Himachal Pradesh High Court
State Of H.P. & Others vs Pritam Singh & Others on 19 March, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
RSA No. 265 of 2025
Date of decision: 19.03.2026.
.
State of H.P. & others
...Appellants.
Versus
Pritam Singh & others ...Respondents.
Coram:
of
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the appellants
rt : Mr. Manish Thakur, Deputy Advocate
General.
For the respondents : Mr. Lovneesh Kanwar, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Tek Chand, Advocate.
Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral):
The present appeal arises out of the judgment and decree
as passed by learned Additional District Judge, Sarkaghat, District
Mandi, H.P. dated 04.08.2025, whereby the appeal preferred by the
State-appellant has been dismissed and the judgment and decree as
passed by learned Civil Judge(Senior Division), Sarkaghat, District
Mandi, H.P. in Civil Suit No.295/2016 dated 26.09.2023 has been
affirmed.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiffs/respondents
filed a suit for declaration and consequential relief for mandatory
injunction on the ground that Smt. Paharo Karodhu (daughter of
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the
judgment?
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Mehlar son of Dhari) and Ganpat (son of Lokha, son, of Kanhiya) were
in possession of the land comprised in Khata No.8/15. It is further
averred in the plaint that during the settlement and even before that,
.
the entry of Gair Mumkin sadak was effected in the revenue record.
Although, the State of Himachal Pradesh through the HP public works
department had encroached over the land being owned by the
plaintiffs/respondents for the construction of road and even the road
of
was also constructed by the State, however, no compensation was
paid to the plaintiffs/respondents. The consolidation took place in the
rt
area and again Khata, Khatauni and Khasra numbers and new Khata
No. 20/22 min Khasra No. 291 land measuring 0-08-92 hect, came into
existence and the entries of the road continued in the column of
possession in Misal Hakiyat for the year 1991-1992.
3. The Land Acquisition Officer (defendant No.3) issued
notice under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring the
land of the plaintiffs/respondents and thereafter notification under
Sections 6 and 7 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued as per
negotiation on 11.04.2000. Further, the negotiated rates were
approved by defendants No.1 and 2 and Rs.45,000/- per biswas, in
lump sum, in pursuance of the negotiated award No. 30 dated
26.03.2009, was awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector i.e.
defendant No.3. It was further averred that the plaintiffs/respondents
are entitled to the compensation which was assessed on 26.03.2009
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vide award No. 30 i.e. Rs. 9,92,336/-, Though, it was averred in the
plaint that there is no dispute with regard to the acquisition of land, but
the compensation was withheld by the defendants under the pretext
.
that the land was earlier acquired and the compensation was paid, but,
in fact, no compensation has been paid to the plaintiffs/respondents.
4. It has further been averred that the plaintiffs/respondents
and co-sharers have approached this Court by filing Civil Writ Petition
of
No.5064 of 2010 and this Court by holding that highly disputed
questions of fact are involved in the matter, the parties were relegated
rt
to pursue the proceedings by filing Civil Suit. The said writ petition was
permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh Civil Suit before
appropriate Court. Therefore, the suit was filed for declaration and
mandatory injunctions. That the plaintiffs are entitled for grant of
compensation of suit land i.e. Khasra No.291 along with interest at the
rate of 15% per annum from the date of award with consequential
relief for mandatory injunction directing the defendants to make the
payment of Rs.9,92,336/- with interest @ 15 % w.e.f. the date of award
i.e. 26.03.2009 till the payment or any other relief which the Court
deems fit.
5. The suit was contested by the defendants/appellants by
raising preliminary objections such as maintainability, cause of action,
jurisdiction, limitation, suppression of material facts etc. On merits, it
was averred in the written statement that the compensation of Khasra
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No.291 amounting to Rs.60,074/- was paid to Pritam Singh one of the
plaintiffs on 26.03.2009 for the widening purpose of road, namely,
super highway Jahu to Kalhar. It has further been submitted that the
.
suit land initially was acquired in the year 1958-60 and compensation
of Rs.547/- was paid to the predecessor of the plaintiffs. Even
Rs.109.74 are lying deposited in Treasury in the name of Ganga and
others, which are yet not withdrawn. Further, revenue entries as well
of
as registering of mutation have not been denied. Further it was
specifically averred that a wrong and false suit has been filed on the
rt
basis of miscalculation. Therefore, the defendants/State sought
dismissal of the suit filed before the learned trial Court.
