Karnataka High Court
State Of Karnataka Rep By Its Pi Dwd Women … vs Muttappa Ningappa Vayagal on 27 February, 2026
Author: Mohammad Nawaz
Bench: Mohammad Nawaz
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CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 27th DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE MOHAMMAD NAWAZ
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE GEETHA K.B.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.100369 OF 2022 (A)
BETWEEN
STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY THE
POLICE INSPECTOR, DHARWAD,
WOMEN POLICE STATION,
DHARWAD DISTRICT,
THROUGH THE ADDITIONAL
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
ADVOCATE GENERAL OFFICE,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH-580001.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. M.B. GUNDWADE, ADDITIONAL SPP)
AND
1. SHRI MUTTAPPA
S/O. NINGAPPA VAYAGAL,
AGE: 31 YEARS, OCC: LABOURER,
R/O. JADAGERI ONI,
NEAR HALE MASUTI,
ANNIGERI-582201,
DIST: DHARWAD-580001.
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CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
2. KASTURAVVA
W/O. SOMASHEKHARAYYA HIREMATH,
R/O. AGASI ONI, ANNIGERI,
DIST: GADAG.
CAUSE TITLE AMENDED AS
VIDE ORDER DATED 28/07/2025.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. PRAVEEN HUCHAREDDY, ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SMT. ANURADHA R. DESHPANDE, AMICUS CURIAE FOR R2;
P.W.-6 AND P.W.-8 ARE SERVED)
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 378(1)
AND (3) OF CR.PC., SEEKING TO GRANT LEAVE TO APPEAL
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF ACQUITTAL DATED
20.09.2021 PASSED BY II ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND
SESSIONS AND SPECIAL JUDGE, DHARWAD IN
SPL.S.C.NO.53/2019 AND TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND
ORDER OF ACQUITTAL DATED 20.09.2021 PASSED BY THE II
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS SPECIAL JUDGE,
DHARWAD IN SPL S.C.NO.53/2019 AND TO CONVICT THE
RESPONDENT/ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE
UNDER SECTION 376 OF IPC AND UNDER SECTION 6 OF POCSO
ACT, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 12.02.2026 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
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CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: THE HON’BLE MRS JUSTICE GEETHA K.B.)
The appellant-State has filed this appeal under Section
378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short
‘Cr.P.C.’) challenging the judgment of acquittal dated
20.09.2021 in Spl.S.C.No.53/2019 on the file of II Addl.
District and Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Dharwad
(for short ‘trial Court’).
2. The parties would be referred with their ranks, as
they were before the trial Court for the sake of convenience
and clarity.
3. The case of prosecution in nutshell is that the
accused being the relative of complainant was visiting the
house of complainant often. Thus, he was in acquaintance
with the family members of the complainant. He was having
close relationship with the victim who was aged about 7
years. On 30.10.2019 at about 03.30 p.m., when the child
victim was playing in front of her house, accused entered
the house and as the victim was alone in the house, he
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CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
asked her to give water, at that time he closed the door and
committed sexual assault with her by removing his pant and
the panty of the victim and also squeezed her chest and
thereby the accused has committed the offences punishable
under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of Protection Of
Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012 (for short ‘POCSO
Act).
4. Immediately after the incident, the victim
screamed loudly and went inside the house where her
mother was preparing sweet pancake (ºÉÆýUÉ) and informed
it to her mother.
5. On 01.11.2019, the mother of victim lodged the
first information and set the Criminal Law into motion. After
receipt of the first information, the investigation
commenced. The victim and accused were subjected to
medical examination; Panchanamas were drawn. The
Investigating Officer collected the birth certificate of the
victim and other required documents from the concerned
authorities. After completion of investigation, Investigating
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CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
Officer has filed the charge sheet before the Special Court.
Afterwards, the learned Sessions Judge has taken
cognizance of the aforesaid offences against accused.
6. After hearing both sides, the learned Sessions
Judge has framed the charges against accused for the
offences punishable under Sections 376 IPC and Section 6
of the POCSO Act.
7. On behalf of prosecution, totally, 18 witnesses
were examined as P.W.1 to P.W.18 apart from marking
Exs.P.1 to P.35 and marking Material Objects 1 to 10 and
closed its side before the trial Court.
8. After recording the statement of accused under
Section 313 Cr.P.C., and after hearing arguments of both
sides, the learned Sessions Judge held that all the private
witnesses have turned hostile and evidence of the victim
child is not trustworthy and thereby acquitted the accused
for the offences punishable under Section 376 IPC and
Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012.
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CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
9. Aggrieved by the said judgment of acquittal, the
State has preferred the present appeal.
10. Learned Addl. SPP would submit that there is
consistent evidence of the victim from initial stage till she
has given evidence before the Court that accused has
committed sexual assault upon her. Only because there is
no corroboration from the other witnesses who have turned
hostile because of compromise with accused, the learned
Sessions Judge has acquitted the accused which is not in
accordance with law. The evidence of child victim even
though, as sole testimony shall be believed if it is
trustworthy and unimpeachable. In the instant case, there
is trustworthy evidence from the side of victim. Hence, he
prayed for allowing the appeal and to convict the accused
for the offences punishable under Sections 376 IPC and
Section 6 of POCSO Act, 2012.
11. Smt. Anuradha R. Deshpande, Amicus curiae
appointed for respondent No.2-the first informant would
also submit that there is consistent evidence of the victim
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CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
child. The parents of victim and other witnesses have not
completely supported the case of prosecution because of
the pressure exerted upon them from the people of accused
even though accused was in custody at that time.
12. The learned Amicus Curie would further submit
that, the defense has taken one year time to cross-examine
the complainant, the victim and other witnesses, which
establishes that only after making the parents of the victim
and others hostile, cross-examination on behalf of accused
was done. There is clear and clinching evidence that
accused has put his private part in the vagina of the victim
which is clearly and categorically established; only because
there is no injury on the private parts of the victim, her
evidence cannot be disbelieved. Hence, prayed for allowing
the appeal and to convict accused.
