Uttarakhand High Court
State Of Uttarakhand vs Umesh Chandra Pandey And Ors on 24 February, 2026
Author: Pankaj Purohit
Bench: Pankaj Purohit
2026:UHC:1230
Reportable
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Appeal From Order No. 505 of 2011
State Of Uttarakhand --Appellant
Versus
Umesh Chandra Pandey and Ors. --Respondents
With
Appeal from Order No.7 of 2018
Umesh Chandra Pandey --Appellant
Versus
State of Uttarakhand --Respondent
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Presence:
Mr. Tej Singh Bisht, learned D.A.G. for State of Uttarakhand/appellant in
AO/505/2011 and respondent in AO/7/2018.
Mr. Lalit Belwal, learned counsel for respondent-claimant No.1 in AO/505/
2011 and appellant in AO/7/2018.
Mr. Ravi Bisht, learned counsel holding brief of Mr. Aditya Pratap Singh,
learned counsel for respondent No.2.
Mr. J.C. Belwal, learned counsel for respondent No.3-driver of the vehicle,
appeared through V.C.
Hon'ble Pankaj Purohit, J. (Oral)
The appeal from order No.505 of 2011 has been
preferred by the State of Uttarakhand under Section 173 of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, assailing the judgment and
award dated 27.10.2010 passed by learned Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Udham Singh
Nagar, in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 102 of 2006
Umesh Chandra Pandey Vs. U.P. Seeds and Tarai Vikas
Nigam and Ors., whereby, compensation to the tune of
Rs.7,24,000 with interest @6% p.a. from the date of filing of
the claim petitioner till actual payment, has been awarded in
favour of the respondent-claimant.
2. The case of the respondent-claimant, in brief, is
that on 14.01.2006 at about 7:15 p.m., the respondent-
claimant was returning home after duty from Rudrapur
towards Devriya, while sitting on the pillion seat of a
motorcycle bearing registration No.UK-06-5172. When the
motorcycle reached near Lalpur petrol pump, before the
Dharamkanta, the motorcycle slowed down on account of
traffic conditions. At that point of time, a Jeep bearing
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registration No.UK-04-1698 came from the side of Kichha
and collided with the motorcycle. It was alleged that the said
Jeep was being driven in a rash and negligent manner, as a
result of which the respondent-claimant sustained injuries.
The injured respondent-claimant was taken for medical
treatment and subsequently a First Information Report was
lodged in respect of the said accident. Claiming that the
accident occurred solely due to the rash and negligent
driving of the Jeep, respondent-claimant filed a claim
petition before the Tribunal seeking compensation.
3. In the claim petition, respondent-claimant
asserted that the accident occurred due to the rash and
negligent driving of the Jeep bearing registration No. UK-04-
1698. It was pleaded that respondent-claimant sustained
serious injuries and incurred medical expenses and loss of
income on account of the accident. The respondent-claimant
further stated that he was earning prior to the accident and
due to the injuries suffered, his earning capacity had been
adversely affected. On these grounds, compensation was
sought from the owner, driver and insurer of the offending
vehicle.
4. The respondent-claimant also filed a cross
objection for enhancement of compensation awarded by
learned Claims Tribunal in AO No.505 of 2011, which was
registered as AO No.07 of 2018. The respondent-claimant, by
way of cross-objections, contends that compensation
awarded by the learned Tribunal is wholly inadequate and
does not satisfy the statutory requirement of “just
compensation” under the Motor Vehicles Act. It is submitted
that despite clear evidence on record establishing permanent
disability to the extent of 90%, learned Tribunal failed to
assess the true impact of such disability on the claimant’s
earning capacity, future prospects and overall quality of life.
The respondent-claimant asserts that the injuries have
rendered him dependent on assistance for the rest of his life,
a factor which was not properly accounted for while
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determining compensation. It is further submitted that the
learned Tribunal erred in not awarding compensation under
several mandatory heads such as pain and suffering, loss of
amenities, mental shock, loss of expectation of life and
future medical care. The respondent-claimant also assails
the award of interest at the rate of 6% per annum as being
on the lower side, contending that a higher rate ought to
have been granted. On these grounds, the respondent-
claimant seeks enhancement of the compensation and
suitable modification of the impugned award.
5. The owner and driver of the Jeep filed their
written statement denying the allegations made in the claim
petition. It was contended that the accident did not occur
due to rash or negligent driving of the Jeep. They further
pleaded that the Jeep was being driven carefully and in
accordance with traffic rules. It was also stated that the
vehicle was insured at the relevant time and, therefore, in
case any compensation was found payable, the liability
would be that of the insurance company.
6. On the basis of the pleadings of parties, the
Tribunal framed the following issues:
1. Whether on 14.01.2006 at about 7:15 p.m., near Lalpur petrol pump,
before the dharamkanta, the claimant while sitting on his parked
motorcycle by the roadside bearing registration no. UA 06 A 5172
sustained injuries due to an accident caused by rash and negligent
driving of Jeep bearing registration No. UK-04-1698? If so, then its effect?
2.Whether the claimant is entitled to receive compensation? If so, from
whom and to what extent?
