Himachal Pradesh High Court
State Of H.P. & Others vs Hem Raj on 8 April, 2026
( 2026:HHC:11553 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
RSA No. 210 of 2025
Decided on 08.04.2026
.
____________________________________________________
State of H.P. & others ...Petitioners.
Versus
Hem Raj .....Respondent.
Coram
of
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the petitioners: Mr. Manish Thakur, Deputy Advocate
rt General.
For the respondent: Mr. Varun Chauhan, Advocate.
____________________
Romesh Verma, Judge
The present appeal arises out of the judgment and
decree, dated 22.05.2025 as passed by the learned District
Judge-I, Mandi, District Mandi, HP in Civil Appeal No. 13 of
2025, whereby the appeal preferred by the present
appellants/ defendants has been ordered to be dismissed and
the judgment and decree dated 26.03.2024, as passed by the
learned Senior Civil Judge, Court No.1, Mandi, District Mandi,
H.P., passed in Civil Suit No. 82 of 2020, have been affirmed,
whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for declaration
and mandatory injunction was decreed.
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
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2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff/
respondent filed a suit for mandatory injunction in the Court
.
of learned Senior Civil Judge, Court No.1, Mandi, HP on
26.03.2024 on the ground that the land comprised in Khewat
Khatauni No. 45 min/ 49, Khasra No. 1123 measuring 00-04-05
bigha situated in Muhal Badyar/30, Mauja Bhardgaon, Tehsil
of
Kotli, District Mandi, H.P is owned and possessed by the
plaintiff. In the year 1994, the defendants No. 3 and 4 had
rt
constructed Gharwan to Taryasal -Dawahan road and for that
purpose, the land owned and possessed by the plaintiff was
utilized.
3. The officials of the defendants assured the plaintiff to
compensate him for utilization of his land, however no steps
were taken by them. When the plaintiff approached the
defendants for the grant of compensation, no steps were taken
by them for the reasons best known to them. Though, assurance
was given to the plaintiff to compensate him, but till date, no
compensation amount has been paid, therefore, the plaintiff
was constrained to file a suit for declaration to the effect that he
is the owner in possession of the suit land and for mandatory
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injunction that since the defendants have utilized the suit land,
therefore, the plaintiff sought vacant possession of the suit land.
.
4. The suit was contested by the defendants/State by
raising preliminary objections qua maintainability, limitation,
cause of action, estoppels, equity, valuation , mis joinder and
non joinder etc. On merits, it was averred that the
of
defendants No. 3 & 4 had constructed the road in question with
the consent of the plaintiff in the year 1994 and the defendants
rt
had not given any assurance to the plaintiff to pay the
compensation for the suit land. At the time of construction of the
road, the plaintiff never raised any objection and now he cannot
be permitted to raise objection that too after elapse of more than
30 years of the construction of road and consequently, the
defendants sought dismissal of the suit.
5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court
on 27.04.2022 framed the following issues:-
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a
mandatory injunction against the defendants, as
prayed ? OPP
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree
of possession, as prayed ? OPP
3. Whether the suit in hand is not
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4. Whether the plaintiff has not approached
the Court with clean hands, if so, its
consequences ? OPD.
5. Whether the plaintiff has concealed material
facts from the Court, if so, its consequences ?
OPD
6. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action
against the defendants ? OPD
of
7. Whether the suit in hand is bad for non
joinder of necessary parties ? OPD
8. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of
rt
parties ? OPD
9. Whether the suit is not properly valued for
Court fee and jurisdiction ? OPD
10. Relief.
6. The learned trial court directed the respective
parties to adduce evidence in support of their contentions
to corroborate their respective case and ultimately, the
learned trial court vide its judgment and decree dated
26.03.2024 decreed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent and
mandatory injunction is issued in favour of the plaintiff
directing the defendants to compensate the plaintiff for suit
land comprised in Khasra No. 1123/1 situated in Muhal
Badyar/30, Tehsil Kotli, District Mandi, H.P. within one year
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from the date of passing of the judgment for its formal
acquisition.