13. Learned counsel Sri.Praveen Huchchraddi for
accused/respondent No.1 would submit that there is no
admissible material produced before the trial Court to say
that accused has committed the offences alleged against
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CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
him. The victim has improved her version from time to time
and thus her evidence is not believable one. Except the
victim and official witnesses, there is no evidence on record
to show that the alleged incident has taken place. The
victim being child, aged about 7 years, there is every
chance of tutoring the victim, which cannot be ruled out in
this case. Considering these aspects, rightly the trial Court
has acquitted the accused. Hence, prayed for dismissal of
the appeal. In this regard, he relied on the following
judgments:-
1) The State Vs. Vipin @ Lalla in Crl.A.No.94/2025(SC)
2) Mallappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka in
Crl.A.No.1162/2011(SC)
3) Ms. Suja Jones Mazurir W/o Pascal Vs. State of
Karnataka in Crl.A.No.1050/2017(HC)
4) Nirmal Premkumar and another Vs. State of
Karnataka in Crl.A.No.1098/2024(SC)
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14. Having heard the arguments of both sides,
verifying the appeal papers and the trial Court records, the
points that arise for consideration are:
1) Whether the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that accused has
committed the offences punishable under Section
376 IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act?
2) Alternatively, whether the
prosecution has established that accused has
committed the aggravated sexual assault on the
victim?
15. Our answer to Point No.1 is in Negative and
Point No.2 is in Affirmative for the following:
REASONS
The case of prosecution in nutshell is that on
30.10.2019 at about 03.30 p.m., in the house of
complainant situated at Annigeri village; accused has
committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault on victim
child aged about 7 years and thereby committed the offence
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CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
punishable under Section 6 of POCSO Act, 2012 and Section
376 IPC.
16. To substantiate its case, the prosecution
examined in all 18 witnesses as P.W.1 to P.W.18. P.W.1 is
the spot panchanama and spot sketch witness; P.W.2 is
said to be the panch witness for Ex.P4 and P5; P.W.3 is said
to be the panch witness for Ex.P5; P.W.4 is the Headmaster
of school who has produced the school admission register of
the victim; P.W.5 is the doctor who examined the accused;
P.W.6 and P.W.7 are parents of the victim; P.W.8 is the
victim; P.W.9 is female police officer in whose presence
statement of victim was recorded; P.W.10 is the P.W.D
Assistant Engineer who has prepared spot sketch;. P.W.11
has issued the extract of the house property, wherein the
alleged incident has taken place; P.W.12 is the doctor, who
conducted medical examination on victim. P.W.13 to P.W.17
are neighbors/relatives of the victim. They have not
supported the case of prosecution; P.W.18 is the
Investigating Officer, who conducted investigation.
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CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
17. The evidence of P.W.4, the Headmaster of
Adikavi Pampa Primary School, Annigeri, reveals that he has
issued the birth certificate of victim stating the date of birth
of victim as per Ex.P.8 as 19.08.2012, based on the school
admission register; Ex.P.8 is the school admission certificate
reveals that the victim was studying in second standard and
her date of birth is mentioned in Register No.1470/2018.
According to this document she was born on 19.08.2012.
Along with this school certificate, the witness has brought
the school admission register which is marked as Ex.P.9.
After obtaining the extract of the relevant entry as per
Ex.P.9(a), the original register was returned to the school
Headmaster which is required for his day to day
administration. This register reveals that date of birth of the
victim is mentioned as 19.08.2012. Thus, Ex.P.8 and school
admission register extract as per Ex.P.10 clearly and
categorically establish that the date of birth of the victim is
19.08.2012. The alleged incident has taken place on
30.10.2019. Hence, the victim was aged about 7 years as
on the date of the alleged incident. Exs.P.8 to 10 were not
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CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
disputed by the accused at the time of cross-examination of
P.W.4. Furthermore, the learned Sessions Judge has come
to the conclusion that Victim was child aged about 7 years
as on the date of alleged incident and this finding of the
learned Sessions Judge is not challenged by the accused.
Furthermore, he has not disputed the date of birth of the
victim at the time of submitting arguments in this appeal.
18. Evidence of P.W.12-doctor reveals that as per
the radiologist’s opinion age of victim is 6 to 9 years and as
per the opinion of the dentist, age of victim was 6 to 8
years.
19. Thus, the coupled reading of the evidence of
Headmaster and the doctor’s opinion, age of victim is less
than 12 years is established by the prosecution beyond all
reasonable doubt.
20. P.W.6 is the mother of victim who has not
supported the case of prosecution in entirety in her
examination-in-chief. Hence, she was cross-examined by
learned SPP. In that cross-examination, the suggestion was
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CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
put to P.W.6 that the victim has narrated what happened to
her at 03.30 p.m. on 30.10.2019 and said suggestion was
denied by the witness. But, she narrated that the victim has
stated so before C.W.9, which establishes that she is not
disputing such an incident has taken place. She has
admitted that afterwards, the victim was examined by her
and C.W.8 and C.W.9. She admitted that, seeing the
mother and others, accused ran away from the spot. She
has admitted that she waited till her husband came and
then after enquiring with the elders, she has lodged the
complaint that accused has committed sexual assault upon
the victim child and she got written the first information
through C.W.11. She has also categorically admitted that
the people of accused have requested to compromise the
case and accordingly, they have compromised the case and
she met the advocate of the accused. She has only denied
the suggestion that because of such compromise she is
deposing falsely.
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CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
21. After the examination-in-chief and cross-
examination of this witness by learned special PP, nearly
one year later, the witness was again recalled by learned
counsel for accused and in that cross-examination she
deposed that she does not know what is written in the first
information and panchanama and why photos were taken
and because she was called by her sister-in-law-
Sugandhamma to prepare sweet pancake on that day, she
went to her house etc. The entire evidence of P.W.6 is to be
looked into and not a portion of her cross-examination
conducted by learned counsel for accused alone.