6. Learned trial Court framed issues on 18.08.2023 in the
following manner:
1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for
compensation qua the suit land to the extent of
Rs.9,92,336/- along with @ 15% w.e.f. 26.03.2009,as alleged? OPP
2. Whether suit is not within limitation, as
alleged? OPD
3, Whether plaintiffs have no cause of action to
file the present suit? OPD
4. Whether the plaintiffs have suppressed the
material facts from this Court, is so, its effect? OPD
5. Whether suit is bad for non-joinder of
necessary parties, as alleged? OPD
6. Relief.
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7. Learned trial Court directed the parties to adduce its
.
evidence in support of their contentions. Thereafter, vide its judgment
dated 26.09.2023 decreed the suit filed by the plaintiffs/respondents
and it was ordered that the plaintiffs/respondents are entitled to
compensation of Rs.9,32,262 after deducting Rs.60,074/- along with
of
simple interest @ 6 per annum from 26.03.2009 till the realization of
whole amount which amount is to be paid by the defendants.
rt
8. Feeling dissatisfied, the defendants/appellants preferred
an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Sarkaghat,
District Mandi, and the learned Court vide its judgment and decree
dated 04.08.2025 dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants.
9. Still feeling dissatisfied, the defendants/appellants are
before this Court by filing the present regular second appeal.
10. It is contended by Mr. Manish Thakur, learned Deputy
Advocate General, that the judgments and decrees, as passed by the
learned Courts below, are erroneous and liable to be quashed and set
aside. He submits that the learned Courts below have not appreciated
the real point in controversy and have wrongly decreed the suit as filed
by the plaintiffs/appellants and the learned Courts below have not
taken into consideration the fact that the amount of compensation
stands already paid to the claimants/plaintiffs.
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11. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel, Mr.Lovneesh
Kanwar, duly assisted by Mr. Tek Chand, Advocate, has defended the
judgments and decrees as passed by the courts below. He further
.
submits that in view of the mandate, as laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, no person can be deprived of his property without
following the due process of law. He also submits that the State has
dragged the plaintiffs into uncalled for litigation for more than 30 years
of
and that, although the land of the plaintiffs was utilized way back, yet
till date, the amount of compensation has not been paid to them.
rt
12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have
gone through the case file.
13. With the consent of the parties, the case is finally heard at
admission stage.
14. The undisputed facts in the present case are that the suit
land owned by the plaintiffs/appellants was utilized by the State for the
construction of road known as Una-Aghar/ Barsar/ Jahoo/ Bhambla/
Kalkhar and Nerchowk. It is further admitted by the respective parties
that land has been utilized and the acquisition process was started by
the competent authority. It is further submitted that though, the
acquisition proceedings were started, but the amount of compensation
was not paid by the authority. The plaintiffs were constrained to
approach this Court for payment of amount of compensation, however,
this Court, by observing that since highly disputes questions of fact are
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involved in the case disposed of the said petition as having been
withdrawn by the plaintiffs with liberty to file civil suit before the
competent court of law. Learned trial Court has taken into
.
consideration the oral as well as documentary evidence on record and
came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are entitled for a sum a sum
of Rs.9,32,262/- after deducting Rs.60,074/ along with simple interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from 26.03.2023 till the realization of
of
whole amount.
15. In order to support their contentions, the plaintiff Prittam
rt
Singh entered the witness box as PW-1 and tendered in evidence his
affidavit Ext.P-1/PW1, wherein he has reiterated the averments as
made in the plaint. The documentary evidence in the form of misal
hakiyat bandobast jadid Ex. P2/PW1, copy of record of rights
Ex.P3/PW1, copy of record of rights for year 2005-2006 Ex.P4/PW1,
copy of record of rights of year 2010-2011 Ex.P5/PW1, copy of
application under Section 31 of Land Acquisition Act Mark-A, copy of
award Mark-B, copy of notice under Section 80 CPC Ex. P6/PW1,
copy of judgment passed by this Court Ex.P7/PW1, postal receipts Ex.
P8/PW1, acknowledgment Ex.P9/PW1, Ex.P10/PW1 and Ex.
P11/PW1 has been tendered in order to substantiate the claim as put
forward by the plaintiffs. He has stated in his deposition that he has
received Rs.60,074/- when the road was widened. However, he did not
receive any compensation from the authorities when the road was
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constructed. He further stated that in the year 1958 he was about 7-8
years old. He has specifically denied that in the year 1958-1960
compensation of the suit land which was used in road assessed at
.