.
7. Feeling dissatisfied by the judgment and
decree, dated 26.03.2024, the defendants/State preferred
an appeal before the learned First Appellate Court on
02.05.2024, which came to be dismissed vide judgment
of
and decree dated 022.05.2025.
8. Still feeling
rt aggrieved by the aforesaid
judgments and decrees, the appellants/State have
preferred the present regular second appeal.
9. It is contended by Mr. Manish Thakur, learned
Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the
appellants/State that the learned courts below have not
appreciated the real point of controversy inter se the
parties and the impugned judgments and decrees passed
by the learned courts below are perverse and thus, liable to
be quashed and set aside. He has further contended that
the learned Courts below have not appreciated oral as well
as documentary evidence, therefore, on that count, the
instant appeal deserves to be allowed.
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10. On the other hand, Mr. Varun Chauhan,
Advocate, learned counsel for the respondents has
.
defended the judgments and decrees as passed by the
learned courts below and has submitted that since the land
of the respondent was utilized for the construction of the
road in question, therefore, in view of the mandate as laid
of
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, whereby it has been
repeatedly held that no person can be deprived of his
rt
property without following the due process of law, therefore,
the impugned judgments and decrees deserves to be
upheld.
11. With the consent of the parties the appeal is finally
heard at the admission stage.
12. In order to substantiate his case, the plaintiff, Hem
Raj, has entered the witness box as PW-1. In his
deposition, he has reiterated the averments as made in the
plaint, and a copy of his affidavit has been placed on record
as Ext. PW-1/A. As per the same, the plaintiff has stated
that the defendants raised construction of the road, i.e.,
Gharwan to Taryasal-Dawahan road, in the year 1994
through the suit land comprised in Khasra No. 1123/1,
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measuring 0.3.4 bighas, without the express or implied
consent or permission of the plaintiff.
.
13. It has been stated in his examination-in-chief that,
although an assurance was given by the officials of the
defendants to follow the due process of law, including the
payment of compensation, no steps were taken by them.
of
Neither were acquisition proceedings initiated nor was any
compensation paid to the plaintiff. In cross-examination, the
rt
defendants could not extract anything in their favour.
14. In order to rebut the evidence of the plaintiff, the
defendants examined DW-1, Sohan Lal Chaudhary, who
was posted as Junior Engineer, Bhargaon, sanctioned
under the HPPWD Sub-Division, Kotli, during the year
1994. He stated that the road was constructed at the
request and with the oral consent of the local public
members, including the plaintiff, and that no one raised any
objections regarding the construction of the road at the
relevant time. He further stated that neither the defendants
assured the plaintiff nor any other stakeholders of payment
of compensation for the land used for the construction of
the road.
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15. DW-2 is the statement of Daya Ram Katoch, who
was working as a Work Inspector during the construction of
.
the road in the year 1994. He also reiterated the same
points as stated by DW-1, Sohan Lal. He stated that the
road was constructed at the request and with the oral
consent of the local public members, including the plaintiff,
of
and that no one raised any objections regarding the
construction of the road at the relevant time. He further
rt
stated that no assurance was given to the plaintiff regarding
the payment of compensation.
16. DW-1, in his cross-examination, admitted that at
the time of construction, no written permission was
obtained from the stakeholders. He stated that the road
was constructed with the consent of the local residents. He
further admitted that, with respect to such consent, no
affidavit was obtained by the department. He
acknowledged that, when the land was utilized for the
construction of the road, a notification should have been
issued under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,
however, in the present case, no such notification was
issued by the department. He also admitted that the
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defendants/appellants had constructed the said road over
Khasra No. 1123.
.
17. In order to prove his title, the plaintiff has placed
on record a copy of the jamabandi, Ext. DW-1/B, with
respect to Khasra No. 1123/1, which clearly demonstrates
that the plaintiff is the owner in possession of the suit land.
of
The Hon’ble Apex Court, in its various verdicts, has held
that no person can be deprived of his property without
rt
following due process of law.