7. While adjudicating Issue No.1, learned Tribunal
considered the oral testimony of claimant as well as the
documentary evidence placed on record, including the FIR,
site plan and medical documents. Learned Tribunal noted
that the claimant had consistently stated that Jeep bearing
registration No.UK-04-1698 came from the side of Kichha
and hit the motorcycle, on which the claimant was travelling,
due to rash and negligent driving. Learned Tribunal further
observed that no convincing evidence was adduced by the
opposite parties to rebut the version put forth by the
claimant. The driver of Jeep failed to establish that the
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accident occurred due to any fault on the part of the
motorcycle rider or due to unavoidable circumstances. On an
overall appreciation of evidence, learned Tribunal came to
the conclusion that accident in-question occurred due to
rash and negligent driving of the Jeep bearing registration
No.UK-04-1698. Accordingly, Issue No.1 was decided in
favour of the claimant.
8. While deciding Issue No.2, learned Tribunal
examined the nature of injuries sustained by the claimant,
the period of treatment, and the medical records brought on
record. Learned Tribunal also considered the evidence
relating to the income of the claimant and his age at the time
of the accident. After assessing the material available on
record, learned Tribunal computed the compensation under
different permissible heads, including medical expenses,
pain and suffering and loss of income. On the basis of such
assessment, the Tribunal determined the total compensation
payable to the claimant. The Tribunal further examined the
question of liability and held that the compensation awarded
was payable by the parties held responsible for the accident,
as per the findings recorded in the claim petition.
9. Accordingly, Issue No.2 was also decided in
favour of the claimant and the claim petition was allowed to
the extent indicated in the award.
10. The appellant-State has assailed the impugned
judgment and award dated 27.10.2010 primarily on the
ground that the learned Tribunal has erred in fastening
liability upon the State without recording any clear or cogent
finding of rash and negligent driving on the part of driver of
the vehicle bearing registration no.UP-04-1698. It is
contended that learned Tribunal failed to appreciate the
evidence on record and mechanically presumed negligence,
thereby invoking the principle of vicarious liability against
the State in absence of proof of any tortuous act attributable
to the driver.
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11. According to the appellant-State, such an
approach is contrary to settled principles governing
adjudication of claims under the Motor Vehicles Act. It is
further argued that learned Tribunal committed a serious
error in holding the State liable despite the fact that vehicle
in-question was not owned by appellant at the relevant time
and was, in fact, in the ownership of respondent no.2. The
appellant-State also questions the legality of compensation
awarded, submitting that the medical evidence was not duly
proved, Medical Officer was not examined, and the quantum
awarded is excessive and unsupported by reliable evidence.
On these premises, the appellant-State prayed for setting
aside of the impugned award in its entirety.
12. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and upon perusal of the material available on record, this
Court proceeds to determine these appeals. The principal
question which arises for consideration is with regard to
liability to satisfy the award as well as the correctness of
quantum of compensation determined by learned Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal. So far as the question of liability is
concerned, it is not in dispute that the vehicle in question
i.e. Jeep No. UP-04-1698, was registered in the name of U.P.
Seeds and Tarai Development Corporation Ltd. However, the
material available on record clearly establishes that on the
date of accident, said vehicle had been requisitioned by the
District Magistrate, Udham Singh Nagar, and was being
utilized for official purposes in connection with the Pulse
Polio Programme. The requisition of the vehicle and its
deployment for governmental duty has not been disputed.
Once vehicle stood requisitioned, the effective possession,
command and operational control over the vehicle and its
driver vested in the State authorities. The question as to on
whom the liability would fall in such circumstances is no
longer res integra. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajasthan
State Road Transport Corporation v. Kailash Nath
Kothari & Ors., (1997) 7 SCC 481, while dealing with a
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similar situation, has authoritatively laid down the governing
principle in the following terms:
“17. The definition of owner under Section 2(19) of the Act is not exhaustive. It has,
therefore to be construed, in a wider sense, in the facts and circumstances of a given
case. The expression owner must include, in a given case, the person who has the
actual possession and control of the vehicle and under whose directions and
commands the driver is obliged to operate the bus. To confine the meaning of “owner”
to the registered owner only would in a case where the vehicle is in the actual
possession and control of the hirer not be proper for the purpose of fastening of liability
in case of an accident. The liability of the “owner” is vicarious for the tort committed by
its employee during the course of his employment and it would be a question of fact in
each case as to on whom can vicarious liability be fastened in the case of an accident.
In this case, Shri Sanjay Kumar, the owner of the bus could not ply the bus on the
particular route for which he had no permit and he in fact was not plying the bus on
that route. The services of the driver were transferred along with complete “control” to
RSRTC, under whose directions, instructions and command the driver was to ply or not
to ply the ill-fated bus on the fateful day. The passengers were being carried by RSRTC
on receiving fare from them. Shri Sanjay Kumar was therefore not concerned with the
passengers travelling in that bus on the particular route on payment of fare to RSRTC.