Rs.547/- was given to his ancestors. In the cross-examination, the
State could not extract anything from him in order to demolish the case
of the plaintiffs.
16. In order to rebut the case of the plaintiffs, defendants
of
examined DW-1 Anshul Chaudhary, who tendered his affidavit Ext. D-
1/Ext.DW-1 in his examination-in-chief. He has admitted in his
rt
deposition that he can say that some portion of the suit land has been
acquired. He voluntarily stated that the same was acquired in the year
2009 for the widening purpose. He admitted that in the year 2009
00.08.92 Hect land has been acquired by the defendants. He showed
his ignorance that the value of the land has been negotiated as
Rs.45,000/- per biswa. He stated that he has no knowledge whether
proceedings under Sections 4, 6 and 11 were initiated under the Land
Acquisition Act. However, the amount of compensation was not paid to
the plaintiffs.
17. Vinod Kumar, who was posted as Kanungo in LAC Mandi,
was examined as DW-2. He has admitted in his deposition that by
issuing notice under Section 4, entire Khasra No.291 was acquired by
the authorities. He admitted that the entire record has not been
brought by him. Thereafter various opportunities were granted to the
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defendant to bring on record the entire evidence and ultimately, by the
Court’s order, the evidence of the defendants was closed on
05.08.2023.
.
18. Learned Courts below, after appreciating the entire
evidence along with record, rightly came to the conclusion that the
plaintiffs are entitled for remaining compensation amounting to
Rs.9,32,282/- after deducting Rs.60,074/- along with simple interest @
of
6% per annum from 26.03.2009. The said finding of fact has been
affirmed by the learned first appellate Court vide its judgment and
rt
decree dated 04.08.2025.
19. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that no
person can be deprived of his property without adopting due process
of law.
20. It is admitted fact that the land of the plaintiffs has been
utilized by the defendants for the construction of Una- Aghar/ Barsar/
Jahoo/ Bhambla/ Kalkhar and Nerchowk road. It is further admitted
that the acquisition proceedings including notification under Section 11
of the Land Acquisition Act was issued by the authorities. However,
when no amount was paid to the claimants/plaintiffs, they approached
this Court by filing CWP No.5064/2010. This Court granted liberty to
the plaintiffs to approach the trial Court for rederessal of their
grievances. Thereafter, the learned Courts below have passed the
judgments and decrees by ordering the payment of compensation to
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the plaintiffs. Learned counsel for the appellant mainly contended that
the claim as filed by the plaintiffs was stale and highly belated and
there was oral consent by the claimants/plaintiffs.
.
21. The defendants/appellants are constituents of the welfare
State. It is well settled that the welfare State cannot claim adverse
possession against its citizens. Thus, a suit on the basis of title cannot
be said to be time barred which right could only be defeated by proof
of
of perfection by way of adverse possession by the other.
22. Admittedly, the plaintiffs/respondents are the title holders
rt
of the suit property. Being the owners of the suit property, they can file
a suit at any stage until and unless, their right is defeated by the
present appellants/defendants through the perfection of title by way of
adverse possession. Being owners of the suit land, the
plaintiffs/respondents were well within their right to file a suit for
declaration and mandatory injunction since the suit land was utilized
by the State for construction of the road in question without adopting
due process of law, including payment of compensation.
23. Admittedly, the defendants/appellants were not in
possession of any document to show that the plaintiffs had consented
for the construction of the road through the suit land. Furthermore,
when learned counsel for the State was called upon to substantiate
the claim that the plaintiffs had provided either express or implied
consent, he was unable to produce any such record.
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24. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidya Devi vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh & others (2020) 2 SCC 569 has held that no
person can be forcibly dispossess of his property without any legal
.
sanction and without following the due process of law and depriving
her payment of just and fair compensation. The State being a welfare
State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status
beyond what is provided by the Constitution. The Court has held as
of
follows:
“12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and
rt
perused the record. 12.1. The Appellant was forcibly
expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to propertywas a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of
the Constitution. Vidaya Devi vs The State Of Himachal
Pradesh on 8 January, 2020 Article 31 guaranteed the right toprivate property 1, which could not be deprived without due
process of law and upon just and fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by
the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978,however, it continued to be a human right 2 in a welfare State,
and a Constitutional right under Article 300 A of theConstitution. Article 300 A provides that no person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State
cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in
accordance with the procedure established by law. The
obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included
in Article 300 A, can be inferred in that Article The State of
West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Ors. AIR 1954 SC 92.
