Delhi District Court
State vs Mohd. Shamim on 12 February, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. JOGINDER PRAKASH NAHAR
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE (FTC-01), CENTRAL
DISTRICT
TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
CNR No. DLCT01-003189-2017
SC No. 172/2017
FIR No. 689/2016
U/Sec. 304/370/374/34 IPC & 16 Bonded Labour Act, 3/14 Child
Labour Act & 75/79 JJ Act
P.S. Sarai Rohilla
STATE VERSUS MOHD. SHAMIM & ANR.
(i) SC No. of the case : 172/2017
(ii) Date of commission of offence : 17.11.2016
(iii) Name, parentage and address : 1. Mohd. Shamim
S/o Mohd. Ramjaan
R/o H. No. 337, Phase
I, Shahzada Bagh,
Inder Lok Delhi.
2. Noman
S/o Mohd. Taiyab
R/o Village Tarbadi,
PS Mahal Gaun,
District Araria Bihar.
(iv) Offence complained of : Section
304/370/374/34 IPC &
16 Bonded Labour Act
& 3/14 Child Labour
Act & 75/79 JJ Act
(v) Plea of the accused : Pleaded not guilty
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(vi) Final order : 12.02.2026
Date of Institution : 27.02.2017
Date of Judgment reserved on : 02.02.2026
Date of Judgment : 12.02.2026
JUDGMENT
BRIEF FACTS AND REASONS FOR DECISION :-
1. The present case was registered on the complaint of Sh.
Ajaun Tahjeeb vide complaint Ex. PW-6/A dated 17.11.2016. It
is alleged in that complaint that since last two months he was
working in the factory making toys. Sh. Mansoom and Sh.
Jamshed/PW-10 were also working in the same factory
alongwith him. The age of Sh. Mansoom and PW-10 was
around 13 years. The accused no. 2 Noman had bought Sh.
Mansoom and PW-10 from their village. Accused no. 2 Noman
is resident of Village Tarbadi, Bihar and he had put Sh.
Mansoom and PW-10 for employment in the factory owned by
accused no. 1 Mohd. Shamim. It is further stated in Ex.
PW-6/A that they used to work from 09:00 AM to 09:00 PM
every day. Their monthly pay was Rs. 3,500/-. They were
eating food in the same factory and they were also sleeping in
the same factory. In the morning of 17.11.2016 Sh. Mansoom
and PW-10 had suddenly lost their consciousness on which the
complainant/PW-6 alongwith accused no. 1 had bought Sh.
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Mansoom and PW-10 to Sh. Acharaya Sindhu Hospital.
During his treatment Sh. Mansoom had got expired. Accused
no. 2 had promised for a good employment and salary and with
such promise he had brought PW-6 and other children for
working in a hazardous factory. Accused no. 1 used to take
work for 12-13 hours and he used to give less salary. Due to
long working hours and hazardous work the health of PW-10
and Sh. Mansoom has got deteriorated. The accused used to
take work from them as they are bonded labour.
2. FIR Ex. PW-1/A was registered in the matter of
17.11.2018 after receipt of DD no. 27PP dated 17.11.2016 at
06:00 PM. Vide DD no. 16PP dated 18.11.2016 Ex. PW-15/C it
is recorded that a boy by the name of Tausif aged about 12
years was admitted to hospital in unconscious state. The site
plan is Ex. PW-15/B. After the investigation charge-sheet was
filed and accused persons were summoned. Charge was given
to both the accused on 14.11.2018. Both the accused are
charged under section 370(5) IPC, u/s 374 IPC, u/s 75/79 of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
and they are further charged u/s 3/14 of the Child and
Adolescent (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986. Both the
accused have not pleaded guilty to all the charges and claimed
trial.
3. Prosecution has led PW-1 to PW-18 as entire evidence
against both the accused. The prosecution evidence was closed
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on 21.11.2023. The statement of accused was recorded u/s 313
Cr.P.C on 15.09.2025. Accused no. 2 has preferred not to lead
evidence in defence. However, accused no.1 Mohd. Shamim
has preferred to lead evidence in defence. Despite grant of
opportunities accused no. 1 has failed to bring evidence in
defence and vide separate statement by Ld. Counsel for
accused no. 1 the DE was closed on 10.11.2025.
4. Final arguments are heard and record perused.
5. To prove the offence under Section 370 IPC the
prosecution is required to establish the ingredients laid down
under Section 370 IPC are as under:
(1) Whoever, for the purpose of exploitation, (a) recruits,
(b) transports, (c) harbours, (d) transfers, or (e) receives, a
person or persons, by Firstly, using threats, or Secondly,
using force, or any other form of coercion, or Thirdly, by
abduction, or Fourthly, by practicing fraud, or deception, or
Fifthly, by abuse of power, or Sixthly, by inducement,
including the giving or receiving of payments or benefits,
in order to achieve the consent of any person having control
over the person recruited, transported, harboured,
transferred or received, commits the offence of trafficking.