18. In the present case, in the absence of perfection
of title by virtue of adverse possession, the State cannot
deny the claim put forward by the plaintiff. On the basis of
the plaintiff’s title and in light of the admissions made by the
defendants’ witnesses that the road has been constructed
on the suit land owned by the plaintiff, it becomes apparent
that the land owned by the plaintiff has been utilized by the
appellants/defendants for the construction of the road.
19. The contentions of the learned Deputy Advocate
General that there was oral consent by the plaintiff are
unsupported, as there is no material on record to
demonstrate or show that any oral or written consent was
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given by the plaintiff to the department. There is not an iota
of evidence on record to show that oral consent was
.
provided by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has based his case on
the strength of his title, and as the absolute holder of the
suit property, he is entitled to file a suit at any point in time,
unless his claim is defeated by the perfection of adverse
of
possession by the opposite party. In the present case, that
is not the case of the State. Therefore, the suit could have
rt
been filed by the plaintiff at any time as the titleholder of the
suit land. Admittedly, in the present case, the land has
been utilized for the construction of the road. However,
neither acquisition proceedings were initiated, nor has any
amount of compensation been paid.
20. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidya Devi vs. State
of Himachal Pradesh & others (2020) 2 SCC 569 has
held that no person can be forcibly dispossessed of his
property without any legal sanction and without following
the due process of law and depriving her payment of just
and fair compensation. The State being a welfare State is
governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a
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status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. The
Court has held as follows:
.
“12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties
and perused the record.
12.1. The Appellant was forcibly expropriated of her
property in 1967, when the right to property was a
fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III
of the Constitution. Vidaya Devi vs The State Of
of
Himachal Pradesh on 8 January, 2020 Article 31
guaranteed the right to private property 1, which could
not be deprived without due process of law and upon
rt
just and fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a
fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a
human right 2 in a welfare State, and a Constitutional
right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Article
300 A provides that no person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law. The State cannot
dispossess a citizen of his property except in
accordance with the procedure established by law.
The obligation to pay compensation, though not
expressly included in Article 300 A, can be inferred in
that Article The State of West Bengal v. Subodh
Gopal Bose and Ors. AIR 1954 SC 92. 2 Tukaram
Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC
353.
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private
property, without following due process of law, would
be violative of a human right, as also the
constitutional right under Article 300 A of the
Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in
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Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius
Shapur Chenai4, wherein this Court held that:
” 6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in
.
Article 300A of the Constitution, the State in exercise
of its power of “eminent domain” may interfere with
the right of property of a person by acquiring thesame but the same must be for a public purpose and
reasonable compensation therefor must be paid.”
(emphasis supplied)
of
12.4 In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy5,
this Court held that:
“21. If the right of property is a human right as also a
rt
constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away
except in accordance with law. Article 300A of theConstitution protects such right. The provisions of the
Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the
provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India,must be strictly construed.” (emphasis supplied) 4
(2005) 7 SCC 627.
12.5 In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v.
State of U.P. & Ors., this Court recognized the right to
property as a basic human right in the following
words:
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by
different political thinkers that some amount of
property right is an indispensable safeguard against
tyranny and economic oppression of the Government.
Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long
subsist without the support of property.
“Property must be secured, else liberty cannot
subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the
view that property itself is the seed bed which must be
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is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.6 In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat,7
.
this Court held as follows :
“48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the
powers of the State that no person shall be deprivedof his property save by authority of law. There has to
be no deprivation without any sanction of law.
Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition orof
taking possession under Article 300A. In other words,
if there is no law, there is no deprivation.” (emphasis
supplied) 10.3. In this case, the Appellant could not
rt
have been forcibly dispossessed of her property
without any legal sanction, and without following dueprocess of law, there is no deprivation.”