2 Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC
353.::: Downloaded on – 03/04/2026 20:33:37 :::CIS
-12-12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property,
without following due process of law, would be violative of a
human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300 A
of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in.
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur
Chenai4, wherein this Court held that:
” 6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in
Article 300A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of
its power of “eminent domain” may interfere with theof
right of property of a person by acquiring the same but
the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable
compensation therefor must be paid.” (emphasis
rt
12.4
supplied)
In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy5, this Courtheld that:
“21. If the right of property is a human right as also a
constitutional right, the same cannot be taken awayexcept in accordance with law. Article 300A of the
Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the
Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of theprovisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India,
must be strictly construed.” (emphasis supplied) 4(2005) 7 SCC 627.
12.5 In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U.P.
& Ors., this Court recognized the right to property as a basic
human right in the following words:
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by
different political thinkers that some amount of property
right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and
economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was
of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the
support of property.
“Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was the
opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is::: Downloaded on – 03/04/2026 20:33:37 :::CIS
-13-the seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional
values are to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers
and jurists.” (emphasis supplied)
12.6 In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat,7 this.
Court held as follows :
“48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the
powers of the State that no person shall be deprived ofhis property save by authority of law. There has to be no
deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation byof
any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession
under Article 300A. In other words, if there is no law,
there is no deprivation.” (emphasis supplied) 10.3. In
rt this case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly
dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction,and without following due process of law, there is no
deprivation.”
12.6 In this case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly
dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and
without following due process of law, and depriving her 6
(2011) 9 SCC 354. 7 (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 596. payment of just
compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of
forcible dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her
predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is
completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and
legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant of her
property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the
State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without
the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this
Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. wherein
it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for
acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory
mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of
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law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided
by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar held
that the right to property is now considered to be not only a
.
constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. 8
(2013) 1 SCC 353. Human rights have been considered in the
realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood,
health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi−
faceted dimension.
of
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before
the High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession
of the land for over 42 years, it would tantamount to “adverse”
rt
possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot be
permitted to take the plea of adverse possession, which allows
a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to
gain legal title over such property for over 12 years. The State
cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking
the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its
own citizens, as has been done in the present case. 12.12.
The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of
the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected.
Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing
cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial
conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of
judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and
reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will
depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the
remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is
no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their
constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. 12.13. In a
case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a
constitutional Court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view
to promote justice, and not defeat it.
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12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors.,10 this
Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as
follows : “There are authorities which state that delay and
laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these
.
authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of
compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago,
recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and
other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that
there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches
of
debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental
right has been violated, under Article 9 P.S. Sadasivaswamy v.
State of T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152. 10 (2013) 1 SCC 353. 32 or
rt
226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different
scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over
possession of the land belonging to the Appellants without any
sanction of law. The Appellants had asked repeatedly for grant
of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply
with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or
any other permissible statutory mode.” (emphasis supplied)
13. In the present case, the Appellant being an illiterate
person, who is a widow coming from a rural area has been
deprived of her private property by the State without resorting
to the procedure prescribed by law. The Appellant has been
divested of her right to property without being paid any
compensation whatsoever for over half a century. The cause of
action in the present case is a continuing one, since the
Appellant was compulsorily expropriated of her property in
1967 without legal sanction or following due process of law.
The present case is one where the demand for justice is so
compelling since the State has admitted that the land was
taken over without initiating acquisition proceedings, or any
procedure known to law. We exercise our extraordinary
jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution, and
direct the State to pay compensation to the appellant.
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25. To the similar effect, the Hon’ble Apex Court in (2022) 7
SCC 508 titled as Sukh Dutt Ratra and another vs. State of H.P. and
.
others has held as under:
“14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that nobody
can be deprived of liberty or property without due process, orauthorization of law. The recognition of this dates back to the
1700s to the decision of the King’s Bench in Entick v.
of
Carrington17 and by this court in Wazir Chand v. The State of
Himachal Pradesh18. Further, in several judgments, this court
has repeatedly held that rather than enjoying a wider
rt
bandwidth of lenience, the State often has a higher
responsibility in demonstrating that it has acted within theconfines of legality, and therefore, not tarnished the basic
principle of the rule of law.