Explanation 1.The expression “exploitation” shall include
any act of physical exploitation or any form of sexual
exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery,
servitude, or the forced removal of organs.
Explanation 2.The consent of the victim is immaterial in
determination of the offence of trafficking.
(2) Whoever commits the offence of trafficking shall be
punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than seven years, but which may extend to
ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
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(3) Where the offence involves the trafficking of more than
one person, it shall be punishable with rigorous
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and
shall also be liable to fine.
(4) Where the offence involves the trafficking of a minor, it
shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than ten years, but which may
extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to
fine.
(5) Where the offence involves the trafficking of more than
one minor, it shall be punishable with rigorous
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
fourteen years, but which may extend to imprisonment for
life, and shall also be liable to fine.
(6) If a person is convicted of the offence of trafficking of
minor on more than one occasion, then such person shall be
punished with imprisonment for life, which shall mean
imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life,
and shall also be liable to fine.
(7) When a public servant or a police officer is involved in
the trafficking of any person then, such public servant or
police officer shall be punished with imprisonment for life,
which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that
persons natural life, and shall also be liable to fine.
6. The case of the prosecution is that on 17.11.2016
accused no. 1 Mohd. Shamim was running at toy factory at plot
no. 335 phase-1 Shahzada Bagh, Inderlok, Delhi within
jurisdiction of PS Sarai Rohilla. For the purpose of exploitation
recruited more than one minor children namely Tehzeeb,
Mamnoon @ Mannu, Mansoom, Zafar @ Tausif and Jamshed
in his toy factory. Accused no. 2 Noman on 17.11.2016 had
transported minor children namely Mamnoon @ Mannu,
Mansoom, Zafar @ Tausif and Jamshed from their native place
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to the toy factory at plot no. 335, phase-1 Shahzada Bagh,
Inderlok, Delhi and thereby both the accused are charged under
370(5) IPC.
7. PW-6 Tehjeeb has deposed that in the year 2016 he was
residing at Delhi. He used to do whatever work available to
him. Mansoom (since deceased), Mannu and Jamshed used to
work in factory at plot no. 335, phase-1, Shahzada Bagh,
Inderlok, Delhi. PW-6 is not aware that what was done by them
as he has never worked in the said factory. In November, 2016
he had returned back to his native village. On that day before
returning to his native village he had went to factory of Mannu
then he saw few unconscious boys were being shifted in a car.
He had accompanied Mannu in the said car upto the hospital.
He had also given his statement before Ld. MM. PW-6 is cross-
examined by the Ld. APP for the State and he has turned
hostile to the case of the prosecution. On the basis of statement
of PW-6 Ex. PW-6/A the FIR was registered in the matter vide
Ex. PW-1/A. The statement of PW-6 under Section 164 Cr.P.C
is Ex. PW-6/B and he has claimed that such statement was
given by him at the instance of Police. Cross-examination is
PW-6 is done.
8. PW-8 Mamnoon @ Mannu has deposed that in the year
2015-16 he was working as Fitter of the toys at Inderlok, Delhi
and the owner was accused no. 1 Shamim. PW-8 has correctly
identified accused no. 1 before the Court. Hence, the joint
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reading of PW-6 and PW-8 has proved on record that a toy
factory was being run by accused no. 1 in the year 2015-16 at
plot no. 335, phase-1 Shahzada Bagh, Inderlok, Delhi. It is
deposed by PW-8 that accused no. 1 used to pay Rs. 500/- per
day for the work he used to do. He used to work for 8 hours in
a day. He was staying with his distant relative whose name he
does not remember. He came to Delhi on his own. He had
worked with accused no. 1 for 5-6 months. He has also
declared hostile by the prosecution. Ld. APP for the State has
cross-examined him. The statement of PW-8 under Section 161
Cr.P.C dated 18.11.2016 is Ex. PW-8/A and his supplementary
statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C is Ex. PW-8/B. His
statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C is Ex. PW-8/C. PW-8 has
turned hostile to the case of prosecution whose cross-
examination was allowed.
9. PW-10 Jamshed has deposed that in the year 2016 he
came alone to Delhi alongwith Naseem (since deceased) and
Naseem was his co-villager. He came to Delhi for work and
started working in the toy factory. He is not aware that who is
owner of the factory. He worked in the factory for about one
month. His duty was to paste sticker on the toys in the said
factory and duty of Naseem was to assemble the toys. They
used to stay in rented premises situated 5 minutes walking
distance away from the factory. The factory owner used to pay
them Rs. 2000/- per month. Around 15-16 boys were working
in the said factory whose name PW-10 does not remember. It is
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further deposed that one day Naseem had ordered meal from
outside and after taking the said meal their health got
deteriorated. They became unconscious. PW-10 regained
consciousness in the hospital and he does not remember that
who had shifted them to hospital. After being discharged from
hospital he went back to his village. He has also turned hostile
to the case of the prosecution and cross-examined by Ld. APP
for the State by confronting him with the statement under
Section 161 Cr.P.C Ex. PW-10/A and the statement under
Section 164 Cr.P.C Ex. PW-10/1. It is admitted as correct that
in his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C it is written that
Mannu and Tehjeeb beat them with belt. Cross-examination of
this witnesses is Nil. Hence PW-10 has proved that about 15-16
boys used to work in the toy factory of accused no. 1 and while
working in the said factory and by taking meal from outside
they have become unconscious.