22. The sum and substance of the entire evidence of
P.W.6 clearly and categorically establish that only because
of compromise with people of accused, she has not deposed
the truth before the Court even though the child narrated
the incident to her.
23. P.W.7 is the father of victim and he also not
supported the case of prosecution wholeheartedly in his
examination-in-chief and hence cross-examined by learned
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CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
SPP, he admitted that they got written the complaint
through his elder brother and lodged the complaint. He
admitted that as per the request from the people of
accused, they have compromised and in that regard he met
the advocate for accused. He denied the suggestion that
because of said compromise he is not deposing the truth.
About one year after this cross-examination by learned SPP,
this witness was cross-examined by learned counsel for
accused and at that time again he has given a complete go
by and deposed that no such incident as alleged had taken
place and accused was not visiting their house, etc.
24. P.W.1 is the panch witness for drawing up of spot
panchanama and spot sketch as per Ex.P.1 and Ex.P.2. He
has only deposed about drawing up of such panchanama
and stated that he does not know the complete details of
said panchanama.
25. P.Ws.2 and 3 are said to be the panch witnesses
for drawing up of punchanamas at the time of seizure of
articles of accused and articles belonged to child victim in
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CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
the police station. But, they have not supported the case of
prosecution.
26. P.W.5 is the doctor who examined the accused
on 01.11.2019 and gave his certificate that there is nothing
on record to show that accused is incapable of performing
the sexual act. He has collected the articles from accused
and handed over them to the police. His above evidence is
not disputed by the accused.
27. P.W.9 is woman PSI in whose presence the
statement of victim was recorded as per Ex.P.16.
28. P.W.10 has prepared spot sketch by examining
the spot.
29. P.W.11 has issued the property extract of the
spot of incident as per Ex.P.21.
30. Evidence of P.W.12-doctor is relevant. The
evidence of doctor reveals that the hymen of the victim was
intact, there was no discharge. She has given her final
– 17 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
opinion that there is no evidence to show the recent sexual
assault on the victim as on the date of issuing report.
31. The evidence of P.W.13 to P.W.17 is not much
relevant because they are relatives and neighbors of the
victim and not supported the case of prosecution, as
already there was compromise between the parents of
victim and the people of accused. Hence, their evidence has
no relevance.
32. The remaining evidence is the evidence of
P.W.18-Investigating Officer. He has deposed in detail
about how he has conducted the investigation. He has
revealed the procedure of investigation conducted by him.
33. On perusal of the evidence of Investigating
Officer, it is established that he conducted investigation in
accordance with the procedure prescribed under law.
34. The accused has taken specific contention that
there is no evidence of penetrative sexual assault or
aggravated penetrative sexual assault on the victim
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CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
because the doctor’s evidence establishes that there was no
such assault on the victim.
35. As discussed earlier the evidence of victim is very
very important to decide what happened to her at the time
of incident. The evidence of doctor is corroborative piece of
evidence to substantiate the case and that alone cannot be
the base to decide the case.
36. As far as discrepancy alleged by the defence in
the evidence of victim and highlighted by the learned
Sessions Judge is concerned, her entire evidence, statement
before doctor and statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., are
to be analyzed with care and caution. With this background,
the evidence of victim before Court has to be looked into.
37. P.W.8 was initially questioned by the learned
Sessions Judge to know whether she is in a position to give
evidence or not because she is a child who was below the
age of 10 years at the time of recording her evidence; by
putting some questions, the learned Sessions Judge
satisfied that she is in a position to give evidence. But, oath
– 19 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
is not administered to her because she is aged below 12
years. Hence, her evidence given before Court is to be
looked with care and caution.
38. Initially, when child witness entered the witness
box, she kept silent for some time for about half an hour
afterwards, again she was examined wherein she has stated
as follows:
“2. £Á£ÀÄ DlªÁqÀĪÀ ªÀÄÄAZÉ DgÉÆæ C°èUÉ §AzÀ£ÄÀ . JµÀÄÖ
¢ªÀ¸ÀzÀ »AzÉ §A¢zÀÝ£ÄÀ JAzÀÄ £À£ÀUÉ UÉÆwÛgÄÀ ªÀÅ¢®è. DvÀ ¤ÃgÀÄ PÉÆqÀÄ ¨Á
JAzÀÄ PÉýzÀ£ÀÄ. £ÀAvÀgÀ DgÉÆæ PÀzÀ ªÀÄÄaÑzÀ£ÄÀ . £ÀAvÀgÀ DvÀ vÀ£ßÀ ¥ÁåAl£ÀÄß
©aÑzÀ£ÀÄ. £ÀAvÀgÀ £À£ßÀ ¥ÁåAl£ÀÄß ©aÑzÀ£ÄÀ . ¸ÁQë £ÀAvÀgÀ ZÀrØ ©aÑzÀ£ÄÀ JAzÀÄ
£ÀÄrAiÀÄÄvÁÛ¼É. £ÀAvÀgÀ DvÀ£À ¸ÁªÀiÁ£À£ÄÀ ß vÉUÉzÄÀ £À£ßÀ ¸ÁªÀiÁ¤UÉ ºÀaÑzÀ£ÄÀ .