15. When it comes to the subject of private property, this court
has upheld the high threshold of legality that must be met, to
dispossess an individual of their property, and even more so
when done by the State. In Bishandas v. State of Punjab19 thiscourt rejected the contention that the petitioners in the case
were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order,and instead concluded that the executive action taken by the
State and its officers, was destructive of the basic principle ofthe rule of law. This court, in another case – State of Uttar
Pradesh and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors. 20,
held: “A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume
possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even
after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture
or otherwise. The use of the expression ‘re-entry’ in the lease-
deed does not authorise extrajudicial methods to resume
possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after
the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and
forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be::: Downloaded on – 03/04/2026 20:33:37 :::CIS
-17-dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the
present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not
place it in any higher or better position. On the contrary, it is
under an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement.
that all actions of Government and Governmental authorities
should have a ‘legal pedigree'”.
16. Given the important protection extended to an individual
vis-a-vis their private property (embodied earlier in Article 31,
and now as a constitutional right in Article 300-A), and the high
of
threshold the State must meet while acquiring land, the
question remains – can the State, merely on the ground of
delay and laches, evade its legal responsibility towards those
rt
from whom private property has been expropriated? In these
facts and circumstances, we find this conclusion to be
unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the grounds of
equity and fairness.
17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State’s
actions, or lack thereof, have in fact compounded the injustice
meted out to the appellants and compelled them to approach
this court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of acquisition
proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred only at the behest of
the High Court. Even after such judicial intervention, the State
continued to only extend the benefit of the court’s directions to
those who specifically approached the courts. The State’s
lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this action of initiating
acquisition proceedings selectively, only in respect to the lands
of those writ petitioners who had approached the court in
earlier proceedings, and not other land owners, pursuant to the
orders dated 23.04.2007 (in CWP No. 1192/2004) and
20.12.2013 (in CWP No. 1356/2010) respectively. In this
manner, at every stage, the State sought to shirk its
responsibility of acquiring land required for public use in the
manner prescribed by law.
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18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches which
conclude either way – as contended by both sides in the
present dispute – however, the specific factual matrix compels
this court to weigh in favour of the appellant-land owners. The
.
State cannot shield itself behind the ground of delay and
laches in such a situation; there cannot be a ‘limitation’ to
doing justice. This court in a much earlier case – Maharashtra
State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor
Service, held:
of
’11……”Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is
not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would
be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because
rt the party has, by his conduct, done that which might
fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, orwhere by his conduct and neglect he has, though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party
in a situation in which it would not be reasonable toplace him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted
in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are
most material.
But in every case, if an argument against relief,
which otherwise would be just, is founded upon meredelay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by
any statute of limitations, the validity of that defencemust be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances, always important in such cases,
are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval, which might affect either party
and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the
one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
19. The facts of the present case reveal that the State
has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner, actively tried
to limit disbursal of compensation as required by law,
only to those for which it was specifically prodded by the
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courts, rather than to all those who are entitled. This
arbitrary action, which is also violative of the appellants’
prevailing Article 31 right (at the time of cause of
action), undoubtedly warranted consideration, and
.
intervention by the High Court, under its Article 226
jurisdiction. This court, in Manohar (supra) – a similar
case where the name of the aggrieved had been
deleted from revenue records leading to his
dispossession from the land without payment of
of
compensation – held: 6″Having heard the learned
counsel for the appellants, we are satisfied that the case
projected before the court by the appellants is utterly
rt
untenable and not worthy of emanating from any State
which professes the least regard to being a welfare
State. When we pointed out to the learned counsel that,
at this stage at least, the State should be gracious
enough to accept its mistake and promptly pay the
compensation to the respondent, the State has taken an
intractable attitude and persisted in opposing what
appears to be a just and reasonable claim of the
respondent.
Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights
available to the citizens are declared by the
Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f) was deleted by
the Forty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, Article
300-A has been placed in the Constitution, which reads
as follows: “300-A. Persons not to be deprived of
property save by authority of law.–No person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law.” 8.This
is a case where we find utter lack of legal authority for
deprivation of the respondent’s property by the
appellants who are State authorities. In our view, this
case was an eminently fit one for exercising the writ
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-20-
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution…
20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra) while dealing
with a similar fact situation, this court held as follows:
.
(SCC p. 359 para11)
“11”There are authorities which state that delay and
laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most ofthese authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant
of compensation for a wrong done to them decadesof
ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational
facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc.
Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay
rt
down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking
remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated,under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at
hand deals with a different scenario altogether. The
functionaries of the State took over possession of theland belonging to the appellants without any sanction of
law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of
the benefit of compensation. The State must eithercomply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or
requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.”
21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this court
finds that the contentions raised by the State, do not
inspire confidence and deserve to be rejected. The
State has merely averred to the appellants’ alleged
verbal consent or the lack of objection, but has not
placed any material on record to substantiate this plea.
Further, the State was unable to produce any evidence
indicating that the land of the appellants had been taken
over or acquired in the manner known to law, or that
they had ever paid any compensation. It is pertinent to
note that this was the State’s position, and subsequent
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-21-
findings of the High Court in 2007 as well, in the other
writ proceedings.”
26. The similar position has been reiterated and relied upon
.
by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 491 of 2022,
titled as Sakuntla Devi and another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh
& another dated 20.10.2023. After relying upon the judgment of the
Apex Court in Vidya Devi & SukhDutt Ratra‘s case, the Court held as
of
follows:
“7. In the aforesaid judgments, Hon’ble Apex Court has
rt
categorically held that contention advanced by the State of
delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is liableto be rejected especially when it is not in dispute that petitioner
are suffering continuous loss coupled with the fact that they
repeatedly requested the authorities to initiate acquisitionproceedings.
8. If the aforesaid judgments are read in their entirety, it clearly
emerges that land owners cannot be deprived of their land,
without following due process of law. If it is so, ground raisedby the respondents that petitioners have made their land
available with consent, is of no consequence rather, this court,having taken note of the fact that the land of petitioners stands
utilized for the construction of road in question, is compelled to
agree with the submission of learned counsel for the
petitioners that her clients are entitled for compensation qua
the land utilized by respondents for construction of road in
question.
10. Admittedly, land of the petitioners stands utilized for
construction of road but till date, they have not been paid any
amount, which action of the respondent-State certainly
amounts to forcible dispossession of the petitioners from their::: Downloaded on – 03/04/2026 20:33:37 :::CIS
-22-land, which is violative of provision contained under Art. 300-A
of the Constitution of India.
14. In case titled, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed Ram
Sharma (1986) 2 SCC 68, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that.
entire State of Himachal Pradesh is a hilly area and without
workable roads, no communication is possible; every person is
entitled to life as enjoined in Article 21 of the Constitution ofIndia; every person has right under Article 19 (1) (b) of the
Constitution of India to move freely, throughout the territory ofof
India; for the residents of hilly areas, access to road is access
to life itself. Stand taken by the respondents that there was a
policy for providing roads on demand of residents as a favour
rt
to them on conditions that they would not claim compensation,
cannot be sustained because such stand is violative of Article300A of the Constitution of India.
15. In case titled Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of
Maharashtra and others, 2020 9 SCC 356, Hon’ble Apex Courthas held that though right to property is not a fundamental
right, but it is still a constitutional right under Article 300A of the
Constitution of India and also a human right; in view of themandate of Article 300A, no person can be deprived of his
property save by the authority of law. No doubt, Statepossesses the power to take or control the property of the
owner of the land for the benefit of public, but at the sametime, it is obliged to compensate the injury by making just
compensation.”
27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments has
held that the first appellate is the final court of the fact. No doubt,
second appellate court exercising the power under Section 100 CPC
can interference with the findings of fact on limited grounds such as –
(a) where the finding is based on inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is
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-23-
in ignorance of the relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it is based
on misreading of evidence; (d) where it is perverse, but that is not case
in hand.
.
28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with scope of
interference under Section 100 in Hero Vinoth (minor) vs.
Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 has held as under:
“18. It has been noted time and again that without insisting for
of
the statement of such a substantial question of law in the
memorandum of appeal and formulating the same at the time
of admission, the High Courts have been issuing notices and
rt
generally deciding the second appeals without adhering to the
procedure prescribed under Section 100 of the CPC. It hasfurther been found in a number of cases that no efforts are
made to distinguish between a question of law and a
substantial question of law. In exercise of the powers underthis section in several cases, the findings of fact of the first
appellate court are found to have been disturbed. It has to bekept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an
inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantivestatutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in
force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in thesection must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be
maintained and no court has the power to add or to enlarge
those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on
merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts will
not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers
under this section. Further, a substantial question of law has to
be distinguished from a substantial question of fact. This Court
in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg.