10. PW-11 is Zafar @ Tausif @ Jafar who has deposed that
in the year 2016 he came to Delhi alongwith Naseem(since
deceased) who was his co-villager. He came to Delhi for work.
PW-11 and Naseem had started working in the factory. His
duty was to paste stickers and assemble the toys in the said
factory and so was the duty of Naseem. They used to stay in
rented premises situated at a walking distance of 5 minutes
away from the said factory. The factory owner used to pay Rs.
2000/- per month to him. Around 15-16 boys were working in
the said factory. One day Naseem ordered meal from outside
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after taking of which their health got deteriorated and they
became unconscious. PW-11 had regained consciousness in the
hospital. He does not know who had shifted them to hospital.
After getting discharged from hospital he went back to his
village. He cannot identify owner of the factory. PW-11 is
cross-examined by Ld. APP for the State and confronted his
statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C Ex. PW-11/A and also two
statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C which is Marked as
PW-11/1. PW-11 had identified his signature at point A.
11. PW-6 when examined on 05.08.2019 has deposed that on
such date he was about 18 years. PW-8 when deposed on
17.10.2022 has claimed his age about 24 years. PW-10 has
claimed his age as 22 years on 09.02.2023 and PW-11 has
claimed his age as 19 years on 09.02.2023. The above age of
the above witness is not challenged by the accused person.
Hence prosecution has successfully proved on record that the
incident is dated 17.11.2016 then PW-6, PW-8 , PW-10 and
PW-11 were minors at the time of commission of offence.
Hence the prosecution has successfully proved the first
ingredient of Section 370 IPC.
12. PW-8 has deposed that he came to Delhi on his own.
PW-10 has also deposed that he came to Delhi alongwith
Naseem (since deceased) who was his co-villager. PW-11 has
also deposed that he came to Delhi alongwith Naseem (since
deceased). Hence from the above prosecution witness the
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prosecution has failed to prove that the above witness has been
transported by the accused person. Now it has to seen that
whether witness PW-6, PW-8, PW-10 and PW-11 were
recruited or received by the accused person. The deposition of
the above witness has proved that they were recruited by the
accused person in their toy factory and the deceased Mansoom
was also recruited in the same toy factory who was aged about
13 years vide Ex. P-1 his postmortem examination. PW-11 was
confronted with his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C which
is Ex. PW-11/I at point A1 to A2. It is recorded that accused no.
2 Noman was the contractor who was resident of Tarbadi
Village and he had brought PW-11 to Delhi for work. He
brought PW-11 one month back. At point B1 to B1 it is stated
that he was hit during his course of employment by
Mannu/PW-8 and Tehjeeb/PW-6. The statement under Section
164 Cr.P.C is not a substantive piece of evidence however
greater amount of credibility is attached to it since it is
recorded by Judicial Magistrate and not by an IO. A
corroborative piece of evidence can only corroborate a
substantive piece of evidence and not another corroborative
piece of evidence. Hence statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C
cannot corroborate the statement given to the Police which
formed the basis of registering the FIR. The deposition before
the court is substantive piece of evidence. The presumption
under Section 80 of Evidence Act extends only to the
genuineness of the recording of statement recorded under
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Section 164 Cr.P.C and not as to its contents. The defence can
impeach the credibility of such witness in reference to Section
155(3) and Section 145 of the Evidence Act. However in the
present case this occasion to impeach the credibility of above
witness has not arisen since the above prosecution witness has
turned hostile and cross-examined by Ld. APP for the State. It
was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Jayantibhai
Chaturbhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat that when the witness has
been declared hostile then the Court should be slow to act on
the testimony of such witness. A witness different statement at
different time has no regard for truth. The relevant citation is
reproduced here under :
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case titled
Jayantibha Chaturbhai Patel vs State of Gujarat on 16 December,
2025 = 2025 INSC 1443 in Criminal Appeal No. 890-891 of 2017.
10. This Court, in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Bhawani, (2003) 7
SCC 291, has held that where the witness has been declared hostile,
the court should be slow to act on the testimony of such a witness.
Similar stance was reiterated by this Court in the case of Paramjeet
Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2010) 10 SCC 439. The relevant
paragraph of Bhawani (Supra) reads as under:
“10. The fact that the witness was declared hostile by the Court at the
request of the prosecuting counsel and he was allowed to cross-
examine the witness, no doubt furnishes no justification for rejecting
en bloc the evidence of the witness. But the court has at least to be
aware that prima facie, a witness who makes different statements at
different times has no regard for truth. His evidence has to be read
and considered as a whole with a view to find out whether any weight
should be attached to the same. The court should be slow to act on the
testimony of such a witness and, normally, it should look for
corroboration to his evidence…..”