12.6 In this case, the Appellant could not have been
forcibly dispossessed of her property without any
legal sanction, and without following due process of
law, and depriving her 6 (2011) 9 SCC 354. 7 (1995)
Supp. 1 SCC 596. payment of just compensation,
being a fundamental right on the date of forcible
dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or
her predecessors had “orally” consented to the
acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete
lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily
divesting the Appellant of her property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of
law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of
their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is
placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana
Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. wherein it was held
that the State must comply with the procedure for
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acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible
statutory mode. The State being a welfare State
governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a
.
status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh
Kumar held that the right to property is now
considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory
right, but also a human right. 8 (2013) 1 SCC 353.
Human rights have been considered in the realm of
of
individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood,
health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a
multi− faceted dimension.
rt
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the
State before the High Court, that since it has been in
continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it
would tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State
being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the
plea of adverse possession, which allows a
trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a
crime, to gain legal title over such property for over 12
years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its
title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse
possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as
has been done in the present case. 12.12. The
contention advanced by the State of delay and laches
of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable to
be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a
case of a continuing cause of action, or if the
circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the
Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial
discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and
reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case.
It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights,
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and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay
arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for
the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to
.
do substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not
defeat it.
12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. &
of
Ors.,10 this Court while dealing with a similar fact
situation, held as follows : “There are authorities
which state that delay and laches extinguish the right
rt
to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain
to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a
wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of
statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and
other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is
true that there are a few authorities that lay down that
delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking
remedy, even if his fundamental right has been
violated, under Article 9 P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State
of T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152. 10 (2013) 1 SCC 353. 32
or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with
a different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the
State took over possession of the land belonging to
the Appellants without any sanction of law. The
Appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the
benefit of compensation. The State must either
comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition,
or requisition, or any other permissible statutory
mode.” (emphasis supplied)
13. In the present case, the Appellant being an
illiterate person, who is a widow coming from a rural
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area has been deprived of her private property by the
State without resorting to the procedure prescribed by
law. The Appellant has been divested of her right to
.
property without being paid any compensation
whatsoever for over half a century. The cause of
action in the present case is a continuing one, since
the Appellant was compulsorily expropriated of her
property in 1967 without legal sanction or following
due process of law. The present case is one where
of
the demand for justice is so compelling since the
State has admitted that the land was taken over
without initiating acquisition proceedings, or any
rt
procedure known to law. We exercise our
extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142
of the Constitution, and direct the State to pay
compensation to the appellant.
21. To the similar effect, the Hon’ble Apex Court in
(2022) 7 SCC 508 titled as Sukh Dutt Ratra and another vs. State
of H.P. and others has held as under:
“14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that
nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without
due process, or authorization of law. The recognitionof this dates back to the 1700s to the decision of the
King’s Bench in Entick v. Carrington17 and by this
court in Wazir Chand v. The State of Himachal
Pradesh18. Further, in several judgments, this court
has repeatedly held that rather than enjoying a wider
bandwidth of lenience, the State often has a higher
responsibility in demonstrating that it has acted within
the confines of legality, and therefore, not tarnished
the basic principle of the rule of law.
15. When it comes to the subject of private property,
this court has upheld the high threshold of legality
that must be met, to dispossess an individual of their
property, and even more so when done by the State.
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In Bishandas v. State of Punjab19 this court rejected
the contention that the petitioners in the case were
trespassers and could be removed by an executive
order, and instead concluded that the executive.
action taken by the State and its officers, was
destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law.
This court, in another case – State of Uttar Pradesh
and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors. 20,
held: “A lessor, with the best of title, has no right toresume possession extra-judicially by use of force,
from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier
termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise.
The use of the expression ‘re-entry’ in the lease-deedof
does not authorise extrajudicial methods to resume
possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee,
even after the expiry or its earlier termination is
juridical possession and forcible dispossession is
rt
prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed
otherwise than in due course of law. In the present
case, the fact that the lessor is the State does notplace it in any higher or better position. On the
contrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemming
from the requirement that all actions of Government
and Governmental authorities should have a ‘legal
pedigree'”.