¸ÁªÀiÁ£ÀÄ JAzÀgÉ J£ÀÄ JAzÀgÉ ¥Àæ²ß¹zÀÝPÌÉ ¸ÁQë DPÉAiÀÄ ªÀĪÀiÁAðUÀzÀ PÀqÉ
¨ÉÆlÄÖ ªÀiÁr vÉÆÃj¹ C°èAzÀ vÉUÉzÄÀ ºÀaÑzÀ£ÄÀ JAzÀÄ £ÀÄrAiÀÄÄvÁÛgÉ. £ÀAvÀgÀ
DgÉÆæ £À£Àß ¨Á¬Ä ªÀÄÄaÑzÀ£ÀÄ. £ÀAvÀgÀ £Á£ÀÄ aÃjPÉÆAqÉ£ÄÀ . £Á£ÀÄ
aÃjPÉÆAqÀ £ÀAvÀgÀ £À£Àß ªÀÄ«Ää §AzÀgÄÀ . D ¸ÀªÄÀ AiÀÄzÀ°è DgÉÆæ ¥ÁåAl
ºÁQPÉÆAqÀÄ Nr ºÉÆÃzÀ£ÀÄ. DgÉÆæ ªÀiÁrzÀÝ£ÄÀ ß £Á£ÀÄ £À£ßÀ vÁ¬ÄUÉ
w½¹zÉ£ÀÄ. F WÀl£É £ÀqÉAiÀÄĪÀ ¥ÀǪÀðzÀ°è £À£ßÀ JzÉAiÀÄ ªÉÄïÉ
PÉÊAiÀiÁr¸ÀÄwÛzÀÝ£ÀÄ, DzÀgÉ J£ÀÆ ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀÅ¢®è.”
39. P.W.12-Dr.Swetha has given her evidence that
on 01.11.2019 at 09.15 a.m., the victim and her mother
was brought to the hospital by WHC 808 of Dharwad
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CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
Women Police Station and then she enquired the victim,
wherein victim deposed that since about 5 years the
accused was visiting their house and he is well acquainted
to them and he was talking with her. It is further stated by
the victim before P.W.12 as follows:
“30-10-2019 gÀAzÀÄ ªÀÄzsÁåºÀß 3-30 ¸ÀªÄÀ AiÀÄzÀ°è vÁ£ÀÄ ©zÀÝ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è
DlªÁqÀÄwÛzÁÝUÀ DgÉÆæ vÀ£ßÀ JzÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ªÀÄÄnÖ ªÉƯÉUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß »ZÀÄQ vÀ£ßÀ
ªÀĪÀiÁAðUÀPÉÌ DvÀ£À UÀÄ¥ÁÛAUÀªÀ£ÄÀ ß vÁV¹zÀ JAzÀÄ £ÉÆAzÀ ¨Á®QAiÀÄÄ C¼ÀÄvÀÛ
§AzÀÄ ºÉÆýUÉ ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛzÀÝ vÀ£ßÀ vÁ¬ÄUÉ w½¹gÀÄvÁÛ¼É. £ÉÆAzÀ ¨Á®QAiÀÄ
vÁ¬Ä ¸ÀºÀ F §UÉÎ ºÉýPÉÆArzÀÄÝ vÀ£ÀUÉ DgÉÆæ ªÀÄ£ÉUÉ §A¢zÀÄÝ
UÉÆwÛgÀ°®è WÀl£ÉAiÀÄÄ ªÀļɬÄAzÁV vÀªÄÀ ä ©¢ÝgÄÀ ªÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è £ÀqÉ¢zÀÄÝ
DPÉAiÀÄ UÀAqÀ 2 ¢£ÀUÀ¼À PÁ® HgÀ°è E®è JAzÀÄ w½¹gÀÄvÁÛ¼É.”
40. The statement given by the victim before judicial
officer under Section 164 CrPC. is marked as Ex.P17,
wherein the child victim has stated as follows:
“£Á£ÀÄ JgÀqÀ£Éà vÀgÀUÀwAiÀÄ°è NzÀÄvÉÛãÉ. £ÀªÄÀ ä ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è £Á£ÀÄ £À£Àß vÀAzÉvÁ¬Ä
EgÀÄvÉÛêÉ. £À£Àß CªÀé£À ºÉ¸ÀgÀÄ PÀ¸ÀÆÛj. £À£Àß CªÀé £À£Àß eÉÆvÉ §A¢zÁݼÉ. £Á£ÀÄ DgÁªÀÄ
E®è JAzÀÄ ±Á¯ÉUÉ ºÉÆÃVgÀ°®è ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è EzÉÝãÀÄ. £Á£ÀÄ ªÀÄzsÁåºÀß 3-00 UÀAmÉ
¸ÀĪÀiÁjUÉ Dl DqÀÄwÛzÉÝ£ÀÄ. £ÀªÀÄä Hj£À ªÀÄÄvÀÄÛ EªÀ£ÄÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ PÀqÉUÉ §AzÀ£ÀÄ. £ÀªÀÄä
ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ M¼ÀUÉ §AzÀÄ ¨ÁV®Ä ºÁQzÀ£ÄÀ . ªÀÄÄvÀÄÛ vÀ£Àß ¥ÁåAlÄ PÀ¼ÉzÀ£ÀÄ £À£Àß ¥ÁåAmï
– 21 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
PÀ½¹zÀ£ÀÄ. ªÀÄÄvÀÄÛ vÀ£Àß ¸ÁªÀiÁ£À£ÄÀ ß £À£ßÀ ªÉÄÊUÉ ºÀaÑzÀ£ÀÄ. £À£Àß JzÉAiÀÄ ªÉÄÃ¯É PÉÊ
Dr¹zÀ£ÀÄ. £À£Àß JzÉ £ÉÆêÁ¬ÄvÀÄ. ªÀÄÄvÀÄÛ £À£ßÀ ¨Á¬Ä ªÀÄÄaÑ »r¢zÀÝ£ÀÄ. ªÀÄÄvÀÄÛ ¨Á¬Ä
ªÉÄðAzÀ PÉÊ vÉUÉzÁUÀ £Á£ÀÄ eÉÆÃgÁV ¨Á¬Ä vÉUÉzÀÄ aÃjzÉ£ÀÄ. £À£Àß CªÀé Nr§AzÀ¼ÀÄ.