13. Under Section 370 IPC the trafficking of a person must
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be by using threats, force, coercion, affection, fraud or
deception, abuse of power, inducement including giving and
receiving of payments of benefits. The prosecution witness
PW-6, PW-8, PW-10 and PW-11 have no where deposed that
the accused person had recruited or received them in
satisfaction of above ingredients. Hon’ble High Court of Delhi
in case titled State NCT of Delhi vs. Rakesh Dua in criminal
revision petition 68/2017 dt. 26.11.2024 has laid down at para
no. 35 that the basic ingredients to attract the offence under
Section 370 IPC is that such person should have been received
for the purpose of exploitation. Reference is also made to
Explanation 1 of Section 370 IPC. In the present case there is
no allegation of the prosecution witness in their deposition
regarding physical/sexual exploitation. The only allegation is
that they had joined the job in the toy factory of accused no. 1
and they were remunerated for the work done by them. There is
no evidence on record that the victims were recruited by using
threat or any form of coercion. PW-6 was also residing in
Delhi. PW-6, PW-8, PW-10 and PW-11 were not residing in the
premises of the factory. They were leaving everyday from the
toy factory and returning back to the same toy factory. Hence
they had freedom not to come back to the work however they
continue to return back for the work. As per deposition of
PW-18/IO/ASI Surender Kumar the accused no. 2 Noman had
made a disclosure statement that he used to take salary of
children from accused no. 1 Mohd. Shamim and thereafter, the
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salary was distributed by him to the children. It is not the case
of prosecution that the salary was misappropriated by him.
PW-6 had worked in the said factory in the year 2016 for two
months. PW-8 had worked in the said factory for 5-6 months in
the year 2015-16. PW-10 had worked in the said factory in the
year 2016 . PW-11 was also working in the said factory in the
year 2016. PW-10 and PW-11 had came to the factory with
Naseem (since deceased) and not with the accused person.
Hence, it has come in evidence that PW-6, PW-8 PW-10 and
PW-11 had joined the factory of the accused no. 1 on their own
for which they were compensated. There is no allegation with
regard to any form of exploitation as laid down u/s 370 (1) of
the IPC.
14. U/s 374 IPC the prosecution has to prove that the
accused person were compelling the victims unlawfully to do
compulsory labour against their own will. In the present case,
most of the victims were around in the age group of 15-16
years except the deceased Mansoom who was aged about 13
years on 20.11.2016. The victims PW-6, PW-8, PW-10 and
PW-11 were going daily out of the toy factory and returning
back to the toy factory. They were free to move and commute
from their place of residence and the place of employment.
None of the above prosecution witness has deposed that there
was any kind of restriction for them to visit back to their home.
Had there been any threat or exploitation then the victim could
have approached Competent Authority or any Police Official to
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submit about their grievance. PW-6 had even went back to his
native village while working at the toy factory. PW-8 was paid
Rs. 500/- per day and he was staying with his distant relative in
nearby locality. PW-10 is staying in rented premises at a
walking distance of 5 minutes from the factory and so was
PW-11 staying in the rented premises at a distance of 5 minutes
from the factory. Hence, it is found that the victim were not
unlawfully compelled by the accused person to do labour
beyond their will and the necessary ingredients u/s 374 IPC
have remained unproved on record. The relevant para no. 34 to
39 of the citation referred above titled State of NCT of Delhi
vs. Rakesh Dua are reproduced here as under:-
Offence under Section 370 of the IPC
34. Section 370 of the IPC deals with ‘trafficking of
person’. Section 370 of the IPC is reproduced as hereunder:
370. Trafficking of person.–(1) Whoever, for the purpose
of exploitation, (a) recruits, (b) transports, (c) harbours, (d)
transfers, or (e) receives, a person or persons, by–
First.–using threats, or
Secondly.–using force, or any other form of coercion, or
Thirdly.–by abduction, or
Fourthly.–by practising fraud, or deception, or
Fifthly.–by abuse of power, or Sixthly.–by inducement,
including the giving or receiving of payments or benefits, in
order to achieve the consent of any person having control
over the person recruited, transported, harboured, transferred
or received, commits the offence of trafficking.
Explanation 1.–The expression “exploitation” shall include
any act of physical exploitation or any form of sexual
exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery,
servitude, or the forced removal of organs.
Explanation 2.–The consent of the victim is immaterial in
determination of the offence of trafficking. (2) Whoever
commits the offence of trafficking shall be punished with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
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than seven years, but which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable to fine. (3) Where the offence involves
the trafficking of more than one person, it shall be
punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. (4)
Where the offence involves the trafficking of a minor, it
shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend
to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. (5)
Where the offence involves the trafficking of more than one
minor, it shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for
a term which shall not be less than fourteen years, but which
may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable
to fine. (6) If a person is convicted of the offence of
trafficking of minor on more than one occasion, then such
person shall be punished with imprisonment for life, which
shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s
natural life, and shall also be liable to fine. (7) When a
public servant or a police officer is involved in the
trafficking of any person then, such public servant or police
officer shall be punished with imprisonment for life, which
shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s
natural life, and shall also be liable to fine.