16. Given the important protection extended to an
individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied
earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right
in Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State
must meet while acquiring land, the question remains
– can the State, merely on the ground of delay and
laches, evade its legal responsibility towards those
from whom private property has been expropriated?
In these facts and circumstances, we find this
conclusion to be unacceptable, and warranting
intervention on the grounds of equity and fairness.
17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the
State’s actions, or lack thereof, have in fact
compounded the injustice meted out to the appellants
and compelled them to approach this court, albeit
belatedly. The initiation of acquisition proceedings
initially in the 1990s occurred only at the behest of
the High Court. Even after such judicial intervention,
the State continued to only extend the benefit of the
court’s directions to those who specifically
approached the courts. The State’s lackadaisical
conduct is discernible from this action of initiating
acquisition proceedings selectively, only in respect to
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the lands of those writ petitioners who had
approached the court in earlier proceedings, and not
other land owners, pursuant to the orders dated
23.04.2007 (in CWP No. 1192/2004) and 20.12.2013
.
(in CWP No. 1356/2010) respectively. In this manner,
at every stage, the State sought to shirk its
responsibility of acquiring land required for public use
in the manner prescribed by law.
18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and
laches which conclude either way – as contended by
both sides in the present dispute – however, the
specific factual matrix compels this court to weigh in
favour of the appellant-land owners. The State
of
cannot shield itself behind the ground of delay and
laches in such a situation; there cannot be a
‘limitation’ to doing justice. This court in a much
earlier case – Maharashtra State Road Transport
rt
Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, held:
’11……”Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of
Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine.
Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy,
either because the party has, by his conduct, done
that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he
has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet putthe other party in a situation in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material.
But in every case, if an argument against relief,
which otherwise would be just, is founded upon meredelay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by
any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances, always important in such cases,are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval, which might affect either
party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in
taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to
the remedy.”
19. The facts of the present case reveal that the
State has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner,
actively tried to limit disbursal of compensation as
required by law, only to those for which it was
specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to all
those who are entitled. This arbitrary action, which is
also violative of the appellants’ prevailing Article 31
right (at the time of cause of action), undoubtedly
warranted consideration, and intervention by the High
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Court, under its Article 226 jurisdiction. This court, in
Manohar (supra) – a similar case where the name of
the aggrieved had been deleted from revenue
records leading to his dispossession from the land
.
without payment of compensation – held: 6″Having
heard the learned counsel for the appellants, we are
satisfied that the case projected before the court by
the appellants is utterly untenable and not worthy of
emanating from any State which professes the least
regard to being a welfare State. When we pointed out
to the learned counsel that, at this stage at least, the
State should be gracious enough to accept its
mistake and promptly pay the compensation to the
of
respondent, the State has taken an intractable
attitude and persisted in opposing what appears to be
a just and reasonable claim of the respondent.
rt Ours is a constitutional democracy and the
rights available to the citizens are declared by the
Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f) was deleted by
the Forty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution,
Article 300-A has been placed in the Constitution,
which reads as follows: “300-A. Persons not to be
deprived of property save by authority of law.–No
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.” 8.This is a case where we find utter
lack of legal authority for deprivation of the
respondent’s property by the appellants who are
State authorities. In our view, this case was an
eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction of
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution…
20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra) while
dealing with a similar fact situation, this court held as
follows: (SCC p. 359 para11)
“11”There are authorities which state that delay and
laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most
of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence,
grant of compensation for a wrong done to them
decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for
educational facilities and other categories of similar
cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few
authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar
a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his
fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32
or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals
with a different scenario altogether. The functionaries
of the State took over possession of the land
belonging to the appellants without any sanction of
law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of
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20 ( 2026:HHC:11553 )
the benefit of compensation. The State must either
comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition,
or requisition, or any other permissible statutory
mode.”