ªÀÄÄvÀÄÛ vÀ£Àß ¥ÁåAmï ºÁQPÉÆAqÀÄ NrºÉÆÃV©lÖ£ÄÀ . ªÀÄÄvÀÄÛ ¢£Á®Æ £À£Àß JzÉAiÀÄ
ªÉÄÃ¯É PÉÊAiÀiÁr¸ÀÄwÛzÀÝ£ÀÄ.”
41. The above examination-in-chief of child victim
was recorded on 07.03.2020. She was cross-examined on
29.03.2021 i.e., more than one year after completion of her
examination-in-chief. In that cross-examination, there are
specific suggestions put to the victim that she has deposed
falsely in her examination-in-chief as per the say of police;
several specific suggestions were made to the victim that
whatever she deposed in her examination-in-chief was
wrong; but the child victim denied all those suggestions.
42. Specifically, question No.9 was put to her that
the incident narrated in her examination-in-chief is not done
by accused-Muttappa, for which she has answered “E¯Áèj
– 22 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
ªÀiÁqÁå£À”. That means he did it and she denied the said
suggestion.
43. Learned counsel for accused vehemently
submitted that the witness was tutored. Who has tutored
the witness is not explained by him. Admittedly, the parents
of victim have not supported the case of prosecution when
they were examined on 07.03.2020 i.e., on the day of
examination-in-chief of victim itself. Thus, there is no
chance or occasion for her family members or parents to
tutor the witness. There is no personal interest to any police
or to any other person to tutor the victim and it is not
elicited in her evidence. Under these circumstances, the
argument of learned counsel for the accused that the victim
was tutored is ruled out and that cannot be accepted.
44. The ‘penetrative sexual assault’ is defined in
Section 3 of POCSO Act, 2012. It reads as follows:
“3. Penetrative sexual assault.–A person is said to
commit “penetrative sexual assault” if–
– 23 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
(a) he penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the
vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a child or makes the
child to do so with him or any other person; or
(b) he inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of
the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the
urethra or anus of the child or makes the child to do so
with him or any other person; or
(c) he manipulates any part of the body of the child
so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus
or any part of body of the child or makes the child to do
so with him or any other person; or
(d) he applies his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus,
urethra of the child or makes the child to do so to such
person or any other person.”
45. Section 5 defines the ‘aggravated penetrative
sexual assault’. It reads as follows:
“5. Aggravated penetrative sexual assault.–
(a) Whoever, being a police officer, commits penetrative
sexual assault on a child —
(i) within the limits of the police station or
premises at which he is appointed; or
(ii) in the premises of any station house,
whether or not situated in the police station, to which
he is appointed; or
(iii) in the course of his duties or otherwise; or
– 24 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
(iv) where he is known as, or identified as, a
police officer; or
(b) whoever being a member of the armed forces or
security forces commits penetrative sexual assault on a
child–
(i) within the limits of the area to which the
person is deployed; or
(ii) in any areas under the command of the
forces or armed forces; or
(iii) in the course of his duties or otherwise; or
(iv) where the said person is known or identified
as a member of the security or armed forces; or
(c) whoever being a public servant commits
penetrative sexual assault on a child; or
(d) whoever being on the management or on the staff
of a jail, remand home, protection home, observation
home, or other place of custody or care and protection
established by or under any law for the time being in
force, commits penetrative sexual assault on a child,
being inmate of such jail, remand home, protection
home, observation home, or other place of custody or
care and protection; or
(e) whoever being on the management or staff of a
hospital, whether Government or private, commits
penetrative sexual assault on a child in that hospital; or
(f) whoever being on the management or staff of an
educational institution or religious institution, commits
– 25 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
penetrative sexual assault on a child in that institution;
or
(g) whoever commits gang penetrative sexual
assault on a child.
Explanation.–When a child is subjected to sexual
assault by one or more persons of a group in
furtherance of their common intention, each of such
persons shall be deemed to have committed gang
penetrative sexual assault within the meaning of this
clause and each of such person shall be liable for that
act in the same manner as if it were done by him
alone; or
(h) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a
child using deadly weapons, fire, heated substance or
corrosive substance; or
(i) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault
causing grievous hurt or causing bodily harm and
injury or injury to the sexual organs of the child; or
(j) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a
child, which–
(i) physically incapacitates the child or causes the
child to become mentally ill as defined under clause (l)
of section 2 of the Mental Health Act, 1987 (14 of
1987) or causes impairment of any kind so as to
render the child unable to perform regular tasks,
temporarily or permanently;
(ii) in the case of female child, makes the child
pregnant as a consequence of sexual assault;
– 26 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
(iii) inflicts the child with Human Immunodeficiency
Virus or any other life threatening disease or Infection
which may either temporarily or permanently impair
the child by rendering him physically incapacitated, or
mentally ill to perform regular tasks;
(iv) causes death of the child; or
(k) whoever, taking advantage of a child’s mental or
physical disability, commits penetrative sexual assault
on the child; or
(l) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on
the child more than once or repeatedly; or
(m) whoever commits penetrative sexual
assault on a child below twelve years; or
(n) whoever being a relative of the child through
blood or adoption or marriage or guardianship or in
foster care or having a domestic relationship with a
parent of the child or who is living in the same or
shared household with the child, commits penetrative
sexual assault on such child; or
(o) whoever being, in the ownership, or
management, or staff, of any institution providing
services to the child, commits penetrative sexual
assault on the child; or
(p) whoever being in a position of trust or authority
of a child commits penetrative sexual assault on the
child in an institution or home of the child or anywhere
else; or
– 27 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
(q) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on
a child knowing the child is pregnant; or
(r) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on
a child and attempts to murder the child; or
(s) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on
a child in the course of [communal or sectarian
violence or during any natural calamity or in similar
situations]; or
(t) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on
a child and who has been previously convicted of
having committed any offence under this Act or any
sexual offence punishable under any other law for the
time being in force; or
(u) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on
a child and makes the child to strip or parade naked in
public,
is said to commit aggravated penetrative sexual
assault.
