Kerala High Court
Sudha Gupta vs The Special Tahsildar (La) General on 30 March, 2026
O.P.(C) No.2658 of 2019 1 2026:KER:28438
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE EASWARAN S.
MONDAY, THE 30TH DAY OF MARCH 2026 / 9TH CHAITHRA, 1948
OP(C) NO. 2658 OF 2019
AGAINST L.A.R. NO.34 OF 2014 OF REFERENCE COURT (SUB COURT)
ERNAKULAM
APPELLANTS :
1 SUDHA GUPTA,
AGED 66 YEARS
W/O.LATE A.J.GUPTA, SUDHA NIVAS,
UDAYA NAGAR, KATHRIKKADAVU JUNCTION,
KADAVANTHRA ROAD, KALOOR, ERNAKULAM.
2 PANKAJ GUPTA,
AGED 45 YEARS
S/O.LATE J.P.GUPTA, UDAYA NAGAR,
KATHRIKKADAVU JUNCTION, KADAVANTHRA ROAD,
KALOOR, ERNAKULAM.
3 MANOJ GUPTA,
AGED 44 YEARS
S/O.LATE J.P.GUPTA, UDAYA NAGAR,
KATHRIKKADAVU JUNCTION, KADAVANTHRA ROAD,
KALOOR, ERNAKULAM.
4 GAURAV GUPTA,
AGED 40 YEARS
S/O.LATE J.P.GUPTA, UDAYA NAGAR,
KATHRIKKADAVU JUNCTION, KADAVANTHRA ROAD,
KALOOR, ERNAKULAM.
BY ADVS. SHRI.T.R.S.KUMAR
SMT.DEENA JOSEPH
SHRI.FRANCIS ASSISI
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS :
1 THE SPECIAL TAHSILDAR (LA) GENERAL,
NH3, VYTTILA -682 019.
O.P.(C) No.2658 of 2019 2 2026:KER:28438
2 KOCHI METRO RAIL LTD.,
REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR,
8TH FLOOR, REVENUE TOWERS,
PARK AVENUE, KOCHI - 682 011.
3 MATHEW V.FRANCIS,
VALLANATTU HOUSE, ST.FRANCIS XAVIER ROAD,
KALOOR -682 017.
4 MURALEEDHARAN,
AGED 50 YEARS, S/O.LATE V.NARAYANAN NAIR,
MURALI NIVAS, KADAMPUR P.O.,
KANNUR - 670 601.
R1 BY ADV.SRI.K DENNY DEVASSY, SR.GP
R2 BY ADV.SRI.MANU VYASAN PETER
R3 BY ADV.SRI.VARGHESE K.PAUL
R4 BY ADVS.SRI.GEORGE POONTHOTTAM (SR.)
SMT.NISHA GEORGE
SRI.DISHARTH R. WARRIER
SRI.PHILIP T.VARGHESE
SRI.PETER KURIAN
SHRI.P.B.KRISHNAN (SR.)
SRI.P.B.SUBRAMANYAN
SRI.SABU GEORGE
THIS OP (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 30.03.2026, THE
COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
O.P.(C) No.2658 of 2019 3 2026:KER:28438
EASWARAN S., J.
-----------------------------
O.P.(C) No.2658 of 2019
-------------------------------------
Dated this the 30th day of March, 2026
JUDGMENT
Petitioners in this Original Petition (Civil) challenge Ext.P7, the
order passed by the reference court on an application, I.A. No.2858 of
2019 in L.A.R. No.34 of 2014. The said application is filed by the
petitioners to return the reference to the Land Acquisition Officer for
redetermination of the compensation in terms of the provisions under the
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, ‘Act 30 of 2013’).
2. An extent of 2.75 cents of land is the subject matter of Section
4(1) notification dated 15.6.2011. A declaration under Section 6(1) of the
erstwhile Land Acquisition Act was approved by notification dated
21.1.2012 and published in the Kerala Gazette (Extra Ordinary) on
23.1.2012, and the award was passed on 29.11.2013. It appears that
possession was taken on 12.7.2013, invoking the urgency clause under
Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is stated that 80% of the
compensation amount was disbursed to the claimants on 26.7.2013, and
the balance was deposited in the court on 20.12.2023 in the form of
O.P.(C) No.2658 of 2019 4 2026:KER:28438
cheque, and the amount was credited to the court account on 31.12.2013.