.
21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this court
finds that the contentions raised by the State, do not
inspire confidence and deserve to be rejected. The
State has merely averred to the appellants’ alleged
verbal consent or the lack of objection, but has not
placed any material on record to substantiate this
plea. Further, the State was unable to produce any
evidence indicating that the land of the appellants
had been taken over or acquired in the manner
of
known to law, or that they had ever paid any
compensation. It is pertinent to note that this was the
State’s position, and subsequent findings of the High
Court in 2007 as well, in the other writ proceedings.”
rt
22. The similar position has been reiterated by the
Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 491 of 2022, titled
as Sakuntla Devi and another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh &
another dated 20.10.2023. After relying upon the judgment of the
Apex Court in Vidya Devi & SukhDutt Ratra‘s case, the Court held as
follows:
“7. In the aforesaid judgments, Hon’ble Apex Court
has categorically held that contention advanced bythe State of delay and laches of the appellant in
moving the Court is liable to be rejected especially
when it is not in dispute that petitioner are suffering
continuous loss coupled with the fact that they
repeatedly requested the authorities to initiate
acquisition proceedings.
8. If the aforesaid judgments are read in their entirety,
it clearly emerges that land owners cannot be
deprived of their land, without following due process
of law. If it is so, ground raised by the respondents::: Downloaded on – 17/04/2026 20:35:12 :::CIS
21 ( 2026:HHC:11553 )that petitioners have made their land available with
consent, is of no consequence rather, this court,
having taken note of the fact that the land of.
petitioners stands utilized for the construction of road
in question, is compelled to agree with the
submission of learned counsel for the petitioners thather clients are entitled for compensation qua the land
utilized by respondents for construction of road in
question.
of
10. Admittedly, land of the petitioners stands utilized
for construction of road but till date, they have not
been paid any amount, which action of the
rt
respondent-State certainly amounts to forcible
dispossession of the petitioners from their land, whichis violative of provision contained under Art. 300-A of
the Constitution of India.
14. In case titled, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed
Ram Sharma (1986) 2 SCC 68, Hon’ble Apex Court
has held that entire State of Himachal Pradesh is ahilly area and without workable roads, no
communication is possible; every person is entitled tolife as enjoined in Article 21 of the Constitution of
India; every person has right under Article 19 (1) (b)of the Constitution of India to move freely, throughout
the territory of India; for the residents of hilly areas,
access to road is access to life itself. Stand taken by
the respondents that there was a policy for providing
roads on demand of residents as a favour to them on
conditions that they would not claim compensation,
cannot be sustained because such stand is violative
of Article 300A of the Constitution of India.
15. In case titled Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of
Maharashtra and others, 2020 9 SCC 356, Hon’ble::: Downloaded on – 17/04/2026 20:35:12 :::CIS
22 ( 2026:HHC:11553 )Apex Court has held that though right to property is
not a fundamental right, but it is still a constitutional
right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India.
and also a human right; in view of the mandate of
Article 300A, no person can be deprived of his
property save by the authority of law. No doubt, Statepossesses the power to take or control the property
of the owner of the land for the benefit of public, but
at the same time, it is obliged to compensate theof
injury by making just compensation.”
23. The Courts below, after appreciating the oral as well as
rt
documentary evidence placed on record and on the basis of the
title, decreed the suit as filed by the respondent and have rightly
came to the conclusion that he is entitled for mandatory
injunction with the direction to acquire the portion of the suit land
which has been utilized by the present appellants for the
construction of the road.
24. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that no
person can be deprived of his property without adopting due
process of law, therefore, under such circumstances, the plea as
set up by the appellants-State is not tenable in the facts and
circumstances of the case, once they have utilized the land of
the villagers without adopting due process of law. Now the plea
as raised by the present appellants is not permissible that too at
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23 ( 2026:HHC:11553 )
the stage of Regular Second Appeal. There are concurrent
findings of fact by the Courts below.
.