46. Thus, as per Section 5(m), whoever commits
penetrative sexual assault on a child below 12 years is said
to have committed ‘aggravated penetrative sexual assault’.
Hence, if prosecution is able to establish that accused has
committed penetrative sexual assault on the victim then it
amounts to aggravated penetrative sexual assault because
– 28 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
it is established that victim is minor below the age of 12
years.
47. In the instant case it is alleged that the accused
has committed penetrative sexual assault on the victim.
However, it is not supported by the medical evidence. If
accused has used force and penetrated his penis on the
vagina of the victim, then there is every possibility of
causing some injury on that part of the victim because she
was a child aged only 7 – 9 years at that time. However,
that has not happened in this case. On careful perusal of
victims evidence, it is not conclusive to hold that the victim
that the accused has penetrated or inserted any part of his
penis in her vagina. However, the act committed by the
accused would amount to ‘sexual assault’.
48. Section 7 of the POCSO Act, 2012 defines ‘sexual
assault’. It reads as follows:
“7. Sexual assault.–Whoever, with sexual
intent touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast
of the child or makes the child touch the vagina,
penis, anus or breast of such person or any other
– 29 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
person, or does any other Act with sexual intent
which involves physical contact without
penetration is said to commit sexual assault.”
49. According to POCSO Act, 2012, if any person
with sexual intent touches the vagina of the child then it
amounts to sexual assault.
50. Section 9 defines ‘aggravated sexual assault’. It
reads as follows:
“9. Aggravated sexual assault.–(a) Whoever,
being a police officer, commits sexual assault on a
child–
(i) within the limits of the police station or
premises where he is appointed; or
(ii) in the premises of any station house whether or
not situated in the police station to which he is
appointed; or
(iii) in the course of his duties or otherwise; or
(iv) where he is known as, or identified as a police
officer; or
(b) whoever, being a member of the armed forces
or security forces, commits sexual assault on a child–
(i) within the limits of the area to which the person
is deployed; or
– 30 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
(ii) in any areas under the command of the
security or armed forces; or
(iii) in the course of his duties or otherwise; or
(iv) where he is known or identified as a member
of the security or armed forces; or
(c) whoever being a public servant commits sexual
assault on a child; or
(d) whoever being on the management or on the
staff of a jail, or remand home or protection home or
observation home, or other place of custody or care and
protection established by or under any law for the time
being in force commits sexual assault on a child being
inmate of such jail or remand home or protection home
or observation home or other place of custody or care
and protection; or
(e) whoever being on the management or staff of a
hospital, whether Government or private, commits
sexual assault on a child in that hospital; or
(f) whoever being on the management or staff of
an educational institution or religious institution,
commits sexual assault on a child in that institution; or
(g) whoever commits gang sexual assault on a
child.
Explanation.–when a child is subjected to sexual
assault by one or more persons of a group in furtherance
of their common intention, each of such persons shall be
deemed to have committed gang sexual assault within
the meaning of this clause and each of such person shall
– 31 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
be liable for that act in the same manner as if it were
done by him alone; or
(h) whoever commits sexual assault on a child
using deadly weapons, fire, heated substance or
corrosive substance; or
(i) whoever commits sexual assault causing
grievous hurt or causing bodily harm and injury or injury
to the sexual organs of the child; or
(j) whoever commits sexual assault on a child,
which–
(i) physically incapacitates the child or causes the
child to become mentally ill as defined under clause (l) of
section 2 of the Mental Health Act, 1987 (14 of 1987) or
causes impairment of any kind so as to render the child
unable to perform regular tasks, temporarily or
permanently; or
(ii) inflicts the child with Human Immunodeficiency
Virus or any other life threatening disease or infection
which may either temporarily or permanently impair the
child by rendering him physically incapacitated, or
mentally ill to perform regular tasks; or
(k) whoever, taking advantage of a child’s mental
or physical disability, commits sexual assault on the
child; or
(l) whoever commits sexual assault on the child
more than once or repeatedly; or
(m) whoever commits sexual assault on a
child below twelve years; or
– 32 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
(n) whoever, being a relative of the child through
blood or adoption or marriage or guardianship or in
foster care, or having domestic relationship with a parent
of the child, or who is living in the same or shared
household with the child, commits sexual assault on such
child; or
(o) whoever, being in the ownership or
management or staff, of any institution providing
services to the child, commits sexual assault on the child
in such institution; or
(p) whoever, being in a position of trust or
authority of a child, commits sexual assault on the child
in an institution or home of the child or anywhere else;
or
(q) whoever commits sexual assault on a child
knowing the child is pregnant; or
(r) whoever commits sexual assault on a child and
attempts to murder the child; or
(s) whoever commits sexual assault on a child in
the course of [ communal or sectarian violence or during
any natural calamity or in any similar situations]; or
(t) whoever commits sexual assault on a child and
who has been previously convicted of having committed
any offence under this Act or any sexual offence
punishable under any other law for the time being in
force; or
(u) whoever commits sexual assault on a child and
makes the child to strip or parade naked in public; 2
– 33 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
[(v) whoever persuades, induces, entices or
coerces a child to get administered or administers or
direct anyone to administer, help in getting administered
any drug or hormone or any chemical substance, to a
child with the intent that such child attains early sexual
maturity,] is said to commit aggravated sexual assault.
is said to commit aggravated sexual assault.”
51. Thus, according to Section 9(m), whoever
commits sexual assault on a child below 12 years has
committed ‘aggravated sexual assault’.
52. In the instant case, as discussed above, accused
has committed ‘sexual assault’ on a child below the age of
12 years. The evidence of victim child categorically
establishes that accused touched his penis on the private
part of victim. There is no exaggeration in her evidence.