This was primarily due to the reason that there was a dispute between the
various claimants regarding the proportion under which they are entitled
to receive compensation. The Land Acquisition Officer immediately on
deposit of the amounts sought an adjudication of the disputes under
Section 31(2) of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act. In the meantime, the
claimants also instituted an application seeking higher compensation
under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Land Acquisition
Reference Court answered the reference under Section 31(2) by judgment
dated 5.6.2015. In the meantime, the petitioners had filed an application
for enhancement of the compensation under Section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act. During the pendency of the reference, the petitioners
herein filed I.A. No.2858 of 2019 for returning the reference to the Land
Acquisition Officer for redetermination of the compensation under the
proviso to Section 24. The prayer for returning the reference to the Land
Acquisition Officer was objected to by the State as well as the
requisitioning authority. The reference court took up the application and
found that the amount of Rs.83,69,873/- was forwarded to the court being
the compensation amount after deducting the income tax and that the
proviso to Section 24 is not attracted to the facts of their case and
O.P.(C) No.2658 of 2019 5 2026:KER:28438
accordingly refused to accept the plea that the reference should be
returned to the Land Acquisition Officer for a fresh consideration.
Accordingly, Ext.P7 order was passed rejecting the request.
3. Heard Sri. T.R.S Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners, Sri. K. Denny Devassy, the learned Senior Government
Pleader, Sri. Sreegesh, the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd
respondent, Sri. Varghese K. Paul, the learned counsel appearing for the
3rd respondent and Smt. Nisha George, represented by Sri. Sidharth R.
Warrier, the learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent.
4. Sri. T.R.S Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners, relied on the decision of the Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal
and Others [2020 (8) SCC 129] :[AIR 2020 SC 1496] and contended that
the words ‘paid’ and ‘deposited’ have a huge difference. The principle laid
down by the Supreme Court for lapsation of the acquisition proceedings
under the old Act squarely applies to the present proceedings as well. It is
further pointed out that the word ‘paid’ used under Section 24(2) does not
include within its meaning the word ‘deposited’, which has been used in
the proviso to Section 24(2), and therefore it is pointed out that the mere
deposit by the Land Acquisition Officer on 20.12.2013 is not sufficient. He
O.P.(C) No.2658 of 2019 6 2026:KER:28438
further pointed out that since the amounts were paid into the account of
the petitioners after 1.1.2014, the reference court ought to have returned
the reference for fresh adjudication in terms of the new Act.
5. Per contra Sri. K. Denny Devassy, the learned Senior Government
Pleader appearing on behalf of the State supported the findings rendered
by the courts below and pointed out that the details of deposits in respect
of the Land Acquisition Proceedings are made available before this Court
through a memo dated 1.4.2025, wherein the 1st respondent has
specifically made it clear that 80% of the compensation was disbursed to
the claimants on 26.7.2013, the balance was deposited in the court on
20.12.2023 in the form of cheque and the amount was credited to the court
account on 31.12.2013 since there was a dispute between the petitioners
and the other claimants as regards the proportion under which the
amounts are to be received.
6. Sri. Sreegesh, the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd
respondent/requisitioning authority, would point out that the deposit
under Section 31(2) was necessitated because of the refusal of the
claimants to receive compensation determined by the Collector under
Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act. Referring to paragraph No.226 of
the decision of the Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority
O.P.(C) No.2658 of 2019 7 2026:KER:28438
(Supra), the learned counsel pointed out that the benefit of the proviso
cannot be attracted in a case where the landowner does not accept the
amount, but seeks reference for a higher compensation. He further
pointed out that if there was no dispute among the landowners with regard
to the proportion under which the amounts are to be received, then the
individual landowners have certainly received the amounts much prior to
the cut-off date i.e., 1.1.2014. Therefore, it is pointed out that the order
passed by the reference court is perfectly correct.
7. Sri. Varghese K. Paul and Sri. Sidhardh R. Warrier, the learned
counsel appearing for respondents 3 and 4 respectively, would also
support the submissions raised on behalf of the requisitioning authority
and would submit that the intention of the petitioners is only to delay the
ultimate decision of the court. It is further pointed out that the
respondents 3 and 4 have filed separate claims under Section 18 for
seeking higher compensation, which is kept pending because of the
present original petition.
8. I have considered the submissions raised across the Bar and also
perused the impugned order.
9. Proviso to Section 24 of The Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
O.P.(C) No.2658 of 2019 8 2026:KER:28438
2013 reads as under:
24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be
deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.
(1) xxxxx
Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect
of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the
beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for
acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be
entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
10. The question to be considered by this Court is whether the
interpretation placed by the Supreme Court on the words ‘paid’ and
‘deposited’ would apply with equal force for the determination of
compensation in terms of the new Act. The argument of the petitioners is
that though the proceedings of land acquisition may not lapse, still the
entitlement of the petitioners to claim a higher amount in terms of the new
Act cannot be obliterated by the act of the State in making the deposit
under Section 31(2), the day before the coming into force of the Act, that
is 1.1.2014.
11. The records of the proceedings indicate that the award was
passed on 29.11.2013 and that the cheque for the compensation was
granted on 20.12.2013. From the memo dated 1.4.2025, it is further clear
that 80% of the compensation was disbursed to the claimants on
26.7.2013, the balance was deposited in the court on 20.12.2023 in the
O.P.(C) No.2658 of 2019 9 2026:KER:28438
form of a cheque, and the amount was credited to the court account on
31.12.2013. It is in this context that the provisions of Sections 31(1) and
31(2) of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1984 have to be construed by
this Court.