Driver of the bus, even though an employee of the owner, was at the relevant time
performing his duties under the order and command of the conductor of RSRTC for
operation of the bus. So far as the passengers of the ill-fated bus are concerned, their
privity of contract was only with the RSRTC to whom they had paid the fare for
travelling in that bus and their safety therefore became the responsibility of the RSRTC
while travelling in the bus. They had no privity of contract with Shri Sanjay Kumar, the
owner of the bus at all. Had it been a case only of transfer of services of the driver and
not of transfer of control of the driver from the owner to RSRTC, the matter may have
been somewhat different. But on facts in this case and in view of Conditions 4 to 7 of
the agreement (supra), the RSRTC must be held to be vicariously liable for the tort
committed by the driver while plying the bus under contract of the RSRTC. The general
proposition of law and the presumption arising therefrom that an employer, that is the
person who has the right to hire and fire the employee, is generally responsible
vicariously for the tort committed by the employee concerned during the course of his
employment and within the scope of his authority, is a rebuttable presumption. If the
original employer is able to establish that when the servant was lent, the effective
control over him was also transferred to the hirer, the original owner can avoid his
liability and the temporary employer or the hirer, as the case may be, must be held
vicariously liable for the tort committed by the employee concerned in the course of his
employment while under the command and control of the hirer notwithstanding the fact
that the driver would continue to be on the payroll of the original owner. The
proposition based on the general principle as noticed above is adequately rebutted in
this case not only on the basis of the evidence led by the parties but also on the basis
of Conditions 6 and 7 (supra), which go to show that the owner had not merely
transferred the services of the driver to the RSRTC but actual control and the driver
was to act under the instructions, control and command of the conductor and other
officers of the RSRTC.”
13. The principle which emerges from the aforesaid
authoritative pronouncement is that for the purpose of
fastening vicarious liability, the decisive test is that of
effective control and command over the vehicle and its driver.
Even though the registered ownership may continue with
original owner, once the vehicle along with services of the
driver is placed under effective control and command of
another authority, the latter becomes vicariously liable for
the negligent act committed during such period of control.
Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of present cases,
it is evident that on the date of accident, vehicle had been
requisitioned and placed under the operational control of
State authorities for official duty. The driver, though an
employee of the Corporation, was operating the vehicle under
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directions, control and command of the State authorities.
Consequently, State, being the authority having effective
control over vehicle at the relevant time, became vicariously
liable for the tortious act committed during such period.
Learned Tribunal has, therefore, rightly fastened the liability
upon the State of Uttarakhand to satisfy the award.
14. Coming now to the question of quantum of
compensation, learned Tribunal has assessed the disability
of claimant as resulting in complete loss of earning capacity
and has applied multiplier of 13 taking into account the age
of the claimant. However, while computing compensation,
learned Tribunal has failed to add future prospects to income
of claimant and has also awarded inadequate compensation
under conventional heads. The law relating to assessment of
compensation in cases involving permanent disability has
been comprehensively laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar, (2011) 1 SCC 343,
wherein, it has been held that where permanent disability
results in loss of earning capacity, compensation must be
computed on the basis of functional disability affecting
earning capacity and not merely the percentage of physical
disability. Further, in Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport
Corporation, (2009) 6 SCC 121, Hon’ble Supreme Court
has standardized the selection of multiplier based on the age
of injured, and for the age group of 46 to 50 years,
appropriate multiplier prescribed is 13, which has correctly
been applied by learned Tribunal. However, learned Tribunal
has omitted to add future prospects, which is now a settled
component of compensation. In National Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680, Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that even in cases of permanent disability,
future prospects are liable to be added depending upon the
age of injured. In the present cases, the claimant being aged
48 years at the time of accident, addition of 25% towards
future prospects is warranted. Taking the income of claimant
as ₹4,000 per month as assessed by learned Tribunal, the
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annual income comes to ₹48,000/-. Adding 25% towards
future prospects, annual income becomes ₹60,000/-.
Applying multiplier of 13, the loss of earning capacity comes
to ₹7,80,000/-. In addition, respondent-claimant is entitled
to reasonable compensation under conventional heads
including pain and suffering, loss of amenities, attendant
charges, medical expenses and special diet and
transportation. Upon consideration of the facts and
circumstances of the case, total compensation is re-assessed
at ₹10,50,000/-.
15. Accordingly, the appeal preferred by the claimant
seeking enhancement of compensation is partly allowed. The
compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal is enhanced
from ₹7,24,000/- to ₹10,50,000/-. The enhanced amount
shall carry interest @ 7% per annum from the date of filing of
claim petition till the date of actual payment.
16. Accordingly, the appeal preferred by the
appellant-State challenging the fastening of liability is
dismissed. The appellant-State shall deposit the enhanced
amount, after adjusting the amount already paid, within a
period of two months from the date of production of a
certified copy of this judgment.
17. In view of the foregoing discussion, appeal filed by
the appellant-State of Uttarakhand (AO/505/2011) is
dismissed and the cross-objection filed by the claimant
(AO/7/2018) is partly allowed and the compensation is
enhanced as indicated above.
18. Let the T.C.R. be immediately sent back to the
learned Trial Court for consignment.
19. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(Pankaj Purohit, J.)
24.02.2026
PN
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