35. In accordance with Section 370 of the IPC, whoever,
for the purpose of exploitation, recruits, transports, harbours,
transfers or receives any person by doing any of the acts
specified under Section 370, that is, by threat, force,
abduction, fraud, abuse of power, or inducement, such
individual would be liable for the commission of trafficking.
The basic ingredient to attract the offence under Section
370of the IPC, however, is that such person should have
been received for the purpose of exploitation. In accordance
with the Explanation 1 to Section 370 of the IPC, the term
“exploitation” connotes physical or sexual exploitation,
slavery, servitude, or the forced removal of the organs.
36. From a perusal of the record, it is apparent that no
allegations with regard to there being any form of physical/
sexual exploitation have been levelled against the
respondent. The learned ASJ noted that the victims
categorically stated that they started working with the
respondent way back in the year 1992, and no allegations of
physical or sexual exploitation have been made. It was noted
that the only allegation was that after joining the job, the
victims had taken some loan from the respondent who now
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demands the return of such amount. It was noted that the
victims, in their statement under Section 161 of the CrPC,
nowhere stated that they have already paid the amount to the
respondent. Victims were being remunerated for the work
done by them. The case of the prosecution is not that the
victims were recruited by using threat or any form of
coercion. They were working since the year 1992 and had
joined on their own for which they were being compensated
adequately. Considering that no allegations with regard to
any form of exploitation was levelled by the victims against
the respondent, the learned ASJ rightly noted that no case
under Section 370 of the IPC was made out against the
respondent.
Offence under Section 374 of the IPC
37. Section 374 of the IPC provides as under:
374. Unlawful compulsory labour.–Whoever
unlawfully compels any person to labour against the will of
that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to one year, or with
fine, or with both.
38. In order for the offence under Section 374 of the IPC
to be attracted, any person must be unlawfully compelled to
labour against their will. In the present case, the learned ASJ
noted that the victims were grown up, and were free to move
and commute from their place of residence and the place of
employment. It was noted that the victims were even
carrying out their part time business after the employment. It
was noted that as per the statement of the witnesses and the
family members of the victims, the victims freely visited
their families at their native villages.
39. It was noted that the chargesheet itself mentioned
that the victims were free to roam in the market of Naya
Bans where the Police Station Lahori Gate too was situated.
Had there been any threat or exploitation, the victims could
easily have approached the police officials at any point in
time. It was further noted that the victims even had their
own mobile phones, and the CDR manifested that the
victims were having frequent conversations with their
families and friends. It was consequently noted that in the
event of there being any restriction, the victims could easily
have approached the police or have made a complaint to
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their friends or family who in turn could have lodged a
complaint to the police. From a perusal of the aforesaid, it is
apparent that the victims were not unlawfully compelled to
labour beyond their will. Consequently, the learned ASJ,
rightly discharged the respondent of the offence under
Section 374 of the IPC.
15. Section 75 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act 2015 (hereinafter referred as JJA Act) provides
punishment for cruelty to child. It provides that the person in
charge or in control if assaults, abandons, abuses, exposes or
willfully neglects the child or procures the child for such
purpose in a manner likely to cause such child unnecessary
mental or physical suffering then he had to be punished. The
relevant Section is reproduced here as under:-
75. Punishment for cruelty to child.–Whoever, having the
actual charge of, or control over, a child, assaults,
abandons, abuses, exposes or wilfully neglects the child or
causes or procures the child to be assaulted, abandoned,
abused, exposed or neglected in a manner likely to cause
such child unnecessary mental or physical suffering, shall
be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years or with fine of one lakh rupees or
with both:
Provided that in case it is found that such abandonment of
the child by the biological parents is due to circumstances
beyond their control, it shall be presumed that such
abandonment is not wilful and the penal provisions of this
section shall not apply in such cases:
Provided further that if such offence is committed by any
person employed by or managing an organisation, which is
entrusted with the care and protection of the child, he shall
be punished with rigorous imprisonment which may
extend up to five years, and fine which may extend up to
five lakhs rupees:
Provided also that on account of the aforesaid cruelty, if
the child is physically incapacitated or develops a mental
illness or is rendered mentally unfit to perform regular
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tasks or has risk to life or limb, such person shall be
punishable with rigorous imprisonment, not less than three
years but which may be extended up to ten years and shall
also be liable to fine of five lakhs rupees.
