proceeding after
such prolonged delay would amount to causing undue
harassment to the petitioner.
25. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner is on the
verge of superannuation and has already faced departmental
proceedings for more than a decade and in this regard, I have
already recorded that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
consistently held that protracted disciplinary proceedings
without reasonable justification are liable to be interfered with
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by the Court, particularly when the delay is attributable to the
employer and causes serious prejudice to the employee.
26. I find that the record reveals that for the similar
allegation, an FIR dated 30.07.2014 bearing Madhepura
(Parmanpur O.P.) PS Case No.401 of 2014 was also instituted
against the petitioner and the said case has been closed by
holding the petitioner not guilty. The law is well settled by a
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Depot Manager,
A.P.S.R.T.C. v. Mohd. Yusuf Miyan and others, (1997) 2 SCC
699, wherein the Apex Court held that there is no bar to proceed
simultaneously with the departmental enquiry and trial of a
criminal case unless the charge in the criminal case is of a grave
nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. The
above preposition of law was again considered in the case of
Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd and Anr,
reported in, (1999) 3 SCC 679 and the Hon’ble Supreme Court
laid down the following five parameters to help to make a
decision regarding the conduct of both proceedings, which are
as follows:-
• “Departmental Proceedings and proceedings in a
criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there
is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously,
though separately.
• If the departmental proceedings and the criminal
case are based on an identical and similar set of
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the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which
involves complicated questions of law and fact, it
would be desirable to stay the departmental
proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.
• Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case
is grave and whether complicated questions of fact
and law are involved in that case, will depend upon
the nature of the offence, the nature of the case
launched against the employee on the basis of
evidence and material collected against him during
the investigation or as reflected in the charge sheet.
• The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot
be considered in isolation to stay the departmental
proceedings but due regard has to be given to the
fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be
unduly delayed.
• If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal
is unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings
even if were stayed on account of pendency of the
criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with
so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if
the employee is found not guilty his honour may be
vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the
administration may get rid of him at the earliest.”
27. The legal position in this regard was further
crystallized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State
of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena, reported in, (1996) 6 SCC 417,and
it was held that the approach and objective in the criminal
proceeding and disciplinary proceeding are altogether distinct
and different. On one hand, in the disciplinary proceeding, the
question is whether the employee is guilty of such conduct
which may merit his dismissal or imposition of any other
punishment as per service rules, as the case may be, but in the
criminal proceeding, the question is whether an offence
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attributed against the employee, if established, would warrant
punishment under the criminal law.
28. From the perusal of the records it is evident that
the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant on the
very same set of allegations, evidence, and witnesses have
culminated in discharge by the competent court. Where the
departmental proceedings are founded on identical and verbatim
facts and evidence, and no additional or independent material
has been brought on record to distinguish the departmental case
from the criminal prosecution, such acquittal assumes
significant probative value. In these circumstances, it would be
wholly unjust and legally untenable to sustain the findings
recorded in the departmental proceedings. The appellant,
therefore, is entitled to exoneration, and the impugned order of
dismissal is liable to be set aside in the interest of justice. Law
in this regard is well settled by the Apex Court in the case of
G.M.Tank vs State of Gujarat reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446,
which inter alia are as under:
“20. It is thus seen that this is a case of no evidence.
There is no iota of evidence against the appellant to
hold that the appellant is guilty of having illegally
accumulated excess income by way of gratification.
The respondent failed to prove the charges levelled
against the appellant. It is not in dispute that the
appellant being a public servant used to submit his
yearly property return relating to his movable and
immovable property and the appellant has also
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entire movable and immovable assets. No query
whatsoever was ever raised about the movable and
immovable assets of the appellant. In fact, the
respondent did not produce any evidence in support
of and/or about the alleged charges levelled against
the appellant. Likewise, the criminal proceedings
were initiated against the appellant for the alleged
charges punishable under the provisions of the PC
Act on the same set of facts and evidence. It was
submitted that the departmental proceedings and the
criminal case are based on identical and similar
(verbatim) set of facts and evidence. The appellant
has been honourably acquitted by the competent
court on the same set of facts, evidence and witness
and, therefore, the dismissal order based on the
same set of facts and evidence on the departmental
side is liable to be set aside in the interest of justice.
24. In Corpn. of the City of Nagpur v. Ramchandra
[(1981) 2 SCC 714 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 455 : AIR
1984 SC 626] the same question arose before this
Court. This Court, in para 6, held as under: (SCC p.
718)
“6. The other question that remains is if the
respondents are acquitted in the criminal case
whether or not the departmental inquiry pending
against the respondents would have to continue.
This is a matter which is to be decided by the
department after considering the nature of the
findings given by the criminal court. Normally
where the accused is acquitted honourably and
completely exonerated of the charges it would not
be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on
the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but
the fact remains, however, that merely because the
accused is acquitted, the power of the authority
concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is
not taken away nor is its direction [discretion] in
any way fettered.”
29. In the facts and circumstances of the present case,
this Court is of the considered opinion that in the present case,
even considering that the departmental proceeding was delayed
on account of pendency of the criminal case can be resumed and
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proceed but the said criminal case has been closed, the
continuation of the departmental proceeding initiated against the
petitioner in which he has been exonerated by the Enquiry
Officer from all the charges can be said to be wholly unjustified
and is vitiated on account of inordinate delay, as well as, in
absence of substantive material to establish culpability on the
part of the petitioner.
30. Accordingly, the entire departmental proceeding
initiated against the petitioner, arising out of the charges framed
pursuant to the inquiry report dated 21.11.2013 and culminating
in the punishment order dated 26.02.2020, as well as, the
subsequent proceedings for reconsideration thereof, are hereby
quashed and set aside as being illegal and void.
31. The writ petition is accordingly allowed.
32. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Purnendu Singh, J)
chn/-
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