She has not made any improvement on this point but her
evidence is consistent as discussed above. Only by
considering minor variations in her evidence, the learned
Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the sole
testimony of victim is inconsistent and is unbelievable,
which is not justifiable.
– 34 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
53. Learned counsel for appellant relies on following
citations:
1) The State V/s Vipin @ Lalla in Crl. Appeal
No.94/2025, (SC)“9. We have gone through the order of the Trial Court
as well as the High Court. The only worthwhile
evidence which has been produced before the Court by
the prosecution is the deposition of the prosecutrix
herself. Although the age of the prosecutrix is 16
years and four months which has not been seriously
disputed (accused was about 20 years of age at the
time of the incident). Nevertheless the fact remains
that the medical examination which was conducted on
18.09.2014 revealed that no injuries were detected on
the body of the prosecutrix. Though it was stated in
the medical report that her hymen was torn. Definitely
the prosecutrix in her examination-in-chief as well as
in cross-examination has stuck to the fact that she
was raped by the accused but the fact remains that
she has contradicted her statement at more than one
place. Moreover she has said in her statement under
Section 164 CrPC she had hit the accused on her head
by Danda whereas in her examination-in-chief she
stated that she hit the accused on his foot. When the
accused had surrendered on 10.10.2014 none of these
injuries were noticed on the body of the accused.
– 35 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
10. Although it is absolutely true that in the case of
rape, conviction can be made on the sole testimony
of the prosecutrix as her evidence is in the nature of
an injured witness which is given a very high value
by the Courts. But nevertheless when a person can
be convicted on the testimony of a single witness
the Courts are bound to be very careful in
examining such a witness and thus the testimony of
such a witness must inspire confidence of the Court.
The testimony of the prosecutrix in the present case
thus has failed to inspire absolute confidence of the
Trial Court, the High Court and this Court as well.
12. In any case as we have already stated above
that the testimony of the prosecutrix does not
inspire confidence, under these circumstances, we
are not inclined to interfere with the well considered
order of the Trial Court and the High Court.”
2) Mallappa and others V/s State of Karnataka in Crl. Appeal
No.1162/2011(SC)
“25. No doubt, an order of acquittal is open to
appeal and there is no quarrel about that. It is also
beyond doubt that in the exercise of appellate
powers, there is no inhibition on the High Court to
re-appreciate or re-visit the evidence on record.
– 36 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
However, the power of the High Court to re-
appreciate the evidence is a qualified power,
especially when the order under challenge is of
acquittal. The first and foremost question to be
asked is whether the Trial Court thoroughly
appreciated the evidence on record and gave due
consideration to all material pieces of evidence. The
second point for consideration is whether the finding
of the Trial Court is illegal or affected by an error of
law or fact. If not, the third consideration is whether
the view taken by the Trial Court is a fairly possible
view. A decision of acquittal is not meant to be
reversed on a mere difference of opinion. What is
required is an illegality or perversity.
26. It may be noted that the possibility of two views
in a criminal case is not an extraordinary
phenomenon. The ‘two-views theory’ has been
judicially recognized by the Courts and it comes into
play when the appreciation of evidence results into
two equally plausible views. However, the
controversy is to be resolved in favour of the
accused. For, the very existence of an equally
plausible view in favour of innocence of the accused
is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the
prosecution. Moreover, it reinforces the
presumption of innocence. And therefore, when two
views are possible, following the one in favour of
innocence of the accused is the safest course of
– 37 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
action. Furthermore, it is also settled that if the
view of the Trial Court, in a case of acquittal, is a
plausible view, it is not open for the High Court to
convict the accused by reappreciating the evidence.
If such a course is permissible, it would make it
practically impossible to settle the rights and
liabilities in the eyes of law. In Selvaraj v. State of
Karnataka3,
“13. Considering the reasons given by the trial
court and on appraisal of the evidence, in our
considered view, the view taken by the trial court
was a possible one. Thus, the High Court should
not have interfered with the judgment of acquittal.
This Court in Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N.
[(2002) 9 SCC 639] has laid down that as the
appreciation of evidence made by the trial court
while recording the acquittal is a reasonable view,
it is not permissible to interfere in appeal. The
duty of the High Court while reversing the
acquittal has been dealt with by this Court, thus:
“9. …We are constrained to observe that the High
Court was dealing with an appeal against
acquittal. It was required to deal with various
grounds on which acquittal had been based and to
dispel those grounds. It has not done so. Salutary
principles while dealing with appeal against
acquittal have been overlooked by the High Court.
If the appreciation of evidence by the trial court
did not suffer from any flaw, as indeed none has
been pointed out in the impugned judgment, the
– 38 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
order of acquittal could not have been set aside.
The view taken by the learned trial court was a
reasonable view and even if by any stretch of
imagination, it could be said that another view
was possible, that was not a ground sound enough
to set aside an order of acquittal.””
(emphasis supplied)
In Sanjeev v. State of H.P.4, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court analyzed the relevant decisions and
summarized the approach of the appellate Court
while deciding an appeal from the order of acquittal.
It observed thus:
“7. It is well settled that:
7.1. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal,
the reasons which had weighed with the trial court in
acquitting the accused must be dealt with, in case the
appellate court is of the view that the acquittal rendered
by the trial court deserves to be upturned (see Vijay
Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka5, Anwar Ali v.