16. Section 79 provides for prohibition of exploitation of a
child employee. Whoever offensively engages a child and
keeps him in a bondage for the purpose of employment or
withholds his earnings or uses his earnings for his own purpose
then such person has to be punished. Employment includes
selling goods and services and entertainment in public places
for economic gain. The relevant Section is reproduced here as
under :-
79. Exploitation of a child employee.–Notwithstanding
anything contained in any law for the time being in force,
whoever ostensibly engages a child and keeps him in
bondage for the purpose of employment or withholds his
earnings or uses such earning for his own purposes shall
be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term
which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to
fine of one lakh rupees.
Explanation.–For the purposes of this section, the term
“employment” shall also include selling goods and
services, and entertainment in public places for economic
gain.
17. The prosecution is required to prove cruelty and
exploitation the ingredients of Section 75 and Section 79.
From the evidence already discussed above it has come on
record that the boys were working in the factory of accused
person were not under any kind of bondage and they were free
to move in and out of factory.
18. Mark PW-15/X1 is the postmortem report which
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mentions the cause of death as consolidation of both the lungs
and it is reported that it is a natural death. It was incumbent on
the part of the prosecution to prove that such consolidation of
the lungs had occurred while the victim were working in the
toy factory of the accused person. PW-12 SI Vishram Meena
has deposed that on 17.11.2016 two children had been admitted
at Acharya Bhikshu Hospital, Moti Nagar, Delhi with alleged
history of food poisoning who were declared brought dead on
arrival at the hospital. PW-13 HC Anil has deposed that the
injured Jamshed and injured Mansoom aged about 13 years
were brought to hospital. The injured Mansoom was brought
declared dead. PW-16 Dr. Adesh Kumar from FSL Delhi has
deposed that he had examined viscera of deceased Mansoom
and it is deposed that on chemical microscopic and TLC
examination, metallic poisons, ethyl and methyl alcohol,
cyanide, phosphide, alkaloids, barbiturates, tranquilizers and
pesticides could not detected in exhibits ‘1A’, ‘1B’, ‘1C’, and
‘3’. Hence, there is no medical evidence that the children were
developed harmful medical condition after working in the toy
factory of the accused person. PW-6 has denied that he ever
worked in the said factory. PW-8 has deposed that he was
working as fitter of toys. PW-10 has deposed that his duty was
to paste stickers on the toys. PW-11 has deposed that his duty
was to paste stickers on the toys and assembling them. Hence,
there is no evidence of record on the basis of which it can said
that the child were kept in bondage for the purpose of
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employment or their earnings were withheld. The assault,
abuse, abandons, illegal exposure or neglect of the child with
unnecessary mental and physical suffering is not proved on
record. Hence, it is held that the prosecution has failed to prove
the necessary ingredients Section of 75/79 of JJ Act 2015. It
was held in case titled Kothakonda Aishwarya Kottakonda vs
The State of Telangana, 2023 in Criminal Petition No. 9020 of
2022 from Hon’ble High Court of Telangana that if a juvenile
works voluntarily or by his own wish then Section 75 which
deals with the punishment for cruelty to a child and Section 79
which deals with the provision regarding the exploitation of a
child employee would not come into effect. Para 5 to para 8 of
the Citation referred above are reproduced here as under:-
Hon’ble Telangana High Court in case titled Kothakonda
Aishwarya Kottakonda vs The State of Telangana on 5
January, 2023 in Criminal Petition No.9020 of 2022
5. For the sake of convenience, Sections 75 and 79 of the
Act are extracted hereunder:
“75.Punishment for cruelty to child:- Whoever, having the
actual charge of, or control over, a child, assaults,
abandons, abuses, exposes or willfully neglects the child or
causes or procures the child to be assaulted, abandoned,
abused, exposed or neglected in a manner likely to cause
such child unnecessary mental or physical suffering, shall
be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years or with fine of one lakh rupees or with
both:
Provided that in case it is found that such abandonment of
the child by the biological parents is due to circumstances
beyond their control, it shall be presumed that such
abandonment is not willful and the penal provisions of this
section shall not apply in such cases:
Provided further that if such offence is committed by any
person employed by or managing an organisation, which is
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entrusted with the care and protection of the child, he shall
be punished with rigorous imprisonment which may extend
up to five years, and fine which may extend up to five lakhs
rupees:
Provided also that on account of the aforesaid cruelty, if the
child is physically incapacitated or develops a mental
illness or is rendered mentally unfit to perform regular
tasks or has risk to life or limb, such person shall be
punishable with rigorous imprisonment, not less than three
years but which may be extended up to ten years and shall
also be liable to fine of five lakhs rupees.”
79.Exploitation of a child employee: Notwithstanding
anything contained in any law for the time being in force,
whoever ostensibly engages a child and keeps him in
bondage for the purpose of employment or withholds his
earnings or uses such earning for his own purposes shall be
punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which
may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine of
one lakh rupees. Explanation.– For the purposes of this
section, the term “employment” shall also include selling
goods and services, and entertainment in public places for
economic gain.”
6. In the present case, on the basis of the complaint, crime
was registered. Even according to the witnesses, who
formed the team ‘Operation Muskan’ also stated that when
they went to the premises, they found six girls and they
have not revealed the details. However, according to the
Team, they were employed in the company. The children
who were examined as LW’s 9 to 14, stated that due to
Corona pandemic, they were working for the company as
sales girls to make ends meet. Further they stated that they
went from door to door selling masalas.