25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments
has held that the first appellate is the final court of the fact. No
doubt, second appellate court exercising the power under
Section 100 CPC can interference with the findings of fact on
of
limited grounds such as – (a) where the finding is based on
inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of the
rt
relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it is based on
misreading of evidence; (d) where it is perverse, but that is not
case in hand.
26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with scope
of interference under Section 100 in Hero Vinoth (minor) vs.
Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 has held as under:
“18. It has been noted time and again that
without insisting for the statement of such a
substantial question of law in the
memorandum of appeal and formulating the
same at the time of admission, the High Courts
have been issuing notices and generally
deciding the second appeals without adhering
to the procedure prescribed under Section 100
of the CPC. It has further been found in a
number of cases that no efforts are made to::: Downloaded on – 17/04/2026 20:35:12 :::CIS
24 ( 2026:HHC:11553 )distinguish between a question of law and a
substantial question of law. In exercise of the
powers under this section in several cases, the.
findings of fact of the first appellate court are
found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept
in mind that the right of appeal is neither anatural nor an inherent right attached to the
litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, itof
has to be regulated in accordance with law in
force at the relevant time. The conditions
mentioned in the section must be strictly
rt
fulfilled before a second appeal
maintained and no court has the power to add
can beor to enlarge those grounds. The second appeal
cannot be decided on merely equitable
grounds. The concurrent findings of facts willnot be disturbed by the High Court in exercise
of the powers under this section. Further, a
substantial question of law has to bedistinguished from a substantial question of
fact. This Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and
Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (AIR1962 SC 1314) held that : “The proper test for
determining whether a question of law raised
in the case is substantial would, in our opinion,
be whether it is of general public importance or
whether it directly and substantially affects
the rights of the parties and if so whether it is
either an open question in the sense that it is
not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy
Council or by the Federal Court or is not free::: Downloaded on – 17/04/2026 20:35:12 :::CIS
25 ( 2026:HHC:11553 )from difficulty or calls for discussion of
alternative views. If the question is settled by
the highest court or the general principles to be.
applied in determining the question are well
settled and there is a mere question of
applying those principles or that the plearaised is palpably absurd the question would
not be a substantial question of law.
of
” 19. It is not within the domain of the High
Court to investigate the grounds on which the
findings were arrived at, by the last court of
rt
fact, being the first appellate court. It is true
that the lower appellate court should notordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial
court in respect of credibility but even where it
has rejected the witnesses accepted by thetrial court, the same is no ground for
interference in second appeal when it is found
that the appellate court has given satisfactoryreasons for doing so. In a case where from a
given set of circumstances two inferences of
fact are possible, one drawn by the lowerappellate court will not be interfered by the
High Court in second appeal. Adopting any
other approach is not permissible. The High
Court will, however, interfere where it is found
that the conclusions drawn by the lower
appellate court were erroneous being contrary
to the mandatory provisions of law applicable
or its settled position on the basis of
pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or::: Downloaded on – 17/04/2026 20:35:12 :::CIS
26 ( 2026:HHC:11553 )was based upon inadmissible evidence or
arrived at by ignoring material evidence. 20. to
22 xx xx xx xx.
23. To be “substantial” a question of law must
be debatable, not previously settled by law of
the land or a binding precedent, and musthave a material bearing on the decision of the
case, if answered either way, insofar as theof
rights of the parties before it are concerned. To
be a question of law “involving in the case”
there must be first a foundation for it laid in the
rt
pleadings and the question should emerge from
the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by
court of facts and it must be necessary to
decide that question of law for a just and
proper decision of the case. An entirely new
point raised for the first time before the High
Court is not a question involved in the case
unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will,
therefore, depend on the facts and
circumstance of each case whether a question
of law is a substantial one and involved in the
case, or not; the paramount overall
consideration being the need for striking a
judicious balance between the indispensable
obligation to do justice at all stages and
impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in
the life of any lis.”
27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annamalai vs.