12. Section 31(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 reads as follows:
31. Payment of compensation or deposit of the same in Court
(1) On making an award under section 11, the Collector shall tender
payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested
entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay it to them unless
prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the
next sub-section.
13. It must be noted that, if in fact, there was no dispute among the
claimants, then immediately on the passing of the award and
determination of the compensation, the amount so determined by the
Land Acquisition Officer would have been received by the claimants
subject to their right to claim a higher compensation in terms of Section
18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. If that be so, proviso to Section 24 of
the new Act will not get attracted.
14. In the present case, however, an inter se dispute arose as regards
the claimants 2 to 5 and claimants 1 and 6, on the other hand. The
claimants 2 to 5 are the petitioners herein who contend that since they
have received compensation only after the determination of the reference
O.P.(C) No.2658 of 2019 10 2026:KER:28438
under Section 31(2), the entire proceedings should be redone by Land
Acquisition Officer under the new Act, and the amount should be
determined in terms of the new Act.
15. This Court is unable to subscribe to the aforesaid contention for
multiple reasons. The reference under Section 31(2) itself was
necessitated because of the dispute between the parties. In such
circumstances, this Court is of the view that the benefit of the proviso
cannot be applied to a case where the landowners have refused to accept
the compensation.
16. In Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and
Others [2020 (8) SCC 129], the Supreme Court considered the true
purport of the word ‘paid’ and ‘deposited’ occurring in Section 24 of the
Act, Para 226 reads as under:
226. Thus, in our opinion, the word “paid” used in Section 24(2) does not
include within its meaning the word “deposited”, which has been used in
the proviso to Section 24(2). Section 31 of the Act of 1894, deals with the
deposit as envisaged in Section 31(2) on being ‘prevented’ from making
the payment even if the amount has been deposited in the treasury under
the Rules framed under Section 55 or under the Standing Orders, that
would carry the interest as envisaged under Section 34, but acquisition
would not lapse on such deposit being made in the treasury. In case the
amount has been tendered and the landowner has refused to receive it,
it cannot be said that the liability arising from non-payment of the
amount is that of lapse of acquisition. Interest would follow in such a
O.P.(C) No.2658 of 2019 11 2026:KER:28438case also due to non-deposit of the amount. Equally, when the
landowner does not accept the amount, but seeks a reference for higher
compensation, there can be no question of such individual stating that
he was not paid the amount (he was determined to be entitled to by the
collector). In such case, the landowner would be entitled to the
compensation determined by the Reference court.
17. In the present case, the petitioners have admittedly received 80%
of the compensation deposited by the Land Acquisition Officer. Having
received the amount, it is not open for the petitioners to seek for
redetermination of the compensation under the new Act. Even if this
court were to assume that the principles laid down in Indoor
Development Authority (Supra) will apply, even then it is difficult to
accept the proposition canvassed by the petitioners, especially since there
was a conscious refusal on the part of them to receive the compensation
determined by the Land Acquisition officer. Hence, the reference court is
perfectly justified in rejecting the request of the petitioners for returning
the reference to the Land Acquisition Officer for a fresh consideration in
terms of Act 30 of 2013.
Resultantly, the original petition is found to be devoid of merit, and
accordingly, the same fails and is dismissed.
Sd/-
EASWARAN S.
NS JUDGE
O.P.(C) No.2658 of 2019 12 2026:KER:28438
APPENDIX OF OP(C) NO. 2658 OF 2019
RESPONDENT EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT R1(A) TRUE COPY OF THE CERTIFICATE PRODUCED IN WHICH
GRANTED THE COMPENSATION IN LAR 67/13(LAC
38/11) DATED 30.12.2013
EXHIBIT R1(B) TRUE COPY OF THE CERTIFICATE PRODUCED IN WHICH
THE INCOME TAX DEDUCTION IN H/A 8658-00-112-TDS
DATED 20.12.2013
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE REFERENCE FILE DATED
29/11/2013 SUBMITTED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT
UNDER SECTION 19.
EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF 4(1) NOTIFICATION PUBLISHED IN
KERALA GAZETTE DATED 20/05/2011.
EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF CLAIM THE STATEMENT DATED
11/12/2017.
EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF I.A.NO.2859/2019 IN LAR 34/2014
DATED 18/09/2019 TO APPOINT THE BUILDING
VALUER.
EXHIBIT P5 TRUE COPY OF THE I.A. NO.2859/2019 IN LAR
34/2014 DATED 18.9.2019 TO RETURN THE REFERENCE
FILE
EXHIBIT P6 TRUE COPY OF OBJECTION FILED BY THE 3RD
RESPONDENT DATED 28.2.2018.
EXHIBIT P7 TRUE COPY OF ORDER DATED 24/09/2019 BY THE
HON’BLE REFERENCE COURT.