7. Section 75 of the Act provides for punishment, if any
person having control over a child, assaults, abandons,
abuses, exposes or willfully neglects the child or procures
the child to be assaulted, abandoned, abused, exposed or
neglected, resulting in mental or physical suffering of the
child. Even according to the Team, none of them state
about any such acts as required under Section 75 of the Act.
The witnesses did not speak about any assault by the
accused or abandoning or they the children were abused or
neglected in any manner causing physical or mental
suffering. When none of the ingredients of Section 75 of
the Act are attracted, the proceedings against the petitioner
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have to be quashed.
8. Section 79 of the Act prescribes punishment for the acts
of ostensibly engaging a child and keeping him in bondage
for the purpose of employment or withholding his earnings
or using such earning for one’s own purposes. There are no
such allegations in the entire set of documents filed under
section 207 Cr.P.C before the Trial Court. For the said
reasons, the prosecution against the petitioner cannot be
maintained for the offence under section 79.
19. Now it has to be seen that whether the prosecution has
successfully proved Section 3/14 of the Child and Adolescent
Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986. The relevant
statutes are reproduced here as under:-
3. Prohibition of employment of children in any
occupations and processes.–(1) No child shall be
employed or permitted to work in any occupation or
process.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply where the child,
—
(a) helps his family or family enterprise, which is other
than any hazardous occupations or processes set forth in
the Schedule, after his school hours or during vacations;
(b) works as an artist in an audio-visual entertainment
industry, including advertisement, films, television serials
or any such other entertainment or sports activities except
the circus, subject to such conditions and safely measures,
as may be prescribed:
Provided that no such work under this clause shall effect
the school education of the Child.
Explanation.–For the purposes of this section, the
expression,
(a) “family” in relation to a child, means his mother,
father, brother, sister and father’s sister and brother and
mother’s sister and brother;
(b) “family enterprises” means any work, profession,
manufacture or business which is performed by the
members of the family with the engagement of other
persons;
(c) “artist” means a child who performs or practices any
work as a hobby or profession directly involving him as anSC No.172/2017
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actor, singer, sports person or in such other activity as may
be prescribed relating to the entertainment or sports
activities falling under clause (b) of sub-section (2).
14. Penalties.:
(1) Whoever employs any child or permits any child to
work in contravention of the provisions of section 3 shall
be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall
not be less than six months but which may extend to two
years, or with fine which shall not be less than twenty
thousand rupees but which may extend to fifty thousand
rupees, or with both:
Provided that the parents or guardians of such children
shall not be punished unless they permit such child for
commercial purposes in contravention of the provisions of
section 3.
(1A) Whoever employs any adolescent or permits any
adolescent to work in contravention of the provisions of
section 3A shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than six months but which
may extend to two years or with fine which shall not be
less than twenty thousand rupees but which may extend to
fifty thousand rupees, or with both:
Provided that the parents or guardians of such adolescent
shall not be punished unless they permit such adolescent
to work in contravention of the provisions of section 3A.
(1B) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections
(1) and (1A) the parents or guardians of any child or
adolescent referred to in section 3 or section 3A, shall not
be liable for punishment, in case of the first offence.
(2) Whoever, having been convicted of an offence under
section 3 or section 3A commits a like offence afterwards,
he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than one year but which may extend to
three years.
(2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(2), the parents or guardian having been convicted of an
offence under section 3 or section 3A, commits a like
offence afterwards, he shall be punishable with a fine
which may extend to ten thousand rupees. Telangana High
Court Kothakonda Aishwarya Kottakonda … vs The State
Of Telangana on 5 January, 2023
(3) Whoever–
(d) fails to comply with or contravenes any other
provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder, shall
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extend to one month or with fine which may extend to ten
thousand rupees or with both.
20. Ld. Counsel for the accused has submitted that PW-15 in
his deposition dated 31.10.2023 has failed to show any
ownership of the factory or property with accused no. 1. PW-12
SI Vishram Meena has deposed that the deceased Mansoom
was admitted with the history of food poisoning. However,
PW-11 has deposed that Naseem had ordered meal from
outside and after taking the said meal their health was
deteriorated and they become unconscious. Similarly, PW-10
has deposed the same facts. PW-10 had regained consciousness
in the hospital. Hence, the death of deceased Mansoom had not
occurred due to the act of accused person. PW-15 has not
recorded the statement of the owner and he does not remember
the name of the owner of the factory or property. He had not
taken possession of the toys lying in the factory. PW-15 has
deposed that accused no. 1 was not called as Pappu. The
disclosure statement Ex. PW-15/1 of accused no. 2 alone
cannot form basis for conviction in absence of support from
prosecution witness. However, PW-8 has deposed that he was
working in the toy factory and owners of which was accused
no. 1 This is not rebutted or controverted in the deposition of
PW-8. It is deposed by PW-8 that accused no. 1 used to pay Rs.