Vasanthi, 2025 INSC 1267, has held as follows:-
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27 ( 2026:HHC:11553 )
“16. Whether D-1 and D-2 were able to
discharge the aforesaid burden is a question of
fact which had to be determined by a court of.
fact after appreciating the evidence available
on record. Under CPC, a first appellate court is
the final court of fact. No doubt, a second
appellate court exercising power(s) under
Section 100 CPC can interfere with a finding of
of
fact on limited grounds, such as, (a) where the
finding is based on inadmissible evidence; (b)
where it is in ignorance of relevant admissible
rt
evidence; (c) where it is based on misreading of
evidence; and (d) where it is perverse. But that
is not the case here.
17. In the case on hand, the first appellate
court, in paragraph 29 of its judgment,
accepted the endorsement (Exb. A-2) made on
the back of a registered document (Exb. A-1)
after considering the oral evidence led by the
plaintiff-appellant and the circumstance that
signature(s)/thumbmark of D-1 and D-2 were
not disputed, though claimed as one obtained
on a blank paper. The reasoning of the first
appellate court in paragraph 29 of its judgment
was not addressed by the High Court. In fact,
the High Court, in one line, on a flimsy defense
of use of a signed blank paper, observed that
genuineness of Exb. A-2 is not proved. In our
view, the High Court fell in error here. While
exercising powers under Section 100 CPC, it
ought not to have interfered with the finding of
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28 ( 2026:HHC:11553 )
fact returned by the first appellate court on this
aspect; more so, when the first appellate court
had drawn its conclusion after appreciating the
.
evidence available on record as also the
circumstance that signature(s)/thumbmark(s)
appearing on the document (Exb.A2) were not
disputed. Otherwise also, while disturbing the
finding of the first appellate court, the High
of
Court did not hold that the finding returned by
the first appellate court is based on a
misreading of evidence, or is in ignorance of
existed
rt
relevant evidence, or is perverse. Thus, there
no occasion for the High Court,
exercising power under Section 100 CPC, to
interfere with the finding of the first appellate
court regarding payment of additional Rs.
1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 over and above the
sale consideration fixed for the transaction. 18.
Once the finding regarding payment of
additional sum of Rs.1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2
recorded by the first appellate court is
sustained, there appears no logical reason to
hold that the plaintiff (Annamalai) was not
ready and willing to perform its part under the
contract particularly when Rs. 4,70,000, out of
total consideration of Rs. 4,80,000, was
already paid and, over and above that,
additional sum of Rs.1,95,000 was paid in lieu
of demand made by D-1 & D-2. This we say so,
because an opinion regarding plaintiff’s
readiness and willingness to perform its part
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29 ( 2026:HHC:11553 )
under the contract is to be formed on the
entirety of proven facts and circumstances of a
case including conduct of the parties. The test
.
is that the person claiming performance must
satisfy conscience of the court that he has
treated the contract subsisting with
preparedness to fulfill his obligation and accept
performance when the time for performance
of
arrives.”
28 In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex
Court, this Court finds that there is neither any error nor
rt
perversity in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by
the courts below. No question of law, much less a substantial
question of law, arises in the present case.
29 Both the courts below have rightly appreciated
the point in controversy after considering the oral as well as
documentary evidence placed on record and have rightly come
to the conclusion that the plaintiff/respondent is entitled to a
decree, directing the defendants/appellants to compensate the
plaintiff for the suit land comprised in Khewat Khatauni No. 45
min/49, Khasra No. 1123, measuring 00-04-05 bigha, situated in
Muhal Badyar/30, Mauja Bhardgaon, Tehsil Kotli, District Mandi,
H.P., within one year from the date of passing of the judgment.
There is no jurisdictional error on the part of the courts below.
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30 ( 2026:HHC:11553 )
30. In view of above, the present appeal being
devoid of any merit deserves to be dismissed. Ordered
.
accordingly. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed
of.
(Romesh Verma)
Judge
of
April 8, 2026
(Nisha)
rt
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