Co. Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 1314) held that : “The proper test for
determining whether a question of law raised in the case is::: Downloaded on – 03/04/2026 20:33:37 :::CIS
-24-substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general
public importance or whether it directly and substantially
affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an
open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this.
Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not
free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If
the question is settled by the highest court or the generalprinciples to be applied in determining the question are well
settled and there is a mere question of applying thoseof
principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the
question would not be a substantial question of law.
” 19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate
rt
the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last
court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that thelower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses
accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even
where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court,the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when
it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory
reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set ofcircumstances two inferences of fact are possible, one drawn
by the lower appellate court will not be interfered by the HighCourt in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not
permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere where it isfound that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court
were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of
law applicable or its settled position on the basis of
pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon
inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring material
evidence. 20. to 22 xx xx xx xx
23. To be “substantial” a question of law must be debatable,
not previously settled by law of the land or a binding
precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision
of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the::: Downloaded on – 03/04/2026 20:33:37 :::CIS
-25-parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law
“involving in the case” there must be first a foundation for it laid
in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the
sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it.
must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and
proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for
the first time before the High Court is not a question involved inthe case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will,
therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each caseof
whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in
the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the
need for striking a judicious balance between the
rt
indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and
impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of anylis.”
29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annamalai vs. Vasanthi,
2025 INSC 1267, has held as follows:-
“16. Whether D-1 and D-2 were able to discharge the aforesaid
burden is a question of fact which had to be determined by acourt of fact after appreciating the evidence available on
record. Under CPC, a first appellate court is the final court offact. No doubt, a second appellate court exercising power(s)
under Section 100 CPC can interfere with a finding of fact onlimited grounds, such as, (a) where the finding is based on
inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of relevant
admissible evidence; (c) where it is based on misreading of
evidence; and (d) where it is perverse. But that is not the case
here.
17. In the case on hand, the first appellate court, in paragraph
29 of its judgment, accepted the endorsement (Exb. A-2) made
on the back of a registered document (Exb. A-1) after
considering the oral evidence led by the plaintiff-appellant and
the circumstance that signature(s)/thumbmark of D-1 and D-2::: Downloaded on – 03/04/2026 20:33:37 :::CIS
-26-were not disputed, though claimed as one obtained on a blank
paper. The reasoning of the first appellate court in paragraph
29 of its judgment was not addressed by the High Court. In
fact, the High Court, in one line, on a flimsy defense of use of a.
signed blank paper, observed that genuineness of Exb. A-2 is
not proved. In our view, the High Court fell in error here. While
exercising powers under Section 100 CPC, it ought not to haveinterfered with the finding of fact returned by the first appellate
court on this aspect; more so, when the first appellate courtof
had drawn its conclusion after appreciating the evidence
available on record as also the circumstance that
signature(s)/thumbmark(s) appearing on the document
rt
(Exb.A2) were not disputed. Otherwise also, while disturbing
the finding of the first appellate court, the High Court did nothold that the finding returned by the first appellate court is
based on a misreading of evidence, or is in ignorance of
relevant evidence, or is perverse. Thus, there existed nooccasion for the High Court, exercising power under Section
100 CPC, to interfere with the finding of the first appellate court
regarding payment of additional Rs. 1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2over and above the sale consideration fixed for the transaction.
18. Once the finding regarding payment of additional sum of
Rs.1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 recorded by the first appellate
court is sustained, there appears no logical reason to hold thatthe plaintiff (Annamalai) was not ready and willing to perform
its part under the contract particularly when Rs. 4,70,000, out
of total consideration of Rs. 4,80,000, was already paid and,
over and above that, additional sum of Rs.1,95,000 was paid in
lieu of demand made by D-1 & D-2. This we say so, because
an opinion regarding plaintiff’s readiness and willingness to
perform its part under the contract is to be formed on the
entirety of proven facts and circumstances of a case including
conduct of the parties. The test is that the person claiming
performance must satisfy conscience of the court that he has::: Downloaded on – 03/04/2026 20:33:37 :::CIS
-27-treated the contract subsisting with preparedness to fulfill his
obligation and accept performance when the time for
performance arrives.”
.
30. No other point was raised by the learned counsel for the
parties.
31. Both the Courts below have rightly appreciated the point
in controversy after considering the oral as well as documentary
of
evidence placed on record. No question of law much less substantial
question of law arises in the present case.
32.
rt
In view of above, the present appeal being devoid of any
merit deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly. Pending
application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Romesh Verma)
Judge
19th March, 2026.
(vt)
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