State of H.P.6)
7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the
normal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter
gets reinforced (see Atley v. State of U.P.7)
7.3. If two views are possible from the evidence on
record, the appellate court must be extremely slow in
interfering with the appeal against acquittal (see
Sambasivan v. State of Kerala8)”
– 39 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
3) Ms. Suja Jones Mazurier W/o Pascal V/s State of
Karanataka in Crl. Appeal No.1050/2017 (HC)“19. The other judgments referred by learned counsel
for appellant are Ranjit Hazarika Vs. State of Assam4
(Ranjit Hazarika), Ganesan Vs. State Represented by
its Inspector of Police5 (Ganesan) the Apex court
emphasized that while the victim testimony is
important, it must be scrutinized in light of entire
evidence including medical reports and circumstances
of the case. Where the victim’s testimony is
inconsistent, influenced by external tutoring or where
medical evidence fails to corroborate the allegations,
the benefit of doubt must go to the accused. In the
present case, the child’s memory gaps, admitted
coaching by mother, lack of conclusive medical
evidence of sexual assault, and DNA reports creates
serious doubts on the prosecution’s case. While the
legal proposition laid down by the Apex court in the
above referred decisions is undoubtedly authoritative,
however the facts and circumstances of the present
case are clearly distinguishable and are not applicable
to the present case.”
4) Nirmal Premkumar and another V/s State of Karnataka in
Crl. Appeal No.1098/2024 (SC)l
“11. Law is well settled that generally speaking,
oral testimony may be classified into three categories,
– 40 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
viz.: (i) wholly reliable; (ii) wholly unreliable; (iii) neither
wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. The first two
category of cases may not pose serious difficulty for the
Court in arriving at its conclusion(s). However, in the
third category of cases, the Court has to be circumspect
and look for corroboration of any material particulars by
reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, as a
requirement of the rule of prudence.”
54. Amicus Curie for respondent No.2 relied on the
SLP (Crl.)No.69/2025 wherein at paragraph No.16 it is
mentioned as below:
“16. The reasoning of the High Court, set out above,
falls far short of the parameters required under Section
389 of Cr.P.C. for enlargement of a convict, punished
for heinous offence, on bail after suspending the
sentence. The finding that no sexual assault was found,
without considering the overall nature of the evidence
of the case, is completely untenable. According to the
evidence of the prosecutrix, Respondent No.2, at
gunpoint, closed her mouth and forcibly took her to the
house of Amro and committed rape on her. All that the
medical evidence said was that no conclusive opinion
about the crime could be given since FSL Report was
awaited. That does not mean that the ocular evidence
could be ignored. As far as non-availability of FSL
Report is concerned, the prosecution has explained the
– 41 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
situation and the Trial Court has also found that the
non-availability of the DNA Report did not adversely
affect the case of the prosecution. The reasoning that
despite the availability of washrooms in the house it
was difficult to believe that the prosecutrix could go out
for the toilet, is conjectural in nature.”
55. On careful perusal of all the aforesaid citations;
the principle stressed by Hon’ble Apex court, time and again
is that when there is consistency in the evidence of solitary
evidence of victim, then it is to be accepted. But, if there is
inconsistency in her evidence and if it is not trustworthy,
then the conviction based on sole testimony of victim is
improper.
56. In the instant case as discussed above in detail,
there is consistency in the evidence of victim about the
alleged incident.
57. We are fully aware about the power of Appellate
Court in case of acquittal and how it is to be exercised. In
this regard, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Chandrappa vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007)
– 42 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
4 SCC 415 has laid down the general principles regarding
the powers of Appellate Court while dealing with an appeal
against an order of acquittal, which reads as follows.
“42. From the above decisions, in our considered
view, the following general principles regarding powers of
the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against
an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-
appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the
order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such
power and an appellate court on the evidence before it
may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact
and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and
compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very
strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring
mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive
powers of an appellate court in an appeal against
acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of
“flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an
appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail
the power of the court to review the evidence and to
come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind
that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in
favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
– 43 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
innocence is available to him under the fundamental
principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall
be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by
a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having
secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is
further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the
trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the
basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the
trial court.”
58. The aforesaid judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
and principles noted down in the aforesaid judgment are
reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sampat
Babso Kale vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2019)
4 SCC 739. This judgment is followed by a Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in Criminal Appeal No.200098/2019
dated 24.04.2020 of Kalaburagi Bench.
59. Having independently assessed the evidence of
the prosecution witnesses and having carefully examined
the material on record, we are of the considered view that
the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that
accused has committed ‘aggravated sexual assault’ on the
– 44 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
victim which is punishable under Section 10 of POCSO ACT,
2012.
60. Hence, the following:
ORDER
i) Appeal filed under section 378(1) & (3) of
Cr.P.C., is partly allowed by setting aside the
judgment of acquittal dated 20.09.2021 in
Spl.S.C.No.53/2019 on the file of II Addl. District
and Sessions and Spl. Judge, Dharwad;
ii) Accused is convicted for the offence punishable
under Section 10 of POCSO ACT, 2012.
iii) Accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment of 5 years and to pay fine of
Rs.25,000/-; in default of payment of fine, to
undergo simple imprisonment of further period of
six months. Out of this fine amount, Rs.20,000/-
shall be paid to the victim as compensation
under Section 395 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 (Section 357 Cr.P.C.), balance
shall be credited to the State exchequer.
iv) The appellant is directed to surrender before the
trial Court within one month, to serve the
remaining part of the sentence, failing which, the
– 45 –
CRL.A NO.100369 OF 2022
trial Court shall proceed in accordance with law to
secure his presence.
v) Appellant/accused is entitled for set-off for the
period he has already undergone in custody under
Section 468 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 (Section 428 of Cr.P.C.)
vi) Learned Amicus Curiae, Smt.Anuradha R.
Deshpande, counsel is entitled to honorarium of
Rs.10,000/- which shall be paid by the High Court
Legal Services Committee, Dharwad.
vii) The victim is entitled for compensation under
Victim Compensation Scheme. Hence, the DLSA is
hereby directed to provide appropriate
compensation to the victim, if any such
application is filed by her, by making due enquiry.
viii) Copy of this judgment shall be forwarded to the
trial Court.
Sd/-
(MOHAMMAD NAWAZ)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(GEETHA K.B.)
JUDGE
HMB
CT-MCK