500/- per day for the work he used to do. He used to work 8
hours per day. There is no cross examination of this deposition
and hence prosecution has successfully proved that the toy
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factory was run by accused no. 1 and he was taking the work
from the boys employed in said factory. PW- 10 has deposed
that the factory owner pay to him Rs. 2000/- per month and
hence corroborated the fact with accused no. 1 as the payment
of Rs. 500/- was received by PW-8 only from accused no. 1.
PW-11 also used to receive Rs. 2000/- per month from the
owner of the factory.
21. The PW-6, PW-8, PW-10 and PW-11 are found above
the age of 12 years. The deceased Mansoom was also aged
about 13 years vide Ex. P-1. As per the definition of WHO
generally the age between 10-19 years are considered as the
age group of adolescence. Hence, all the children produced
before the present Court comes under the category of
adolescence. Section 3A of the Child and Adolescent Labour
(Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986 has laid down
prohibition of employment of adolescent in certain hazardous
occupation and process which is laid down in the schedule. The
Central Government has further power to lay down or specify
the nature of non-hazardous work which an adolescent may be
permitted to work. Under the said Act the adolescent is defined
under Section 2(i) who is between 14-18 years of age. The
child is defined as the person u/s 2(ii) of the said Act who has
not completed the age of 14 years. Hence the deceased
Mansoom had not completed the age of 14 years on the date of
his death and he was child on date of his death. The Schedule
u/s 3A defines that the hazardous work are mines, inflammable
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substance and explodes and hazardous process. It has come in
evidence of prosecution witness that the deceased Mansoom
and PW-6, PW-8, PW-10 and PW-11 were working in a toy
factory owned by accused no. 1. They were doing work of
assembling toys, pasting stickers on the toys and which cannot
be regarded as hazardous as defined under the Schedule of the
above Act. Hence, the evidence of the prosecution has failed to
prove that PW-6, PW-8, PW-10 and PW-11 were employed in
any hazardous occupation and process in violation of Section
3A of the Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and
Regulation) Act 1986. However prosecution successfully
proved on record that accused no. 1 had employed the deceased
Mansoom the child aged about 13 years on the date of his death
and it has come in evidence that the family members of the
deceased Mansoom were not working in the toy factory of
accused no. 1. The family members are defined in the
Explanation (a) of Section 3 of the Child and Adolescent
Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986. Hence, the
exemption clause as provided under Section 3 (2) of Child and
Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986 is
held not applicable in favour of accused no. 1. There is specific
prohibition under Section 3 (1) of Child and Adolescent Labour
(Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986 that no child shall be
employed or permitted to work in any occupation or process.
Hence, the deceased Mansoom was employed by the accused
no. 1 in his toy factory and this work was done by deceased
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Mansoom. It was proved by PW-6 in his deposition and the
same is unrebutted and not cross-examined. Hence, the
prosecution has successfully proved that the deceased
Mansoom was employed by accused no.1 in his factory in
violation of provisions of Child and Adolescent Labour
(Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986. The above violation is
punishable under Section 14(1) of Child and Adolescent
Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986. Hence, accused
no. 1 is convicted under Section 3(1) of Child and Adolescent
Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986 r/w Section 14
of Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation)
Act 1986.
22. It is further held that the prosecution has failed to
substantiate all the ingredients of the offence charged against
accused no. 2 Noman and therefore, accused no. 2 Noman is
acquitted of all the charges levied against him.
23. In such view of the matter, it is held that prosecution has
failed to prove all the charges levelled against the accused No.
2 Noman. Hence the accused No. 2 Noman stands acquitted of
all the offences under Section 304, 370, 374, 34 IPC and 16
Bonded Labour Act and 3/14 Child Labour Act & 75/79 JJ Act.
His earlier personal bond stands cancelled and surety bond
stands discharged. The documents, if any, be returned to the
surety and endorsement on security documents is allowed to be
de-endorsed. In terms of Section 437A Cr.P.C, accused person
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have furnished his bail bond as directed which will be in force
for period of six months from the date of this judgment. Case
property be confiscated to the State.
24. However, it is held that the prosecution has successfully
proved on record that the accused No. 1 Mohd. Shamim has
committed the offence under Section 3(1) of Child and
Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986 r/w
Section 14 of Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and
Regulation) Act 1986 and accordingly accused No.1 Mohd.
Shamim is held guilty and convicted under Section 3(1) of
Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act
1986 r/w Section 14 of Child and Adolescent Labour
(Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986.
Put up for arguments on the point of sentence on
17.02.2026.
Announced in the open Court
Digitally signed
on 12.02.2026. JOGINDER by JOGINDER
PRAKASH
PRAKASH NAHAR
NAHAR Date: 2026.02.12
16:12:53 +0530
(JOGINDER PRAKASH NAHAR)
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE
(FTC-01) CENTRAL/TIS HAZARI
COURT/ DELHI
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